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Gabriele Balbi, Nelson Ribeiro, Valérie Schafer
and Christian Schwarzenegger
Digging into Digital Roots. Towards a
Conceptual Media and Communication
History
The digital age did not arrive from nowhere; it grew from its own roots and even
the roots of previous ages. It already has its own narratives, made up of key players
and heroes, brilliant technological ideas, disruptive devices, spectacular forecast-
ing and sometimes epic failures. But over the past few years, scholars have started
to narrate these histories in new ways, challenging heroic and teleological narra-
tives and underlining multiple temporalities, stakeholders and cultural reappropri-
ations. New histories of the digital age have also adopted a critical perspective,
focusing on issues like global and equal distribution of digital tools (and in parallel
digital inequalities and asymmetries of access), maintenance of digital networks,
devices and content, co-shaping of digital technologies, and connection and
disconnection in different societies. This has expanded our knowledge of the
digital past and, of course, of the digital present.
Nevertheless, a chapter in these histories is often missing. The digital age is
also made up of theoretical concepts which are mostly taken for granted and
used “automatically” in the academic literature as well as in everyday life. Con-
cepts influence the way we look at social reality, they shape how and in what
terms we think and speak about the digital era, and they affect the ways we com-
municate and live. So, it is high time that we set a new trend in research that
focuses on the concepts of the digital age. Indeed, by grounding research in con-
cepts that are not properly problematized, we run the risk of making erroneous
assumptions, which may prevent us from looking in the right direction and im-
pair our ability to see beyond simplistic narratives about technology and its im-
mediate impact on society. For example, in the 1990s and early 2000s, utopian
visions of how the internet would usher in a new era of cultural democracy and
undermine the power of dictators concealed the fact that the concepts of digital
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participation and digital disruption were scarcely problematized. This led to faulty
suppositions about the potential of technology to expand democracy (as demon-
strated by Curran 2012, Morozov 2011 and several other scholars), while also reflect-
ing a failure to recognize that in previous eras, other media were also greeted by
utopian discourses in their early days (Ribeiro 2015).
This book aims to help avoid this trap by analyzing and historicizing some es-
sential concepts of the digital age that have been widely used in the literature. In
the introduction, we set out what we mean by historicizing digital concepts and
digging into their roots, we explain the structure of the book, and finally we advo-
cate for a conceptual media and communication history – a new way at looking at
communication technologies, practices, and consequences over time, starting from
their concepts.
1 Excavating the Roots of Digital Concepts
What does it mean to devote a book to the roots of digital concepts? The etymolo-
gies of these two words in the Oxford English Dictionary can help explain our ap-
proach. The word concept is derived from the Latin conceptum (concipere, to
conceive); it refers to something people are able to think of, something imagined
in their mind, an idea or mental image, as encapsulated in the Middle French term
concept. In philosophy, the word is used as a “mental representation of the essen-
tial or typical properties of something, considered without regard to the peculiar
properties of any specific instance or example,” meaning that a concept can be
also considered as an ideal-typical image of the world.
Root has a different geographical origin: it is a borrowing from early Scan-
dinavian, with Greek and Latin cognates. According to the Oxford English Dictio-
nary, most etymologies indicate the botanical meaning: a root is “the part of a
plant or tree, normally underground, which attaches it to the ground (or other
supporting medium) and conveys water and nutrients from the ground to the
body of the plant or tree.” Figuratively, a root can also be the source, the origin
or the cause of something, as well as the essence and the core of it. There is also
an emotional dimension of roots, in the sense of strong links and attachments
to ancestors (the word is indeed used to denote “a person or family considered
as the source of a lineage”).
Our project therefore aims to identify the origins, sources, lineage, and heri-
tage of some of the most common mental images of the digital world. These
images are often condensed in keywords or buzzwords that tend to be used
widely, without any real reflection on their origins, development or even their
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real meaning. By offering a detailed analysis of 16 relevant concepts, this book
attempts to dig into the innermost part of digital age, to reveal when and where
these mental images emerged (some of them in analogue times), and how they
have changed in recent decades.
This volume is not a dictionary, nor does it mirror the series named “Con-
cepts of the Digital Society” in the journal Internet Policy Review (Katzenbach
and Bächle 2019). First, this is because it is an edited volume, in which there is
a dialogue between the chapters and an interrelated network of reflections on
the digital age. Of course, the reader can focus on single chapters, but reading
all of them together and in order (the old linear model of books) will provide a
deeper sense of the project and may lead to the emergence of unintended
themes or threads, some of which are suggested in the last paragraph of this
introduction. Second, and more importantly, this is a historical book. History
is undoubtedly the discipline which is most capable of embarking on such a
long and difficult dig into the mental images of the innermost digital world.
The historical approach will help analyze some of the relevant concepts of the
digital age by following them through time and rediscovering their lost or per-
sistent meanings and genealogies. Several of the most well-known and fre-
quently discussed concepts in the digital age predate digitalization itself, as
demonstrated in this book, and were previously used in the “analogue era.”
This may sometimes even challenge the opposition between analogue and dig-
ital, which in some cases is quite artificial (as Haigh 2019 and Sterne 2016
show). Other concepts were coined for the digital society but have changed
and are continuously changing over time, in a clear demonstration of how
meanings are social and cultural constructions. More generally, digitalization
has had an impact on concepts: it has reintroduced or reinvigorated old concepts,
or even changed their meanings. Concepts like networks, global governance and
amateurism clearly have a pre-digital life, but they have been incorporated so fully
into digital semantics that, when we think about them today, we immediately link
them to the realm of digitalization.
With this book we aim to highlight the persistent changing nature of digital
concepts (and any concepts) as a result of cultural reappropriation and transfor-
mation over time, and to analyze the flexibility of what we tend to see as frozen
mental images. We are aware that concepts tend to change slowly, but they al-
ways change over time (see for example Bay 2017 and Hösl 2019 on the seman-
tics of the internet). Since history is the discipline of continuity and change par
excellence, this book aims to equip researchers in media and communication
studies, general history, digital studies and related disciplines with flexible
lenses to understand the present. A root always carries water and nutrients from
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the ground to the surface plant, and digital history can similarly irrigate the digi-
tal present.
Finally, this book is rooted in history at several levels, as it also tries to pro-
vide a brief overview of the evolution of digital historiography for each specific
concept. The readers will find essential literature reviews in each chapter and a
state of the art of the ways in which scholars from different disciplines have
treated each notion. This is a chance to rediscover and discuss some seminal ap-
proaches, such as those by McLuhan (1964), Negroponte (1995), Castells (1996),
Turkle (2011) and several other digital champions.
To sum up, by historicizing digital concepts we mean identifying their roots
and tracing the changes and developments they – or the phenomena they de-
scribe – have gone through over time and in terms of historiography. Historicizing
is a way of complexifying, contextualizing, and entwining technological visions
with mental images, social appropriations, and political and economic discourses.
2 Structure, Content, and Viennese Roots
The idea of this book emerged during a lunch in one of the most famous Vien-
nese restaurants for Wiener schnitzel. This lunch was on September 11, 2019 and
it predated the ECREA Communication History Section workshop “Jeopardizing
Democracy throughout History,” held in Vienna and co-organized by the Aus-
trian Academy of Sciences. At this workshop, the three elected section chairs
and former chair Nelson Ribeiro wanted to create a symbolic bridge connecting
past and present. At the same workshop, the first tangible publication by the
Communication History Section, set up in 2010, was presented (Arnold, Preston,
and Kinnebrock 2019), and so we decided to engage the section members in a
new project. A call for chapters was later launched and disseminated via the
usual academic channels and mailing lists. Consequently, we received further
applications and we were able to make a selection from an ample base, comple-
mented by experts that we contacted directly as editors to write specific chap-
ters. In other words, the book emerged on a rolling basis, but as a rounded and
consistent project. The result of this long process is a series of contributions
from well-known scholars, coming from or working in Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The reader may feel that some notions are missing and point out some silen-
ces. In 2016, no fewer than a hundred notions relating to digital civilization were
briefly addressed in a book edited by Jean-Paul LaFrance (2016). And new notions
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have already appeared since. However, our goal was to allow for a detailed analy-
sis of concepts, relying on a strong diachronic perspective, historical sources and
careful “gardening” of the roots, which made exhaustive coverage both impossi-
ble and undesirable. The book therefore also paves the way for further analysis
and potentially one or more additional volume(s), but it already provides strong
outputs in three directions that reflect the main sections of the book: Technolo-
gies and connections, Agency and politics and Users and practices.
Section one (Technologies and connections) is composed of five chapters fo-
cusing on the foundations and underlying infrastructures, as well as the connec-
tions and interactions of the digital age. This section reconstructs the paths that
have led to the merging and integration of technologies. It starts from a period of
functionally differentiated tools, technologies and devices and proceeds to a time
when technologies and media seem to be overlapping and multiplying more than
in any other previous age. In this latter era, prefixes such as inter-, multi-, net-
denote a connecting and connective dimension of digitalization per se. Chapter 1,
by Massimo Rospocher and Gabriele Balbi, is about one of the most symbolic and
obsessively repeated concepts in digital literacy: networks. The authors recon-
struct a history of road, postal, telecommunications, transportation, and broad-
casting networks over the centuries, identifying two persistent dimensions that
also characterize the digital age: the infrastructural and material aspect underly-
ing all types of network, on the one hand, and the ability to create communities
of people connecting over the new infrastructure, on the other. John O’Sullivan
and Leopoldina Fortunati focus on the concept of media convergence, tracing its
ramifications in cultural, technological, market and policy terms. By examining
case studies such as newspaper supplementation and add-ons in the nineteenth
century and the relationship between the telephone and broadcast media in the
twentieth century, they rediscover processes of combination and adaptation in
pre-digital media and the need to recognize them if we are to understand equiva-
lent phenomena in the digital era. Katie Day Good retraces the origins of the term
multimedia by focusing particularly on educational uses and tracing the emer-
gence of a multimedia sensibility in US education in the interwar years. The chap-
ter also demonstrates how early educational discourses and experiments helped
pave the way for corporate and cultural visions of multimedia.The author further
shows that not all concepts age well and describes how, with the progress of
digitalization, the once progressive promise of multimedia began to feel dusty
and the concept lost intellectual trajectory. Chapter 4, by Benjamin Thierry, is
about interactivity. When this concept emerged in the 1960s, it was linked to
computers and used in several fields like ergonomics, computer science, and
psychology. It refers to the relationship between humans and digital (or ana-
logue) machines, a relationship which the author believes has constantly changed
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over time: from a simple dialogue to a broad framework for interpreting the digi-
tal world. Paolo Bory, Simone Natale, and Dominique Trudel scrutinize artificial
intelligence. Their chapter reconstructs the historiographies of AI, starting
with cybernetics and human-computer interaction, then irrigated by science
fiction and gaming perspectives, and culminating in the pervasiveness we see
today. They conclude by suggesting that AI historiography can give us new in-
sights into the theoretical foundations of communication and media studies in a
broad sense.
Section two of the book is entitled Agency and politics. The five chapters in
this section look at digital concepts related to policy and the way in which cul-
tural interventions have shaped the contemporary digital landscape. None of
the five concepts is new or was created in the digital age, but all are emblematic
of our times. The battle for the control and regulation of the internet is a matter
of global governance. The process of generation, interpretation, and transfor-
mation of data as a means of understanding, describing, and predicting reality
is called datafication. The idea of fake news has been obsessively alluded to by
Donald Trump and other populist leaders but has also been extensively used in
scholarship. It refers to the dissemination and spread of disinformation as well
as the strategic discrediting of news sources to diminish citizens’ trust in jour-
nalism and media outlets. Echo chambers refer to personalized information
bubbles as alleged boosters of social fragmentation and polarization, which
supposedly only resonate with preformed and coherent opinions. Finally, activ-
ism has re-emerged in the digital era with new and specific characteristics,
often accompanied by premature claims that new forms of protests and activist
participation were only rendered possible by the internet and digital communi-
cation. These concepts summarize processes that are shaping our everyday life.
In their chapter, Francesca Musiani and Valérie Schafer focus on the history
of global governance, from the telegraph to the internet. Media governance at
worldwide level is not a digital invention, and back in 1865 the first interna-
tional organization was founded to regulate (and govern) telegraphy: the Tele-
graph Union, today the ITU. A historical approach to the topic may help both to
flesh out continuities through time and to historicize internet governance, since
the concept has evolved in recent decades with the creation of other powerful
international organizations like ICANN and WSIS. In Chapter 7, Erik Koenen,
Christian Schwarzenegger, and Juraj Kittler approach the notion of data(fica-
tion) from a long-term perspective. They analyze how, long before the “digital
revolution,” data and datafication were already producing exclusive arrange-
ments of infrastructures and ordering knowledge. They also retrace shifting and
persistent institutions for data collection and processing and governance of ac-
cess, while providing an analytical matrix to identify enduring questions and
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changing answers through the ages. Monika Hanley and Allen Munoriyarwa ad-
dress one of the most misused concepts of the past decade: fake news. As the
chapter subtitle makes clear, this is a new term but a very old practice that has
been prevalent since societies first started to share information. Nevertheless,
the acceleration of communication distribution and new spaces and platforms
that can be used to spread disinformation are changing its meaning, as contem-
porary populism and the Covid-19 pandemic have demonstrated. Fake news is a
prototypical example of how (digital) concepts are constantly acquiring new se-
mantic meanings and how terms coined in public debate or popular discourse
can infiltrate and dominate scholarship. In Chapter 9, Maria Löblich and Niklas
Venema historicize echo chambers. On the surface this concept appears to refer
to recent changes in the digital media environment, but the authors demonstrate
how it replicates past concerns about the fragmentation of public discourse. The
history of echo chambers is indeed full of simplistic assumptions and unjustified
worries about naive media audiences and “wrong” uses: from the print press in
the nineteenth century to cinema and broadcasting in the twentieth century, the
media have often been seen as forces serving both the aggregation and the frag-
mentation of the public sphere. Digital media are no exception, but the diversi-
fied communication offerings constituting people’s personal blend of information
raise unprecedented challenges. The last chapter in this section is written by Emi-
liano Treré and Anne Kaun and engages with the notion of digital media activ-
ism. The chapter argues for the adoption of both a historical and a contextualized
ecological perspectives. In their journey through the history of digital activism,
they also demonstrate how the concept has been “constructed” by parallel ideas
and terms used to emphasize particular technological aspects or to foreground
particular modes of participation.
The third and final section of the volume looks at six digital concepts that
are indicative of Users and practices often considered characteristic of the digi-
tal age. This section is related to user experiences in a broad sense and to new
practices from below in the digital realm. These practices also have their own
histories. The concepts in this section have become popular in recent decades
because they embrace a new relationship between media and their users, espe-
cially the fact that users are increasingly “active” and actively involved in the
generation and circulation of mediated content. Amateurism, user-generated
content and fandom, for example, all refer to different ways in which users par-
ticipate in the production of digital content or engage with existing content cir-
culating in networks in creative ways. Other concepts are related to renewed
experiences and practices by users, like telepresence or feelings of loneliness,
both of which have a long history. Finally, the concept of authenticity diverges
somewhat and considers the specific case of historians as users. Even historians
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have to take into account how digitalization has changed their field, methods,
and tools and to adopt new practices, especially digital hermeneutics, which our
approach to concepts may also help deepen.
In Chapter 11, Jérôme Bourdon enlarges the meaning of (tele)presence to in-
clude historical forms of presence from a distance, like painting and correspon-
dence but also telegraphy, newspapers, and broadcasting. Taking into account
non-digital media and past experiences, it demonstrates how presence at a dis-
tance has created connections with a variety of creatures, both humans and
non-humans, but always in some way humanized. This pre-digital past of the
concept also involves several interlinked related concepts and semantic ele-
ments such as liveness, synchronicity, social presence, and virtual reality and
their persistence across technologies and times. Edward Brennan historicizes
the idea of digital loneliness. Paradoxically, digital media, which are defined as
means of connection with the potential to link people, have also introduced
and even promoted new forms of isolation and new feelings of loneliness. The
chapter contextualizes digital loneliness as the latest manifestation of the type
of polarized “hopes and fears” discourse that cyclically greets new communica-
tion tools, while also approaching it as a cultural phenomenon shaped by long-
term historical processes. In Chapter 13, Susan Aasman, Tim van der Heijden,
and Tom Slootweg explore the multiple meanings of amateurism in the ages of
film, video, and digital technologies. In the current digital age, media amateurs
seem to have taken over a large part of cultural production and revised tradi-
tional hierarchies between professionals and amateurs. But the concept is older
and more complex: the associated mental images and meanings emerged in the
late nineteenth century, if not before. In addition, in this chapter, the authors
propose to develop an analytical tool to identify various amateur modes of prac-
tice, a kind of ontology of amateurism which requires a historical perspective.
Göran Bolin deals with the related concept of user-generated content, also known
by the acronym UGC – concepts are sometimes real “brands”, like this acronym
shows. Popularized in the early 1990s to describe media content produced by
users outside the traditional professional media institutions, UGC gained wide-
spread popularity around 2005. But the chapter also situates UGC in the longer
history of media production and suggests explanations for why the concept rose
to popularity when it did and why it has been met with increasing criticism. In
Chapter 15, Eleonora Benecchi and Erika Wang historicize fandom and look at
the difference between Eastern and Western perspectives. Even though fandom
has changed in the digital age, the authors argue that there has been an overesti-
mation of the novelty of modern fan communities (this is quite typical of any-
thing digital in media and communication research), since digital fan practices
can often be traced back to the pre-digital era. Furthermore, fandom and fans
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themselves are defined in several different ways, as the comparison between
Western and Eastern cultures shows. In other words, this chapter demonstrates
how a comprehensive history of any digital concept should be transnational and
should also include meanings and ideas from the analogue era. In the last chap-
ter of the book, Andreas Fickers proposes a new interpretation of a key concept
of the digital era: authenticity. Instead of considering it as an apparent rise in au-
thentic or less intermediated digital communication, the chapter investigates how
digitality has affected the idea, concept, and meaning of the authenticity of histori-
cal sources. The chapter is particularly geared towards historians, as it advances a
critical understanding of how digital infrastructures, tools, and technologies affect
historical methodology. Digital concepts can also influence specific and narrow
fields of work, and Andreas Fickers provides a clear example of this. The chapter
symbolically echoes the name of the series, Studies in Digital History and Herme-
neutics, thereby creating a bridge with future books in the series.
3 New Roots to be Explored
As already mentioned in the previous section, this book is intended to be more
than the mere sum of its chapters. Just as roots can grow above the earth or run
beneath it, there are some hidden and some more visible links among the con-
cepts in this collection and the chapters historicizing them. In particular, the
book proposes an agenda for how to approach media and communication stud-
ies through concepts. In this part of the introduction, we identify the main
topics of this agenda, but of course we are eager to know if our future readers
will find other more relevant issues.
First, several chapters address digital concepts from a longue durée perspec-
tive, making reference to the French historian Fernand Braudel (1960). In a tell-
ing metaphor, Braudel claims that seas are characterized by three degrees of
movement: quasi-static deep abysses; undersea currents, which are moving and
deep down; and constant surface ridges. Historical research should examine all
three dimensions together but should especially focus on the first and second be-
cause it is only over the long term (longue durée in French) that the deepest and
most meaningful social changes take place. What does it mean to study the lon-
gue durée of digital concepts? It means studying them even before they were com-
monly used, when they had different names, or even when societies were not
able to name them at all. It means studying digital concepts from a diachronic
perspective, looking at the present as just one of many options and maybe not
the most enduring or meaningful. It also means recognizing how the frenetic daily
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pace of digital innovation does not correspond to the slow and uncertain pace with
which ideas and mental constructs evolve. The absorption of concepts in the men-
talities and socio-cultural fabric of societies is a much slower process. The roots of
apparently new concepts like networks, fake news, data(fication), and telepre-
sence have grown deeper and deeper over the centuries and have evolved hand in
hand with the development of human cultures and societies.
A second and related thread in the book has to do with repetitions, patterns
over time, and therefore once again with the temporalities of digital concepts.
Historicizing is more than just looking back. It enables us to trace continuity
and change, to pinpoint shifts and identify differences in the meaning of con-
cepts. Historicizing does not only mean following a concept back to its seed and
its roots; it also means retracing this path and applying concepts with a greater
understanding of the nuances they have carried through time, their dominant
meaning at a given point in time, connotations they may have shed at other mo-
ments or may still omit today.
We often tend to emphasize the uniqueness of the world we live in. This ten-
dency is known as “presentism,” “chrono-centrism” or “newness” (see for exam-
ple Fischer 1970), and it has often been embraced by media and communication
studies (for a critique see the seminal work by Marvin 1989). We tend to think
that digitalization is an exceptional phenomenon (this attitude is also referred to
as “digital exceptionalism”), that digital media are disruptive and unprecedented
innovations which have radically changed the way we communicate and, conse-
quently, the way we live (for a critique, see Balbi and Magaudda 2018; Menke
and Schwarzenegger 2019). The same goes with digital concepts: digitalization
must have produced new ways of thinking, with minor or no ties with the past,
and so must have introduced “exceptional” concepts. This is simply wrong, and
it is always refreshing to look at the continuities in which new media and tech-
nologies of communications were envisaged over time, how related concepts
were born and how they have evolved. Networks have always had infrastructural
and material dimensions, as well as the ability to create and destroy communi-
ties. The collection, distribution and conservation of data have always gone hand
in hand with political, economic and symbolic power. People felt lonely when
watching TV in their living rooms way before digitalization. Fans were considered
“weird” and liminal audiences even when they exchanged paper newsletters to
discuss their idols.
Very often these reflections on new media and communication technologies
are stereotypical and recurrent: if we borrow the words of Umberto Eco (1964),
media are often judged with a polarizing vision which he called “apocalyptic”
and “integrated.” Apocalyptic visions are negative, looking at the development of
new media as a dangerous phenomenon for societies, while integrated visions
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tend to underline the benefits societies will have in using them. Eco wrote his
book mainly focusing on the polarization of discourses around television in the
1960s, but the same claims can be adapted to digital media, digitalization, and
digital concepts. Before the 2000s, digital visions were mainly positive and “inte-
grated”: think about concepts like collective intelligence and frictionless capital-
ism, as well as the terms user-generated content and interactivity, included in our
book. After the 2000s, maybe because of the burst of the internet bubble or maybe
because of the rise in surveillance, there was a critical or “apocalyptic” turn in the
ways we think about digital technologies. Consequently, concepts like fake news,
echo chambers and digital loneliness (as well as others not included in this book
such as digital solutionism and digital surveillance) have emerged. The book re-
veals how stereotypical ways of looking at communication and media re-emerge
and persist over time, medium by medium, but also how concepts are born of their
time and their meanings may change according to shifts in the political, eco-
nomic, and cultural zeitgeist. Repetitions, patterns, and temporalities of digital
concepts are lenses to take away from this book. They are closely intertwined and
are prerequisites for the third way we suggest approaching the book, which may
be the most relevant in theoretical terms.
Media and communication history is often focused on messages, technolo-
gies, politics, economics and other related aspects. This book proposes to launch
a conceptual media and communication history, scrutinizing how concepts in
the field of media and communication develop over time. This is also why we
chose to use the term “concepts” for this volume, rather than keywords or ideas.
A history of concepts emerges at the crossroads where keywords and a history of
ideas intersect. In our understanding, keywords highlight what is considered as
the shared and defining knowledge at the time of writing or editing a project. As
Raymond Williams noted in his pioneering work on the keywords of culture and
society, they reflect not the dictionary or glossary of a particular academic subject,
but the “shared body of words and meanings in our most general discussions”
(Williams 1983, 15). Decades later, the spirit of Williams’ seminal publication was
evoked again in the anthology Digital Keywords edited by Benjamin Peters. Follow-
ing in Williams’ footsteps, the book by Peters explains that keywords are indicative
of social change and transformation in how we speak and think. Keywords can
serve as a literal key and open up particular perspectives on the world, but they
will only do so “if the work [they do] can be distinguished from and then connected
to other terms – a keyword must serve as a discrete operator in a larger semantic
system” (Peters 2016, xx). A key in this sense is used both to open and to lock
doors: “They stand sentinel to the halls of knowledge and power” (Peters 2016,
xiii). In the discussion of keywords, the role of language is paramount, as is the
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core question of how it shapes, moves, and affects ways of being in the current
media environment and what is hidden or revealed by the vocabulary used (Pe-
ters 2016).
A history of ideas is even broader and more general, as it sets out to trace
theoretical ideas and perceptions of the world and the epistemic grounds on
which they have been built through the ages, regardless of the verbal expres-
sion they find at a given moment and the ways in which particular ideas unfold
in debates at specific times. Ideas can come in different shapes and sizes, and
similar ideas can exist in different ages as well as in different cultural and geo-
graphical settings. However, it is in concepts that ideas are manifested – ideas
travel loosely, but in concepts they take shape and form. Concepts give names
to abstract ideas and hence become fundamental building blocks of thoughts
and perceptions. The history of concepts allows us to identify how different
ideas have manifested themselves in various (key)words over time and to find
instances where a new term does not signify a new conceptual idea as well.
Conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte) has a long theoretical tradition dat-
ing back to at least the 1930s in the German historiography, and especially to
the work of Otto Brunner (Vogelsang 2012). We refer to this tradition, but we
also propose something different for media and communication studies. Con-
ceptual history is traditionally linked to semiotics and linguistics, since the
meanings of concepts can be found in their semantics, in their definitions or in
words and discourses. This literary approach, quite similar to the keyword ap-
proach outlined above, is not the focus of this book. Despite the fact that ety-
mologies are relevant (and this should be clear even towards the end of this
introduction), you will not find semantic trajectories of all the concepts. This
book is not an etymological history of digital concepts.
We embrace a more extensive and social-historical approach to digital con-
cepts, following in the footsteps of the German historian Reinhart Koselleck. He
famously theorized the relationship between social history and conceptual history
in two texts (Koselleck 1989, 2004), but we have particularly drawn insights from
the one published in the book Future Pasts. According to Koselleck (2004, 76),
“Without common concepts there is no society, and above all, no political field
of action. Conversely, our concepts are founded in sociopolitical systems that
are far more complex than would be indicated by treating them simply as linguis-
tic communities organized around specific key concepts.” Adapting this idea for
our book, there is no digital age without its concepts and, conversely, those con-
cepts are not merely a linguistic reality but also a societal one.
Conceptual history helps us understand the political, economic, and social
struggle to impose new ways of thinking. We have already said that this book tries
to retrace the histories of concepts even before they were created or imagined, and
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Koselleck claims that “concepts no longer serve merely to define given states of
affairs, but reach into the future. [. . .] positions that were to be secured had first to
be formulated linguistically before it was possible to enter or permanently occupy
them” (Koselleck 2004, 80). Concepts have politics and stakeholders fighting to im-
pose them. This is especially relevant in the digital age, when several of the key
concepts conceal power, economic interests and cultural hegemony.
Conceptual history is also a method for source criticism, and Otto Brunner
(1946, 187) proposed that we look at the past through a terminology derived
from sources themselves, “so that the meaning of these sources may be cor-
rectly interpreted with the help of these concepts.” When engaging in media
and communication history, we should always ask ourselves if a nineteenth
century concept that has apparently lasted over time really means the same
today. This is a difficult but necessary exegesis of the sources we use and can
help us to avoid incorrect historical parallelisms and, in the final analysis,
anachronism. In every conceptual history, there is a risk of overusing current
mental categories to analyze past concepts, just as there is also a risk of negat-
ing the particularities of the current moment when applying well-established
concepts to them. This is a paradox for a conceptual media and communication
history: it can cause us to overstate change while underestimating continuity or,
on the contrary, to overemphasize persistence and negate transformations in the
concepts we use. We are conscious that this is a risk we took when we started
editing this book, but we think that there would be more at stake if we had failed
to do so. Furthermore, the chapters in the volume are intended to start conversa-
tions rather than end them.
Conceptual history focuses on “persistence, change and novelty” (Koselleck
2004, 84) and takes the diachronic perspective very seriously. Concepts that ap-
pear not to have changed for a long time may actually have acquired an entirely
new meaning, but their redefinition may have been overlooked or unrecog-
nized. Moreover, “Concepts not only teach us the uniqueness of past meanings,
but also contain structural possibilities, treating the concatenations of differ-
ence invisible in the historical flow of events” (Koselleck 2004, 91). Concepts
can reveal the contemporaneity of non-contemporaneous events, linking them
at different points in time.
Applying these ideas to our field, as already mentioned, with this book we
propose to launch a conceptual media and communication history of the digital
age. This is a first attempt to make digital concepts (and not devices, gurus, pol-
itics, business, etc.) central to reflections on the digital age. It is also a plea for
concepts to be understood in the social context in which they emerge and de-
velop, as well as a means of urging scholars to consider shifting realities and
mentalities and different ways of envisaging and imagining media over time.
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This approach is different from that of conventional media history and can
bring to light new narratives regarding media and communication. The differ-
ence is that research is not guided merely by phenomena related to media and
communication but by how we (used to) think about them, approach them and
make sense of them. For instance, looking at media convergence in its analogue
forms, starting with the press, the telephone and broadcasting means revisiting
established assumptions of digital media convergence and thereby redefining
an idea that is often taken for granted. A conceptual history of artificial intelli-
gence can help us to reconsider and discuss the theoretical foundations of
communication and media studies as a whole. Examining the concept of fan-
dom calls for sensitivity towards transnational and transcultural differences
and illustrates how conceptual histories can bring to light a global perspec-
tive which is somewhat rare in media historiographies. The same concept
can have different meanings – Koselleck (2004, 85, 90) calls this a “plenitude” or
“diverse strata” of meaning – in different cultures and geographical areas; it
can be evaluated according to different social and academic normativity and
hence guide research in various ways. Concepts can also travel in peculiar
ways from one cultural setting to another, re-enter via different neighboring
fields and find fresh reception and application in another context (Pooley and
Schwarzenegger 2017).
A conceptual media and communication history should therefore also high-
light how concepts emerge, become hidden, are transformed and re-emerge over
time. Concepts are like streams which can flow under the surface of social recogni-
tion for a long time and burst forth abruptly at specific moments in time. Artificial
intelligence is a typical concept that has gone through summers of visibility and
obscure winters (Natale and Ballatore 2020), but this also applies to concepts such
as telepresence, multimedia, and interactivity, which were all very popular in the
1990s and 2000s but have since declined in favor of others. Concepts always influ-
ence each other, both diachronically and synchronically, and digital concepts are
no different. Concepts can even shape the future. Digital concepts symbolize politi-
cal and economic tensions and negotiations, and if powerful stakeholders want to
reuse and re-semanticise them for their purposes in the future, they will probably
be given a second birth. French scholars André Gaudreault and Philippe Marion
(2005) have introduced the “double birth model” to describe and explain the re-
emergence of media technologies over time, but this model can be applied to con-
cepts as well. Furthermore, processes of reinvention and re-birth always entwine
different concepts, especially when their meanings seem to be written in stone,
well defined and accepted. So, historicizing digital concepts which are presumably
expressions of a current state of affairs and disentangling them from the digital
realm allows us to straighten out their roots and trace them back to previous
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eras. This can help scholars avoid historical blindness and make them less
receptive to suggestions of exceptionalism.
A conceptual media and communication history can be beneficial for “tradi-
tional”media and communication history and also for media and communication
research in a broader sense, showing both where the political, economic, socio-
cultural and technological mental images applied to our media come from and
also how concepts in media and communication can be changed, used, instru-
mentalized and co-shaped over time, how different cultures interpret them, and
their ascending and declining popularity. Concepts are always fragile and, as ex-
pressed in the famous poem Soldiers by the Italian Giuseppe Ungaretti (1918),
they are “like leaves on the trees in autumn.”
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Technologies and Connections

Massimo Rospocher and Gabriele Balbi
Networks
Infrastructures, Materiality, and Communities from Ancient
Rome to Social Media
Abstract: Network is one of the most symbolic and obsessively repeated key-
words in digital literacy. But networks are obviously not exclusively digital. In
Ancient Rome, transportation networks were built and maintained to link a dis-
persed and immense empire. Postal networks were crucial in the early modern
period to foster communications and acted as a premodern info-structure. Elec-
tric telegraphy, telephony, and then wireless allowed instantaneous communi-
cation from the nineteenth century, changing the sense of speed and place, and
acting as info-structure for nascent train and plane systems. The word network
was then applied to radio and TV in the twentieth century.
After an overview of what we call digital network studies, this chapter
aims to historicize and deconstruct the arguments surrounding networks in
a long-term perspective, highlighting continuities and changes over time.
We will focus specifically on two dimensions: networks as infrastructures
and networks as socio-cultural tools to build communities.
Keywords: infrastructure, space and time, nodes and hubs, social network, lon-
gue durée
The word “network” is neither new nor native digital, but this lemma has ac-
quired multiple meanings over time. One of the oldest connotations – the word
networke appears in the 1530 Tyndale Bible – was with “Work (esp. manufac-
tured work) in which threads, wires, etc., are crossed or interlaced in the fash-
ion of a net” (Oxford English Dictionary Online; henceforth OED). The net-work
is a net that needs human work to be made, for example fishermen’s nets which
require a long process of sewing to be completed and especially maintained
(Musso 1997).
It was only from the nineteenth century that the concept became wide-
spread and directly connected with communications. Indeed, the second ety-
mology of network deals with “Any netlike or complex system or collection of
interrelated things, as topographical features, lines of transportation, or tele-
communications routes (esp. telephone lines)” (OED). Translated in contempo-
rary research fields, the Macro-Systemic and/or Large Technical Systems (LTS)
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dimension of networks is a second and relevant character. Communication
networks are both made of several interrelated technologies and social practi-
ces, as Thomas Hughes (1983), Alain Gras (1993) and several other authors have
shown.
A third etymology of network emerged in the twentieth century, as “an inter-
connected group of people; an organization; spec. a group of people having certain
connections (frequently as a result of attending a particular school or university)
which may be exploited to gain preferment, information, etc., esp. for professional
advantage” (OED). A network, then, is not only a socio-technical and material sys-
tem made of interrelated technologies assembled by humans, but it can also sym-
bolize social groups where humans meet face-to-face, in virtual settings, or groups
that never meet but to which people belong (for example the alumni of a presti-
gious college). From this perspective, networks create profitable and invisible con-
nections, social ties and links among people both inside and outside the network
itself.
Even if networks are embedded in human societies for centuries, this con-
cept became a buzzword in the digital age: we might think about terms like net-
work society and social network (site). Or, again, we can consider how the
suffix –net was used as the extension of web dominions (.net), in digital neolo-
gisms (netiquette), in the names of digital corporations (Netscape, Netflix) and
in relevant political debates (net neutrality). Networks seem to be at the center
of digital culture and to drive it metaphorically.
In the first section of this chapter, we offer a concise overview of the ways
in which the concept of network has been used in digital literacy over time.
Then, in the second section, we historicize the ideas surrounding networks and
deconstruct its meanings with historical examples from Ancient Rome to the
twentieth century. Continuities and differences in the way networks are consid-
ered are addressed specifically in the conclusion.
1 Digital Network Studies. A Brief Overview
There are various, and sometimes conflicting, ways of naming studies about
digital networks. For example, network science is an academic field examining
complex networks mainly through mathematical models. Social network analy-
sis investigates social structures using networks and graph theory. Network
analysis aims at creating maps and graphs of the degrees and intensity of con-
nections among people in different settings.
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We decided to use the term digital network studies to label a branch of media
and communication studies dealing with digital networks. This is neither a disci-
pline nor an academic field, but a way to grasp how digital literacy, especially
from the 1990s to today, has used the concept of networks in very different realms.
Providing an overview of all these research fields is nearly impossible and, conse-
quently, we focus only on some of the media and communication “classics” in dig-
ital network studies.
As already mentioned, network society is probably one of the most re-
nowned concepts in digital network studies. In 1996, Manuel Castells wrote
The Rise of the Network Society, becoming probably the best-known scholar
in the field. Castells focuses on five interrelated phenomena which, accord-
ing to him, have changed contemporary societies since the 1970s. First, the
trend of liberalization and deregulation of financial markets, which caused
economic and financial transformations. Second, the pressing need for skilled and
highly educated workers changed the job market – in line with Daniel Bell’s idea
of post-industrial societies. Third, the emergence of connected cities and places in
the global architecture of networks (e.g., New York becoming a hub able to attract
wealth, power, culture, innovation, and people) has created different “spaces of
flows” where “the material arrangements allow for the simultaneity of social prac-
tices without territorial contiguity” (Castells 1999, 295). Thanks to infrastructures
made of nodes and hubs, social actors operating the network and electronic spaces
such as websites for exploiting interactions, people can experience new forms of
geography and spatial interactions. A fourth and similar transformation emerged
with what Castells called “timeless time”: from the end of the twentieth century,
societies started to be no longer characterized by the “clock time” of the industrial
age or by the “natural” rhythm of pre-industrial ages, but by a constant tension
and desire for instantaneity, a minimization of time-lapses, and by the flexibility of
timeslots. For Castells, this time-space compression is mainly caused by new digital
communication technologies: this is the fifth transformation creating contempo-
rary network societies, with the expansion of the internet, wireless technologies
and, more generally, interactive, peer-to-peer and horizontal media instead of ver-
tical and hierarchic ones. These media, according to Castells, favor a “mass self-
communication,” where audience/users decide and create their own schedules or
timetables, fragmenting their media consumption.
A second champion of network society is Jan van Dijk who, in a book writ-
ten in Dutch in 1991 and then translated into English at the end of the decade,
claims: “With little exaggeration, we may call the 21st century the age of net-
works. Networks are becoming the nervous system of our society, and we can
expect this infrastructure to have more influence on our entire social and per-
sonal lives than did the construction of roads for the transportation of goods
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and people in the past” (van Dijk 1999, 2). In other words, a new form of society
based on digital networked media is gradually replacing or complementing pre-
viously existing personal communications. The so-called networked media have
economic, legal, socio-cultural, psychological, and political “effects” on contem-
porary societies, transforming them into network societies, where people become
linked to one another and have access to information and communication con-
tinuously and on-demand. As well as providing a historical overview of networks
in “ancient history,” van Dijk argues that “A network can be defined as a collec-
tion of links between elements of a unit. The elements are called nodes. Units are
often called systems” (van Dijk 1999, 24).
Link is also the title of a famous book (subtitled The New Science of Net-
works) written by the physicist Albert-László Barabási and which is another
classic work in digital network studies. Barabasi (2002) compared how networks
operate in very different spheres like biology, physics, mathematics, virology,
and communications, among others. There are similar characteristics: the pres-
ence of hubs (key nodes of communication, highly interconnected) and links
(connections); the fact that big and very well connected hubs tend to grow over
time, while small hubs tend to decrease their relevance (“The rich get richer
and the poor get poorer”); and, finally, the fact that nodes in different networks
require just a few steps to be accessed, according to the well-known “small
world” and “degrees of separation” theories. Barabasi’s book is relevant for digital
network theory not only because he analyzes the Internet and the Web, but espe-
cially because he reminds us that the ways in which networks are designed (their
so-called architecture) can shape flows and power dynamics of communication.
From the mid-2000s, the explosion of so-called social network sites (SNSs)
like MySpace, Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram, and others changed the para-
digm of digital network studies. danah boyd and Nicole Ellison (2007, 211) were
among the first scholars to define SNSs, claiming that “What makes social net-
work sites unique is not that they allow individuals to meet strangers, but rather
that they enable users to articulate and make visible their social networks. [. . .]
participants are not necessarily ‘networking’ or looking to meet new people; in-
stead, they are primarily communicating with people who are already a part of
their extended social network. To emphasize this articulated social network as a
critical organizing feature of these sites, we label them ‘social network sites’”. If
in the 1980s and especially the 1990s, computer networks were used to meet
new people and to perform new roles and personalities (possibly anonymously),
from the mid-2000s SNSs have been studied as places where the personality and
the inner self of people could be built in the public sphere. Not by chance, Zizi
Papacharissi (2011) has introduced the acronym “networked self,” while Alice
Marwick (2013) has focused her attention on the practices of celebrities in SNSs.
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In the last decade of digital network studies, the political, social, and espe-
cially economic relevance gained by the SNSs has led to the triumph and then
decline of digital networks as a buzz concept of our age. A triumph because net-
work has become an obsessively repeated buzzword even outside academia. “Net-
working,” and related concepts like connecting, are used in everyday language
and by digital corporations to explain their missions: for example, a 2006 Facebook
tagline was “Facebook is a social utility that connects you with the people around
you [. . .] made up of lots of separate networks – like schools, companies, and re-
gions” (Reagan 2009). Despite (or maybe because of) its success, digital network
studies have started to rethink the role and substitute the concept of network with
other ones. Due to the transformation of SNSs into enclosed “walled gardens,”
where users can spend their entire navigation experience, platform is probably the
next attractive and popular concept which has started to replace or integrate “net-
work” in digital studies (e.g., van Dijck, Poell, and de Waal 2018). Platforms have
been defined in different and sometimes contrasting ways, but they share several
elements with networks: the material and socio-technical dimension, the power to
shape and control flows of information, the speed and acceleration in social rela-
tionships, among others.
This does not mean that network will soon disappear in digital and media
studies. This concept is too embedded in how people think about and represent
their communication practices. For this reason, asking why and how the concept
has emerged over time, how it was imagined in past societies and which charac-
teristics are enduring is an essential task for contemporary media studies.
2 Deconstructing and Historicizing Networks:
Two Long-standing Ideas
Two main ideas and characteristics of networks emerge both in the etymologi-
cal definitions provided at the beginning of this chapter and in the overview of
digital network studies. On the one hand, networks have an infrastructural di-
mension; they are complex systems that help, process and shape flows of infor-
mation through nodes and hubs. This represents a material notion of network,
focusing on networks of transportation, technological networks, networks of
cities. On the other hand, networks have a social dimension, being used by indi-
viduals to interact with each other or to build communities. The latter is more a
metaphoric conception of networks, focusing on the social networking allowed
by networks (a tautology) and on the communication flows generated by them.
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2.1 Networks as Infrastructures: The Shape of Materiality
This section introduces the infrastructural dimension of communication net-
works over the centuries and the discourses generated by them: what are their
“effects” and how do they shape or are shaped by political issues, economic in-
terests, and cultural ideas?
2.1.1 Infrastructure, Politics, and Power
First of all, the ways in which communication networks are built is not neu-
tral but politically driven; understanding the materiality of networks means
understanding the political ideology behind them. In this regard, the high-
speed courier service and road networks of ancient Rome are often described
as the earliest examples of network infrastructures that allowed people to
connect, interact, and communicate, with information and goods transmit-
ted and shared from the Iberian Peninsula to Asia, from Italy to Britain.
These information and administrative infrastructures were designed to link a
dispersed and immense empire (Innis 1950) and they shared some common
characteristics: used by the Roman army to conquer new territories or imme-
diately after to link them to Rome, they had to last over time (and some of
them are still visible and usable) and were designed to maximize the speed
of communication (with stations for the exchange of horses, for example).
This network infrastructure was mainly centripetal and the Latin Omnes viae
Romam ducunt (“all roads lead to Rome”) is a metaphorical way of express-
ing the infrastructural design of the Roman road networks.
Nowadays, as in the past, the architecture and organization of networks can
shape the flows and power dynamics of communications. For this reason, adminis-
trative structures represented another important infrastructural element in the
formation of communication networks by pre-modern political or religious au-
thorities. For empires like that of Philip II of Habsburg (1527–1598), which ex-
tended from Spain to the Philippines and South America, reliable communication
networks were crucial elements for the government of the state. Philip II estab-
lished various communication infrastructures and an information network which
spanned over oceans in order to rule over the Spanish “Global Empire.” “Monarchy
without letters, Empire without light,” commented the Spanish bishop Bravo de la
Serna in 1674, underlining the importance of the correspondence network to rule
over the vast territories of the Spanish Habsburgs (Castillo Gomez 2006, 7).
The regular exchange of documents had a similar importance for the admin-
istration of international religious orders such as the Jesuits, which operated via
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a communication system on a worldwide scale, encompassing various hubs
and transmission nodes of the Society of Jesus’s network. The Jesuits made
limited use of commercial post and couriers, but “diplomatic, mercantile, and
maritime networks all intersected with Jesuit communication at key points”
(Nelles 2015, 440). The Society’s bureaucratic infrastructures of information
originated from their institutional hub in Rome, transmitting administrative
correspondence and newssheets via strategic nodes such as Lisbon and Seville
in order to communicate with their overseas missions in the New World, Asia,
and Africa. In order to support communication within such a wide topographical
range, and also to store all of these rivers of paper, the Jesuits created a complex
“network of archives” that closely mirrored the institutional framework of the
Society bureaucracy (Friedrich 2010). This was a network of coordinated and sub-
sidiary archives designed to irradiate administrative knowledge from a central hub
to specific locations, aiming to create a delicate (and not always effective) balance
between centralizing and decentralizing power.
Establishing and controlling information and knowledge networks was inter-
preted as a form power also for all the colonial empires in different historical
times, for example, the Colonial administration of the British Empire, stretching
from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Adapting Manuel Castells’ concept of a informa-
tion order, Christopher Bayly has shown that between the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries British colonial authority over India was based on a dense
informative network of spies, messengers and local scribes. Preserving the same
time-space relation of the early modern period, this information system was still
mostly based on human runners and horse posts. Despite showing several dys-
functionalities and sometimes creating dis-connections, this information network
persisted well into the 1850s, when it was then replaced by new material infra-
structures such as the railways and the electric telegraph which permitted the sur-
vival of British power (Bayly 1996).
The electric telegraph is another example of how networks encompass poli-
tics and power. Nineteenth-century maps of submarine cables clearly show how
the global infrastructure of communication was centered on London. The city
was, symbolically but also materially, the center of the world, the place from and
to where a network of cables crossing the Oceans and the whole world was con-
nected. Those cables brought information and communication from all over the
British Empire and were mainly owned by British companies, which had a domi-
nant position in this market. The network of submarine cables, still relevant and
driven by political dynamics today (Starosielski 2015), has been considered by
scholars like Daniel Headrick (1991) as the “invisible weapons” of the nineteenth-
and twentieth-century empires. In the last two centuries, countries owning sub-
marine cables and, more in general, telecommunications infrastructures have
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always played a leading role in global politics. Not by chance, there was a “change
of the guard” in cable dominance between the United Kingdom and United States
of America in the twentieth century and today China is slowly replacing the US,
with infrastructural projects like the “One Belt One Road” initiative.
In the twentieth century, radio and TV networks symbolized the growing
power of the media themselves. In the OED, a fourth etymology of network ety-
mology is “A broadcasting system consisting of a series of transmitters able to be
linked together to carry the same program; a group of radio or television stations
linked by such a system; (chiefly U.S.) a large (esp. nationwide) broadcasting
company which produces programs to be relayed to affiliated local stations. Also
(occasionally): a nationwide broadcasting channel.” This infrastructural defini-
tion gradually became metaphorical and, for a long time, the word network has
been associated with broadcasting, probably the most important medium of the
twentieth century. Not by chance, one the most symbolic movies on the media is
entitled Network (1976). In this movie, the director Sydney Lumet focuses on the
“powerful effect” that TV had on its audience.1 TV was (and still is) considered a
political weapon, so dangerous that its ownership is regulated strictly: in several
countries, specific laws forbid private companies to own a certain quantity of
channels and networks and so to establish dominant positions in the broadcast-
ing market. Like in the case of the Internet today, networks of communication
have always been tools of power and have been driven by political needs and
worries.
2.1.2 Complexity: Nodes, Hubs, Flows
A second defining feature of networks as material infrastructures is their configu-
ration as complex systems characterized by the presence of highly interconnected
hubs, links and nodes of communication. In this respect, as pointed out by Wolf-
gang Behringer, the dynamics of the early modern postal network share many
similar elements to Castells’ description of the (digital) network society: “a ‘space
of flows’ consists of, first, a ‘technological infrastructure of information systems,
telecommunications, and transportation lines’; secondly, ‘nodes and hubs’ at
which exchanges of all kinds can take place and whose functional logic is depen-
dent on their position within the network; and thirdly, the ‘habitats of the social
1 In the 1970s, media research also experienced a (re)turn to focusing on the powerful effects
of the media (think about the “cultivation”, the “spiral of silence” and the “knowledge gap”
theories).
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actors who operate the network’” (Behringer 2003; Castells 1999, 19–20). Despite
the irreducible differences between the contemporary “information age” and the
pre-industrial period, such a theoretical model based on the “space of flows,”
“nodes and hubs” and “social actors” could be effectively applied to the period
from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries and even later.
While in the contemporary digital age the term “space of flows” represents
apparently deterritorialized spaces, early modern cities were instead territorial
spaces that acted as networking hubs of exchange where flows of news and
ideas were processed and transmitted. Within the already mentioned “Taxis
Galaxy,” for instance, a number of cities emerged as major points of exchange
or key nodes (for example, Rome, Venice, and Milan; Antwerp and Brussels;
Madrid and Lisbon; Constantinople; Lyon and Paris; Augsburg, Cologne and
Frankfurt), along with secondary nodes that were nonetheless important in the
architecture of the network for the regular flow of information (like Naples,
Genoa, Florence). As a strategic commercial node with the Orient, a political
capital of a large state and home to the largest printing industry in Europe, Ven-
ice in the sixteenth century was at the crucial intersection of vast regional and
international communication and information networks (de Vivo 2007). As one
of the most cosmopolitan metropolises of the time, Venice became a hub able to
attract wealth, power, culture, innovation and people, similar to contemporary
cities like New York.
It is often said that Internet networks of today are part of a composite infra-
structure of other networks and that this complexity is hard to grasp and, con-
sequently, to control. Again, this distinctiveness is historically inaccurate as
networks of communication have always interacted with other networks of
communication or of transportation. This was the case of the widespread
news market that emerged during the pre-modern period and which depended on
the creation of a series of interrelated hyper-networks of communication overlap-
ping each other. For this reason, the concept of network was adopted as a meta-
phor to conceptualize early modern news (Raymond and Moxham 2016). Tangible
transport infrastructures were built to support the pre-modern news network and
to link the various hubs. Waterways, for instance, played a part in the transport
revolution, making European information and postal networks increasingly more
efficient, more accessible and geographically widespread over the continent. In the
seventeenth century, for example, the Dutch Republic developed a system for
transporting newspapers, letters, books, and people between Amsterdam and
other cities, using canals and barges. On a global scale, new maritime routes
and improvement in oceanic navigation expanded the transportation network
that connected Europe, Asia, and the Americas and through a collection of
links between different nodes produced a truly worldwide cosmopolitan web
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of communication (McNeill and McNeill 2003). Similarly, from the nineteenth
century, train and telegraph networks started to be seen as interlinked be-
cause, through the telegraph, train traffic could be regulated and the circulation of
trains began to be safer and more rational (Schivelbusch 2014).2 Communication
and transportation networks, for a long time, have often been interrelated, have
shared the same topographical features or routes and combined technologies and
social practices. Not by chance, these networks have been built to favor flows of
information, people, and goods and they can be melded in the concept of mobility
(Balbi and Moraglio 2016). Therefore, their symbiosis started much earlier than the
digital age, as did the complexity of the infrastructural dimension.
2.1.3 Acceleration: Compressing Time
Network infrastructures have always been considered as ways to accelerate the
human experience. This is one of the most recurring arguments when a new
network of communication is established.
It is acknowledged that, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a new
acceleration of processes of communication took place and a comprehensive net-
work of post routes and relay stations was (re)created in order to foster the politi-
cal needs of European monarchs. The development of faster and more reliable
postal services was fundamental to establishing an interconnected communica-
tion network embracing the whole continent (and beyond). The growth of this in-
frastructure was not brought about by any fundamental technological invention,
but it responded to commercial and administrative needs, and was fostered by
wide-ranging organizational improvements. This structural revolution in commu-
nications also accelerated the speed of old media – handwritten letters or corre-
spondence networks – and increased their communicative power. By means of a
dense network of postal stations connecting the Mediterranean to the North Sea,
the horse-mounted couriers of the Taxis family (who in the fifteenth century cre-
ated the first transregional high-speed postal service) linked the principal cities
of Europe with the “empire of paper” of the Habsburgs, their principal patrons.
Couriers offered their clients various services that differed in speed (and cost):
the cavalcata was an ordinary mode of mail delivery, while in the sixteenth cen-
tury a faster mode of transportation based on changing horses was introduced,
2 This “classic” vision is confronted with recent revisionist histories of the relations between
train and telegraph networks, in which the two are less interconnected and inter-functioning
(Sidney and Schwantes 2019).
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the estafette. Thanks to this infrastructure, the average travel time between Rome
and Paris was around 20 to 25 days but, depending on the urgency of the infor-
mation, could be reduced to ten days.
According to several scholars, a further moment of acceleration occurred
with the spread of the electric telegraph in the first half of the nineteenth century.
As noted by James Carey (1989, 203), this “permitted for the first time the effective
separation of communication from transportation” or, in other words, accelerated
the transportation of messages up to the speed of light (freeing itself from the
speed of the carrier, whether man, horse, or stagecoach). Telegraph networks
transfer communications instantaneously and, for this reason, their invention
was considered a remarkable acceleration of human experience. Contemporary
observers claimed that the telegraph changed the ways in which people did busi-
ness (accelerating the market stock exchange); the way they obtained informa-
tion (speeding up and even creating a news business); or improved how people
understood each other (in the words of a British ambassador in 1858, “What can
be more likely to effect [peace] than a constant and complete intercourse between
all nations and individuals in the world?” (Standage 1998, 90).
Similar acceleration effects were imputed to other networks of communication
like the telephone, the wireless, satellite networks, and of course the Internet in
the digital age (Cairncross 1997). Consequently, the re-emergence of the discourse
about acceleration in communication networks should be addressed historically
simply because time is a historical construct. Andreas Fickers and Pascal Griset
claim that “This phenomenon of acceleration or speed lies at the very heart of the
modernization process and is responsible for experiences of de-synchronization in
the last two centuries” (Fickers and Griset 2019, 333). The “cult of speed,” the idea
that “modernity is speed” in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was intrinsi-
cally paired with the emergence of new networks of communication. These infra-
structures have been considered so powerful as to accelerate the daily lives of
millions and then billions of people, or to even produce pathological effects like
neurosis in the nineteenth century or the desire to disconnect (also called digital
detox) today. In conclusion, acceleration is another long-term “effect” and, at the
same time, another stereotype linked to the building of networks.
2.1.4 New Geographies: Compressing and Decompressing Space
There is a fourth and connected “effect” of the material dimension of networks,
which emerged before the digital era. Whereas it is true that the emergence of
connecting nodes and hubs in the global architecture of digital networks has
transformed the geographic space of human experience, new networks of
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communication have always shaped space, changed spatial interactions and cre-
ated new geographies. For instance, while in the sixteenth century hubs such as
Antwerp and Nuremberg were strategically located within the postal network,
and consequently increased their relevance as fundamental nodes of communica-
tion, in the seventeenth century a city like Augsburg lost its position as the most
important postal center in Germany and was replaced by Frankfurt.
By privileging some nodes and hubs over others, network infrastructure dis-
played one more time its political dimension and shaped a new geo-political map.
As in the sixteenth century, one could dispatch letters from Rome as far as Russia
with reliable postal services, but not to the nearby town of Tivoli because the local
delivery network was not connected with the transregional postal network (Fedele,
Gerosa, and Serra 2014). On the other hand, Tivoli could suddenly become a well-
connected central node of an extended news-network when the pope was visiting
the town. A seventeenth-century Londoner would know that on Thursdays “letters
were sent to Brussels, Heidelberg, Cologne, Frankfurt, Prague, and the Paris-Turin-
Madrid route,” while “letters for the Hague and Holland left on Saturday night or
very early on Sunday mornings” (Schobesberger et al. 2006, 58). In other words,
some cities were closer or more distant on certain days than others, configuring a
temporal geography made by networks. With electric telegraphy, this process of
both space compression and new disconnections persisted: as Jonas Harvard (2011,
48–49) has shown in the case of the telegraph in Sweden, “When the telegraph
worked as it should, in the 1870s Oresund-Posten could get news faster from cities
far away than from nearby locations in the province. The telegraph placed news
from Berlin, Paris, London and Vienna on a single temporal scale, and regional
news was left behind.” In sum, networks of communication like the post and the
telegraph have a double and co-existent effect: on the one hand, they connect previ-
ously disconnected places (so compressing space) but, on the other, create more dis-
connection, privileging some nodes and hubs over others.
Radio and especially TV networks also had a similar and significant impact
on contemporary geographies. John Thompson (1995) theorized the idea of “des-
patialized simultaneity,” claiming that for the first time in history radio and TV
audiences could enjoy the same programs live (or simultaneously) despite being
at home (despatialized). In other terms, thanks to broadcasting, people became
more synchronized even at a global level if we include events like the Olympics.
In a similar vein, Joshua Meyrowitz (1985), in a book entitled No Sense of Place,
theorized how TV networks undermined the connection between physical and
social “place,” reconfiguring the link between local and televised communities.
Again, radio and TV networks have always been seen as electronic media able, on
the one hand, to compress and annihilate space and, on the other, to create a new
sense of place, made of de-territorialized connections and “televised” realities.
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Compressing and decompressing, disconnecting from real geographies and con-
necting to virtual ones are the same asymmetries that digital networks are produc-
ing today. But this process is far from new.
2.2 The Social Network: Creating and Maintaining
Communities
Beside their material dimension (made of roads, cables, technologies and cit-
ies), communication networks have a social dimension, and they create inter-
connected groups of people or organizations (remember the third etymology in
the OED).
2.2.1 Being Part of a “Network”: Advantages and Problems
Communication networks are part of and contribute to creating social networks
(and vice versa). Social networking is probably one of the most familiar con-
cepts for contemporary digital scholars and digital historians, but again this is
clearly a pre-digital concept. Neville Morley (2010, 125) claims that “One way of
thinking about the processes of Roman globalization is as the expansion and
proliferation of networks, shared forms of social co-ordination which require
the acceptance of certain standards in order to be accepted into membership.”
The Roman Empire was based on several networks: the already mentioned road
and post infrastructures, but also social networks with access to social and eco-
nomic benefits like the imperial elite, networks of Latin speakers or the users of
Roman law, networks of trade, military networks, and others. The “membership
of a network brings an individual into contact with new information, interpreta-
tions and practices, whether that individual likes it or not” (Morley 2010, 25).
Resembling the theory of the strength of weak ties (Granovetter 1973), also in
the Roman Empire joining exclusive social networks provided more chances to
the members, even chances to be better informed.
By challenging this traditional view, which saw individuals as members of so-
cial groups, societies, institutions or nations, in the last two decades historians
began to analyze the network of relations that defined social spaces. This coin-
cided with a growing interest in associative a relational culture and to the social
mechanisms and practices involved in communication and social networks. The
respublica litteraria from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, a transregional
socially mixed community of learned people, is a classic example of social net-
working. The ways to define this pre-modern network society often adopt a digital
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terminology: for instance, the epistolary network linking all the interconnected
nodes seems to work as “a proxy for a social network” (van Miert, Hotson, and
Wallnig 2019, 28). Moreover, quantitative network analysis has been consistently
employed by historians to describe the complex system of relationships within
this network. The Republic of Letters was an “imagined community” (Mayhew
2004) bound together by a combination of old media (correspondence) and new
media (newspapers and journals) overlapping with each other: the personal net-
works created by letters were added to the wider webs created by the printing
press. Through the publication of their own epistles, humanists could use this
social network as a space to build their personality and inner self in the public
arena (here we are explicitly reusing the same sentence of the paragraph on digi-
tal networks studies).
Other socially heterogeneous communities appeared in the early modern pe-
riod, such as the network of “friends of friends” that connected migrant communi-
ties (Prajda 2018) or the travelling and highly mobile network of merchants. A
network science approach has been used to analyze these trade networks that tra-
versed commonly defined geographical, political, and cultural areas in the pre-
industrial world. These non-hierarchical networks were operated by economic and
commercial communities that stretched all over Europe and beyond. By sharing
news and useful information (but also fears and emotions) through the same
routes employed for their trade, immaterial “weak ties linked external individuals
with shared business goals and expectations” (Ribeiro 2016). These informal so-
cial networks created that sense of “familiarity among strangers” (Trivellato 2012)
that could echo contemporary digital forms of social interaction.
Nonetheless, connection with strangers was not always a positive experi-
ence. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the telephone allowed
people to interact over long distances and, potentially, to be called by strangers.
This created new “etiquette” problems: especially young ladies could be sexually
harassed by unknown voices and so, in order to solve this issue, specific rules
were introduced. At the same time, the telephone was considered a tool able to
cure loneliness. As reported by Fischer (1992, 50), the American 1907 Census of
Telephone argued that “a sense of community life is impossible without this
ready means of communication [. . .] The sense of loneliness or insecurity felt by
farmers’wives under former conditions disappears.”3 Other twentieth-century ob-
servers claimed exactly the opposite: the telephone caused an increase in fear
and loneliness because virtual meetings over telephone wires replaced physical
ones (Balbi 2013). According to the economist Robert Gordon (2016), the telephone
3 On loneliness, see Brennan’s chapter in this book.
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(with electricity, gas, water, and sewer) was one of the five connections which
made the house “networked.” According to him, this revolution happened be-
tween 1870 and 1940 and it was more relevant than the digital revolution itself: in
this period, houses in Western countries radically changed and people could profit
from a series of overlapping networks without leaving their living rooms or bed-
rooms. Among these networks, Gordon forgets to mention radio and TV: thanks to
them, the house became a self-sufficient place also in terms of information. This
idea was theorized by Raymond Williams (1974), who coined the concept of “mo-
bile privatization”: thanks to radio and TV networks, from their sofa and without
leaving the house, the audience could travel and adopt a “mobile” lifestyle. Audi-
ence could “see” and “visit” places, get information and entertainment, satisfy its
need for mobility. Being part of a material and especially social network linking
the world directly to your house is probably one of the least acknowledged changes
in the history of communication – and a change that occurred in the years before
digitalization started.
2.2.2 Materializing Social Networks
Communities could also coalesce around material objects, rather than around
shared intellectual, financial or political interests. Material objects provide
the most direct way to grasp examples of social network tools before the ar-
rival of social media apps, as in the case of the formation of social networks
around artefacts like sixteenth- and seventeenth-century friendship albums
(alba amicorum) that invited encounters with friends or strangers. The alba
amicorum were blank albums designed to collect signatures, mottos, coats-of-
arms, portraits and visual imagery of acquaintances and encounters as stu-
dents (but also merchants, artists, and humanists) moved between different
places. “Albums were forms of social media that connected individuals to a net-
work, sometimes of strangers,” open to future members or readers (Wilson 2012)
206. Humanists’ emblem books performed a similar function. Containing a motto,
an image, an epigram and (sometimes) a dedication associated with fellow mem-
bers of the scholarly community, Emblemata represented intermedia dictionaries
of human relations (Almási 2009). Analogous to contemporary digital social net-
working (the album amicorum can be framed as a direct ancestor of Facebook,
also because amicus in Latin means friend), these tools of communication consti-
tuted spaces of sociability, opened up possibilities for new encounters, connec-
tions, and associations, but at the same time also enabled users to articulate and
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make visible their extended social networks – to use danah boyd and Nicole Elli-
son’s SNS definition.
Other material objects such as seeds or porcelain could also act as central
elements of global networks connecting individuals, as recent global histories
of material culture have shown in relation to the circulation of artefacts in the
early modern world (Gerritsen and Riello 2016). The same happened in the nine-
teenth century (and still today) with photographs travelling all over the world
thanks to postal networks, as reminders of love affairs. In other words, commu-
nication devices have always had the power to re-activate or even to create so-
cial networks long before our smartphones.
2.2.3 Virtual and Real Networks: Replacement or Reinforcement?
For long-time digital network studies have believed that digital media could re-
place personal interactions and hence that “virtual” networks could replace
“real” ones. This is now recognized as untrue, as the lockdown experience of
the Covid-19 pandemic has dramatically demonstrated in recent times. On the
contrary, humans experience an interrelated web of in-person and distant forms
of communication through different and overlapping networks.
Even in the premodern period individuals could be part of overlapping net-
works (local, national or global), interconnected by multiple types of social rela-
tions: some based on face-to-face communication, others connected through
different media or technologies. Within early modern urban society, for exam-
ple, the advent of new media (e.g., print) made it possible to establish immate-
rial networks overlapping with (but not replacing) a widespread “culture of
presence”4 based on social media spaces such as streets or squares, markets
or salons (Schlögl 2019). John-Paul Ghobrial (2013) has analyzed a similar in-
terweaving of virtual and real networks, showing how the information flows
that connected Europe and the Ottoman world were themselves the product of
interpersonal exchanges that took place at the small-scale level of everyday
practices of communication in cities like Paris, London and Istanbul during
the seventeenth century. In the early colonial American South, a region that
lacked a regular postal service or a printing press until the 1730s, Indians,
Africans, and Europeans created oral communication networks that linked to-
gether people who otherwise shared no physical relationships (via spies, scouts,
traders, missionaries, and other improvised couriers, such as sailors or hunters,
4 On (tele)presence in historical perspective, see Bourdon’s chapter in this book.
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see Dubcovsky 2016). Similarly, by illustrating how in eighteenth-century Paris
oral poetry and word of mouth represented an ephemeral communication net-
work that intersected with more established news networks, Robert Darnton (2010)
challenged many assumptions about today’s new and unprecedented information
society. Finally, one of the most famous theories in the field of media studies has
to do with issues of replacement and reinforcement. When Katz and Lazarsfeld
(1955) introduced the two-step flow of communication model, they wanted to test
how mass media (and especially radio and TV) influenced personal opinions. They
concluded that most people form their opinions under the influence of opinion
leaders, who in turn are influenced by the mass media (a two-step process). This
was also a way to discover (or rediscover) the relevance of private networks, to con-
test the powerful effects of media and, especially, to underline that radio and TV
networks and social networks are integrated sources of information and not oppos-
ing ones.
Conclusion
This chapter has historicized the concept of networks over time through two
main axes. Firstly, the infrastructural/material dimension has always been a
fundamental characteristic of communication networks: infrastructures have
symbolized power to control information flows, have always been complex sys-
tems (often interconnected with other non-communication networks) and have
been considered tools of compression and acceleration of time and space, even
creating new geographies. The second axis deals with communication networks
creating sociality/sociability and shaped by social interactions. Concerns and
opportunities like strengthening or maintaining connections, exchanging mate-
rial tools of social interaction and finding a balance between “virtual” and
“real”meetings have been continuously discussed over the centuries. While the
infrastructural and socio-cultural dimensions of networks are usually consid-
ered distinctive of the digital era, we have shown that similar arguments and
characteristics of networks emerged much before.
So far, we have mainly underlined continuities, but with these final remarks
we want to answer a simple question: has nothing really changed in the concept
of networks during the digital era?5 Of course, concepts and humans change
5 Beside the “newness ideology,” claiming that everything related to digital is unprecedented
and disruptive, there is indeed an opposite but similar alienation: an attempt to find historical
antecedents and “constant continuities” (see Balbi and Magaudda 2018).
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continuously, slowly or fast, in transparent or hidden ways and historians are
well aware of it. They are also aware of the limits and strengths of the network
concept applied to historical analysis and that the metaphor probably has been
overused to draw (often anachronistic) historical comparisons, in particular in
the wake of the “global turn.”
The material/infrastructural and social dimensions in networking have also
changed over time. We conclude by mentioning two possible lines of research for
networks’ historians. On the one hand, digital networks have increased the inter-
connections of previously separated networks: the Internet itself is an example of
“networks of networks,” but digital networks of communication are increasingly
crucial to transportation, electricity, water, and other webs’ functioning, as those
non-communication networks are constantly digitized and changed by digitaliza-
tion. This growing interconnection is creating a hyper-structure of hyper-networks
that can no longer function separately. From a social perspective, there is a clear
tendency towards the mobility of previously geographically fixed networks. Take
the smartphone (and its network) or our social media profiles which follow us as
we travel or relocate to other countries. Every single person is becoming a hub and
a node of her/his social connections, while in the past cities or houses were the
key places from where and to where information was produced and distributed.
We are not arguing that all nodes are equal, because there are still people (and
thus nodes) or servers (and thus hubs) that are more important than others.
Nonetheless, we are saying that, theoretically, the power of networks has been
re-distributed from politics to people and especially corporations. To understand
these and other changes (as well as continuities), networks must be studied in
long-term perspective.
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Press, 2019.
Williams, Raymond. Television: Technology and Cultural Form. London: Fontana, 1974.
Wilson, Bronwen. “Social Networking. The ‘Album amicorum’ and Early Modern Public
Making.” In Beyond the Public Sphere: Opinions, Publics, Spaces in Early Modern Europe,




John O’Sullivan and Leopoldina Fortunati
Media Convergence
Expanding Perspectives Beyond the Digital
Abstract: In this chapter we analyze the now pervasive appropriation of the con-
cept of media convergence to encapsulate processes of digitalization in media. We
interrogate this almost universally adopted notion, tracing its ramifications as de-
lineated in cultural, technological, market, and policy terms, while also drawing
attention to complementary and generally much less recognized processes of diver-
gence. More fundamentally, we draw attention to the long-standing independence
of media convergence from digital technology, illustrating processes of combina-
tion and adaptation in pre-digital media. Historical cases of newspaper supplemen-
tation and add-ons, the changing form of the serialized novel, and the relationship
between the telephone and broadcast media are invoked to demonstrate the ex-
tent, variety, and dynamism of change, bringing into focus processes of remedia-
tion that have long pertained in analogue media. We conclude that a view of
media change is needed that better recognizes historical convergences and that,
consequently, is less inhibited by the often dualist and positivist underpinnings of
much recent thinking that sets the analogue and the digital in opposition.
Keywords: media convergence, digitalization, remediation, newspapers, talk
radio, television phone-in
The idea of convergence has a normalized, taken-for-granted status across dis-
ciplines concerned with the study of media. It gained its current prominence in
the ICT developments of the 1990s, but its roots lie in the previous decade, most
influentially in the thinking of de Sola Pool (1983). Convergence, perhaps most
visibly, has motivated business mergers across media sectors and massively
scales ICT enterprises, is assumed or implied in domestic uses of technology,
underpins approaches to new cultures of participation – breaking down barriers
between producers and users – and, in the political realm, is seen as a powerful
motor for democratization or for tyranny.
Most of the time, if not invariably, discussion of convergence in media has
centered on the digital, to the extent that the qualifier safely can be omitted
without compromising this understanding. Often freighted with the analogue
(“old”) and digital (“new”) working distinction, it has been associated with a
similarly assumed notion of progress led by technology. More recently, with the
deleterious effects of social media and platform capitalism becoming more man-
ifest, a backlash – the so-called “techlash” – is under way (Doctorow 2019).
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In this chapter, we trace some of the main contours of the development and
application of the idea, which has grown to a point of importance, beyond
media, in framing understandings of society in late capitalism (Hassan 1999)
and liquid modernity (Bauman 2000). Deploying relevant case studies and asso-
ciated scholarship – newspaper supplements, add-ons and serialization of the
novel; and live calls in television and radio – we demonstrate how, in spite of
its centrality to discourse around ICTs, convergence has had a longer-standing,
more fundamental role in media and in human affairs more generally. Indeed,
the incorporation in newspapers of different media formats within print and the
fusion of broadcast and the telephone are of their essence forms of conver-
gence. If the concept strictly is confined to digital media, it does, of course, dis-
qualify this account and analysis from any consideration of convergence. Instead,
however, we propose a wider understanding that does not take the digital as its
first point of reference.
1 Convergence and Digital Media
The notion of the transcendence of boundaries between media forms and, with it,
the wider overcoming of social, economic, and political boundaries, permeates
discussion of digital media across all of its dimensions. It has moved to the core
of consideration of the production and consumption of meaning and content, in-
cluding economy, labor, organization, formats, diffusion, audiences, regulation
and wider politics but, as articulated by Balbi (2017) in his categorization of con-
vergence discourse, it is the technological perspective that has attained the most
volume. The then optimistic idea of formerly discrete fields coming together by
virtue of the possibilities of the fluid articulation of information in zeros and
ones, as opposed to rigidly in atoms, found powerful institutional and popular
expression in the writings of futurist Nicholas Negroponte of MIT (1996), part
of the wider anticipation of the potentialities inherent in digital technologies
(Dyson 1998) and the sometimes shrilly euphoric celebration of their revolu-
tionary power. A sense of escape and liberation from material confines under-
pinned this digital sublime (Mosco 2005), encouraging a rehabilitation of the
medium-centric, deterministic thinking of Marshall McLuhan (Levinson 1999).
Parallel to the technologically and economically inflected discussion of the
overthrow of the old, broadcast model media order, a theme of openness, con-
nectivity, and free communication was cultivated, echoing in part the American
counterculture of the 1960s which survived, in spite of a complex of contradic-
tions, within the palette of predominantly conservative values comprising the
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Californian ideology of Silicon Valley (Barbrook and Cameron 1996). The sense of
community and flattening of hierarchy perhaps was expressed most resonantly in
the cultural impact of the Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link (Rheingold 1993). A more
substantial theme of participation and power was brought within a structured
framework by Henry Jenkins’ Convergence Culture (2006), placing the melding of
media formats at the heart of the new era of “user” activity usurping the unidirec-
tional communication supremacy of big media. Where once audiences could be
viewed as passive, or else exercising autonomy through their reception of
seemingly pre-determined media texts (Hall 2006), now users could become
active subjects and media producers themselves. The user-centered theme has
been developed and sustained as a core characteristic of networked and con-
verged media (Deuze 2006; Jenkins and Deuze 2008), with the widespread
adoption of the neologisms of prosumer (Toffler 1980) and produsage (Bruns
2005) aimed at capturing the blurring of the demarcation between producer
and audience.
Focusing on interactivity, user-generated content, and fan communities,
such participation traverses categories including news, entertainment and gam-
ing, and has been strengthened enormously by the advent of Web 2.0 and social
or “spreadable” media, with a strong element of business-oriented thinking
(Jenkins, Ford and Green 2013; Fuchs 2014). Hardware, software and now plat-
form intermediaries converge yet further in a networked system where catego-
ries such as quality or significance may not automatically apply, and where the
emphasis is firmly on the needs of the individual (Miller 2008). The negative
consequences of such accessible communication (excluding the realities of the
digital divide) in turn raise the need for regulation, especially of the now near-
monopolistic power of the digital intermediaries whose highly concentrated
success depends on the network-enabled affordances made available to citizens,
bullies, propagandists, data manipulators and pornographers alike (Siapera 2018).
Where convergence had been the premise for deregulation of media industries in
a global wave of liberalization and marketisation (Jin 2008; Holt 2011), it has be-
come viable, arguably for the first time since the digital turn, to raise the prospect
of stronger democratic control of networks, artificial intelligence, data and algo-
rithms (Foer 2017). As observed by Meikle and Young, convergence has exacer-
bated pre-existing tensions in the “complicated and disputed realm” of media
policy (2012, 195). Now, in a period of crisis for capitalism (Duménil and Lévy
2011), and as the notion of a self-governing, convergence-charged media land-
scape recedes, part of the discussion around reasserting societal priorities in sys-
tems of communication centers on the advocated separation of the activities of the
platform behemoths (Coyle 2018). These developments are occurring simulta-
neously with the well-established but less recognized trends towards divergence
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shown by Peil, Sparviero, and Balbi (2017) as a complementary, rather than sim-
ply opposing, process of media convergence, and as manifested in the record of
industry mega-mergers and subsequent demergers (Jin 2012). Market deconver-
gence, perhaps most memorably instanced in the 2008 break-up of AOL-Time-
Warner, therefore fits within a more fundamental configuration of deconstruc-
tion and splitting apart.
2 More than Digital
We will focus in this chapter on two elements, the convergences, firstly, within
print newspapers and magazines and, secondly, between the telephone and
broadcast media, aiming to demonstrate that there are forms of convergence oc-
curring before the exclusively digital, and that the prior concept of remediation
effectively captures such pre-digital evolution. The extraordinary momentum
behind the concept of convergence and its generally assumed association with
digital networked media has meant that the term has come to be used as short-
hand or even as a synonym for the digital, carrying with it the sense of a defini-
tive breach with the past. “New” media sells. Digitally-driven change now is
orthodoxy, unquestioned by many in the academic community, with a paradox-
ically familiar characterization of novelty and iconoclasm. According to Balbi
and Magaudda, one of the persistent myths of digital media is that digitalization
is an “irresistible force” of permanent revolution and change (2018, 216). How-
ever, regardless of the original intention, it is now clear that the appropriation
of the concept of convergence to capture processes of digitalization disregards
its essentially non-digital nature. Convergence can be digital, but it has also
been analogue, or pre-digital, and it can be postdigital (O’Sullivan et al. 2017),
in the sense that the essence of a medium platform, whether it be printed news
or streamed video, rests other than on whether it is digital. What is in play in
convergence is not, therefore, simply the overcoming of boundaries by digital
technology, but something more essential, and a persistent feature of media
communication. Drawing from Boccaccio (1956, 1348–1353), we can recognize
the universal opposing forces of diversification and unification as the basis for
a broader theoretical and historical understanding of processes of convergence.
As outlined above, this concept has been taken up and systematized within the
debate on media deconvergence, as a complementary phenomenon, by Peil,
Sparviero, and Balbi (2017). In this wider and deeper perspective, the tendency
toward the unit historically has occurred in multifarious ways between varying
domains of human activity, industries or media platforms, sometimes stemming
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from similarity, as in the established case of broadcast media, whereby radio
programs are re-aired, with the radio studio becoming a set for television, but
also from dissimilarity. Tourism, for example, represents a convergence of the
distinct spheres of travel and hospitality that occurred in advance of ICTs. In
other cases, convergence stems from complementarity, as in the disparate in-
stances of fashion and the motor industry fusing the domains of design and pro-
duction. Industrial and post-industrial societies have been replete with such
convergences, with little or no digital basis, even though they can later have
been digitally inflected. Media convergence, now often seen as occurring within
the framework of the technology, fits within this broader phenomenon.
Shortly prior to the rise of the idea of convergence, and its wide sharing as
a common theme among scholars, as outlined above, the evolution of media
through incorporation already was comprehensively captured in Bolter and
Grusin’s conceptualization of remediation (1999), which moderated ideas of
the overthrow of older media, such as radio, by new ones, such as television.
This more considered model of continuity privileges the clear historical lineage of
media forms and has been an effective counterweight to ahistorical fetishization
of the new in media studies. Within discussion of participatory culture and the
practice of bricolage, Schmidt and de Kloet (2017) integrate the perspectives of
Lévi-Strauss (1962) and Derrida (1978) to capture the functional expression of con-
vergence in the production of media content by a process of incorporation, or can-
nibalization, of materials, formats, and styles. Viewed this way, the creation of the
unit from pre-existing elements of both media and media practices and uses owes
more to social construction, rooted in historical processes, than to the unalloyed
force of technology (Bijker 1995). In similar vein, Nail’s explication of Deleuze and
Gattari’s theory of assemblages (2017) can be applied to media add-ons, such as
those offered with newspapers, where, rather than producing a single, unified en-
tity, what matters is the relationship between elements brought together. A news-
paper is still a newspaper, and a book is still a book; their assemblage addresses
their relationship to one another. Such theorizing forces a confrontation with the
materiality and the meaning of objects (Friedman and Forde 2015), routinely over-
looked in thinking confined to the digital. It is, therefore, when we look at situated
instances of convergence, with their material particularities, that we can appreci-
ate its non-technological, or not purely technological, nature and apprehend the




In this section, we look in particular at analogue-to-analogue convergences that
serve to demonstrate that the concept is not exclusively or predominantly digi-
tal. Convergence has long been part of human communication. If we consider
writing to be the first communication technology (Ong 1982, 2007), then it is
clear that it incorporated language to produce a new medium that not only laid
the foundation for modernity but also changed the nature of orality. This change
is evidenced in the early history of human societies, but also in the progression
to print, for example, in the production of verse chapbooks in Ireland in the late
eighteenth century (Carpenter 2010). Print, in turn, represents a particularly sig-
nificant convergence of the technologies of writing, type and the press, but ex-
tending to the use of color in painting, as well as the inheritance of the press
from wine-making (Eisenstein 1979), with the invention of moveable type, ironi-
cally in retrospect, routinely invoked in the digital context as precursor of the rev-
olutionary power of digital media, and most markedly since McLuhan (1964)
taken as a point of comparison for newer, cooler, or more liquid media. Another
key phase in medium-focused theory concerns the much-aired interplay begin-
ning in the nineteenth century between the press and the telegraph (Carey 1983;
Winseck 1999), with its effects on time and space forming a theme that endures
in the digital (Castells 2009). In the arena of visual culture, the connection be-
tween theatre (in all its forms, including the cabaret and the opera) and television
is clear, as is the convergence between cinema and television seen in the rise of
the TV movie, but this latter incorporates previous forms such as the magic lantern
and the moving panorama (Huhtamo 2013). In similar vein, Walter Benjamin’s
consideration of the nature of art as reproduced in print (1935, 2004) instances a
convergence as widely diffused as those in which the technologies of the lens and
chemical processes are incorporated in photography and, later, with other technol-
ogies, in cinema.
Where convergence is centered on technologies and cultural practices, it
also inevitably is framed by economic regulatory dispositions, sometimes pro-
moting coalescence, as we have seen, but historically also sometimes aimed at
suppressing trends towards monopoly (Hochfelder 2012) or, more recently, in
anti-trust policies to contain the power communication of giants (Haucap and
Stühmeier 2016).
From this rough survey of medium change, it is clear that convergences,
sometimes incorporating, and sometimes assembling, are present throughout
the evolution of media forms. Where digital convergence processes have been
perceived as categorized around platforms, content and protocols of use by
audiences (Stenport et al. 2014), these processes also can be seen as applying
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pre-digitally, setting in doubt the notion that convergence is exclusively digital.
To illustrate analogue-to-analogue convergence more deeply, we can look at
particular instances of the supposedly ill-fated print newspaper, along with the
use of the telephone in conjunction with mass media.
3.1 Flexible Form in Newspapers
While their encounter with the digital domain has been comprehensively docu-
mented and interpreted in a multi-faceted array of literature and public debate,
newspapers’ continuous and varied record of pre-digital convergence demon-
strates a resilient malleability, matching the flexibilities associated with conver-
gence that arguably has been overlooked. The print news platform, typically
seen as the static foil against which digital dynamism is made salient, has both
maintained its essential formal characteristics and altered the composition of
its offering to readers. A seventeenth century newspaper, in its language, lay-
out, and typography, may be slightly unfamiliar to the late modern audience,
but it is readily recognizable as a newspaper, while in its current form the object
is augmented either via supplements, elements to varying degrees taking the
form of a magazine contained within the newspaper, or add-ons, objects such
as books or promotions offered with the edition to make a single offering on the
newsstand or in the subscription package. These augmentations provide a clear
demonstration that change is not wrought simply by enabling technologies,
digital or analogue, but is animated in response to social and, in the immediate
context, often market conditions, as part of the ever-present process of evolu-
tion of news culture (Barnhurst and Nerone 2001).
3.1.1 Magazines and Supplements
While supplementation has been especially marked over the most recent deca-
des, its origins are older. Brake (2010, 111) explicates the serials carried in Victo-
rian periodicals and newspapers, discussing the object’s identity as one that
“articulates a reference to a prior, primary text to which it is ‘supplementary,’
but not always preserved allied to its host.” Supplements extend the range,
physically and temporally, of content types and presentation modes beyond the
core body of the edition, as conceived in the mass ritual of newspaper reading
(Anderson 1983). Their use facilitates departmentalization, both in terms of edi-
torial organization and consumption of content (Weibull and Nilsson 2010).
Typically, news is augmented with culture, art, lifestyle, business and sport,
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offering longer, deeper reading and sometimes more graphically presented con-
tent, but also palpably and economically transforming the materiality of the
paper object (Stamm 2015; Fortunati et al. 2015).
This format growth is convincingly situated by Smith (1980), as being con-
nected to advances in color printing, with gloss paper and fast-drying ink, most
dramatically shown in the remarkable rise of Life magazine. But he emphasizes
that the newspaper “mosaic . . . is a reflection of the society that gave rise to
the form and the kind of technology that was available” (Smith 1980, 157), and
one can observe that the magazine’s fortunes in the longer term have been de-
termined by influences other than printing affordances.
Farmer (2019) traces the deep changes in the 1960s in the material charac-
teristics of British newspapers, led by the introduction of color supplements in
three broadsheet newspapers, The Sunday Times, The Observer and The Daily
Telegraph. Supplementation, in the form of standalone elements, offered a solu-
tion to the incorporation of color. Apart from organizational and professional
considerations, new spaces were opened for an intensification of photography’s
convergence with print. Perhaps in keeping with the notion that good design is
invisible, changes in layout associated with these developments are often su-
perficially remarked upon beyond specialist literature. Farmer, however, in-
sightfully captures the significance of longer forms covering multiple pages,
which licenses a new relationship between advertising and editorial.
To this extent, supplementation also can be seen as a form of convergence,
in material but also economic terms, in which newspapers respond to the previ-
ously distinct media form of the magazine by attempting, with some success, to
cannibalize it. In a recent example, the Italian daily newspaper, the Corriere
della Sera, has incorporated the formerly weekly independent and literary re-
view La Lettura, so that the latter now is integrated as a non-optional supple-
ment in the newspaper’s Sunday edition, with a price increase of 50 cents.
Here, the physical, editorial and economic natures of the two publications are
fused in an altered entity. Almost inevitably, and albeit enmeshed with other
considerations, it is the imperatives of the market that most pressingly are the
occasion of change. Supplements represent a competition response to maga-
zines, even if that form has developed in the context of wider social change.
Weibull and Nillson (2010) point out that they also are an attractive business
proposition for publishers because they are cheap, with pre-produced, often
freelancer-sourced content, and they generate revenue. They record that, in one
week in 2000, Sweden’s Aftonbladet carried 324 pages over five supplements,
compared with Expressen’s equivalent of 60 in 1980.
Supplementation also has drawn normative commentary. With the opening
up of the space for editorial in the publication comes a perceived softening of
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content, with journalism extending beyond news (Bacon 1999), with the sense of
a loss of purity encapsulated in the idea that newspaper have been magazine-
ified (Brett and Holmes 2008). The freeing of space also allows ingress, beyond
the traditional firewall, for advertising within texts, and, less explicitly, adverto-
rial, which became evident to readers of British supplements in the 1960s (Farmer
2019). While criticism of such commercialization is common, Farmer argues that
the supplements of the period allowed more diverse political expression than had
previously pertained.
Contrary to longstanding ideas of digital impetus bringing revolutionary
change to a previously static or even “dumb” medium (de Sola Pool 1982, 30),
the processes of adaptation that newspapers historically have implemented
around supplements demonstrate that the transcendence of boundaries be-
tween media formats is not digital in essence. Convergence can and has oc-
curred beyond the question of whether platforms, content, or uses are digital.
Moving beyond pure supplementation, another instance from media history
signifying the long-extant potential for convergence is that of the combination
by the Chicago Daily News in the 1920s of a high-quality color picture supple-
ment with matching radio commentary (Good 2017). Here, the newspaper was
engaging not only in supplementation, but also, at a distance, an early experi-
ment in combining with an external object, or add-on.
3.1.2 Add-ons
Insofar as a clear distinction between incorporation and assemblage can be as-
sumed, where supplements represent an expression of convergence as the for-
mer, add-ons belong to the latter category. Other than the printed novel, further
discussed below, the objects most often attached to European newspapers, start-
ing in the current period from the 1990s, have been CDs and DVDs, and, among
pre-digital media, VHS tapes, books, and encyclopedia volumes. A related mate-
rial and cultural coming together between print and the digital was the inclusion
of computer program disks in IT magazines.
For newspapers in Italy, for example, the paid add-on was used directly to
create revenue. In the case of L’Unità, the offer to readers of paid-for VHS mov-
ies instanced a business convergence, as the newspaper leveraged its ownership
of film rights. La Repubblica successfully offered bound encyclopedia volumes,
allowing readers to pay in stages. Finch and Geiger, viewing the newspaper-DVD
hybrids offered in Britain and Ireland from a marketing perspective, refer to a
slippery object that makes use of porous boundaries (2010). Here, again, the
physical and economic natures of the newspaper object, or product, are in
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tension with its normative and cultural existence. In the case of The Observer,
Finch and Geiger observe that its free movie add-on, rather than solely work-
ing to attract new readers, served to underline the publication’s elite cultural
status. In the UK, the prominent former editor and media academic Roy Green-
slade decried those who bought the hybrid and threw away the edition, keeping
the DVD, asserting that newspapers participating in the add-on fray were doing
so not on purely commercial grounds but also to win influence. In Italy, journal-
ists condemned the reverse cannibalization of the newspaper by “the gadget”,
an object that devalued their work (Cortese and Marabese 2004). Eventually, the
longer-term commercial irrationality of the add-on frenzy receded for some time,
both in the UK and Italy, where publishers collectively supported tax measures dis-
couraging the practice.
3.1.3 The Serialized Novel
Attaching novels to newspapers is a specific occasion of the add-on representing
cultural but also technological and market-led convergence. French newspapers
and magazines in the 1800s began to publish serialized novels in the form of the
“feuilleton” – the term is a diminutive of “feuillet,” or sheet, indicating the lower
part of the page of a newspaper, otherwise called the footer, or “rez-de-chaussée.”
The Journal des Débats created a section in the lower parts of its pages devoted to
literary matters, carrying articles that previously had been printed without a fixed
location in the newspaper. Other newspapers imitated the format when the initia-
tive was well-received by the public. Honoré de Balzac was the first writer who un-
derstood the potential of this specific space in which to promote novels, when in
1831 he flagged in advance chapters on which he was still working. However, the
true origin of the feuilleton came in 1836, with the foundation of the newspaper La
Presse by Émile de Girardin. To keep costs down and build readership, de Girardin
used space devoted to literary criticism to carry as yet unpublished stories in instal-
ments, at first in the appendix, then in the last or second last page, and only later
distributed in the classical form of the book. In its first year, La Presse published
La Comtesse de Salisbury, by Alexandre Dumas, and Miss Cormon (La Vieille Fille)
by Honoré de Balzac (Pellini 2015). In the following year, the Journal des débats
published Mémoires du diable by Frédéric Soulié. Other cornerstones of the genre
from this period were Les Misérables by Victor Hugo, The Mysteries of Paris by Eu-
gène Sue, and The Three Musketeers by Alexandre Dumas, which appeared in in-
stalments in Le Siècle in 1844. Il Capitan Fracassa was published by Theo Fracassa
between 1861 and 1863 in Revue Nationale et Étrangère. Flaubert’sMadame Bovary
was carried in instalments from 1856 in La Revue de Paris.
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The appendix novel prospered in other countries such as England – most fa-
mously in the case of Charles Dickens – the United States, Russia, and Italy. Rob-
ert Louis Stevenson published The Black Arrow in the magazine Young Folks;
excerpts from Joyce’s Finnegans Wake were carried in the Paris periodical transi-
tion under the title of Work in Progress. In the US, Edgar Allan Poe’s Manuscript
Found in a Bottle won a literary competition organized by a Baltimore magazine.
Crime and Punishment and The Brothers Karamazov by Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy’s
War and Peace, were first seen as appendix novels in The Russian Messenger. In
Italy, Emilio Salgari first published as newspaper appendices his Sandokan cycle
of novels, as did Carlo Collodi, with The Adventures of Pinocchio.
After the Second World War, the genre declined. It was almost entirely re-
placed by the more immediate picture story (fotoromanzo) and the television
drama or, later, telenovela (teleromanzo), the serialized story, a sort of police cut,
which remained in use in a few newspapers until the end of the 1970s. In cinema,
the influence of the appendix novel extended to the melodramatic genre in vogue
in the 1920s and to the European neorealism of the 40s and 50s.
Its dismemberment into short newspaper articles represented a cross-
fertilization of form that was particularly beneficial to the development of
the nineteenth century novel, in that it demanded the creation of suspense.
Another resulting convergence was that occurring between newspapers and
literature, perhaps most markedly in the case of Emile Zola with his famous
J’accuse in the socialist newspaper L’Aurore. Close relations between news-
papers and novels, and between journalists and novelists, can be seen in a
continuum of further remediations. Appendix novels’ seriality came to be re-
flected in the 1930s in the broadcasting of radio adaptations of such works,
such as The Four Musketeers, and the format persists through to the digital in
the rise of the podcast. For many decades up to the end of the last century,
before consolidation of cultural content in supplements, the structural con-
vergence between journalism and literature was evidenced on the third page
of Italian newspapers, which had long been established as a literary and cul-
tural space (where, by contrast, elsewhere Page Three has been infamously
associated with tabloid titillation).
Further developments in television have followed a similar trajectory of
convergence.
3.2 The Telephone and Broadcast Media
Another historically significant form of convergence that arose in advance of digi-
tal media is that between the telephone and broadcast media. Preceding the phase
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of more direct union, telephony had been used in a form of proto-broadcasting
from the late nineteenth century, with the so-called circular telephone bringing
entertainment and cultural events to elite audiences and distributing news to sub-
scribers of networks in several countries, beginning in Hungary in 1893 but quickly
adopted in the US, and surviving up to World War II (Marvin 1988; Balbi 2010).
Whereas in these instances the telephone incorporated mass media, later, the
relationship was reversed, when broadcast incorporated the telephone. In the
US, on-air radio discussion of music occurred as early as 1945, extending to
political coverage in 1949 (Bobbitt 2010). Elsewhere, live telephone content
has become widespread internationally as a key form of programming in en-
tertainment, cultural and political domains, both in television and radio (e.g.,
Simonelli and Taggi 1985 regarding Italy; Katriel 2004 on Israel; O’Sullivan
2005 on Ireland; Lee 2014 on Hong Kong). In particular, in the context of de-
velopments in the digital domain, it has been observed that key figures in par-
tisan websites in the US have emerged from talk radio (Newman et al. 2018).
To bring new empirical material to this topic, we report here results from
formerly unpublished research by Fortunati and Manganelli in 1994 (Fortunati
and Manganelli 1995). In Italy, this convergence began when, in 1969, the radio
program Chiamate Roma 3131 took the initiative to include live calls from the
audience. The show’s creator, Luciano Rispoli, inspired by a live phone-in seg-
ment in a French radio show hosted by a psychologist, created a two-hour daily
broadcast with live calls, with the aim of including diverse, natural voices. Calls
were “deferred live,” i.e., a direct call with a delay of a quarter of an hour to
allow time to intervene in case of foul language or abusive content. The intro-
duction of the telephone collapsed the wall around radio as an academy of pho-
netic and linguistic perfection, and the beginning of a medium in which people
could express themselves at home, in the streets and at work.
Based on the study’s analysis of a week’s broadcasts, in which 474 live calls
were logged, it can be extrapolated that there would be about 25,000 annually,
mixed with other narrative units, so that the identity of radio can be viewed as
shared between the microphone and the telephone. Since both devices are “voi-
ces,” the relation between radio and telephone has always been closer, histori-
cally and structurally, than that between the telephone and television. This
makes a less unequal, and potentially more participative, discursive contract
between host and listener. The invitation to call or contact the radio station is
oral only and responds to three basic functions of the palimpsest as macro-text.
The first is the self-referencing function, i.e. the creation, strengthening, and
improvement of the network image, enhancing the quality of domesticity and
familiarity between the network and its “loyal audience.” The second is the
phatic function, shown in the continuous quest for contact with the listener,
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repeatedly invited to be part of the “big radio family.” The third is pragmatic, in
the sense that the invitation to call is a commercial communication practice,
widely used in advertising. The live radio call expands the phatic function most
of all. To the cold, unidirectional language of mass media, the live call adds the
warmth of intimacy and relationality.
In the case of television, the study logged 269 live calls, equating to 14,000
annually. A fifth of those surveyed said that they had tried to call a television
program, but only 3.4% of these had succeeded in getting through. The majority
said they had called in the hope of winning a prize or taking part in a game,
and only 7.8% said they had telephoned to express their opinion. This can be
understood as relating less to a lack of interest in participation and more to the
operation of television, which called for the staging of live calls. Calls took on
only the phatic function. They lowered the iconicity of the television text and
enriched the audio band, which on the small screen is otherwise sacrificed to
subordinate functions (Giaccardi 1995). In this sense, the phone-in had the po-
tential to effect change through converging not only technologies but also au-
dience and producer roles, even as the immediate and spontaneous live call
ultimately has been subordinated to the rigid medium demands of TV.
From its convergence with television, the telephone, now including the mo-
bile phone (Goggin and Hjorth 2014), has acquired a new form of existence in
the world of entertainment and mass communications, from the screen overlay
telephone (and fax) numbers to the telephone interviews and to the live tele-
phone dialogues with the public. The telephone also acquired a public dimen-
sion. From its existence as a medium of personal communication, it has moved
to also being a medium of mass communication, positioned as a bridge between
audiences and electronic media. The language of the telephone has powerfully
added a personal dimension to public dialogue. In the digitalized world, televi-
sion and radio, as digitalized analogue media, have experienced divergent evo-
lutions in this respect. While television has dropped live calls as a means of
engaging the audience, radio has continued on this path. Television has
achieved the involvement of the public by proposing new broadcast formats,
such as reality or entertainment shows including the audience by means of
tele-voting, often via smartphones (Hay and Kanafani 2017), or by leaning
more on already tested formats such as talk shows and quizzes. The process
of convergence now persists into the digital, as both television and radio




This discussion of convergence has attempted to place the concept in a broader
historical context of media history and theoretical evolution, and to problemat-
ize its near-exclusive latter association with the digital. We have used a number
of historical case studies centered on specific media platforms to demonstrate
processes of convergence that are pre-digital but that spring from or relate to
aspects of media change commonly associated with the digital, namely evolv-
ing formats, content, and uses, with implications for producers, institutions,
markets, and audiences. Convergence is as old as the earliest mass medium but
connecting in cultural terms from the medieval period to the nineteenth century
romantic novel and, hence, beyond to the twenty-first century (Gabriele 2016).
It has been seen to be agnostic as to the “digitalness” or otherwise of media
types: it has occurred in many guises, and will continue to arise within digital
media, within analogue forms, and, post-digitally, between the two, depending
on many forces including but not confined to the technological. Convergence
has proven useful as an analytic tool to understand media change, but it is not
the first or only such concept to have done so, and its often technological and
market-led framing carries with it a risk of narrowing understanding and, conse-
quently, the discourse around such processes. Many of the categories of media
springing from the more positivist interpretations of convergence and related
concepts, such as commonly-deployed dualities of “legacy” and “new,” “static”
and “dynamic” or “traditional” and “digital,” are limited in scope, unhelpful and
misleading. Convergence and remediation, both of which capture change and the
relationships between diverse media forms, are not mutually exclusive, and it is
perhaps wise to consider them together to support a more nuanced, inclusive
and historically-based view of evolution and continuity in media communication.
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Multimedia
How Educators Made Sense of New Media Multiplicity
Abstract: The term “multimedia” is associated with the proliferation of audiovisual
and computational media technologies in the second half of the twentieth century,
but visions of orchestrating a plurality of media devices, particularly for educa-
tional purposes, appeared earlier than this. This chapter traces the emergence of a
multimedia sensibility in U.S. education in the interwar years. Offering the concept
of media litanies, it describes how educators made sense of the multiplicity of new
media and resisted commercial claims about the transformative teaching power of
singular technologies by calling into focus the wide variety of devices that teachers
could use and combine according to their pedagogical needs. The chapter also dis-
cusses early “multimedia” experiments in schools, such as illustrated radio, in
which educators synchronized radio broadcasts, lantern slides, and filmstrips to
produce audiovisual lessons. Together, these early educational discourses and ef-
forts helped pave the way for corporate and cultural visions of multimedia to gain
valence later in the century.
Keywords: multimedia, education, educational technology, new media, audio-
visual media, twentieth century, pedagogy, users
The term “multimedia” is already a historical artifact, its usage bound up with
the proliferation of new media technologies in the second half of the twentieth
century. In the United States in the 1960s, the word “multimedia” (variously writ-
ten as “multi-media” and “multi media” and used as a noun and an adjective)
took root in the fields of education, advertising, and the arts to describe new
media texts, experiences and installations that intentionally deployed more than
one medium of communication. Amid rapid advancements in consumer technol-
ogy and America’s growing preoccupation with demonstrating its technological
prowess in the context of the Cold War, “multimedia” became a flexible and fu-
turistic descriptor for a range of efforts to make formerly discrete media appara-
tuses both more ubiquitous and fluidly integrated into various spaces, processes,
and sectors of society (Olivero 1962; Anonymous 1969a; 1969b; 1970a; 1970b).
In a 1960s classroom, for example, multimedia might refer to a “transmission
center” or an “integrated materials center” of multiple instructional A-V devices,
such as an overhead projector, portable screen, tape recorder, and record player,
that a teacher could use in various combinations in her lessons (Rurark 1961;
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Olivero 1962). In advertising, “multi-media” described the “multichannel sound
and light shows” and multi-screen projections that became fashionable at inter-
national expositions and sales expos. Developed by young creatives and inspired
by emerging theories from artists and academics, particularly Marshall McLuhan,
that equated the era’s new “electric media” of television, movies, radio, and com-
puters with heightened perception and expanded consciousness, such exposi-
tions celebrated technological innovation and media proliferation while tethering
notions of multi-mediated living to Western ideals of individualism, liberalism
and free-market capitalism (Glueck 1967; Turner 2013).
While the use of the term “multimedia” remained somewhat stagnant in the
1970s and 80s, it surged in popular discourse in the 1990s along with the rise of
personal computing, taking on new meaning to describe the “new types of media
made for computers” (Rockwell and Macktavish 2004, 108). By then, “multimedia”
had largely shed its early associations with panoplies of media hardware and dis-
crete devices and was more commonly used as a synonym for “new media,” or the
converged, mixed-media texts and software, such as interactive encyclopedias,
games, digital journalism and works of digital art that were being created and con-
sumed with computers (Lombreglia 1997). But remarkably, around 1997, multime-
dia’s upward trajectory made an about-face, and by the early 2000s, its usage in
popular discourse plummeted (Google 2020). Perhaps multimedia had an “old-
media” tinge to it in the new millennium, as an emerging class of born-digital
media, including websites, blogs, digital news platforms and social media, com-
bining sound, images, videos, and text, became ever easier to access, create, and
share on the Internet and personal digital devices. By the 2010s, as single media
devices, such as smartphones or digital tablets, became capable of accomplishing
what multiple devices, such as television, video audio players, telephones, and
typewriters, used to do separately, the multiplicity of new media and the distinc-
tions between them no longer seemed as noteworthy as they once were.
But while the word “multimedia” is thus associated with the advent of com-
puting, the explosion of postwar consumer technologies, and the arrival of the
information age, the ideas and cultural visions that it indexes are significantly
older than that. As early as the 1910s and 20s, conversations about the changing
technological environment often focused as much on the plurality of new media
of communication, and their points of potential connection and integration, as
on the novelty or social implications of individual devices (Popp 2011). This chap-
ter will focus on U.S. educational literature in the 1910s-1940s to trace how a mul-
timedia sensibility emerged in schools and the educational field. It argues that the
ability to acquire and marshal together various types of media and machines to ac-
complish a single communicative objective; to think of such devices as potentially
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more useful in combination than in isolation from each other, and to imagine the
user as a commanding orchestrator rather than a passive consumer of the sensory
stimuli produced by multiple media, can be traced to the proliferation and cultural
adoption of popular media technologies in the first decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. Back then, the multiplicity and variability of emerging media forms, and the
possibilities they offered to ordinary people, were a source of both wonder and
anxiety for many observers (Czitrom 1982).
These sentiments were particularly salient and well-documented in the world
of education. In the first decades of the twentieth century, educators in North
America and Europe grappled with how to incorporate a variety of new and popu-
lar technologies, from electricity to film projectors to record players and radio, into
a range of educational settings, including adult education, universities, and do-
mestic and colonial schools (Moser 2019; Goodman 2016; Gregory 2016; Orgeron,
Orgeron and Streible 2012). In the U.S. in particular, rising immigration and urban-
ization led the public educational system to rapidly expand and become more
bureaucratized, prompting many in the educational field to rethink how schools
delivered instruction. This period also saw the implementation of progressive re-
forms aimed at rejecting the rote, verbalistic and “passive” approaches to instruc-
tion that had predominated in the nineteenth century in favor of more engaging
techniques that would educate the “whole child” through activating her interests
and senses.
Beginning in earnest in the 1910s and 20s, the emerging media industries in
the US attempted to woo educators by deploying a techno-utopian promotional
rhetoric that aligned with the concerns of progressive reformers. Each argued
that their respective devices could modernize instruction, “bring the world”
into the classroom, make teaching more engaging and efficient, and deliver the
kinds of virtual or “vicarious experiences” (of world travel, scientific, and in-
dustrial processes and the workings of government) that would mold young-
sters into good citizens and future workers. Newspapers largely reproduced this
industrial narrative that new media technologies would soon revolutionize edu-
cation (Good 2020).
But educators reacted to these claims with ambivalence, at various turns
enticed by the prospect of making their work more efficient and effective, and
in other moments concerned that new media gadgets could render their profes-
sion obsolete. Educational researchers and teachers were also concerned that
teaching with new media gadgets―then largely associated with leisure and en-
tertainment―would make the classroom into a space of amusement or “pas-
sive” reception, rendering it a “substitute for the theater” (Knowlton 1930, 195;
Crumly 1919). Drawing on their professional expertise and the burgeoning field
of progressive educational theory, some educators began to criticize the notion
Multimedia 61
that any single commercial device would transform education. Instead, they de-
veloped a uniquely broadened, user-centric and “active” vision of mediated in-
struction where teachers and learners would mindfully make use of multiple
devices, including high- and low-tech aids, according to their curricular needs.
I suggest that this amounted to the beginnings of a multimedia orientation in
U.S. educational discourse and practice, one that helped to legitimize multiple
new technologies for mass educational use and open the way for the notion of
multimedia to gain wider academic, cultural and commercial valence by midcen-
tury (Turner 2013). Importantly, this integrated and cross-media sensibility in ed-
ucation was forged by the early educational adopters and users, rather than (and
often in subtle opposition to) commercial producers of new media technologies.
As such, it complicates prevailing notions of multimedia as an innovation of
technology industries, engineers, theorists, artists and experts (Packer and Jor-
dan 2002).
This orientation both asserted the importance of teachers and learners in de-
termining the proper uses of media in education and, somewhat ironically, cre-
ated a pedagogical rationale for a flood of consumer media technologies to enter
schools in the latter half of the century under the banner of multimedia learning
(Acland 2017). In the first decades of the century, schoolteachers, administrators,
and researchers began to recast emerging media devices not as standalone, au-
thoritative aids to be passively relied upon for teaching and learning, but rather
as complementary, individually inadequate tools that should be marshaled to-
gether, combined and steered by discerning users according to their communica-
tive objectives. In this formulation, no single form of commercially-prepared media
could be pedagogically superior or even sufficient in its own right. Rather, each
would need to be balanced with an array of other sensory engagements and experi-
ences for their educative benefits to be fully realized.
1 Media Litanies
Historically, users have played a critical role in defining the uses and meanings
of technologies, and have often done so in ways that diverged from the use val-
ues imagined by their inventors or promoters (Gitelman 2003). This was certainly
true of educational technology in the US, as representatives of the early motion
picture, phonograph, stereoscope, and lantern slide industries made bold claims
about how their products’ visual or auditory features made them uniquely fit
to transform the work of teaching (Ives and Clark 1912; Willson 1919; Victrola
Talking Machine Company 1920a; Fitzpatrick and McElroy 1919, 1920). “Let
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the pictures teach the lesson,” urged a typical print advertisement for educa-
tional motion pictures and projectors in 1920. Claiming that “teaching from
books, maps, or charts is dull at best” and consumed “too much brain energy”
from pupils, the advertisement contended that “children are more enthused,
give closer attention, learn more rapidly and retain more thoroughly without
exertion through the medium of motion pictures” (The American Projecting
Company 1921). A few years earlier, the inventor Thomas Edison, an early pro-
ducer of educational motion pictures, made headlines with even bolder claims
that the “schoolhouse will be the screen,” and that movies would soon “revolu-
tionize” education, lessen the workload of teachers, supplant textbooks, erase
prejudice, and even prevent future wars (Anonymous 1919). For their part, pro-
ducers of record players were keen to highlight the instructional versatility of
recorded sound, a sensory engagement that motion picture technology was not
yet capable of providing. Publishing frequently in educational journals, the
Victrola Talking Machine Company (1920b) described the phonograph as “the
supreme instrument” and the “teacher’s staunchest ally, ready for use in every
hour of the day and every branch of school work,” from foreign languages to
music appreciation and physical education.
But while inventors and promoters proposed singular technologies as
the solution for myriad educational challenges, few educators accepted this
idea or put it into practice on the ground. For starters, the uptake of mechan-
ical devices in schools was much slower and more lackluster than industries
hoped, due to a combination of school budgetary constraints, logistical chal-
lenges in acquiring and adopting new equipment, a lack of electricity in the ma-
jority of schools and educators’ general skepticism toward teaching with new
technology (Hodas 1996; Cuban 1986; Good 2016). Moreover, some educators were
alarmed by the encroachment of commercial interests into the educational field,
and in the mid-1910s began to assert their own pedagogical vision for incorporating
new devices into instruction. At the 1916 meeting of the National Education Associ-
ation (NEA), the nation’s largest organization of public schoolteachers and admin-
istrators, a Committee on Visual Instruction convened to discuss how new visual
aids could be applied to “serious educational ends.” This group of nine educators
and administrators was a predecessor the NEA’s Department of Visual Instruction
(DVI), which would form in 1923 and grow into the nation’s largest organization of
A-V educators, changing its name to the Department of Audio-Visual Instruction
(DAVI) in 1947 (National Education Association 1915, 93; Saettler 2004, 167–168).
Key to the committee’s inaugural discussion in 1916 was its rejection
of the notion, made popular by the nascent educational technology industry
and the press, that any single commercial innovation would soon be radically
reconfiguring education. Edward Stitt, the district superintendent of the New York
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schools, delivered prepared remarks in which he praised “the modern methods
of visualization” such as the stereoscope and motion picture, but argued that
the time had come for educators to broaden the definition of visual instruction
beyond the most talked-about technologies of the day and bring it into line with
progressive educational principles.
Stitt took aim at two popular devices in particular―the motion picture and the
phonograph―as examples of how the era’s new media posed the danger of fostering
“passive” and mono-sensory learning, the kind of old-fashioned, one-way informa-
tion transfer and rote instruction that the progressive educational movement was mo-
bilizing to supersede. He criticized the “traditional tendency” of teachers “to make
instruction a pouring-in process, in which the teacher becomes a sort of personal
phonograph,” where “the child is forst [sic] to listen, and so his instruction becomes
entirely too ear-minded.” He levied similar criticisms against the visual medium of
motion pictures, calling for a “release from the passive reception of the wonders of
film reproductions, by enlisting the active energies of the pupils so as to awaken
their self-activity.” Evident in Stitt’s speech was a disdain for the “mechanical” and
mono-sensory nature of education that was believed to have predominated in earlier
years and an apprehension that newmedia machines, if used as their promoters sug-
gested, would simply reproduce that failed approach. Their work as a committee, he
concluded, should be to establish a more dynamic, “active” model of visual instruc-
tion that engaged children via multiple senses, so that “in the future the province of
the teacher shall include the realm of the eye as well as that of the ear.”
So how might teachers forge such an active and multisensory approach to teach-
ing with technology? Stitt’s suggestion was not to reject new technologies altogether,
but rather to offer an alternative to the industry’s vision of how they might be incorpo-
rated into schools. He offered what I’ll call a media litany, an enumeration of a long
list of available media technologies that teachers and students could variously draw
upon, mix, and incorporate into their lessons according to their pedagogical needs.
Media litanies not only foregrounded the plurality of media at the user’s disposal,
but also situated high-profile commercial innovations, such as motion pictures
and slide projectors, within an educational milieu of humbler, older and home-
grown devices. “The following are suggested as useful ways to enlarge the plan
and scope of the work,” Stitt remarked, going on to define visual aids as:
(1) lantern slides for instruction purposes; (2) educational motion pictures; (3) stereographs
[. . .]; (4) display of maps, charts, and models in classroom; (5) greater use of the black-
board by both pupils and teachers; (6) illustrations in reading-books and textbooks gener-
ally; (7) souvenir post-cards and pictures from magazines and newspapers; (8) school
exhibits [. . .]; (9) educational museum [. . .] and distribution of visual aids by municipal or
state bureaus; (10) clay-modeling, molding in sand trays, etc.; (11) homemade apparatus in
elementary science work; (12) visits to museums, art galleries, libraries, etc. (Stitt 1916)
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These sorts of media litanies appeared frequently in the new professional literature
for visual education that proliferated in the interwar years (Pennsylvania De-
partment of Public Instruction 1930, 9–10; Dorris 1928, 60). In a series of
1924 essays titled, “Aeroplane View of Visual Aids,” Joseph Weber, an early
university researcher of visual education methods, echoed Stitt’s call by urg-
ing teachers to resist dependency on any single device and make creative
use, instead, of a broadened mix of mechanical and non-mechanical media
and materials in the classroom. Weber defined visual aids here as “artificial
objects, models, and exhibits; globes, maps, and charts; graphs, diagrams,
and cartoons; paintings, picture prints, and book illustrations; photographs,
stereographs, lantern slides, and motion pictures; and last, but not least, the
time-honored blackboard” (Weber 1924, 338). A few years later, Weber would
write again to make the case for auditory and other sensory aids, criticizing the
visual education movement for “placing the sense of vision on a pedestal and
worshipping it as the golden calf.” He urged practitioners to remember that “all
the senses, more or less and in diverse combinations, co-operate in the steady ac-
cumulation of learning” (Weber 1928). Emphasizing that making interactions with
new media “educational” required an active role for users and a fuller engagement
of their sensoria, these statements knocked motion pictures and other high-profile
visual technologies down from the pedestal to which the industry had elevated
them, and afforded them same educational status as simpler, more homemade,
and other sensory aids.
Media litanies also appeared in the writings of schoolteachers, who chronicled
in educational journals their own experiments with teaching with diverse combi-
nations of sensory devices. Reflecting on how far they had come since the olden
days of rote, book-based instruction, a Massachusetts geography teacher named
Pauline Powers exclaimed in 1938, “No Victrola, no radio, no motion picture, few
newspaper or magazine articles of genuine interest in those days! But how many
aids there are [at] the disposal of the geography teacher of today! Let us mention
just a few of these many agents.” Powers went on to list a variety of visual and
audio and mechanical and non-mechanical media that she had incorporated with
success into her geography lessons, including not only movies, record players,
radio, newspapers, and newsreels, but also student-made scrapbooks, letters to
newspaper editors, stamp collections and pen pal correspondences between stu-
dents (Powers 1938, 275).
Further indicating this shift toward privileging users and a plurality of
media in the classroom, a number of influential educational researchers authored
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teacher-training textbooks in the late 1920s-40s that called for a more pedagogi-
cally-informed praxis of visual education in which teachers, students, and the
curriculum would drive the use of devices, not the other way around. Impor-
tantly, these formulations made room for the new medium of film in instruction
but emphasized that any screenings in school should be anchored in a range of
auxiliary media uses, discussions and activities to promote “active” learning and
critical thought. Anna Verona Dorris, a California educator who served as presi-
dent of the DVI between 1927–29, wrote in Visual Instruction in the Public Schools
that educators must “control and regulate visual education,” particularly the use
of movies, to promote a “more pedagogical use of all visual aids.” Offering a
media litany of her own, she wrote: “Visual aids―photographs, models, exhibits,
charts, graphs, maps, stereographs, slides, and motion pictures―are merely educa-
tional tools to be used at the psychological time.” She warned against “the misuse
and abuse of certain types of visual aids, particularly the film [. . .] [that] must be
attributed largely to the lack of knowledge of modern pedagogy and an overenthu-
siasm regarding the possibilities of new and novel devices” (1928, 38–39; see also
Hoban, Hoban Jr. and Zisman 1937; Dale 1946).
Published in educational journals and declared in speeches at educational
conferences, media litanies were discursive constructs that allowed media-
minded educators to assert their professional agency over emerging technolo-
gies in a time of broad technological change. Such utterances may have been acts
of not only pedagogical theorization but also professional self-preservation: a way
of highlighting the indispensable role of the human teacher in a time when popular
narratives commonly predicted that new technology would render them “obso-
lete.” Describing mediated instruction as a field of endless possibilities achievable
only through the conscious choices and creative actions of teachers and learners,
media litanies allowed educators to push back against characterizations, common
in the press, that they were old-fashioned, change-resistant technophobes while
obliquely staking claims that no single device could handle the work of instruction
on its own.
The contrast between commercial and educational visions of technology in
the classroom was evident in the images of visual education-in-action that these
groups submitted to educational publications. Commercial advertisements for edu-
cational technologies, such as film and slide projectors, unsurprisingly focused on
the devices for sale, highlighting their authoritative, visualizing power and sleek,
mechanical design. Where pictured in these advertisements, the student users of
such devices were often depicted sitting neatly in rows, viewing images on an illu-
minated screen in rapt attention like spectators in a theater (Bell & Howell 1929).
In contrast, educators’ and school administrators’ images of visual education-in-
practice commonly portrayed classrooms and school libraries as chock-a-block
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with heterogeneous mixes of visual and tactile technologies―including wall pic-
tures, charts, maps, projectors, stereoscopes, and collected artifacts―being actively
handled and used by students in a single moment (Dorris 1928, 151, 224; Burrall
1919, 500; Ramsey 1922, 285). These photos have a staged quality to them and may
simply represent an attempt by educators to showcase, in the economy of a single
frame, the variety of items in a school’s collection or on loan from educational
museums. But whether organic or staged, such images celebrating the arrival of
technology into the schoolroom were nonetheless visual analogues of the media
litanies that so often appeared in educators’ writings. They called into focus the
plurality of “devices” available for teaching and ways that users might mobilize
them. Rather than figuring singular new media devices as authoritative solutions
to an array of teaching problems, these images foregrounded the multiple uses
and combinations of an array of high- and low-tech media, and human users as
the commanding orchestrators of their instructive potential.
2 Illustrated Radio, Multimedia Experiments,
and the Promise of “Eye and Ear Instruction”
At the same time that educators were beginning to articulate a multimodal vi-
sion for education, some took part in ambitious efforts to combine and synchro-
nize audio and visual media in their classrooms. In most schools in the 1920s
and 30s, electric audio and visual media were rare, used infrequently and trans-
mitted through separate devices, making it difficult for teachers to apply new
technologies to the vaunted ideal of multisensory learning. The first major tech-
nologies to synchronize visuals with sound―sound films, or “talkies,” and tele-
vision―did not develop until the late 1920s and early 1930s, and both of these
remained out of reach for most schools until after World War II.
Yet some educators made resourceful attempts in the interwar years to mix
sounds, visuals, texts, and other sensory experiences in the pursuit of multisen-
sory instruction, using newly acquired media or devices they already had on
hand. A teacher at a school in Washington, D.C., for example, wrote in 1925 of
an eight-grade class’s project of dramatizing a work of literature by projecting
still images on a screen with their new stereopticon (a two-lens slide projector)
while playing phonograph recordings of classical music in the background and
performing verbal recitations for an audience of their peers (Moore 1925). On
the other side of the country that year, the Oakland Public Schools of California
experimented with improving art instruction through the new medium of radio,
having children draw Christmas cards in their classrooms while listening to a
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“radio teacher” deliver instructions remotely from local station KGO. Reporting
in Radio Digest, an observer of the experiment marveled at how the sounds over
the airwaves conjured up new images in the classroom, created by the young
listeners as they drew: “By radio lessons the children received suggestions through
their ears and sent out the response through eager busy fingers. [. . .] In the child’s
heart and mind alone took place that transmutation which makes out of spoken
word the created image” (Anonymous 1925).
A notable attempt to synchronize mechanically-transmitted sounds and vis-
uals for educational purposes came in the form of “illustrated radio” broadcasts
carried out by city school systems, universities, museums and newspapers in
the 1920s-40s. In 1924, the Chicago-based radio station WMAQ, owned by the
Chicago Daily News newspaper, produced a number of educational programs as
a “public service” to listeners, and developed a novel approach to delivering
remote illustrated lectures to area schools. Partnering with the Art Institute of
Chicago, the radio station broadcast 30-minute lectures on art history while
teachers in multiple public schools, stationed in their classrooms and audito-
riums across the city, screened identical sets of lantern slide images for their
students to view. Students of different schools were thus able to share in a syn-
chronous, illustrated, and remote lecture by listening to a single radio broad-
cast and viewing a common set of projected images at a coordinated time. The
same method would be used again to transmit illustrated talks on geography to
children in the Chicago and surrounding suburban schools in 1927 (Ramsey
1938; Myers 1927).
Illustrated radio techniques were further developed by university radio sta-
tions and extension service educators in the 1930s to provide agricultural edu-
cation to students in rural communities (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1932).
In 1932, the Ohio State University extension service developed a new illustrated
radio lecture format resembling a call-in radio show, utilizing a mix of radio,
filmstrips and the telephone. At a coordinated time, groups of students in rural
classrooms in five different counties viewed identical filmstrips, screened by
local agricultural agents, while tuning into the university radio station, where
an educator delivered a lecture and an assistant operated a filmstrip projector
with the corresponding images. When the lecturer wished to move from one
image to the next, he sounded a gong, signaling both to his projection assistant
in the studio and to the agricultural agents in the five different locations to
move to the next picture in their filmstrips. At the end of the illustrated radio
lecture, each class held a discussion and phoned their questions into the radio
station, where the lecturer answered the questions, for the benefit of all the
groups, over the radio (Hoffman 1932).
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Education by illustrated radio represented a promising development in audio-
visual pedagogy, or what one educational observer called “eye and ear instruc-
tion.” One former high school teacher was so enticed by the prospect of teaching
with illustrated radio that he developed special filmstrips to accompany the popu-
lar educational radio program, The World Is Yours (NBC) in 1938, calling the format
“Radiovision” (Myers 1927; Hoffman 1938). By synchronizing the aural medium of
radio broadcasting with the visual medium of illuminated lantern slide images
and filmstrips, educators, newspapers, and museums produced a technologically-
mediated version of the progressive ideal of multi-sensory instruction envisioned
by Stitt and the Committee on Visual Instruction two decades earlier. The Chicago
lectures arguably lacked the “active” approach to multi-mediated learning that
Stitt and his contemporaries had imagined, as it relegated teachers the role of pro-
jectionists, students to the role of spectators and the distant radio lecturer to the
authoritative role of “master teacher.” But the Ohio lectures included an element
of interactivity and user participation through the incorporation of group discus-
sions and the telephone, which allowed students to call in with their questions
and interact, to a degree, with their remote instructor and peers. Despite these dif-
ferences, illustrated radio experiments comprised ambitious attempts by educators
to combine and synchronize multiple new media technologies to promote a more
engaging and audiovisual learning experience than any single commercial me-
dium could yet provide on its own.
While illustrated radio would soon be eclipsed by educational television after
World War II, at least one urban school system continued to use it as late as 1946.
In Cleveland, Ohio, the public school district-owned radio station, WBOE, broad-
cast art talks by an art teacher while teachers and their students screened accom-
panying sets of colored Kodachrome slides in 64 schools across the city. The
postwar A-V journal See and Hear chronicled this feat of local audiovisual broad-
casting, describing it as “just short of television.” “Television has been called the
ultimate in extending the word and the graphic image into the classroom,” the
editors explained. “Rather than wait [for television], here is a point from which
we can start” (Horton 1946, 48). While it is not entirely clear whether the authors
saw television as a technology to be desired or avoided in the classroom, what is
apparent is that the multimedia sensibility that led to the experimental use of il-
lustrated radio in schools, and that had been developing in the educational field
since the 1910s, emerged at the edges of commercial and mass media develop-
ment, and through educators’ and other institutions’ enterprising attempts to mix
emerging and extant media in pursuit of multisensory learning. By midcentury,
the idea of synchronizing, mixing, and teaching with multiple media at once
would be taken up by the technology industries themselves, and “multimedia”
would move into the mainstream.
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3 From the Schoolroom to the Living Room
In the late 1950s and 1960s, the interest in coordinating multiple media for in-
struction that had been steadily building in the educational field for half a century
was subsumed by a “wave of industrial-electronic futurism” in American industry,
government, and culture, ushered in by Cold War techno-panics, a booming post-
war economy and school-age population, and the popularization of television
(Fletcher 2017). The Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957 prompted the US Con-
gress to pass the National Defense Education Act in 1958, which sought to
help Americans “catch up” with the Soviet Union in science and technology
by allocating significant funds to schools and educational research. The law,
which constituted the largest federal attempt to shape American education to
date (Strain 2005), prioritized research and development in educational tech-
nology and enshrined a distinctively multi-medial vision of it, defining the
“new educational media” as a media litany of “motion pictures, video tapes
and other audio-visual aids, film strips, slides and other visual aids, record-
ings (including magnetic tapes) and other auditory aids, and radio or televi-
sion program scripts” (“National Defense Education Act of 1958” 1958). The
technologization of American education now had the full backing of the fed-
eral government and the moral urgency of staving off nuclear war and ensuring
the triumph of the free world over communism.
One researcher who benefited from the influx of federal support for educa-
tional media was the Canadian communication scholar Marshall McLuhan. Shortly
after the law’s passage, the U.S. Office of Education and the National Association
of Educational Broadcasters commissioned McLuhan to write a report on the state
of new media in education. Working out ideas that would later appear in his clas-
sic Understanding Media (1964) and other works, McLuhan’s “Report on Project in
Understanding New Media” (1960) heralded the arrival of a “multi-media electric
age” and warned that schools needed to adapt to a variety of new media or risk
becoming irrelevant. The spread of television, movies, radio, and computers was
obliterating the divide between formal and informal education, he argued, and
transforming the world into an interconnected “global village” and a “classroom
without walls.” Students should therefore be taught to adopt a “mosaic approach”
to utilizing media and information throughout their everyday lives, learning to
“deal with all media at once in their daily-interaction” (McLuhan and National As-
sociation of Educational Broadcasters 1960; McLuhan and Leonard 1967). Though
McLuhan would popularize this multimedia view of education in his later books
and media appearances, his “Report” reveals how he developed them in dialogue
with an educational sector that had already been grappling the implications of
multiple media in education and society for decades.
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The notion that new technology was obliterating the divide between formal
and informal education was attractive to corporate electronics producers and tech-
nology companies, who mobilized in the post-Sputnik era to develop an array of
new educational products for not only schools, but also homes and workplaces
(Cain 2017). As Curtis Fletcher writes, in the early-to-mid 1960s, virtually every
major electronics manufacturer in the U.S., including Xerox, R.C.A., General Elec-
tric, I.B.M., Honeywell, Westinghouse and Philco-Ford, began to invest in the re-
search and development of educational technologies, with a focus on “multimedia
systems” that incorporated multiple media devices and had multiple instructional
uses. Futuristic advertisements for “homes of tomorrow” and “schools of tomor-
row,” showcasing technologies envisioned but not yet available for sale, depicted
children and parents effortlessly engaging with multi-screen consoles and audio-
visual “education centers” in their everyday activities, including homework, child-
rearing, reading the news, retrieving recipes, watching television and gardening
(Fletcher 2017).
Now, multi-modal and interactive educational technologies were no longer
marginal, relegated to teachers’ grassroots experiments in schoolrooms and audi-
toriums, but a “prominent futurological trope” in American corporate culture, en-
couraging consumers to imagine how a web of new, interconnected technologies
and information flows could enhance multiple domains of their lives. As many
Americans saw it, in contrast to the “closed” societies of the Soviet Union, where
citizens encountered their media through single, state-approved propaganda appa-
ratuses, the expansive, multi-media, andmulti-channel landscape of the U.S. stood
for information freedom, self-directed learning, individualism, enlightenment and
the creation of “free, self-governing individuals.” Liberal media use had come to
be equated with liberalism itself. As Fletcher (2017) and Turner (2013) note, these
techno-utopian visions laid the groundwork for dominant thinking about the
World Wide Web and the vigorous governmental and corporate promotion of dig-
ital technologies, in and outside of schools, in the late 1980s and 1990s. Multime-
dia thinking, or the idea that many media, mixed, and controlled by individual
users and for purposes of teaching and learning, had long ago been articulated
by educators who wished to push back against the notion of undue commercial
influence and single-medium hegemony in education. But it now provided a ped-
agogical, social, and political rationale for a range of consumer devices to flood
into schools and homes.
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Conclusion
Vestiges of educators’ early twentieth-century multimedia visions can still be
seen in the products peddled by the most powerful producers in the digital
economy. At the time of writing, advertisements for computers and mobile digi-
tal devices, such Apple’s iPad and MacBook Air, frequently draw on the idea of
technology conveniently blending together multiple, formerly separate media
functions (e.g., television and movies, music, games, word processing, reading,
correspondence, photos, telephone calls), and assisting users in their ongoing
education, information retrieval, communication and overall empowerment. It
is common now for ads to bring neither the hardware nor the software into
focus but, instead, to render the devices so thin and lightweight (almost like
“air”), their uses (or “applications”) so limitless and the borders between them
so insignificant that they can be effortlessly transcended with a single “swipe”
of a finger or keystroke.1 Now, the user is truly in full command of a fluidly inte-
grated, multisensory mediated experience, with no pesky cords, consoles, reels,
discs, slides, or keyboards to manage. So while the term “multimedia” may not
be as common as it once was, corresponding to a half-century of growth and
consolidation of audio, visual, and digital media industries and products, the
concept is now seamlessly embedded into the idealized uses of our popular media
machines.
The sociotechnical visions that “multimedia” represents exceed the use of
the word itself. Taking root in a historical moment of multiple-media emergence
in the 1910s and 20s, and within an informational institution―the school―that
has long grappled with the threat and promise of technological change, we con-
tinue to feel, see, and hear its effects a century later, absorbed and amplified by
an industry that benefits from the assumption that engaging with a multiplicity
of media in daily life is essential to being an educated citizen.
1 For examples bookending the 2010s, see Apple’s advertisement for the first-generation iPad
at the 2010 Academy Awards “iPad 1 Commercial” (available at: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=U_LceLUFl0U0) and its 2020 advertisement for the iPad Air, “Introducing iPad Air”
(available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r_VSll0WLZE).
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Abstract: Interactivity is a term used in many fields of study including ergonom-
ics, computer science, and psychology. It now refers to a wide variety of features
that are particularly present in digital devices. How did interactivity emerge in
the context of the 1960s as an inseparable quality of computers that paved the
way for personal computing? And how has interactivity become so vital in captur-
ing our attention and clarifying the digital world, a central component in our
daily relationship with our increasingly technologized environment?
Keywords: ergonomics, psychology, affordance, dialogue, HCI
The omnipresence of digital technology in our lives makes interactivity an es-
sential characteristic of the contemporary human condition. Our everyday life is
made up of interactive experiences that are mediated by a digital device and its
interfaces (Vial 2013).
However, much like the notions of “virtual” and “digital,” “interactive” is a
term that has no stable and unambiguous definition over time. There are several
reasons for these shifts in meaning.
Firstly, the word “interactive” can be applied to many different devices and
communication situations (whether or not they involve digital technologies). In
the broadest sense, interactivity refers to a relationship between two or more
agents, human or not, mediated or not by technical means of communication.
The meaning of the term “interactivity,” popularized – as we will see – in the
field of computer science, has evolved along with technical developments: while
it may have been a simple notion in the early days of computing, it has become
more complex as interfaces have benefitted from technological advances.
Lastly, the agents involved in an interactive situation change our view of
what interactivity is. The scientific literature does not emphasize the same char-
acteristics when it examines human-machine, human-human or human-medium
interactions, meaning that ultimately “it is unclear that anyone really knows
what interactivity is” (Liu and Shrum 2002).
It therefore seems futile to attempt to produce a single comprehensive defi-
nition of interactivity. The main objective here will be to show how the concept
of interactivity emerged at the confluence of several theoretical reflections and sta-
bilized in the 1960s with developments in computing (real time, time-sharing, and
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individualization of computer use). We will also see how the term serves as an an-
chor point for several theoretical and disciplinary practices that aim to shed light
on the nature of the relationship between humans and computers.
All things considered, we will try to analyze how the proliferation of inter-
active situations we now experience in our digital lives is leading to a new stage
in the diversification of a term which has come to refer to a wide variety of sit-
uations and objects.
1 Starting Points
The first difficulty lies in the large number of definitions of the term “interactivity.”
The same difficulties apply when attempting to pinpoint when the term emerged.
For Andrew Utterson, the first questions about interactivity emerged in the
1960s and 1970s in the fields of the arts and computer science (Utterson 2013).
The French sociologist Patrice Flichy traces a genealogy starting with North
American interactive television in the 1970s, continuing with the growing con-
vergence between telecommunications and computers and ultimately leading to
the major questions raised in the 1990s by the interactivity between microcom-
puters and users (Flichy 1987). Finally, Pierre Lévy recalls how the interactive
map of the city of Aspen developed at MIT in 1979 played a key role in the birth of
a dynamic relationship between digital artefacts and users (Lévy 1999).
1.1 Emergence of the Term in the Field of Computer Science
In the 1960s in the United States, the use of computers changed radically (Cer-
uzzi 2003). The behemoths of the 1940s were replaced by smaller machines that
became more individual and flexible in their use. Until then, the use of com-
puters in laboratories and businesses was dependent on batch processing. Ma-
chines were supplied with data by means of perforated cards, and computers
were set up to perform lengthy tasks, with each task having to be completed
before another could be started (Taylor 1967).
Interaction with computers was collective (an extensive technical team
worked around one computer, with no one person having full individual re-
sponsibility for the task), sequential (the work had to be performed task by
task) and diachronic (the way in which information would be processed was
planned out before being performed by the computer) (Yost 2017).
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The emergence of computers capable of operating in real time (Utterson
2013) – that is, capable of giving a seemingly immediate response to the user –
radically changed the way in which computers could be used, giving rise to the
concept of interactivity (Bardini 2000).
Computers could now be manipulated individually by a user and operate
on a time-sharing basis (allowing several users to access the computer’s resour-
ces at the same time): this was the advent of the individual’s relationship with
the computer.
That’s when the notion of “dialogue/communication” between the com-
puter and its user appeared. Users now had the impression that they were con-
versing with the machine: they entered instructions on the machine’s keyboard
which were followed by effects (visible on a printer, then on a screen), giving
the impression that they were conducting a conversation with the computer.
The term “interactive computing” appeared in 1967 (Montfort 2016) in an arti-
cle by Robert Taylor, who wondered about the best way to make use of the limit-
less potential of the computer: “Today the question is no longer whether we
should bring interactive computing to the sciences, engineering, law, publishing,
libraries, the government, economics, banking and finance, manufacturing, man-
agement, and education – but how?” (Taylor 1967)
It was at this point that the computer left behind its role as a mere calcula-
tor once and for all; it became an information machine that would allow its
users to manipulate information through logical symbols (Vial 2013).
1.2 A Complex Genealogy
Nevertheless, it would be an anachronism to claim that interactivity itself spawned
reflection about the role that the interactive computer should play in society. It was
not until the late 1960s that considerable attention began to be paid to the conse-
quences of the widespread deployment of computers, and whether or not these
were desirable. The relationship between the machine and its user was central to
these considerations and influenced the way in which interactivity was per-
ceived once the notion emerged in the 1960s. It is possible to identify traces of
a “desire for interactivity” that suggest the existence of a complex, non-linear
genealogy (Deleuze 1983).
Viewed from a long-term perspective, the interactive functions of computers
accelerated the realization of the old dream of “liberation” found in previous
media discourses.
Indeed, as early as the nineteenth century, telegraphy gave rise to the de-
sire for interactive communication between transmitters and receivers. People
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would “meet” at a prearranged time in two telegraph stations a long way from
each other to exchange successive messages and engage in a dialogue that an-
ticipated the immediacy of communication that the telephone would allow a
few years later (Flichy 1991). Games of chess were also played on both sides of
the Atlantic (Müller-Pohl 2013) and, with the advent of electricity, the period be-
tween 1880 and 1925 gave rise to the “first-generation push-button society”
(Plotnick 2018) in which Europeans and Americans became accustomed to ma-
nipulating their newly interactive technical environment. Even today we con-
tinue to “call” the elevator, referring to the action of pressing a button that
generates a technical feedback: the arrival of the elevator.
Literature also saw the emergence of interactive reading experiences: long
before computers, the romantic novel Consider the Consequences! by Doris Web-
ster and Mary Alden Hopkins was published in the United States in 1930, boast-
ing “a dozen or more” different endings depending on the “taste of the individual
reader.” British gamebooks (or Choose Your Own Adventure books) continued
and developed the experience and became world famous before being surpassed
in the Web era with fan fiction.
Within the burgeoning field of computer science, as early as 1945, in an
often-quoted pioneering article (Bush 1945), Vannevar Bush describes an auto-
mated device capable of processing information and putting it “within reach” of
users to increase their intelligence. In 1960, it was Licklider who, in a seminal arti-
cle entitled Man-computer symbiosis (Licklider 1960), summed up the advances
that would be made possible by the spread of connected computing in society.
Bush and Licklider both refer to the benefits of proximity between the com-
puter and the user. Bush envisioned a menu-based description of the “interactive”
parts of a device that were not yet digital but electromechanical (screens, micro-
films, notched wheels, etc.). The aim was to facilitate use of the information stored
on microfilms by presenting it quickly and legibly. Licklider described the com-
puter as having the potential to improve communication between users connected
through networked computers.
In both cases, it was no longer a question of providing information but of
co-constructing it with users and their machines. Interactivity implied a radical
change of orientation that turned the consumer of information into an actor in
its production and circulation.
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1.3 Dialogue as the First Interpretative Framework
for Interactivity
It was thus in the 1960s that interactive computing (based on the use of real-time
processing, personal access to machines and time-sharing) became widespread
and popularized equipment that profoundly changed the way computers were
used, such as Digital Equipment’s PDP-11 (Ceruzzi 2003).
It was also at this point that the first interpretive framework of what digital
interactivity was – or should be – began to emerge: what was the nature of the
relationship between humans and machines now that people were able to type
lines of code on a keyboard that triggered a process on the computer whose re-
sult would be printed or displayed on the screen?
This use of code to interact with computers naturally led to talk about “com-
munication” (“human-machine communication”) or “conversations” (the term
“conversational system,” coined well before the use of artificial intelligence, re-
ferred to the ability of a system to be interrogated by means of a code entered on
a keyboard) and to an understanding of using a computer as akin to engaging in
a “dialogue.”
The “dialogue” metaphor became commonplace, describing the idea of an
autonomous service provided by a machine for a user who was waiting for an
“answer”. It would continue to be used for a long time: microcomputer users in
the 1980s who discovered the joys of programming in Basic spontaneously used
the term and the analogy (Thierry 2012).
The work of cyberneticians from the 1950s onwards (Kline 2015) enhanced
this definition based on the analogy with human conversation by using the con-
cept of feedback to emphasize that in a situation of interactivity the computer’s
capacity to adapt to requests took on a particular importance. The aim was not
to mimic a dialogue by drawing from a stock of predetermined answers but to
adapt dynamically according to an “algorithmic logic” (Vial 2013).
So, interactivity was understood as the ability of a digital device to respond to
the multiple demands of its user in an understandable form (through the screen or
printer) in a dynamic and instantaneous manner. It was this definition that allowed
a first distinction to be made between interactive devices (a computer screen or a
printer) and other devices (such as a television or cinema screen) that, while they
solicit the user’s attention, are not strictly speaking interactive (Vial 2013) because
their content is not affected by the solicitations of their audience.
In the 1960s, this definition opened up new possibilities for the use of com-
puters: John Whitney, who was in residence at IBM from 1966 to 1967, argued that
real time and interactivity should be used as an opportunity for artists to express
themselves more directly through the computer. He used the term “fluidity” to
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describe a relationship between a user and a computer in which creativity was en-
hanced by means of the computer’s interactive functions (Wiberg 2018).
2 New Forms of Interactivity
Everyday users of microcomputers and smartphones know that we generally no
longer interact with our digital environment through command lines.
Accustomed to icons or menus popularized by Apple and the Palo Alto Re-
search Center, interaction with the digital world is now “symbolic” as it was
textual in the early days.
In this context, the dialogue metaphor for interactivity no longer provides
an adequate theoretical framework.
2.1 Symbolic Interactivity
Interactivity based on the manipulation of non-text symbols dates back to the
very early days of computer science. The Semi-Automatic Ground Environment
(SAGE) system, designed in the late 1940s to provide the US Air Force with an
airspace surveillance support system, introduced a form of symbolic interactiv-
ity. Users would select targets on the radar display with a light pen, and the
computer would automatically calculate the location of the target and the inter-
cept trajectory (Machover 1994). Radar operators therefore did not have to use
language to interact with the Whirlwind computer that powered the SAGE sys-
tem (Atkinson 2008) and perform the first “direct manipulation” of a digital ob-
ject on a screen in the history of computing.
Research on graphical interfaces pursued this path of symbolic interactivity
and paved the way for developments in the field of human-machine interaction.
In 1963, Ivan Sutherland programmed Sketchpad, which allowed direct interaction
on the screen using a light pen (Sutherland 1966), following on from the work car-
ried out on SAGE. On December 9, 1968, Douglas Engelbart, a researcher at the
Stanford Research Institute, gave the first “demo” of his OnlineSystem (NLS): a
complete set of symbolic human-computer interaction tools (mouse for on-screen
designation, chord keyboard for macro commands, hypertext links, etc.).
It was on the basis of these pioneering achievements that the Palo Alto Re-
search Center in the 1970s and the American manufacturers of interactive software
thereafter (Apple, Microsoft with Windows, etc.) developed their interactivity re-
gimes based on the desktop metaphor and the designation of symbolic objects on
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the screen to open up microcomputing to as many people as possible in the 1980s
and 1990s.
This was a major turning point in the history of interactivity, as Pierre Lévy
pointed out in an article from the very end of the 1990s: firstly, because the sym-
bolic interface rapidly became widespread, and secondly because it created a
new grammar of interactivity: “In a few decades, all terminals will have sophisti-
cated graphical interfaces. Already a new ideography is being born before our
eyes. Something like dynamic writing based on icons and diagrams” (Lévy 1999).
This grammar of interactivity had its own rules, inertia, and legacies. The resis-
tance of the wastepaper basket that continues to exist on our screens (which
we continue to call “desktops”) shows the capacity for resistance of the office
metaphor that we inherited from the 1970s and which continues to serve as a
semantic frame of reference for our relationship with the deletion of digital
files (which have nothing to do with a sheet of paper).
Another complication in this history of interactivity (which is deliberately
being presented in a non-linear fashion) is the fact that textual modes of inter-
action remain embedded in symbolic modes of interaction: text remains under
our icons for named files, chatbots are becoming widespread thanks to AI and
some devices such as the French Minitel even chose to base their whole interac-
tion regime on text rather than icons in the 1980s and 1990s (Thierry 2015; Scha-
fer and Thierry 2012).
Interaction is thus also an assortment of collective knowledge and practices
that are learned, imitated and ultimately evolve at a much slower pace than the
technology or hardware that supports them: who knows today why an icon
used to save a file still looks like a floppy disk?
2.2 Does Interactivity have Politics?
Winner Langdon’s question Do artifacts have politics? (Langdon 1980) also applies
to interactivity, whose consequences on society are by no means merely technical.
The first issue to mention, closely linked to the question of the role that should
be given to computers in society from the 1960s onwards, was the question of the
role that interactivity should play in empowering users. While the command line
was aimed at computer scientists – members of the “technical elite” – the new in-
teractivity made possible by graphic interfaces opened up the possibility of easier
access for all those who had not mastered programming languages.
It was during the late 1960s and early 1970s that the theme of user-friendliness
as applied to simplified interactivity emerged, thus illustrating the potential
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liberating role of the computer (Bardini 2000) if it was allowed to leave the
laboratory and be usable by everyone.
However, the issue only really came to the fore at the beginning of the
1980s with the advent of micro-computing, which opened up the market for
“neophytes” at work and at home.
But this widespread accessibility was a new notion, and interactivity is like
Janus: although it does suggest a desire for simplification and openness, it also
embraces other values based on a certain elitism and a broader plan to increase
humans’ intellectual capacities through the use of machines.
Douglas Engelbart did not have in mind the simplification of the human-
computer relationship when he developed the mouse and the chord keyboard;
on the contrary, he thought he was helping to “increase” (Engelbart 2012) the
user’s intelligence with complex tools full of new potentialities. His chord key-
board, studied by Thierry Bardini (1998), crystallized these expectations: by al-
lowing complex key combinations that could be used at the same time as the
mouse, it considerably enhanced the possibilities of interaction with digital
content on the screen. At the same time, it made it much more complicated to
manipulate and learn how to use the system. Far from the promise of natural
interactivity made by Apple and the Palo Alto Research Center, interactivity
was seen by some as an enhancement project for certain handpicked users.
The difficulty of the process of interacting with computers (even when graph-
ical interfaces are used) gives rise to several definitions of interactivity as an act
of surpassing oneself. The interface must be mastered, in the same way as the
operation of any tool (Beaudouin-Lafon 2000). Others see it as a process of recip-
rocal adaptation by humans and machines to reach an optimal state of collabora-
tion with a view to the task to be carried out (Dourish 2004).
The challenges posed by the widespread use of computers in the profes-
sional world during the 1970s and 1980s also led to a new kind of technological
humanism driven by developments in ergonomics, an old discipline that was
being given new objectives. From analyzing how manual workers’ bodies could
withstand repetitive machine operation, ergonomists now began studying the
problems facing tertiary-educated workers using computers. By developing new
investigative methodologies, they promoted a “humanistic” approach to the field
of ergonomics, proposing that machines should adapt to humans and not the
other way around. This trend, which is particularly well represented in Europe
(Thierry 2013), sees interactivity as a relationship that must be beneficial to work-
ers and maintains that workers’ needs must govern technical development.
So, there is clearly a political dimension to the definition given to interactiv-
ity. The elitist vision of “augmentation,” the most perfect expression of which
can be found in Engelbart, comes up against the vision of a “soft” interactivity
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in which technology must bear the essential part of efforts to develop users’ un-
derstanding. It is this tendency towards invisibility that we find in Donald Nor-
man’s work. For him the best interface is one that is no longer visible, that
becomes transparent to the user (Norman 1998).
This approach to interactivity is close to the vision of European ergonomics;
it is part of a long tradition of research into work and workers and advocates
the continuous development, in collaboration with workers themselves, of an
interactivity that is perfectly adapted to them (Falzon 2004).
3 An Unattainable Definition in the Age
of the Interactive Society
In 1993, the cover of Newsweek celebrated the “interactive revolution” that was
affecting the way we live, shop, and play. What this consecration of interactivity
by the press shows is above all its generalization in a daily environment in-
creasingly colonized by digital technologies.
Mikael Wiberg takes up this topic by seeing in this abundance of interfaces
a shift from the information society described in particular by Castells (Castells
2004), focused on information storage and processing of data and transactions,
to the interaction society (Wiberg 2005), where contact, networking, and inter-
activity are the decisive factors in our approach to work and leisure.
It is a shift that also explains why the term is increasingly moving beyond
the narrow confines of computer science, where it originated, and being used in
an incredible variety of situations that further obscure the establishment of a
precise definition: “Interactivity . . . has long been associated with the use of
computers that accept user input while a program is running, as opposed to
“batch” computers, which process only preloaded data without interruption. In-
teractive thus came to signify a modern, radically improved technology, usually
in relation to an older one. The industrial rhetoric produced concepts such as
interactive newspapers, interactive video, interactive television, and even inter-
active houses” (Aarseth 1997).
3.1 From Affordances to Faceless Interaction
The generalized use of interactive devices creates a need for a generalized defi-
nition of the term interactivity in academic research. It is in this context that we
see the emergence of a definition of interactivity based on the work of James
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Gibson (1977, 1979), a psychologist and ethologist specializing in human and
animal perception.
For James Gibson and the many human-machine communication specialists
inspired by his work, interactivity refers to the successful use of the affordances
created by the designer of a device to accomplish a given task. These affordances
do not refer to the autonomous invention of a way of using a device by a user, or
to an intrinsic characteristic of the device, but to the series of possibilities for use
“staged” by the designer and identified as such by the user. This vision, which
banishes the idea that there is a “right way of doing things,” is gradually estab-
lishing itself as a framework of thought that makes users actors in their environ-
ment (albeit a digital one), within which the clues created by the designer(s)
allow them to “inhabit” what might be described as an ecological niche (Wino-
grad and Flores 1986). Thus, for Mikael Wiberg, interactivity is the sum of the ma-
terial elements put at the service of an interactive design project (Wiberg 2018).
Interactivity as “experience” is another definitional framework used in the
context of the profusion of interactive devices that we have been witnessing
since the 1980s. By focusing on the user’s experience to define what interactiv-
ity is (McCarthy and Wright 2007), the idea that there is a single way to interact
with one’s environment is abandoned and the concept of interactivity is en-
hanced by taking into account the user’s perspective, giving rise to an approach
that has become known as experience design (Laimay 2017).
These definitions make it possible to go beyond the initial definitional frame-
work of interactivity, one that has proven to be too narrow in light of the subse-
quent proliferation of possibilities for interaction with an increasingly rich digital
environment. Today, we study situations of “faceless interaction” in the material
sense of the term, such as those that can be experienced with a voice assistant
(Janlert and Stolterman 2017).
These framework variations show the extent to which developments affect-
ing devices and their use (from text to symbol, from hardware to voice interfa-
ces, etc.) have fueled debates about the nature of interactivity.
As many authors have observed, these developments are driven by technol-
ogy. As is often the case in the digital field, the power of manufacturers and the
strength of the market give the impression that theory lags behind innovation.
3.2 Interactivity as a Broad Framework for Interpreting
a Digital World
It was also during the period from 1970 to 2000 that the term “interactivity”
began to be used to refer to various situations of communication or bringing
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people together, going far beyond the initial definition of interactivity between
humans and computers.
The vagueness that surrounds the term has played a key role in this extension
of meaning: “The word interactive operates textually rather than analytically, as it
connotes various vague ideas of computer screens, user freedom, and personal-
ized media, while denoting nothing” (Aarseth 1997).
3.2.1 Interaction, Freedom of Choice, and Consumerism
The growth in television offerings in the United States in the 1970s can be seen
as a first stage in the generalization of the use of the term “interactivity” (or the
qualifier “interactive”) outside the field of information technology.
The possibility of choosing content (Video on Demand, Replays or home
shopping (Harrelson 1975) gave rise to a multiplication of discourses promoting
the interactivity that television, traditionally considered as a passivity-inducing
medium, now made it possible to practise (Galbreath 1996).
As early as 1977, experiments were carried out in the field of cable television in
Reading, Rockford and Spartanburg and then with the Qube project in the United
States. Qube was an experimental cable television system that played an important
role in the history of American interactive television. Launched in Columbus, Ohio,
on December 1, 1977 (Greene 1979), the Qube experiment, which was heavily
publicized as a revolutionary and “interactive” breakthrough, allowed viewers
to discover several concepts that later became essential: pay-per-view pro-
grams, specialized cable television networks and so-called “interactive” services
such as weather forecasts and teleshopping, the latter becoming ubiquitous in
the mid-1980s with the Home Shopping Network (HSN).
However, choosing between several feature films on a pay-TV channel or
selecting an item in a teleshopping program is not a matter of interactivity, de-
spite the promotional rhetoric of “interactive television” in the 1970s and 1980s,
but an act of content consumption. Unlike browsing a mail-order website, where
it is the browsing itself that constitutes the interactive situation, buying on a tele-
shopping channel, even if the choice of objects is unlimited, is nothing other
than an act of consumption that is no different from the way in which we previ-
ously chose items from catalogues delivered by post.
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3.2.2 Communication or Interaction
Media analysis (following the work of James Carey, one of the fathers of cul-
tural studies in the United States, or Stuart Hall’s theory of “active recep-
tion” (Hall 1980)) also uses the concept of “interactivity” as a way to refer to
a wide variety of situations. Authors such as Henry Jenkins, however, warn
against this lack of differentiation, maintaining that a distinction must be
made between “communication” and “interactivity” because the former is
social and the latter is technological: “For Jenkins the distinction is between
technological and social protocols – technical versus social code.” (Thor-
burn and Jenkins 2004 cited in Andrejevic 2016).
It is this blurring of boundaries that, in the 1990s, allowed the term “inter-
activity” to come to designate all communications (often mediated by digital
networks) between individuals or organizations (especially businesses) and
consumers or customers. In the early 1990s, Blattberg and Deighton defined it
as the ability for an organization or an individual to encounter another market
player without geographical distance or time being a factor thanks to new
communication tools (Blattberg and Deighton 1991).
Advertising and its market, as reconfigured by the arrival of the Web, suggest
a similar analysis. Advertisers are more interested in how technology can be used
to add value to the communication process (Johnson, Bruner, and Kumar 2006)
than in interactivity itself. Measuring the reception of an advertising message
within a community of potential online buyers, possibly interviewing them, is
not strictly speaking a question of interactivity; instead, it allows old survey
methods to be passed off as modern.
Digital networks certainly give the impression that a vast, borderless global
market opened up in the 1990s and that interactivity (here meaning “communi-
cation” or “advertising”) has become the rule in a globalized society where the
freedom to choose a product is an interactive act.
3.2.3 Interaction and Involvement
As we have just seen, the rapid emergence of the Web and its participatory di-
mension are leading to a further blurring of the boundaries between technical
and social interactivity. In her analysis of “participatory” journalism (Usher
2014), Nikki Usher shows how technology, through the tools used in editorial
offices and by readers, is transforming readers into agents of interaction with
online content rather than mere passive consumers: “Interactivity is a concept
long used in scholarship about user-to-computer interaction, and it helps explain
88 Benjamin Thierry
on a broader level the new capacity of users to control the way content is selected
or presented to them, whether text, audio, video, multimedia, or something else”
(Usher 2014)
What we see here is a confusion between “interactivity” and “participa-
tion.” Andrejevic warns against this dilution of the specificity of the two terms:
“Technically, participation simply means “to take part” in” (Andrejevic 2016).
The fundamental difference lies in the fact that participation, unlike interactivity,
does not imply a series of reciprocal actions to which actors must mutually adapt.
People who leave comments on the sites of major online newspapers often get an-
noyed by this: their comments are rarely taken into account or do not elicit an-
swers from editorial staff. What is more, the idea of articles written in equal parts
by journalists and readers has yet to be explored.
3.3 The Essence of Interaction: Video Games
Video games, the first examples of which date back to the 1950s in American
laboratories (we can cite Alexander Douglas’ OXO game on Edvac in 1952 or
Willy Higinbotham’s Tennis for Two at Brookhaven National Laboratories in
1958), can be seen as a remarkably pure embodiment of what interactivity is.
Based entirely on a combination of sensory-motor and intellectual chal-
lenges (acting at the right moment in a thoughtful way) (Triclot 2011), the video
game is inhabited by what Löwgren and Stolterman define as a “dynamic ge-
stalt”: “One of the first attempts to conceptualize interaction, that of Löwgren
and Stolterman (2004), provides the important cornerstone that we can use to
think about interactive artifacts not only in terms of a user interface and input/
output modalities but also of an interactive system’s ‘dynamic gestalt’.” Löwgren
and Stolterman suggest that through interaction an artifact reveals its dynamic
gestalt. For instance, a classic arcade-style computer game reveals different lev-
els, monsters, obstacles, and challenges along the way as the user continues to
interact with the game (Wiberg 2018). The only goal of video games is to offer
interactive situations (even narrative-based video games, in which the player is
more often passive, offer an interactive challenge at their heart). Unlike word
processing software, for example, the interactivity of a video game is not instru-
mentalized by an external objective (writing a text, producing a document and its
layout in the case of word processing), but finds its raison d’être in itself: to play
is to interact (Vial 2013).
It is for these reasons that video games are used today as a frame of reference
for improving other interfaces, such as those of professional software or online
services. This approach is called “gamification”: “at the core of gamification are
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interactive game mechanisms adapted to nongame systems” (Marache-Francisco
and Brangier 2015).
There are two major trends in software development that are influenced
by gaming today. The first is the revival of symbolic codes that refer to video
games (like representing an order of magnitude in gold coins, which is an ob-
vious nod to all fans of games about dungeons and treasures). This shows just
how much the video game has become a heavyweight in our digital cultures:
its symbols are spreading and becoming an unavoidable reference.
The second trend is the implementation in software of a logic similar to that
found in video games. Gratuities for tasks carried out by a professional (score,
badges, etc.) are part of this logic, as well as the playful scripting of tasks (in
serious games for example).
While interactivity initially focused on how to improve working practices
using a computer, video games have made interactivity a central element of our
leisure time.
Conclusion
“An interaction, grossly speaking, is a transaction between two entities, typi-
cally an exchange of information, but it can also be an exchange of goods or
services” (Sharp et al. 2019).
To avoid the vagueness of an overly general definition of interaction and in-
teractivity that would have the merit of applying to all situations but would not
allow us to think about the particularities of the concept, we opted for a historical
approach to show how the meanings given to the term have changed over time.
The sweet spot of this history is the 1960s. The development of computer
science, allowing personal use of computers (with the advent of real time, time-
sharing, and human-machine interfaces) paved the way for the emergence of
interactivity as a concept and an issue. At that stage, interactivity referred to
the user’s involvement in the algorithmic functioning of the computer. Seen by
computer scientists from the angle of a “dialogue” or “conversation,” interactiv-
ity then became an issue for psychologists and ergonomists as computers began
to pass from the hands of staff trained in their use (computer scientists, the “tech-
nical elite”) to those of office workers or the general public at home.
It was during the period from the 1970s to the 2000s that the main efforts were
made to theorize interactivity. “Dialogue,” human-machine “symbiosis” and “ex-
perience” became conceptual frameworks for thinking about interactivity and
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the ever-increasing number of interactive devices colonizing our workplaces
and homes.
In this chronology that sees the term interactivity becoming richer and more
diversified, another trend is perceptible, namely the move from technical interac-
tivity to social interactivity. This shift in meaning is not a novelty in itself: as we
have pointed out, interactivity is one of the obvious characteristics of interper-
sonal communication.
Used in the context of television offerings, advertising, online journalism,
and the new status given to readers more generally on the Web, the meaning of
the term is becoming blurred and its boundaries are becoming fuzzy. Our era is
one of interactivity. Web 2.0, participatory journalism, even online sales, every-
thing has become interactive.
The video game, however, is there to remind us that the original sense of
the term interactivity – and it is important not to stray too far from this notion –
is the relationship established between the user and the algorithmic logic of a
digital device that allows an original creation through successive stages of co-
construction.
The importance of this definition, which may seem narrow compared to the
many other uses that can be made of the term “interactivity,” is its fecundity
when it comes to the consequences of this relationship between user and
computer.
It is this experience of interactivity that lies at the heart of the ongoing fas-
cination for screens and their ability to be powerful “attention sensors” (Vial
2013) on which reflections about attention and the attention economy are based
(Citton 2014).
It is also the ability to create using interactive tools that underpins the prac-
tice of digital arts, from pixel art to mash up (Miller 2007) and the creation of
movie sets.
Politically, interactivity is not neutral, as we have pointed out. It reveals a
sharing of power between designers, machines and users. At a time when AI is
on the rise, it is more important than ever to reflect on this triad: what freedom
is given to users of interactive systems? Is a system still “interactive” when arti-
ficial intelligence guides the choices made?
Finally, at the broader level of digital anthropology, in the space of a few
years interactivity as an experience has probably become one of the most note-
worthy features of our relationship with the world. We are surrounded by devi-
ces that interact with us. Robotics gives them an anthropomorphic aspect that
allows us to identify them, dream about them, and sometimes fear them. But
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voice assistants and automatons in supermarkets, airports, and public transport
are all “robots” too. Their capacity for interaction changes our relationship with
the world.
For all these reasons, interactivity, however difficult it may be to define, is
of vital importance for social sciences. It deserves our full attention – if we still
have any left over.
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Artificial Intelligence
Reframing Thinking Machines Within the History of Media
and Communication
Abstract: Beginning with a critical exploration of the canonical histories of AI, this
chapter stresses how the history of communication and media research may con-
tribute to existing historiographies of AI. Four key aspects of the long-standing re-
lationship between communication, media, and AI are discussed: the cross-history
of communication theory (especially cybernetics) and AI, the early development of
AI and human-computer interaction, the relevance of media and science fiction
narratives in AI research and imaginaries, and the role of games in shaping inter-
action with AI software as communication between humans and machines. Rely-
ing on an historical and critical discussion of these four aspects, we claim that
reconsidering the history of AI does not only contribute to the historiography of
the field but adds more ground for rethinking and discussing the theoretical foun-
dations of communication and media studies at large.
Keywords: artificial intelligence, communication research, media history, histo-
riography of AI, media studies
With the emergence of technologies such as voice assistants, chatbots, and com-
municative robots, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is today increasingly discussed as a
medium of communication. Scholars have recently argued that the development
and impact of AI should be reassessed by bringing the question of communication
to the center stage as AI raises new questions about the nature of communication
itself, considering that communication theory has long since mostly focused on
human-human communication (Guzman and Lewis 2019; Gunkel 2020; Hancock,
Naaman, and Levy 2020). At the same time, in public forums, widely discussed
phenomena, including the ubiquity of voice assistants such as Apple’s Siri and
Amazon’s Alexa or the use of bots on social media to manipulate political cam-
paigns, have attracted attention to the many challenges raised by contempo-
rary AI. The quest for “ethical AI” – one of the most important transdisciplinary
intellectual debates in recent years – is thus deeply connected with the promi-
nence of AI in cultural and communication phenomena.
However, few efforts have been made to reframe the relationship between AI
and communication as part of the wider history of communication and media.
This chapter aims to fill this gap by more firmly contextualizing the history of AI
Open Access. ©2021 Paolo Bory, et al., published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed
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through the lenses of media and communication history. Feeding into likeminded
efforts that consider communication phenomena as central to the development of
AI (e.g., Ekbia 2008), we aim to show that historicizing communication and AI is
essential to understanding contemporary AI technologies that engage in dialogue
and communication with users. As we will show, the close relationship between
communication and AI is neither a novelty nor a recent evolution in this field: it
accompanied AI from its very inception. As Gunkel (2020, 7) notes, “communica-
tion – and not just verbal communication through the manipulation of language
but also various forms of nonverbal behaviors – is fundamental to defining and
detecting intelligence.”
In order to meet this goal, the chapter first looks at how the historiography of
AI has hitherto been written and disseminated, and how a more specific focus on
the role of communication and media may contribute to existing approaches.
Then, the chapter examines four key aspects of the long-standing liaison between
communication and AI: the cross history of communication theory (especially cy-
bernetics) and AI, the early development of AI and human-computer interaction
in parallel lines, the role of media narratives in science fiction and popular cul-
ture, and the role of games in shaping interaction with AI software as communi-
cation between humans and machines. In conclusion, we point to the fact that
reconsidering the history of AI does not only contribute to the historiography of
AI but adds more ground for rethinking and discussing the theoretical founda-
tions of communication and media studies.
1 Beyond Canonical Histories
With the pace of technological change constantly accelerating, the history of AI,
whose emergence is usually situated in the 1950s, already seems quite old. There
is a universe (or two) between W. Grey Walter’s 1948 Machina speculatrix – a
purely analogue robot tortoise showing “some degree of self-awareness” (Nilsson
2010, 24) – and today’s digital chatbots. In this context, it is difficult to recast artifi-
cial intelligence into the broader history of “intelligent machines” and non-human
forms of intelligence, which can be traced back to the origins of the human
species. To put it differently, while AI was not invented before the 1950s, it had
many precursors, some famous and others forgotten. As Nilsson (2010) rightly
claimed, the long history of AI begins with dreams such as self-propelled chairs
(as in Homer’s Iliad) and ivory statues coming to life (as in Ovid’s Metamorpho-
ses). Non-Western literatures and oral traditions also abound with examples of
imagined forms of non-human and artificial intelligence and these many objects
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and narratives irrigated the western imagination for centuries (Truitt 2020). The
historiography of artificial intelligence mentions many of these precursors, includ-
ing Ramond Lull’s thirteenth century Ars Magna, Leonardo da Vinci’s fifteenth cen-
tury robot knight, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, Blaise Pascal’s seventeenth century
calculator (the “pascaline”), and Jacques de Vaucanson’s eighteenth century so-
phisticated mechanical duck (Nilsson 2010; Dyson 1997; Russell and Norvig 1995;
Riskin 2003).
Such a pantheonization testifies to the prevalence of a teleological and
chronological approach to the history of the AI, which is essentially the history
of technical progress achieved or envisioned by great minds. Mirroring broader
dynamics in the history of computing (Campbell-Kelly 2007), the first scholarly
book-length studies about the history of AI were mostly written from the view-
point of computer scientists directly involved in the development of the field.
Pamela McCorduck’s pioneering work is mostly based on interviews conducted
with “founders” of the field such as Marvin Minsky and Allen Newell, who also
made detailed comments on the manuscript. Among others, Daniel Crevier and
Nils Nilsson made successful careers in AI before writing influential histories of
the field focusing on key American and British scientists. In as early as 1983,
Newell (2000, 25) himself highlighted the danger of such a kind of historical
work, writing that “the accuracy of the participant observer is at least tinged
with bias, if not steeped in it”. He then envisioned the development of historical
works focusing on “intellectual issues” that are still largely to be written.
When exploring the historiography of AI, it is imperative to keep in mind
that a distinctive feature of AI is the centrality of discursive practices. As Ekbia
remarks, “what makes AI distinct from other disciplines is that its practitioners
‘translate’ terms and concepts from one domain into another in a systematic
way” (2008, 5). In this respect, the historiography of AI is at least partly a trans-
lation process aimed at people outside the field. While AI becomes increasingly
integrated in our daily lives and raises many important political and philosoph-
ical questions, these narratives have complex strategic implications. Not only
do they legitimize specific actors and technologies, set boundaries, inform and
fascinate the public, but they are also tracing a path from the past to a future
largely defined by these narratives.
According to the canonical narrative, the emergence of AI as a full-fledged
field of research coincided with the organization of three meetings in 1955 (Ses-
sion on Learning Machines, Western Joint Computer Conference, Los Angeles),
1956 (Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, Dartmouth College)
and 1958 (Mechanization of Thought Processes, National Physical Laboratory,
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UK).1 AI is mostly associated with the work of American and British “founding
fathers” such as John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Allen Newell, Herbert A. Simon
and Alan Turing. In some respect, this “canonical narrative” is similar to the re-
ceived “standard” history of media and communication research according to
which Wilbur Schramm, Harold Lasswell, Kurt Lewin, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Carl
Hovland were the “founding fathers” of this field (Rogers 1994; Schramm 1997).
Recently, new approaches to disciplinary history exposed the strategic functions
of this form of storytelling which is common to many young disciplines establish-
ing their legitimacy and tracing their boundaries (Pooley 2018). In line with the
work of Ekbia and others – who emphasized the communication phenomena that
are central to the field of AI – and the development of critical approaches to the
history of media and communication, this chapter recasts the development of AI
into the history of media and communication. Rather than proposing a History of
AI, we more modestly propose media and communication studies as one of the
possible standpoints for exploring the history – or better said, histories – of AI.
2 From Feedback to Communication Theory:
Cybernetics, AI and Communication
The field of communication and media research owes a great debt to cybernet-
ics. While media and communication research certainly predates cybernetics, it
is only with cybernetics, defined by Norbert Wiener (1948) as the “science of
control or communication in the animal and the machine,” that communication
became a central concern across disciplines and that “communication theory”
and its key concepts (feedback, noise, entropy, signal, etc.) were defined (Shan-
non 1949).
One of the key features of AI is “feedback control,” that is the capacity of a
machine to use its output as an input in order to “behave” autonomously. These
mechanisms are not exactly new. Two thousand years ago, Byzantine lamps were
equipped with a float regulator to maintain a constant level of oil, as the floater
1 The canonical narrative of AI history has faced numerous critiques. While Dreyfus (1965,
1972) ridiculed the teleological accounts put forward by AI scientists and historians, Collins
(1992) debunked the claims and promises of AI and argued that machines can only be “intelli-
gent” in areas where humans behave like machines. Edwards (1997) critically recast the devel-
opment of the field in the context of the Cold War’s political context and strategic imperatives.
There are also local histories of AI in particular labs (Hounshell 1997), specific countries (Cha-
mak 2004) or subfields (de Mantaras and Arcos 2002).
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would open or close the flow of oil in the lamp. While feedback mechanisms
have been well-known for centuries, it is only with cybernetics that feedback be-
came a well formalized theory of self-regulation and a field of scientific inquiry.
The contribution of cyberneticians was not only at the theoretical level as they
also invented many “intelligent” machines using feedback control such as Ross
W. Ashby’s mobile homeostat, Norbert Wiener’s “Moth,” Claude Shannon’s “The-
seus” mouse, and W. Grey Walter’s aforementioned tortoise.2 These works bridg-
ing feedback theory and its applications were of great importance in the early
days of AI as they were a starting point for imagining other forms of intelligent
machines. The work of Claude Shannon (1950, 1953) – which describes logic ma-
chines, game-playing machines, learning machines, Turing machines, and Von
Neumann machines – was of particular importance in this regard.
Cyberneticians were also among the first to observe similarities between the
brain and engineered devices (Ashby 1952). As Arbib (1972) shows, the central
metaphor of AI (the brain as a machine / the machine as a brain) can easily be
traced back to cybernetics. With this metaphor, cybernetics proposed a new an-
swer to the old philosophical question on the nature of machines. Do machines
have purpose? And intelligence? For centuries, the standard Cartesian answer
was to distinguish between mind and matter. In 1943, two of the founding articles
of cybernetics formulated a different answer, arguing that purpose can be in-
stilled in machines by feedback (Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow 1943; McCul-
loch and Pitts 1943). This answer was widely adopted by AI scientists who had
“not provided any qualitatively different argument” (Newell 2000, 30). In the
early days of AI, the brain was considered the model for building intelligent ma-
chines as the neural activity of the brain was to be imitated or replicated by the
electrical pulses of a computer. Nowadays, this homology is still central in various
AI branches, including “brain-computer interfaces,” a field of research dedicated
to connecting the human brain with intelligent machines. Elon Musk’s Neuralink
project is among the most prominent experimentations in “brain-computer interfa-
ces”, which is widely considered as the new frontier of AI (Touzet 2017).
Cybernetics was also central to the debate, now mostly forgotten, which ani-
mated the early days of AI: were computers to be analog or digital? In the 1940s,
analog computers were representing quantities by means of physical variables
(mostly electrical) while digital computers represented quantities by discrete state.
2 Ashby’s homeostat (1948) was a set of four interconnected machines exchanging informa-
tion (feedback) in order to achieve homeostasis (see Pickering 2010). Wiener’s “moth” (1949)
was an automated mobile tricycle integrating feedback to guide its movement. Shannon’s The-
seus (1950) was a mechanical mouse enabled to learn its path through a labyrinth.
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The distinction between analog and digital was widely discussed at each of the
ten Macy conferences on cybernetics. If a complete synthesis of these discussions
falls beyond the scope of this chapter, cyberneticians were mostly convinced that
analog and digital were equally important and that their uses depended on the
specific nature of the problem under consideration (Pias 2005). However, history
and technology eventually resolved this problem. By the 1970s, the progress in
digital signal processing was so important that it became evident that computers
were digital, and analog computing only survived as a marginalized subfield of
electrical engineering. From then on, computer science (the science of digital
computers) and electrical engineering were clearly distinct fields, and enthusi-
asm for cybernetics, as an interdisciplinary field studying analog and digital sys-
tems, fizzled out. As Allan Newell remarks, the development of AI, an important
subfield of computer science, was characterized by “the loss of an analytical
point of view, in which the contrast between analog and digital computation is
taken as a starting point for asking what sort of information-processing the ner-
vous system does [. . .]. This style of analysis belongs to the world of cybernetics
and not to that of AI” (Newell 2000, 34).
The divorce between cybernetics and AI was not abrupt and required many
years of “boundary work” by AI researchers (Kline 2015). During the 1956 Dart-
mouth conference on artificial intelligence, which is highly regarded as a found-
ing moment in AI history, this distinction between AI and cybernetics was not at
all clear. Most of the 20 researchers participating in the conference had deep ties
with cybernetics. While Claude Shannon’s work is obviously a central pillar of
cybernetics, and the names of Julian Bigelow, William Ross Ashby, Herbert Simon,
and Warren S. McCulloch are closely associated with cybernetics, other profes-
sional, personal or intellectual ties are little-known. As a graduate student at MIT,
Oliver Selfridge proofread Wiener’s Cybernetics. Marvin Minsky also studied at
MIT, where he discovered the work of McCulloch with great interest, and he later
worked with Shannon at Bell Labs simultaneously with McCarthy (Kline 2015).
According to John McCarthy, the main organizer of the Dartmouth conference,
the label “artificial intelligence” was then consciously selected as a means “to es-
cape the association with cybernetics” and “to avoid having either Wiener as a
guru or having to argue with him” (McCarthy cited in Nilsson 2010, 78). Another
reason for using the then-new term was to distinguish the matter of the conference
from a narrower focus on automata, which was that of the book McCarthy co-
edited the same year with Shannon, Automata Studies, a book that “still seemed
part of an integrated subject that might be called cybernetics” (Arbib 1987, 6).
Another possible reason to escape the association with cybernetics stemmed
from the strong association between cyberneticians and the Cold War’s military-
industrial complex (Edwards 1997). Likewise, AI was and still is attracting billions
100 Paolo Bory, Simone Natale and Dominique Trudel
for defense and military related projects (Allen and Chan 2017), although public
discourse, for obvious reasons, mostly emphasizes the conviviality of virtual as-
sistants, the promises of autonomous vehicles and the exploits of chess software.
The coming to life of communication research, in the early 1950s, followed a simi-
lar pattern by abandoning earlier labels such as “propaganda” and “psychologi-
cal warfare” (Simpson 1994).
This cross-history of cybernetics, communication research and AI is quite
interesting from the standpoint of media and communication theory and his-
tory. The field of AI was built on the refusal of a specific discussion (about the
merit of analog versus digital feedback) with Wiener and other pioneers of cy-
bernetics. If this discussion did not occur during the Dartmouth conference, cy-
bernetics and cyberneticians were nevertheless “present.” As McCarthy himself
remarked, “If certain scientists were not present at the conference, their spirit
was represented by their work, and sometimes by their colleagues and students.
I think here of Norbert Wiener and his work on cybernetics, Warren McCulloch
and Walter Pitts [. . .] John von Neumann, and to a lesser extent, Alan Turing”
(McCarthy cited in McCorduck 1979, 113). This reference to the “spirits” of cyber-
neticians is maybe the best way to summarize the complicated relationship be-
tween cybernetics and AI, a field so haunted by cybernetics that it often prefers
to ignore its old demons.
3 Human-computer Interaction and AI: The Turing
Test as a “Communication Game”
Considering the centrality of communication in the theoretical frameworks that
underpinned the emergence of AI, from cybernetics to information theory, it is
surprising how little space is given to the problem of communication in the
most authoritative histories of the field (e.g. Crevier 1993; McCorduck 1979).
This was probably a consequence of the disciplinary distinction that emerged in
the 1970s and 1980s but was also applied retrospectively to the early develop-
ment of AI: the separation between AI and human-computer interaction (HCI).
In most discussions among experts in the field as well as in the general public,
AI was mainly conceived as having to do with the definition of intelligence. The
fact that intelligence is strongly related to communication – as cybernetics but
also much of the psychological literature (Boden 2006; Bateson 2000) suggest –
was not usually given sufficient attention. The problem of communication be-
tween humans and machines was mainly restricted to a separate discipline
Artificial Intelligence 101
within computer science, HCI, which aimed at improving the processes of inter-
action and communication between users and computers (Grudin 2006).
Nevertheless, the extent to which this separation is arbitrary is evident not
only in the contemporary diffusion of communicative AI systems, from voice as-
sistants to companion robots and chatbots, but also in the early history of AI.
Let us look for instance at the Turing Test, proposed by British polymath Alan
Turing (1950). In his thought experiment, Turing imagined that a computer
would be programmed to engage in conversation with a human user through
written communication; the machine would have passed the Turing Test if able
to trick the user into believing it was not a computer program but a “real”
human. While the Turing Test has been mainly discussed as a problem regard-
ing the definition of intelligence (Shieber 2004), one may more accurately de-
scribe it as a problem of communication (Gunkel 2018). In fact, the test does not
measure the machine’s cognitive ability per se, but rather the perception that
human users have of it. In this sense, the Turing Test for the first time made
clear that AI is a matter of communication.
In designing the test, Turing felt the need to include actual details about how
humans and machines would engage in communication. In 1950, when Turing
published his paper, computers were mostly calculating tools and interactions be-
tween human users and computers were minimal (Ceruzzi 2003); he therefore
imagined a system of human-machine communication that did not exist at the
time. To ensure the validity of the Turing Test, the interrogator needed to commu-
nicate with both human and computer players without receiving any hints about
their identity other than the contents of their messages. Communications between
humans and computers in the test were thus meant to be anonymous and disem-
bodied (Enns 2019). In the absence of video displays and even input and output
devices such as the electronic keyboard, Turing imagined that the answers to the
judge’s inputs “should be written, or better so, typewritten,” the ideal arrangement
being “to have a teleprinter communicating between the two rooms” (Turing 1950,
434). Turing’s solution shows an acute sense of the role of technical media in com-
munication, considering how telegraphic transmission and the typewriter mecha-
nized the written word, making it independent from its author (Gitelman 1999;
Kittler 1999). The Turing Test’s model of technological mediation allowed com-
puters and human actors to participate in the experiment as pure content, or to
use a term familiar to communication theory, as pure information. In this sense,
the Turing Test was not so much, or not only, an “Imitation Game,” as Turing ini-
tially labelled it, but also and perhaps especially a “Communication Game” (Natale
2021).
In spite of all the arbitrary distinctions between AI and the areas of computer
sciences that engage directly with the problem of communication, such as Human-
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Computer Interaction and Computer-Mediated Communication, Turing’s intuition
that AI was also a matter of communication resonates in the subsequent evolution
of the field. In laboratories and research centers across the US, Europe, Russia,
and Japan, the goal to create “intelligent” machines went together with the objec-
tive of implementing interactive systems ensuring wider and more functional en-
gagement with computers. This was openly acknowledged by computer scientists
of the time, who considered human-machine systems within the remit of AI. MIT’s
AI pioneer Marvin Minsky, for instance, apologized in a 1961 paper for the fact that:
we have discussed here only work concerned with more or less self-contained problem
solving programs. But as this is written, we are at last beginning to see vigorous activity
in the direction of constructing usable time-sharing or multiprogramming computing sys-
tems. With these systems, it will at last become economical to match human beings in
real time with really large machines. (. . .) In the years to come, we expect that these
man-machine systems will share, and perhaps for a time be dominant, in our advance to-
ward the development of ‘artificial intelligence’. (Minsky 1961, 28)
Notwithstanding Minsky’s prediction, it is only recently that the centrality of
communication in AI has become fully evident to computer scientists as well as
to communication and media scholars (Guzman and Lewis 2019; Gunkel 2020).
Yet, the history of AI shows that the division between AI and human-computer
interaction is the fruit of a retrospective partition rather than an organizing
principle useful to understanding the evolution of the field. As practical AI sys-
tems were developed and implemented, researchers and developers were forced
to face the reality that the social and cultural dynamics foregrounding human
communication also inform the outcomes of AI (Suchman 2007). The commit-
ment to the dream of creating thinking machines could never be fully separated
from the question of what happens when “intelligent” systems enter into com-
munication with human users (Natale 2021).
Not only practical developments in the field but also in the popular imagi-
nation conceived AI as indivisible from the problem of developing socially mean-
ingful communications between machines and humans. Science fiction is often
dismissed as detrimental to a proper understanding of AI, especially because
many fictional explorations of AI give excessive emphasis to the problem of con-
sciousness, which is irrelevant to the most practical achievements of AI. Yet, as
Luke Goode (2018) recently argued, popular culture and the circulation of “evoca-
tive stories” have been instrumental to facilitating public engagement with many
important questions related to a complex, technical subject such as AI. In fact, as
the next section conveys, popular media’s engagement with AI has often pro-
vided a powerful invitation to return over and over to the spirit of the Turing
Test – intended first and foremost as a “Communication Game.”
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4 Narratives, Science Fiction, and the Media
Imaginaries of AI
As noted above, thinkers and scientists have been often fascinated with the imagi-
nary of “thinking machines.” As scholars from media and technology studies, but
also from film and literary studies, have aptly shown, science and fiction have
maintained a mutual and complex relationship in this regard, which precedes
even the formulation of the Turing Test (see Cave et al. 2020). Despite the clear
difference between the scientific method and the realms of fiction and imaginary,
the history of AI cannot be separated from the history of media and communica-
tion research also because AI has always been narrated, imagined, and presented
by and through media narratives, and especially in science fiction (SF) narratives.
Importantly, the same emphasis on the role of communication that characterizes
AI history is also a crucial feature of the fictional imaginaries through which AI
was represented and constructed in the realm of popular culture.
Think, for instance, of the persistence in the imaginary of old characters and
machines like the Mechanical Turk of Wolfgang von Kempelen, the fake chess au-
tomaton created in the eighteenth century whose name has been used by Amazon
to market its famous crowdsourcing platform. Or the persistence of a SF classic in
the social imaginary: HAL 9000, the cruel AI imagined by Arthur C. Clarke and
made famous by Stanley Kubrick in his masterpiece 2001 A Space Odyssey (1968) –
whose creation benefited from the insights of AI pioneer Marvin Minsky, who
acted as advisor for the film (Broussard 2018). Almost 30 years after the release of
the movie, the red eye of HAL 9000 was used to advertise the famous human-
machine challenge between the chess world champion Garry Kasparov and IBM’s
Deep Blue.
Like the flashing eyes of Fritz Lang’s robot inMetropolis (1927) or the insensi-
tive eyes of the androids in Blade Runner (Scott 1982), HAL 9000’s red eye sym-
bolically captures one of the most relevant debates on AI: the potentials but also
the risks evoked by the rise of a future intelligent, or even super-intelligent, artifi-
cial being (Bostrom 2012). Such concerns, extensively addressed in SF literature,
recently led to the creation of research centers such as Cambridge University’s
Center for the Study of Existential Risk founded by Nick Bostrom and Stuart Rus-
sell, among others, in order to prevent “unexpected catastrophic consequences”
due to the potential birth of a super AI.
Within SF, critical and anticipatory reflections on the emergence of intelli-
gent machines date back at least to the mid-nineteenth century, when the nov-
elist Simon Butler wrote a famous piece entitled Darwin among the Machines.
Merging one of the most famous theories in the history of science, the Darwinist
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theory, with speculative thinking, Butler warned the readers about a future in
which machines would dominate humankind:
The upshot is simply a question of time, but that the time will come when the machines
will hold the real supremacy over the world and its inhabitants is what no person of a
truly philosophic mind can for a moment question. (Butler 1863, 185)
Notwithstanding the fear of dystopian futures, if we look at the best known and
most persisting representations of AI in SF, the imaginary embedded in such
narratives diverges sharply from the actual developments of intelligent sys-
tems – paying more attention for instance to the problem of consciousness or to
general or strong AI, which has been until now almost irrelevant to the practical
development of AI. However, the imaginary of AI entailed in SF has been quite
perceptive in focusing on, besides the risks entailed in a strong future AI, the
construction of new forms of sociability between humans and machines, and
especially on the role of communication in building such relations. Turing’s in-
tuition that AI was a matter of communication, in fact, also resonates in SF liter-
ature and especially in SF cinema. A long series of variations on the Turing Test
theme permeates SF movies contributing to the landscape of the possible ways
in which intelligence, but also forms of consciousness and vitality, might be
recognized in an intelligent artefact. For instance, it is when robot Number 5
laughs at a stupid joke that the scientist in the movie Short Circuit (Badham
1986) realizes his invention is alive. In Her, one of the most successful recent
movies on AI directed by Spike Jonze (2013), the construction of a human-AI re-
lationship is completely based on oral communication and storytelling. Samantha,
the intelligent assistant who eventually becomes the partner of the protagonist, is
pure communication and her identity evolves throughout the constant dialogue
with the human and by means of a self-narration of her mutual experience with
her material partner.
As stressed before, the fields of HCI, natural language processing and human-
machine interaction have been at the heart of the research on intelligent artefacts.
Today, although the dream of the man-computer symbiosis formulated by Joseph
Licklider (1960) is far from being realized, recent studies show how fields like HCI,
especially in the last three decades, tend to refer to SF to think, predict, and imag-
ine the future of AI. For instance, in their compelling analysis of a dataset based on
proceedings and scientific publications, Jordan et al. (2018) show how the growing
use of SF references in scientific papers indicates that SF stories, movies or shows
are actually inspiring novel Human-Computer Interaction research.
In addition to their contribution to scientific thinking, popular narratives on
AI have deeply shaped the way in which AI is promoted and presented to the
public. Once a new AI prototype is ready or publicly testable, its shape, language,
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modes of interactions and even its discourses are usually inspired by sci-fi litera-
ture, cinema, and popular stories. Consider, for instance, the vocal assistants that
recently crossed the threshold of individuals. Alexa, Siri and Google Home tend
to replicate in their format the “characters” of movies and series like Her or Black
Mirror, starting from the genderization of the (mostly) female voices programmed
in their software. All the examples from SF literature and movies listed in this
paragraph show how fictional narratives have deeply influenced the develop-
ment of real AI, the way in which AI products are designed and promoted, and
finally how scholarship has been addressing and thinking the topic in contempo-
rary research. Hence, the history of AI cannot be separated from the history of the
imaginaries of AI and from the way in which the mass media have historically
built and spread a common ground made of literary topos, figures and ethical di-
lemmas that shaped the scientific and technological debate around AI as related
to the problem of communication.
5 Not Just for Play: Games as Testbeds for
Communication between Humans and Machines
Besides SF, public events and spectacles have also played key roles in the his-
tory of AI. In particular, gaming has been one of the most powerful means to
communicate and familiarize AI with the general public. It is not by chance that
the Turing Test is also called the Imitation Game. As the long tradition in the
social theory of games has aptly shown, play is one of the most distinctive fea-
tures of humankind. Furthermore, play and gaming can be seen as particular
forms of communication between different agents, or, following Gregory Bate-
son’s definition, they provide humans and living beings with a specific form of
meta-communication (2000).
From the Mechanical Turk to more recent chess and GO players like Deep
Blue and AlphaGo, from the conversation chatbot Eliza to Watson – the program
capable of beating human contestants on the TV quiz Jeopardy! – to the human-
oid robot Sophia that recently joked with Jimmy Fallon on his famous talk show,
intelligent prototypes, programs, and machines have often been created with the
goal to imitate, or in some cases surpass, human features in a gameplay situa-
tion. This is probably one of the most underestimated aspects of the relationship
between AI, the media and communication research: the role of playfulness and
forms of meta-communication not so much in the interaction between human
and machines per se, as in the promotional and narrative strategies adopted by
the AI industry and scientists to integrate and make AI products familiar in
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everyday life. Games and playful activities have been essential to the develop-
ment of digital media at large, and AI constitutes no exception. But games, even
more than scientific experiments, have historically played the function of the so-
cial and psychological means to test the acceptance, integration, and familiariza-
tion of machines in human life. It is not by chance that leading companies like
IBM and Google DeepMind used board games to present their most advanced AIs.
Over time, public demonstrations and media narratives on intelligent artificial
players have contributed to reach a twofold goal: on the one hand, AI companies
have shown the potential and the marvelous capabilities of their artefacts for ex-
ploiting the potential of the digital sublime; on the other, these actors profited
from a neutral and non-harmful environment to show how humans and ma-
chines can weave a mutual, positive, and co-productive relationship (Bory 2019).
The history of human-machine communication through gaming is thus an essen-
tial part of the history of communication research. It is a history made up both of
communication and metacommunication in which humans act “as if” machines
are their peers, and in which machines act “as if” they are really experiencing the
emotions and playfulness of the game they are playing; the beauty entailed in a
genius move on the chessboard, or the funny sense of a joke. The history of AI is
thus also a history of how intelligent artefacts communicate and induce emo-
tional reactions and feelings through interaction.
Turing himself intuited this not only when he proposed the “Imitation Game”
(as the Turing Test was originally called) but even earlier, when he suggested
chess as a potential testbed for AI. In a lecture to the London Mathematical Society
in 1947, he contended that “the machine must be allowed to have contact with
human beings in order that it may adapt itself to their standards. The game of
chess may perhaps be rather suitable for this purpose, as the moves of the ma-
chine’s opponent will automatically provide this contact” (Turing 2004, 394). Tu-
ring’s words indicate more than an interest in demonstrating the potential of AI.
The development of “machine intelligence” required pathways for the computer to
enter into contact with human beings and hence adapt to them, and games were
the first means envisioned by Turing to create this contact. Years later, in 1953, be-
side the famous question “Can a machine think?” it is precisely in a paper on “dig-
ital computers applied to games” that Turing further asked: “could one make a
machine which would have feelings like you and I do?” (Turing 1953, 1). Today,
like at the outset of the AI era, games were envisioned as imaginative spaces to
explore the implications of the encounters between AI and communication.
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Conclusion: Recalibrating AI as Part of Media
and Communication History
The term intelligence comes from the Latin intelligere which, in turn, may come
from the two terms inter (between) and ligere (to read, but also to understand).
According to this definition, intelligence is the ability to tie things up, to create
connections between different objects or elements. Indeed, all media can be
seen as a human attempt to extend and exteriorize human intelligence so as to
meaningfully interconnect different elements, including minds, bodies, natural
and technical objects. Notably, through media and communication, humans
have constantly interwoven and shared their thoughts and feelings with those
of their peers and within their social and material environment. All media, from
handwriting to the typesetter, from flying chairs to chess automata, from the
first motion picture to voice assistants, can thus be seen as intelligent “artifi-
ces”, thus as specific forms of AI before AI.
In this chapter, the close relationship between AI and communication has
been explored by considering four key trajectories in AI history. First, we looked
into the cross-history of communication theory (especially cybernetics) and AI to
unveil some of the crucial crossovers – at the conceptual, personal and institu-
tional levels – and the distinctions between cybernetics and AI. The development
of cybernetics in the late 1940s and early 1950s paralleled that of another “new”
field of study labelled “communication,” a then-new buzzword whose success
was linked to the post-war fascination with cybernetics. Second, we focused on
the early histories of AI and human-computer interaction in parallel lines, look-
ing at how artificial agents and humans have interacted over time, especially but
not exclusively by means of language. This entailed demonstrating that work to
develop “intelligent” systems has been done since the origins of the AI field in
close relationship with work aimed at developing human-machine communica-
tion and interactive systems. Third, we highlighted how media, such as cinema
and sci-fi literature, have contributed to the socio-cultural construction of the
imaginary of AI. The history of AI is also characterized by a series of well-known
literary fictions and mass media events. Over time, such narratives have also
influenced the development and the scientific research on AI, shaping how com-
panies and research institutions conceive, promote and present their products
and innovation in this sector. Finally, we stressed how games and playful interac-
tions have been essential to create and publicly test new forms of communication
between humans and AI. This particular kind of interaction is essential to reading
the history of AI also as the history of the different forms of metacommunication
between humans and artificial agents by means of play and games.
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Looking at different strands within the history of AI, this chapter has shown
the potential of a historical approach to AI that places media and communication
at the center stage. Such an approach not only promises to improve our under-
standing of AI’s past, present, and future. It also improves the capacity of com-
munication and media history, and of communication and media studies as a
whole, to make sense of ongoing phenomena in digital and non-digital spaces.
As Guzman and Lewis (2019) recently argued, people’s engagements with
AI do not neatly fit within paradigms of communication theory that have mainly
focused on human-human communication. The very idea of thinking machines
also challenges existing conceptualizations of media as “what is in between,”
i.e. the channel of communication. From the feedback mechanisms of cybernet-
ics that instilled purpose into the machine’s action to the conversations imag-
ined by Turing in 1950 and then conducted by chatbots and other technologies
of communicative AI, from the fictional imagination of communicating with ro-
bots and computers to the role of games in facilitating new forms of communi-
cative engagement with software and AI, the history of AI stimulates us to
extend the concept of medium as a channel and at the same time as a partici-
pant in the communication. Integrating historical research on AI into the remits
of communication and media history, in this sense, does not just help to recon-
sider the history of AI from a different and relevant point of view, nor does it
only respond to the need of giving an account of communication technologies
that are becoming more significant and widespread, such as AI voice assistants
or chatbots. Perhaps even more crucially, it also provides a powerful reminder
of the need to continually rethink and discuss the key concepts that underpin
the study of communication.
From a historical perspective, moreover, the focus on communication works
as an invitation to rewrite not only the history of AI but also its prehistory. While
historians of AI have often pointed to the history of automata and to attempts to
simulate life and intelligence before the computer age (Riskin 2003; Sussman
1999), reframing AI as a medium of communication means that the broader his-
tory of communication is equally relevant and important to understanding AI. In
his landmark history of the concept of communication from the early Roman em-
pire to the present, John Durham Peters (1999) shows that this can be examined
as the history of people’s aspiration for communication contact with others and
their fears over the loss of such contact. The contemporary obsession with ma-
chines that think – or perhaps better said, that are thought to think – can be seen
as part of this same history. Historicizing media and communication concepts, in
this sense, challenges the idea that AI is unprecedented. The problem of how hu-
mans perceive and enter in communicative interaction with AI technologies needs
to be contextualized within the wider histories of mediated communication that do
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not reside exclusively in the digital age. If we really want to understand what hap-
pens when we talk with the virtual assistant on our phone or we comment on
something posted by a bot on Twitter, we may need to consider these exchanges as
embedded within the long history of media and communication.
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Global Governance
A Short History of Debates Born with the Telegraph
and Popularized by the Internet
Abstract: Scholars have successfully attempted to historicize global gover-
nance, comparing the Internet to telephone and broadcasting, from a pri-
marily legal standpoint. Among these scholars, historians have also studied
particular issues that are relevant to Internet governance, e.g. openness and
net neutrality. History is relevant for the concept of global governance for at
least two reasons: to historicize the concept in itself through the Internet/
digital age (the evolution and enrichment of the notion in the past 30 years,
with key turning points such as the creation of ICANN and WSIS) and to
flesh out continuities through time with other “global media” or “global is-
sues,” such as international standardization, multi-stakeholderism, and commu-
nication rights. This chapter addresses these issues at three levels: periodization
of the key concept of “global governance” since the 90s; evolution of the state of
the art/research on global (Internet) governance; analysis of global governance
in the broader field of media and communication.
Keywords: governance, globalization, regulation, media policy, multi-stake-
holderism
The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which took place be-
tween 2003 and 2005, stabilized a definition of Internet governance for the first
time. Widely circulated and re-elaborated in later times, this notion is far from
static. It has evolved over the course of 15 years, be it in practical uses or from a
more theoretical standpoint. It has become more complex as the Internet also
became more complex. It should keep on evolving, prompted by its stakehold-
ers and by different digital arenas in which States, civil society, and the private
sector are led to meet around issues such as Internet policy, media regulation,
net neutrality, and data privacy.
This chapter focuses on approaches to the past and suggests that the roots
of the governance concept as applied to communication technologies are not
limited to the start of the WSIS Internet debates. They can be retraced earlier on
by mobilizing media history, even if the word “governance” is not explicitly used
there. We think especially of the internationalization and globalization issues,
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and of the multi-stakeholder discussions that have, for a long time, paralleled the
development of information and communication technologies (ICTs) – from the
telegraph and submarine cables to radio waves.
Scholars have previously – and successfully – attempted to historicize global
governance, like TimWu in theMaster Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Em-
pires (Wu 2010) or, earlier on, Gary Hamilton in his article “Trademarks on the In-
ternet” (Hamilton 1995), comparing the Internet to telephone and broadcasting,
from a primarily legal standpoint. Some historians have also studied particular is-
sues that are relevant to Internet governance, e.g., Andrew Russell (2014) who has
examined how openness has become a foundational value for the networks of the
twenty-first century, in particular during standardization processes, or Paul Ed-
wards who has analyzed the encounter between digital age and climate change
(Edwards 2010). Pioneer work by the journalist Tom Standage in The Victorian In-
ternet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Century’s On-Line
Pioneers (Standage 1998) should also be mentioned.
These historical perspectives allow us to avoid an Internet-centric vision of
the debates that permeate the world of communication technologies and enable
us to fully position these exchanges within a heritage that is legal, economic, in-
stitutional at once, as well as practice-based and embedded in society. History
also allows to nuance the predominant vision of “digital globalization” as a radi-
cal break or a revolution. Thus, this chapter invites the reader to a two-step
course, aiming to historicize the “global governance” concept in itself through
the Internet/digital age, and to flesh out continuities and turning points with
other “global media” (e.g., telegraph, telephone, radio) or “global issues” within
media before the Internet.
1 Global Governance: An Evolving Concept,
Revealed and Transformed by the Internet
and Co-shaped by Research
The first part of this chapter seeks to historicize and better understand the con-
cept of global governance as it has been applied to Internet governance, so as
to demonstrate its diversification and various trajectories, theoretical and prac-
tical at once.
It should first be underlined that the notion of governance finds its origins
outside media studies, as Manuel Puppis reminds us: “Governance, like regulation
theory, is not an invention of communication science. The origins of governance
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can be traced to different disciplines” (Puppis 2010, 135). In the field of economics,
Puppis points out, governance was used in new institutional economics to de-
scribe institutional rules that help to reduce transaction costs. As he also under-
lines, roots of governance can be found in political science, especially in the field
of international relations. Finally, he emphasizes that governance was heavily
used in politics as well, as since the 1980s, the World Bank disseminated the no-
tion of “good governance” in the developing countries (Puppis 2010, 136). To
these preliminary comments, we add that the notion of globalization also pre-
ceded the Internet, and that scholars traced its origin at the end of the nineteenth
century, and sometimes even before.1 However, Internet governance made global
governance a buzzword in the early 2000s, thanks to its definition at the WSIS
and the ability of stakeholders as well as researchers to enrich this notion.
The birth of “Internet governance” took place in a context broader than the
Internet itself. Innovation and technology governance became an increasingly
important and articulate issue during the last decades of the twentieth century.
Problems such as environmental management, the availability of energy sour-
ces, nanotechnologies, arms control, and food security emerged as full-fledged
objects of interest for transnational politics. They are now governed by different
conflict resolution instruments within the framework of international law, such
as treaties, protocols and conventions. Examples of these arrangements are the
Kyoto Protocol (signed 1997) and then the Paris Agreement (signed 2016) on cli-
mate change, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (signed 1996), and
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
(signed 2001). Nation states have played a central role in the negotiation, writ-
ing, and implementation of these legal systems. However, the challenges of sci-
entific and technical governance most often move beyond national borders to
cross multiple spheres of sovereign action and different jurisdictions, making it
necessary to elaborate new “hybrid forums” able to reunite experts and civil so-
ciety to discuss and co-construct decisions regarding controversial issues that
are both social and technical, in a new form of “technical democracy” (Callon,
Lascoumes, and Barthe 2001). Analysts from a variety of social science disci-
plines have looked at how scientific and technical governance regimes take
effect in light of the internationalization of the issues, the complexity of the ar-
rangements, the changing boundaries of governmentality, the globalization of
actors. This heterogeneous body of work on “global governance” addresses
1 For a short overview of globalization, see Ghorra-Gobin (2017, n.p.): “Anglophone econo-
mists rather situate the ‘first’ modern globalization between 1880 and 1914, due to numerous
political leaders adhering to Adam Smith’s free-exchange thesis” (our translation).
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how these regimes redraw the borders of nation states, and, more generally,
how they reconfigure the meaning and the implementation of democracy (Ja-
sanoff 2004; Hagendjik and Irwin 2006) thanks to the intervention of new
players, whose scope is defined around their involvement in the governance
of complex technical issues. It is mostly in this broader context – which ex-
pands beyond the frame of media and communication and ties it to larger
notions, such as technical regimes and technical democracy – that debates
around Internet governance have taken shape in more recent years.
1.1 Attempting an Internet Governance Periodization since
the 1990s
As Milton Mueller and Farzaneh Badiei argue, Internet governance has emerged
simultaneously “as a label, a field of research and academic study, and a real-
world arena where stakeholders and interest groups clash and cooperate” (Mu-
eller and Badiei 2020). While it has been argued that embryos of at least one of
these three aspects were already present in the discussions over early internet-
working principles, or in the convergence of computing and ICTs, it is arguably
only in the early-to-mid nineties that it became apparent that the Internet posed
unique governance problems, both because of its specific underlying protocols
and its own standardizing organizations and institutions, which grew beyond
and outside those of global telecommunications governance.
Interestingly, in parallel to the chronology of major Internet governance
steps and debates, the state of the art in the academic field demonstrates how
seminal research work has contributed to co-shape the concept of global gover-
nance of the Internet. From Milton Mueller, Lawrence Lessig and Tim Wu’s pio-
neering approaches to Laura DeNardis’ The Internet in Everything (DeNardis
2020), the notion of Internet governance has evolved in practice also due to the
explicit and analytical questions scholars have been asking through the years
about its perimeter, nature, and actors. There are of course differences in the
ways in which periodizations and evolutions of Internet governance as a con-
cept have been established (see e.g. Bradshaw et al. 2015; Mueller and Badiei
2020); however, a few key periods and moments appear to be consensual.
1.1.1 Early Debates on “Internet Exceptionalism” (1996 to Late 1990s)
The first of these revolves around the debates on the understanding of the Internet
as being a space of its own, notably from the standpoint of law and jurisdictions.
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While the first document that comes to mind as a symbol of this phase is perhaps
the 1996 “Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace” by John Perry Barlow, from
a political and academic standpoint, this phase was marked by discussions about
whether the Internet should develop its specific regulation system, more decen-
tralized and multi-centered, and not primarily based on state-centered control
(Johnson and Post 1997), as well as by debates on “cyberspace sovereignty” (Wu
1997). These debates informed the analysis – which was conducted, overwhelm-
ingly, by legal scholars at the time – of the nascent commercial Internet, with
issues such as trademark law, intellectual property law, and online dispute
resolution becoming central.
1.1.2 ICANN, a Controversial Newcomer (1998 to mid-2000s)
In the late 1990s, in what was likely a new, second phase in the periodization of
Internet governance, discussions on Internet exceptionalism became “incarnated”
in a more concrete debate on actually constructing a new Internet governance in-
stitution, or an ensemble of them. Indeed, if there was a general consensus that
existing governments and/or intergovernmental organizations were inadequate to
take on the Internet as their policy subject, the question became how to build a
novel framework or structure for Internet governance, and who should control or
coordinate it. These issues became particularly salient with the creation of the In-
ternet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers in 1998 (ICANN; Mueller
2002). From a political standpoint, ICANN, while novel for its ability to globally
coordinate actors around problems posed by critical Internet resources, was con-
troversial due to the United States’ role in its birth and prerogatives. As a private,
yet global, non-profit corporation, ICANN was empowered by the US to issue pri-
vate contracts as a way to solve public policy issues, and to have sole authority
over the domain name root and Internet address spaces, while at the same time
attempting novel “democratic experiments” such as global elections for its Board.
Scholars have in turn highlighted ICANN as the epitome of new networked gover-
nance for the digital age (Levinson 2002), examined how nation states and their
governments have played a role in the formation and development of ICANN, es-
pecially its ambiguous Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC; Weinberg 2011)
and critiqued the legality – and most strongly, the legitimacy – of the governance
model proposed by ICANN (Froomkin 2000). This phase was also marked by land-
mark judicial decisions, such as the Yahoo! vs France case, where a French court
ordered Internet giant Yahoo! to block French web users from a number of its auc-
tion sites selling Nazi memorabilia (Goldsmith and Wu 2003).
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1.1.3 The WSIS, a Global Discussion Space on Internet Governance (2003 to
Early 2010s)
The WSIS, a United Nations summit, held in two phases in 2003 (Geneva) and
2005 (Tunis), is most probably the process epitomizing the third phase in the
periodization of Internet governance – a process around which Internet gover-
nance in practice, and the structuration of Internet governance as a field of
study, converged. Heavy debates on the definition of Internet governance took
place during the entire WSIS process, with a variety of positions, ranging from
the extremes of critical Internet resources management by ICANN on one hand
to the regulation of the whole ICT spectrum on the other. A central contribution
in the definitional efforts was provided by the WSIS-mandated Working Group
on Internet Governance (WGIG) in 2004, which spoke of “shared principles,
norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that shape the evolu-
tion and use of the Internet,”2 and noted that IG was a so-called “multi-
stakeholder” issue, with relevant actors being not only nation states, but
also businesses and civil society in its different facets (technical community,
civil liberties associations and citizens in their individual capacity). Multi-
stakeholderism as a novel governance arrangement soon became a prime
subject of research on Internet governance for scholars in a variety of fields
(a good review is to be found in Raymond and DeNardis 2015), with particu-
lar attention paid to the ability of civil society to meaningfully participate in
IG processes (Hintz 2005). Among disappointments (voiced in particular by
those actors who wished WSIS to overcome the United States’ unilateral and
predominant role in ICANN, something it failed to achieve), WSIS originated a
global discussion space on Internet governance which carries on to this day, not
without criticism of its own: the Internet Governance Forum (IGF; see Malcolm
2008 for an analysis of its early days). Interestingly, the main scholarly associa-
tion on Internet governance issues, the Global Internet Governance Academic
Network (GigaNet), was born out of the Internet Governance Forum and still
holds its annual conference on the day preceding the official start of the IGF.
2 Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance, Château de Bossey, June 2005. Avail-
able at http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf.
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1.1.4 A “Post-Snowden Internet Policy.” Rethinking Perimeters and Emerging
Issues (Mid-2010s to Present Day)
Discussions about the definition of Internet governance keep on being a core
issue in itself. Indeed, the last and ongoing phase of a hypothetical periodiza-
tion of Internet governance is marked by a discussion about its perimeter, and
the inclusion of a number of issues as they emerged and took center stage in
the global political arena. For several scholars including Laura DeNardis (2014),
Internet governance per se should be distinguished and treated separately from
user practices, uses and content creation and distribution on the Internet, while
other scholars, in particular coming from a STS (Science and Technology Stud-
ies) tradition, argue that Internet governance could meaningfully include the
agency of technology designers, policymakers, and users as those interact, in a
distributed fashion, with technologies, rules, and regulations, leading to unin-
tended consequences with systemic and pragmatic effects vis-à-vis the (re)distri-
bution of power on the Internet (Epstein 2015; Musiani 2015). Placing emphasis
on the distributed and diffused nature of power on the network of networks,
scholars have also argued that this configuration may lead to a lack of clarity on
where actual authority to govern resides, in short, “where is the governance in
Internet governance” (van Eeten and Mueller 2013; see also Hofmann, Katzen-
bach and Gollatz 2016).
Regardless of where scholars may stand in these debates, they reflect a cru-
cial evolution in Internet governance as a field of practice: while a number of po-
litical arenas and institutions such as WSIS or Internet Governance Forum were
closely scrutinized by academics, several issues that de facto pertain to Internet
governance increasingly developed “in the largely non-institutionalized space
formed by transnational Internet services and commerce” (Mueller and Badiei
2020). Such issues include network neutrality; Internet content regulation (filter-
ing, blocking, deep packet inspection techniques); censorship and circumvention
techniques; private sector-led intermediation and regulation of both content and
infrastructure; cybersecurity, information security and the related markets; on-
line-intermediary liability in situations such as defamation, copyright violations
and disputes over e-commerce practices.
The pre-eminent Internet governance-related issue of the last decade is per-
haps – catalyzed by the Edward Snowden revelations, but having its roots in
long-standing debates about personal data, identity on the Internet and cryptol-
ogy – that of online surveillance and privacy. By exposing internal documents
of the U.S. National Security Agency that revealed the extent of its pervasive
global surveillance on the network of networks, the former NSA contractor opened
the era of a “post-Snowden Internet policy” (Pohle and Van Audenhove 2017),
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where the world took full measure of the extent of the United States’ de facto
global authority “by infrastructure” on the Internet and became aware of the
depth of the US government’s “dangerous liaisons” with private intermediaries
(Musiani 2013). This opened up a wide crisis of legitimacy for the US to keep on
acting as the foremost actor in IG. Arguably – even if the process was, slowly but
surely, already underway before Snowden – it contributed to the so-called “IANA
transition”, the process during which the US relinquished their control of the DNS
root, and which originated substantial reforms in the accountability mechanisms
of ICANN. In parallel, the 2010s have also witnessed the rise and/or the stabiliza-
tion of new “superpowers” in Internet governance, most notably Russia and China
(see Litvinenko 2021; Negro 2017), with a predominant strategy of “digital sover-
eignty” – the idea that states should reassert their authority over the Internet and
protect their nation’s self-determination in the digital sphere, not by means of
supranational alliances or international instruments, but by increasing their
independence and autonomy at the technical, economic, and political levels.
Eventually, legal instruments such as the European Union’s General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR, entered into force in May 2018) posed new condi-
tions to both data protection and platform governance, incarnating a major
regulatory challenge for business models based on the harvesting of data and
offering “free” services as a counterpart.
1.2 Broadening the Perimeter (Even More): From One to Many
Governances
The last part of the periodization presented above, with the introduction of
GDPR, as well as data protection and platform governance, leads us to discuss
how governance issues have pervaded several fields and institutions related to
ICTs and digital technologies, such as the Web, research infrastructures, Wiki-
pedia and Web archives as “born-digital heritage.”
As we explore in Musiani and Schafer (2018), the World Wide Web, which
emerged in the late 1980s and especially in the early 1990s, dealt with gover-
nance issues from the start. After its genesis at the European Organization for
Nuclear Research (CERN), the Web moved to the US, when Tim Berners-Lee
joined the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and created the World
Wide Web Consortium (W3C) in 1994. As he considered the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF)’s proceedings too slow for the fast evolution of the Web he
envisioned, he established a dedicated consortium. Andrew Russell notes that
“The W3C model occupies a middle ground between the IETF and ICANN: it
counters the slow speed of grassroots code development by developing code
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within the W3C; by including industry Members, its Recommendations are more
likely to be implemented quickly and effectively; it also considers seriously and
responds to input from Members and the broader public before it issues the code
as a Recommendation” (Russell 2003, 28). The W3C shares some of the long-
standing issues of Internet governance, including standardization, openness, and
multi-stakeholderism.
Less obviously linked to the problem of governance, but nonetheless
strongly related to issues such as standards, commons, author rights, and
multi-stakeholderism, Web archiving initiatives are a good case study to ana-
lyze the way many stakeholders participate in, and negotiate, the governance of
born-digital heritage. Indeed, actors involved in Web archives governance include
– foundations (e.g., Internet Archive),
– transnational organisations (e.g., the International Internet Preservation Con-
sortium), professionals (librarians, archivists),
– representatives of civil society (in particular, activists, and researchers) and
– private businesses (e.g., Facebook and Twitter have their own archives).
All these stakeholders bring to the table their own diverging approaches to
born-digital heritage, from proprietary forms of ownership to an open vision of
web archives as commons (Musiani et al. 2019). The Internet governance typol-
ogy authored by Bygrave and Bing (2009), describing several types of organiza-
tions and power balances at work in Internet governance, is useful here to
account for the technical governance at stake in particular arenas (e.g., crawlers
and metadata). It also helps to account for the different civil society claims for
more inclusiveness (e.g. the Documenting the Now initiative born in 2016 in re-
lation to the Black Lives matter movement3), or to understand the variety of pri-
vate and commercial interests involved in Web archiving (e.g. the presence of
Facebook, Amazon, and Twitter among the main “web archiving” players), as
well as to grasp national attempts to keep web archives within the national her-
itage (e.g. legal deposits for Web archives in France, United Kingdom, etc.).
Digital research infrastructures and knowledge infrastructures also try to
test and develop new forms of governance. Wikipedia is the prime example of a
setting in which the governance of a knowledge platform tries to include issues
such as the commons, self-organization, and shared authority (Cardon 2012).
Last but not least, the final (for now) frontier of Internet governance is the
issue that Michel van Eeten recently described as “the disappearance of the
distinction between devices with and without connectivity and computing
3 See https://news.docnow.io/introducing-documenting-the-now-416874c07e0.
Global Governance 125
capabilities” (van Eeten 2017, n.p.) and that Laura DeNardis (2020) has summa-
rized, in the title of her last book, as The Internet in Everything: the Internet as a
network of networks is becoming the meta-infrastructure of most other infra-
structures, with crucial implications for economics, security, and governance.
While it has long been believed that the influence of digital actors would remain
confined to software, dematerialized content and information, it starts to be
clear that they are using their mastery in these areas to take positions in non-
digital markets, be it transport, infrastructure management, health, or banking.
With the connection of infrastructures and objects, the organization of physical
flows requires the control of information flows. Massive data is at the heart of this
movement, which calls into question the positions of the historical players in
these markets. Eventually, this will generate new interplays between Internet
governance and the governance of other socio-technical systems, which is cur-
rently discussed and acted upon in completely separate settings. It could possibly
lead to unprecedented convergences between institutions and fora examining, for
example, Internet governance and environment or health governance.
2 Media and Communication Global Governance
Before Digitalization
The flexibility of the notion of governance, but also its suitability to think and
analyze arrangements of power, global controversies, transnational regulation,
and arenas of negotiation, makes it an efficient umbrella to describe evolving
realities within the digital area, but also to rethink a number of phenomena in
the media and communication field, even before the word governance was used
in media studies. Indeed, global Internet governance preceded the academic
notion of media governance.
In 2002, Sean O’ Siochru and Bruce Girard (2002, viii) noted: “A few years
ago, we sought in vain a publication that would succinctly present the main is-
sues confronting media and communication governance at the global level. We
were not the only ones searching, and so this book was written.” However, the
notion of media governance has subsequently been developed and addressed
by several scholars, who refined its definition. Freedman (2008, 14) considers
media governance as broader than media regulation and “refers to the sum total
of mechanisms, both formal and informal, national and supranational, central-
ized and dispersed, that aim to organize media systems.” In line with this ap-
proach, Hamelink and Nordenstreng (2007, 232) define media governance as a
“framework of practices, rules, and institutions that set limits and give incentives
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for the performance of the media.” Furthermore, Lange and Schimank (2004, 18)
consider governance as patterns of coping with interdependencies between actors,
while McQuail (2007, 17–18) describes media governance as both the numerous
forms of management and accountability within the media and the institutional-
ized relations between media and society. All these definitions,4 from narrower to
broader ones, invite the rethinking of global Internet governance from a longer-
term perspective within media history. Indeed, global discussions and framework
of practices, as well as international rules, have started long before the Internet in
the field of communications.
2.1 Institutionalizing Global Discussions on Communication
and Media Technology
In his pioneering analysis of media globalization before the Internet, The Victorian
Internet, Standage (1998) highlights – interestingly, although risking anachron-
isms – the similarities between the telegraph and the Internet and the qualitative
shift the telegraph created by allowing “real-time” and “online” communication.
Indeed, global governance was debated in the nineteenth century with electric tel-
ecommunications, such as telegraphy and telephony and, in the twentieth cen-
tury, for technologies like wireless, broadcasting and satellite communications.
With the telegraph, as well as with radio waves or satellites, institutionalisation of
global debates within several arenas were also already at stake, for example at
ITU (International Telecommunication Union), the first and oldest intergovern-
mental organisation, born in 1865, which was set up to manage telegraphy inter-
nationally (Balbi and Fickers 2020).
Definitely, as Pascal Griset shows in his study of the development of inter-
continental telecommunications in the twentieth century (1992, 19), since the
first telegraph cable was laid across the English Channel in the 1850s, “with the
recognition of their strategic importance, these networks became the object of
vigorous strife among the world’s major powers.” Without taking up the com-
plex history which sees leadership on cables, and then on the waves, gradually
move from Great Britain to the USA, it suffices here to underline the weight of
the international discussions at work in the twentieth century, concerning trans-
national communications, and nation states’ renewed power following the two
World Wars, after negotiations primarily conducted by private companies. The at-
tempts to create international agreements, and to think of a more global and less
4 These definitions are discussed at length in Puppis’ article (2010) mentioned earlier.
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sector-focused policy (see, in particular, ITU’s choice to pool the telegraph and
radio branches in 1932, or the INTELSAT international agreement on satellite
transmissions, signed in August 1964 in Washington by 19 countries), are already
clearly found in waves-related and submarine cables-related policies (Headrick
2013), whose geography is largely mimicked today by the geography of infrastruc-
tures and Internet cables.
These international agreements and discussions, implemented in the second
half of the nineteenth century and whose institutionalization continued during
the twentieth century, are linked to the crossing of borders by means of commu-
nication that do not comport with national jurisdictions. This was not the only
motivation; Fari, Balbi, and Richeri (2015) emphasize, in their comparison be-
tween ITU and the Universal Postal Union, the low cost of the infrastructures or
the challenge of coverage (Fari, Balbi, and Richeri 2015, 19–20).
These agreements are of course also linked to international strategies of
companies that leverage the possibility of reaching publics in a foreign country
by radio waves, and modify the audio-visual landscape, in particular the Euro-
pean one. In Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899–1922, Susan J. Douglas (1987)
shows it well with her description of Marconi’s establishment of subsidiaries in
the USA, after the creation of his company in the United Kingdom (1897). Reginald
Fessenden adopted the same strategy with his National Electric Signalling Com-
pany (NESCO), created in 1902, which joined forces with General Electric in 1906
and obtained contracts abroad (Australia, Japan, Russia, Brazil) as well. The first
international meetings were already taking place, like two international conferen-
ces on wireless telegraphy held in Germany in 1903 and 1906 (with, it should be
noted, predominantly military delegates). After the Titanic tragedy and the
role played by wireless telegraphy in rescuing survivors, the Radio Act was
voted on August 13, 1912 to regulate it.
Several other events testify to pre-Internet transnational media governance
issues, such as the creation of the International Broadcasting Union (IBU 1925),
International Broadcasting Organization (IBO 1946; see Michalis 2007), European
Broadcasting Union (EBU 1950) and some transnational initiatives (e.g., Radio Lux-
embourg’s role from 1929 or Radio Monte-Carlo’s and Télé Monte-Carlo’s creation
in 1942 and 1955 respectively). As Fickers and Lommers (2010, 225) show, “broad-
cast communication was the most powerful and influential means for both na-
tional and transnational communication in the twentieth century.” Their study
helps to question “the medial construction of European and international commu-
nication spaces,” but it also provides very insightful elements on the international
governance at stake in broadcasting, which also requires to be nuanced. Henrich-
Franke (2010) demonstrates the challenge of “Creating transnational through an
international organization” in his examination of the transnationality of television
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activities carried out under the umbrella of the European Broadcasting Union
(EBU) between the 1950s and the 1970s.
Satellites like Telstar further reinforced this international trend in the 1970s
and 1980s, which also saw the rise of internationalization in production. The
privatization movement of the late 1980s in the audio-visual sector opens the
way to a reinforced power of “new global media providers, with Rupert Mur-
doch’s News Corp as the champion, [who] aggressively built operations that
crossed national borders, rendering previously important aspects of localized
regulations at least irrelevant and in many cases obsolete (Chenoweth 2001)”
notes Brink Lund (2016, 108). “In this situation, the EU, EFTA, the Council of
Europe and other international agencies attempted to fill the regulatory gap
(Hartcourt 2005). The EU was especially persistent in pursuing transnational
codes of governance to secure the interest in a competitive internal market”
(ibid.). These few lines are an obvious reminder of the current debates on the
Internet giants’ empires of communication, and of the European Union’s goal
(most notably via the GDPR) to find a key role in the definition of regulatory
policies related to communications, in particular digital-supported ones. A
strong historicization of media governance is again necessary in order to bet-
ter understand the current issues at stake, as older and new bodies have to
cooperate in fields that entwine for example broadcasting and digital activities.
This is for example the case with the debates on Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB),
which implies debates between ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards In-
stitute), EBU (European Broadcasting Union), and Internet stakeholders (Kratoch-
vil 2008).
Thus, one should keep in mind that ever since the ages of the telegraph,
telephone, radio or television, companies and States, but also international
bodies, developed in particular in the telecommunications field, are tackling
the question of crossing borders, but also of sharing resources: if today critical
Internet resources concern for example domain names, they previously concerned
the distribution of bandwidth, waves, and infrastructures. This prompted agree-
ments, but also controversies and criticisms, especially in light of the possibility of
domination by a few countries – Great Britain first, on intercontinental routes,
with the weight of the Marconi company, then the United States. Also, throughout
the long history of the media, one can retrace initiatives aimed at a more balanced
distribution of power.
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2.2 Claiming for a New Balance of Power
in the Communication Age
The claims for new balances of power in the media and communication systems
have paved the way to the development of alternative media, and genealogies
of several digital players show some interesting continuities between analog,
early digital and Internet times. Dutch media theorist and net activist Geert Lo-
vink recalls for example the important role of community radio, his support of
anti-war efforts in Zagreb, in Croatia and its contact with Belgrade and the radio
station B92 (Schafer 2018). Another example, among many others, is linked to
the Minitel case (Schafer and Thierry 2012). It showcases issues that are today
important in Internet governance but pre-existed it to be highlighted. In his
paper “Building Internet policy on history: lessons of the forgotten 1981 network
neutrality debate” (2018), Mailland demonstrates how the issues of liability and
responsibility of intermediaries and carriers was actually born with the develop-
ment of telematics in the 1980s and was the precursor of a multi-stakeholder de-
bate. The first cases of “tele-presence” analyzed by Jérôme Bourdon in this book
show the first hints of debates on the secret of private correspondence, or ano-
nymity; the issues of data privacy for courier and telephone remind us that several
questions at the heart of network regulation (the demoiselles du téléphone listen-
ing to discussions, or anonymity within mail) were internationally raised before.
Jones and Ackermann (2020) follow suit, with their recent analysis of data privacy
issues within several pre-Internet networks including packet-switched networks,
Bulletin Board Systems, videotex, online services, and early web browsers, as well
as anonymity issues. The involvement of civil society in global governance was
already in construction via their national actions and reflections, while its more
active participants easily crossed national borders through international debates
held e.g., on newsgroups.
Internet regulation concerning trademark law/author rights also had its pred-
ecessors, before debates on domain names and trademarks on the Internet became
widespread. Hamilton (1995) refers for example to the case of Dranoff-Perlstein As-
sociates v. Sklar: Dranoff-Perlstein Associates, which had been using and advertis-
ing the telephone number “INJURY-1” since 1984, filed an action alleging unfair
competition and trademark infringement against Sklar, when it began using and
advertising the telephone number “INJURY-9” in 1990. Although this case is a na-
tional one, it prompts reflection on copyright issues through the history of media
and the international debates, that arose e.g., within the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), established in 1967. WIPO members agreed to
the so-called WIPO Internet treaties in 1996, on copyright and on performers
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and producers of phonograms, which indicates that the entanglement be-
tween media and digital issues is strong.
These stories of power balance-building at the national, regional and interna-
tional levels contribute to show how, as concisely put by Laura DeNardis (2014,
17), “(g)lobal Internet stability is [. . .] dependent on local Internet conditions.”
They pave the way to Internet governance debates, as they show the need for
multi-stakeholder discussions, the entanglement of infrastructures, content and
economic regulation, and the (geo)political issues at work. They show how dis-
cussions of dominant positions and monopolies, neutrality, public/private prop-
erty and local, sectorial or national debates all contributed to the roots of the
future “Internet governance,” in its globality as well as its “glocality” (Goldsmith
and Wu 2003).
All these debates may also be retraced in the histories of both telegrams
and submarine cables: complex debates on dominant positions and monopolies
arose in the wireless field (e.g., Marconi vs Telefunken) already, while subma-
rine cables led to important debates between the public and private sector. Net
neutrality may also be considered in a longer-term historical perspective by re-
ferring to the “neutrality” over telegrams and the debates surrounding priorities
in the international network, as noted by Balbi et al. (2014).
Deeply entwined with geopolitics from the start, issues surrounding media
and telecommunications governance are clearly retraceable within debates which
took place within the “New World Information and Communication Order” in the
1970s and the 1980s, for example within the WARC conferences (World Adminis-
trative Radio Conferences). They are an international discussion arena which will
outline the first subjects of debate that will subsequently be found within WSIS,
opening the way to the first Internet governance discussions criticized as too
openly US-centric and Western-centric. Following Marc Raboy (2004), we can
even go as far back as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, approved
in 1948. The post-colonial climate of the Cold War and non-aligned nations
played an important role not only in WSIS and in the IGF, but also in venues
such as the World Forum on Communication Rights, the Community Media
Forum and Media Liberties in the Information Society, while “an entirely par-
allel set of activities was organized under the heading of WSIS? WE SEIZE!, an
alternative event organized outside the summit complex, thus marking not
only a geographic but also an ideological distance from the summit proper.
Put simply, the organizers of WE SEIZE! rejected the social, political, and eco-
nomic premises on which the debates and discussions surrounding the WSIS
were based. They proposed instead to re-imagine the role of communication
in the organization of society” (Raboy 2004, 352).
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Conclusion
In “Shifting Governance Structures in Global Commodity Chains, with Special
Reference to the Internet,” Gereffi (2001) underlines three broad and to some
degree overlapping phases of globalisation after the second World War: invest-
ment-based globalisation (1950–1970), trade-based globalisation (1970–1995) and
finally digital globalization (1995 onward). The path we have threaded in this
chapter invites the reader to discuss this periodisation, as we have shown how
this globalisation can, in the “long haul” of media and communication history,
be thought of since the early days of the telegraph, and elements of it can be found
even before World War II.
Of course, reflecting on the historical continuity of issues such as data pri-
vacy, openness, transparency and more broadly media regulation should not
lead us to neglect ruptures and breaks, that are played out both in the so-far-
relatively short time span of Internet governance, as shown in the first part, and
in the longer time span of media history. Indeed, while we can learn from past
media regulation attempts, the Internet also poses specific challenges, particu-
larly in terms of participation and of horizontal and peer-to-peer exchanges.
Our historicization attempted to avoid “the alienation of inherent (as well as)
constant continuity (as) two forms of determinism” (Balbi and Magaudda 2018),
while exploring the roots of some debates, organisations and issues that remain
relevant through media and digital history.
To keep this history in mind is also a way to better understand some chosen
paths, and roads not taken (Schafer 2020; Winseck 2020). An important exam-
ple of this is the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and its prob-
lematic relationship with Internet governance. This United Nations-mandated
organisation had to confront a new model of technical decision-making and
governance arising within the Internet community, which was openly divergent
from the standardisation procedures previously at work, and deeply challeng-
ing of it. Although the ITU sought to restore its techno-diplomatic role through
multi-stakeholderism, of which the WSIS was a crucial step, its roots and past
history created a strong legacy, which remains difficult to overcome and keeps
the organisation at the margins of Internet governance.
Today, there seems to be a scholarly tendency to emphasise the risk of the
Internet and its digital spaces turning into a new medium of top-down dissemi-
nation, controlled by powerful conglomerates and platforms, confiscating alter-
native and distributed speech. However, the Internet and digital ecosystem also
represent, for the so-called traditional media, a chance to reinvent their gover-
nance and modes of participation, contributing not only to the evolution of
global governance challenges – with TV over IP, for example – but also to the
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renewal of the debates on the world of communications today as a “global vil-
lage”. This notion was coined for television, before the Internet – and its current
use in relation to the Internet will be this chapter’s last testimony of the strong
links between “old” and “new”media.
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Data(fication)
“Understanding the World Through Data” as an Everlasting
Revolution
Abstract: In this chapter we set out to historicize and trace the pre-digital roots
of the concept of datafication of communication and society. Collecting and
processing data as well as governing data storage and access to it are not to be
seen as a particularity of the digital era. Data and datafication produced, al-
ready long before the digital revolution, exclusive arrangements of infrastruc-
tures and knowledge orders and they can hence be seen as building blocks of
culture and society. We illustrate this argument in four steps using different his-
toric examples. We first provide a glimpse into the beginnings of datafication in
ancient times. We then present data as early social science instruments in the
modern welfare states since the mid-nineteenth century used for social control
and to grasp facets and consequences of social modernization. Thirdly, data
were also crucial in the service of oppression during the National Socialist era,
in which cutting-edge data technologies contributed to the planning and imple-
mentation of the Holocaust. Finally, the shift of data from the numerical to the
digital information age in the second half of the twentieth century and its con-
sequences for a “datafication of everything” is discussed.
Keywords: big data, data processing, social engineering, technological solution-
ism, dark data, social history
The digital age is an age of data. Digital communication research rhetoric sug-
gests an unprecedented relevance and depth of data for virtually all domains of
social and everyday life and for shaping the very construction and perception of
reality. Data is seen as a fabric, output, fuel, lubricant, and currency of the digi-
tal age. Digital communication is based on algorithms, metrics and complex
processes of datafication. Whereas in principle everything can be turned into
data (Mejias and Couldry 2019), the notion of datafication refers to processes of
rendering information into machine-readable quantifiable data for the purpose
of aggregation, analysis, and anticipation of human behavior and social inter-
action (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013; Mau 2019; Southerton 2020). In
this trajectory, Couldry and Hepp (2017, 34–56) have argued that datafication
marks an entirely new wave of mediatization, causing profound transforma-
tions of our everyday life as well as the organization and evaluation of social
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issues. Following Southerton’s (2020, 1) contribution to the “Encyclopedia of
Big Data”, datafication is also used to describe “a logic that sees things in the
world as sources of data to be ‘mined’ for correlations or sold . . . .” Data is
hence occasionally referred to as the new oil or the most valuable resource,
which to control promises wealth, power, and influence in shaping the social
world. Hence, datafication “combines two processes: the transformation of human
life into data through processes of quantification, and the generation of different
kinds of value from data” (Mejias and Couldry 2019).
But, putting aside the rhetoric of technological newness and the fascination
for the peculiarity of the current historical moment, we can follow Rödder and
ask how new all of this truly is (Rödder 2015). And if so, to what extent and re-
garding what respects are the processes of digital datafication novel. When the
notion of datafication was originally introduced by Mayer-Schönberger and Cuk-
ier (2013), it was coined with regard to the economy of digital platforms and since
used in relation to processes of making virtually all aspects of human behavior
processable for large scale Big Data analysis. Data and the interpretation of data
in this respect is seen as a means of looking at and understanding the world
(Borgman 2016; boyd and Crawford 2012; Mejias and Couldry 2019; van Dijck
2014). Recent publications have argued that data(fication) should not be viewed as
a unique characteristic of the digital era, but rather as a historical category and as
an ongoing historical process with manifold precursors (Beer 2016; Borck 2017; Aro-
nova, von Oetzen, and Sepkowski 2017; van Es and Eef Masson 2018). In a similar
vein, Beer (2016) has called for understanding “Big Data” “both as a material phe-
nomenon and as a concept”, which is changing historically and only reached a new
level in the digital era. “Big Data,” Aronova and colleagues (2017, 7) furthermore
argue, “is often associated with the era of digital electronic databases, but this asso-
ciation potentially overlooks important continuities with data practices stretching
back to much earlier material cultures. While technologies have changed – from
paper-based to mechanical to electronic devices – database practices have been
more continuous than the technologies and tools” (Aronova, von Oetzen, and Sep-
kowski 2017, 7).
In this chapter, we set out to historicize the concept of datafication of com-
munication and society and trace the pre-digital roots of what is nowadays con-
sidered a defining process of the digital era. Rather than imagining data and
datafication as a particularity of the digital era, we provide a perspective on
data as a category and datafication as a historical process. Our perspective is
inspired by Raphael’s (1996) take on the scientification of the social. In a per-
spective on a social history of data and datafication, it becomes evident that
gathering data was never a naïve project but always happened on purpose,
with particular goals and intents regarding its impact on shaping social reality.
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Collecting and processing data as well as governing data storage and access to
using it was produced already way before the digital revolution’s exclusive ar-
rangements of infrastructures and knowledge orders. Furthermore, datafication
has long since amounted to distinct communicative and social practices. A look
back at earlier epochs can thus help us to compare today’s processes of data-
fication with previous historical contexts and put their alleged uniqueness in
perspective.
We illustrate this argument in four steps using different historic periods as
examples: before we leap into the mid-nineteenth-century and the role of data-
fication of the social through the emerging social sciences, we first provide 1) a
glimpse on the beginnings of datafication in ancient times. We then present 2)
data as early social science instruments in the modern welfare states used since
the mid-nineteenth century for social control and to grasp facets and conse-
quences of social modernization; 3) data in the service of oppression during the
National Socialist era, in which cutting-edge data technologies (e.g., Hollerith-
systems) contributed to the planning and implementation of the Holocaust; 4)
the shift of data from the numerical to the digital information age in the second
half of the twentieth century in which the new computer technologies rapidly
increased the processes of datafication and made data gathering increasingly a
private and corporate enterprise. When Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013)
coined the notion of datafication, they predicted Big Data would bring a revolu-
tion that will transform how we live, work, and think. Historicizing datafication,
we show that the aspiration of “understanding the world through numbers” is
indicative of old hopes, renewed promises and an everlasting revolution rather
than a singular turning point.
1 Data(fication) as a Building Block of Culture
and Society – From Early Cultures to the Age
of Enlightenment
It can be argued that the history of datafication is closely intertwined with the
history of writing and hence an early wave of mediatization (Herrenschmidt
2007; Krotz 2012; Ong 1982). According to anthropologists and historians, the
main driving forces behind the development of symbolic forms of data gathering
and recordkeeping were the necessity of the earliest complex social formations to
keep records of their legislative measures and taxes. Thus, the ability of the state
to coordinate substantial public works and the need of private entrepreneurs to
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keep records of their business operations were also matters of record keeping
from the beginning (van de Mieroop 1999, 13; Law et al. 2015, 212). Such tangi-
ble records were external to an individual, which means that they could be in-
spected, verified, and cross-examined (Law et al. 2015, 208). Data collection
hence from the very beginning of written records became a paramount objec-
tive for governing bodies as well as for private individuals and families en-
gaged in complex webs of economic activities and logistics. Data collections
contained the documentation of loans, sales, and rentals as well as public re-
cords of military and religious personnel and were kept in private and public
administrative archives, which can be found practically everywhere in Meso-
potamia where cuneiform writing was diffused.
Additionally, the sophisticated urban civilization of the Greeks soon articu-
lated the need for public and private record keeping (Sickinger 1999). From the
speeches of Attic orators, valuable insights can be gleaned not only about the
quantity and the places in which they were stored but also the cultural, eco-
nomic, and political importance ascribed to these records by their contemporar-
ies. “An excellent thing, fellow citizens, an excellent thing is the preservation of
the public acts,” claimed Athenian politician Aeschynes (3.75) in 330 B.C.E.
“For the record remains undisturbed, and does not shift sides with political
turncoats, but whenever the people desire, it gives them opportunity to discern
who have been rascals of old but have now changed face and claim to be honor-
able men” (Aeschines 1958, 367–369). Thus, anticipating later developments,
already in ancient Greece the collection of data holds out the prospect of objec-
tive and undisputed access to social reality. Data should make it possible to
open up reality independently of bias, whim, and interpretation.
Less direct knowledge exists about the record-keeping and data gathering
activities in Classical Rome. Contrary to Greek social life which took place in the
public square, Roman society, even during the republican era, was organized
on the principle of patronage where wealthy and influential patrons received
their clients in their own homes. Therefore, each patron’s household had a sep-
arate space storing private as well as important public records belonging to the
office administered by the head of the household (Culham 1989, 104). We hence
can identify widely privatized and decentralized practices for the collection and
storage of data. Historical evidence indicates that even such essential public data
as the census, the masterpiece of Roman bureaucracy and backbone of its taxa-
tion system, were not gathered, processed, and stored in one central location.
In the late medieval period, the earliest parish registries appeared but it
was only during the Reformation when they became mandated by the Catholic
Church, and subsequently also by various Protestant Churches in order to keep
track of their own populations (Emigh, Riley, and Ahmed 2015, 174–175). After
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the Council of Trent (1545–1563), the Catholic Church required all parish
priests to keep registers containing lists of persons who received the basic
sacraments, such as baptism or marriage, or who had a Christian burial. By
doing this, it de facto created a permanent, standardized census tracking the
fundamental demographic data by registering those who were born, got mar-
ried and died (Culham 1989, 105).
The relatively high degrees of literacy and numeracy required in the com-
mercial world were simultaneously translated into the civic life of the late me-
dieval urban communities and reflected in the fact that medieval cities and
city-states started organizing their own information-gathering and record-keeping
systems (Barber 1992, 258).
Historians argue that it was the reign of Louis XIV in France which for the
first time demonstrated that an early modern nation-state could prosper despite
its relatively vast and differentiated geography. This was possible mainly due to
the improving systems of transportation and communication but also to the col-
lection and management of large amounts of statistical data. Jean-Baptiste Col-
bert (1619–1683), the king’s chief minister, is often presented as a posterchild of
this trend. Over his two decades of service to the king, Colbert amassed vast
amounts of information through the various sectors of public administration
that he oversaw – from finance and the navy to foreign diplomacy – using data
as a foundation for the rationalization of state operations (Soll 2009). In this ef-
fort, he harnessed many of the techniques developed previously by scholars,
merchants, and churchmen and systematically applied them to government.
Following Mejias and Couldry (2019), and as illustrated by the examples
above, datafication began in the domain of business and administration and
not social life. The collection of data was closely linked to those in politically or
economically privileged positions (positions of power) for doing so and the
command over data helped to reinforce and expand their power. The data col-
lected typically addressed those bound to the powerful through contracts or
other obligations and the purpose of the data was to govern, administer, coordi-
nate and control and further accumulate privilege. But data could also be used
to rationalize processes based on datafied knowledge. While the records that
were kept are partially of surprisingly rich detail, for instance contracts in late
medieval Genova could not only hold the dates but also the hours and minutes
of when the contracts were made if this information was deemed necessary, it is
also a common pattern that the data gathered was more or less directly linked
to its initial purpose and focused on essential elements. It was only later that
the collection of data expanded from the functional collection of data to the
“datafication of everything” (Mayer-Schönfelder and Cukier 2013, 93–94), with
the functions of the data only to be discovered later in the vast collections.
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Datafication practices from their very historical precursors and origins were lo-
cated at the intersections of (recordable) knowledge and power. The study of
datafication, in historical as well as contemporary contexts, is thus also a criti-
cal perspective on processes of gathering and capturing human experience in
data and processing it for economic or political purposes.
2 Open the Box: The Scientification of Data
and the Datafication of Social Life
As shown, the practices of experiencing, collecting and organizing data can al-
ready be observed from early cultures to the Age of Enlightenment. With the ad-
vent of modernity, a new period begins in which societies develop and explore
instruments to systematically observe and describe themselves with data, not
least in order to manage, organize, and regulate social processes based on this
data.
The very ideas that datafication opens vistas for beholding the world and
that society can be discovered, explored and understood through data resonate
in the aspirations regarding the potential of the then emerging social sciences.
“[W]e can in principle control everything by means of calculation,” as Max Weber
(2004, 13) stated. The “disenchantment of the world” through the modern social
sciences, which Max Weber (1864–1920) told to his Munich students a hundred
years ago, was above all to be achieved by the accumulation of data, calcula-
tions, and the technical means which allowed for the collection and processing
of data. “The nineteenth century,” Jürgen Osterhammel argues, “can be seen as
the century of counting and measuring. The idea of an all-embracing taxonomy
now grew into a belief that the power of number – of statistical processing or
even ‘social mathematics’, as the Marquis de Concordet, a bright star of the late
Enlightenment, put it – could open up truth itself to human reason. It was in the
nineteenth century that societies measured themselves for the first time and ar-
chived the results” (Osterhammel 2014, 29).
Over the course of the nineteenth century, social data collection became a
common practice in Europe and the US (Burke 2012), providing spaces for “ongo-
ing institutional self-observation” (Osterhammel 2014, 25) and helping statistics to
become “what it is today: the most important tool for the constant self-monitoring
of society” (Osterhammel 2014, 26). As early as in the 1830s and 1840s, statistical
societies were founded in many industrial cities in England in order to collect so-
cial data for deep insights into the entire social life of the lower classes. One of the
most important studies produced in this context was Charles Booth’s (1840–1916)
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long-term study “Life and Labour of the People of London” (1886–1903), in
which he explored the citizens of London over a period of 16 years (Schubert
1994). The scope of these data collections went way beyond legal obligations,
contracts or financial dependencies but tried to provide insight into broad fac-
ets of everyday life.
This modern empirical view on societies was primarily motivated by the dis-
may about the great social upheavals occurring during the industrial revolu-
tion. At the same time as the industrial revolution, a structural social change
began which was characterized by enormous population growth, migration from
the countryside to the cities and urbanization – a transformation with massive
social consequences. Governments, legal and administrative bodies required reli-
able data and figures to gain an idea of the magnitude and dimensions of these
social shifts. The aim was to use the collection of social data to learn something
about the social reality transformed by industrialization and the many new social
questions that emerged as a consequence. In this sense, ideas and concepts
about the usefulness of data and their collection were framed at first in a phil-
anthropic and idealistic manner. Social data should serve for sociological elu-
cidation and socio-political ambitions, ideas and interests. Furthermore, and
as already briefly stressed above, the rise of the modern nation state as a
model of political organization is deeply entangled with and enabled by the
advent of modern statistics and social sciences. In conjunction with the rise of
nations, a new chapter in the social history of datafication begins because
data and the consequent needs for calculation are paramount preconditions
to making a state administration work. The coordination and efficacy of gov-
erning measures depend on the complex integration and interpretation of di-
verse data, measures, and calculations. Henceforth, the methods, techniques
and technologies for logistics, data collection, and processing also needed to
progress and new, innovative ways were found. The history of the computer
can be told in relation to processes of datafication and the nation state’s need
to count and calculate (Balbi and Magaudda 2018, 31–33).
In Germany, the Verein für Socialpolitik (founded in 1873) and its members
were pioneers in the development of instruments and practices for social investiga-
tion by data (Gorges 1986). In the mechanical era of datafication, the Verein für So-
cialpolitik created important paper tools to gather social knowledge about society.
One of the most frequently used tools was the “Enquete” (Embden, Cohn, and Stieda
1877; Horst 1980). In the spirit of the English social reformers, the Verein für Social-
politik defined the “Enquete” as scientific preparatory work for the enactment of
laws: each “Enquete” was expressly intended to have a political impact. To become
effective as a “mean of control, agitation and power of the modern state,” the “En-
quete” was a “complex body” of social data collection (Kern 1980, 89). Ideally, an
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“Enquete” integrated different practices and techniques of empirical social research
such as field studies, questionnaires, special reports by experts, statistics, and sur-
veys. What becomes evident from this example is that the collection of data in the
“Enquete” clearly exceeds the documentation of what is a current state of affairs.
Instead, they mark a shift from aiming to record society and social relations as they
are at the moment of data collection towards the ambition of effectively shaping
how society moves forward based on datafied knowledge.
In this manner, the “Enquete” and the method-mix associated with it
turned into the standard instrument “of social factfinding in Germany before
the first World War”: “All the leading historical economists, Schmoller, Bücher,
Brentano, Adolph Wagner, as well as those of the next generation who are known
to us as the founders of sociology, Tönnies and Max Weber, became involved in
planning and directing surveys, writing out questionnaires and analyzing the re-
turns” (Oberschall 1965, 3). The classical philologist and economist Karl Bücher
(1847–1930), to take just one example from this list, was not only the father of the
“law of mass production” and founder of “newspaper science” as the precursor of
communication research in Germany but also a busy empirical social researcher.
Prepared by a series of historical-statistical studies, in 1888 and 1889, he con-
ducted a census and a housing-“Enquete” in Basel and with the “Investigations
on the Situation of the Craft in Germany” (1892–1897) organized a large-scale
study for the Verein für Socialpolitik (Bücher 1890a, 1890b, 1895–1897, 1919).
Bücher’s studies and the many studies of his colleagues once again reveal the
specific view that early empirical social researchers wanted to gain of society with
the help of social data. Although the individual researchers and their studies dif-
fer in their points of view and objectives, they are united in their political purpose
to identify social patterns and regularities in the data in order to use this knowl-
edge to solve serious social problems and imbalances. Thus, it was never just
about developing and training a data-based “factual view” (Bonß 1982) on the
world, but always also about policy advice, public information, and social re-
forms. In doing so, early empirical social researchers contributed to the advent of
datafication by providing a complex system of reliable instruments, practices and
techniques with which modern societies began to discover, observe, and manage
themselves with the help of data.
2.1 The Birth of Data Processing
Despite all the ambitions, dedication and efforts of empirical social researchers,
collecting social data was only a first step. The huge amounts of data on paper
they produced were nothing but worthless data garbage without the right data
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processing techniques. In contrast to the tradition of the cameralistic statistics in
the Age of Enlightenment, which were primarily interested only in the description
of “state peculiarities” (“Staatsmerkwürdigkeiten”) (Kern 1980, 19–27), the insights
for modern empirical social researchers were hidden in the complex combinations
and relations making up the collected data.
Therefore, the statistical methods and procedures had to be refined and effi-
cient calculation aids were required. For his Basel studies, Bücher used a manual
method of data processing with a paper tool called “counting slips” (“Zähl-
blättchen”), which was commonly used in European official statistics prior to
the punch card (Rauchberg 1890; von Oertzen 2017). “The counting slip,” writes
von Oertzen in her important study on the innovative data practices of Prussia’s
statistical office in the second half of the nineteenth century to handle census
data, “was an intermediate, movable data carrier designed to facilitate and en-
hance the counting and sorting of data compiled in lengthy enumeration lists,
praised for its ability to greatly enhance statistical complexity. [. . .] The main dif-
ference was that the information on counting slips had to be transferred from
enumeration lists with a pen, not, as with punch cards, via punched holes. And
whereas punch cards could be sorted and counted by machines, counting slips
had to be sorted into stacks and counted by hand” (Aronova, von Oertzen, and
Sepkowski 2017, 137). The next step was from manual to automated, machine-
based data processing. In 1889, Herman Hollerith (1860–1929) was awarded the
gold medal at the Paris World Exhibition for a prototype of his Electric Tabulating
System. A year later this system was used for the first time in a large-scale experi-
ment for processing data from the American census. Punch cards as data carriers
and resources for electro-mechanical data processing, however, only became
widely accepted in the following decades (Austrian 1982; Heide 2009). There-
after, the punch card remained dominant for machine-based data processing
until the availability and application of means of magnetic storage possibili-
ties, thus through to at least the 1970s.
Even while the technical processes of data processing by counting slips and
punch cards were very different – manual in the former case and machine-
based in the latter – both data practices were characterized by common basic
techniques for handling large amounts of data. Clearly, the Hollerith machines
were faster but “manual and mechanical data processing rested on the same
principle: a movable paper tool carrying all relevant data of one person, which
enabled statisticians to sort and compile census data in new ways” (Aronova,
von Oertzen, and Sepkowski 2017, 149). Data as such do not exist. Data are al-
ways complex constructions and so even then a lot of human work was hidden
in data to make it usable at all. In this sense, they both revolutionized the orga-
nization of data handling by establishing basic data procedures and routines
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(e.g., formatting, merging, sorting, synchronizing), which were not yet performed
by machines alone, but by many people, who acted as “human computers” (Grier
2007). In these days, computers were not only partly human, as Grier suggests,
but oftentimes female: the skillful tasks necessary for serving in the capacity of
human computers were often performed by women (Abbate 2012; Edwards and
Harris 2017; Hicks 2017). This detail in the history of datafication was later some-
what obscured in computer history, which has strongly reproduced myths of
computer development as driven by the great deeds of exceptional men. Whether
with or without the support of the Hollerith machine, human-based data process-
ing thus needed “carefully planned choreographics of sorting, sustained labor
management, skillful counting techniques, relentless tracing of errors, and strict
control” (Aronova, von Oertzen and Sepkowski 2017, 132). This is also indicative
of a development characteristic of datafication in the digital era, namely the inte-
gration of data collection and data processing in entangled processes.
The modern empirical social research that emerged in the second half of the
nineteenth century is only one example of the data enthusiasm prevailing at that
time. Especially for the organization of politics and the rationalization of bureau-
cracy, data became increasingly important. “Seeing like a state,” as James Scott
has pointedly summarized it, in around 1900 meant seeing the world more and
more with the aid of numbers. (Scott 1999). “For governments and state authori-
ties,” claims Mau, “the numerical medium is essential in a chaotic reality in order
to define problems adequately and devise suitable intervention programmes”
(Mau 2019, 32). The numerical approach through data enabled by empirical so-
cial research techniques and tools furthermore began to spread. Gradually, al-
most all areas of social life based their work on data and adopted the “language
of numbers” to describe, decipher, and organize social affairs (Mau 2019).
2.2 Data and Social Engineering
Simultaneously, expectations and ideas about the potential and usefulness of
data began to shift significantly. The increasing possibilities for measuring so-
cial behavior and for surveying societies by data are noticeably intertwined
with discourses and concepts of social planning as well as the rationalization
and regulation of social life. From this perspective, the many social questions
raised by modernity were no longer questions of political action, but rather
questions of a more technical nature. The increasing measurement of the social
with ever new instruments, machines and methods was a basic prerequisite for
this. Social engineering is a generic term for a variety of ideas to adapt social
life and societies according to the pace and rhythm of industrial modernity by
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means of “social interventions” (Peukert 1987, 132–149; Raphael 2011, 149–157).
Thomas Etzemüller points out that the idea of social engineering at that time
was nourished by a popular longing for social order, the scientificisation of the
social and a general belief in the blessings of technology (Etzemüller 2017). Etze-
müller has thus defined social engineering as a “combination of (social) techno-
logical solutions, a specific idea of social order and a decided design imperative,”
which could appear in “various contexts” – from the left to the right of the politi-
cal spectrum (Etzemüller 2017). Such techno-utopian visions are reflected by what
in contemporary datafication discourses is addressed as technological solutionism
(Morozov 2013); the oftentimes naïve, and partially ignorant of collateral effects,
ideological belief that big data “will allow us to make large-scale and sophisti-
cated interventions in politics, culture, and everyday life. Technology will allow
us to solve problems in highly original ways and create new incentives to get
more people to do the right thing” (Morozov 2013). However, visions of improving
society through social interventions based on data were always connected with
utopias of a “new human being”: “Coercion through the transformation of things
or through authoritarian political intervention and the learning adaptation of
those concerned were the two complementary poles of such programs” (Ra-
phael 2011, 151, translation by the authors).
With the increasing measurement of the social and growing technical possi-
bilities, social planning and rationalization became a key political concept far
beyond the economic field in the first third of the twentieth century. The 1920s
are known for the rationalization of housing, urban planning and social policy
from data-driven, functional aspects, but rationalization also intervened more
and more in people’s individual lifestyles and privacy and covered issues such
as controlling “proper” family planning and sexuality in order to optimize the
reproduction of the population (Raphael 2011).
3 Times of Dark Data
However, whereas the datafication of human life and social behavior allegedly
aimed for the betterment of society and an optimization of social life, there was
also a dark side to the datafication of the social world and humanity. Notions of a
“new human being” and of the socio-technical control and optimization of the
social through data reflect a world view that perceives “the self-dynamics of so-
cial change as a jeopardy for the nation” (Raphael 2011, 155, translation by the
authors). A means to counter this danger was seen in the biological and social
selection of individuals and populations. Since the middle of the nineteenth
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century, numerous anthropological doctrines have been established in the grey
area between natural and social sciences, which promoted the measurement of
man and the social in order to identify the supposedly “deviant and marginal-
ized” (Bernard 2017, 119). Stephen Jay Gould has critically reviewed this “mis-
measurement” of man as driven by the idea of biological determinism (Gould
1981). Well-known examples are Alphons Bertillon’s (1853–1914) anthropometry,
Paul Broca’s (1824–1880) craniometry or Cesare Lambombroso’s (1835–1909) con-
cept of the “born criminal.” These are all concepts that insist on a correlation be-
tween the measured external bodily characteristics and mental and moral anomalies
and which found widespread support, especially in police practice (Bernard 2017).
Classification, categorization and standardization of individual features, social charac-
teristics and normed categories in general play an important role in shaping the mod-
ern world, as was stressed by Bowker and Star (2000). Classifications order human
interactions and depending on what is classified for what purposes, the classification
of standards and deviation can impact on society for the better or the worse.
Even before the First World War, the German historical economist Rudolf Gold-
scheid (1870–1931) drew up the plan for a comprehensive “economy of human
beings” (“Menschenökonomie”), “which would ensure that ‘human material’ was
not wasted, but on the contrary to optimize the population of a country by improv-
ing its genetic make-up and rationalizing its reproductive conditions” (Exner 2004;
Raphael 2011, 154). In the interwar period, questions of “improving” the biological
and social quality of the population increasingly came to the attention of a diverse
field of experts, including demographers, eugenicists, medical scientists and social
politicians. Their demands, ideas, and models for a planned “healthy regenera-
tion” of human populations based on complex data also reached social policy,
which intervened in various countries with political interventions aimed at
“negative” (for example marriage prohibition, forced sterilization) and “posi-
tive eugenics” (child benefit, laws to protect the health of mother and child
etc.) (Raphael 2011).
The times of dark data that loomed on the horizon found their breakthrough
in the era of National Socialism, in which the various instruments of biologistic
measurement and eugenic selection became the foundations of Nazi racial poli-
tics. As Götz Aly and Karl Heinz Roth have extensively researched, experts,
practices and techniques of systematic identification, isolation, and selection of
people based on the datafication of health, ideology, race, social status, and re-
ligion became in fact the administrative backbone of the race-hygienic extermi-
nation policy (Aly and Roth 2004). For this purpose, state-of-the-art Hollerith
punch card technology was used, which was developed and provided by the
German IBM subsidiary DEHOMAG (Black 2002).
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4 Data as the Functional Logic of Societies
in Digital Transformation
“What may the state, what may the statisticians know about the individual?”
Questions such as these may sound anachronistic today, with more data avail-
able to states and private enterprises than ever before and with comparatively
little critical opposition against the widespread collection and availability of
data. But in 1983, Götz Aly and Karl Heinz Roth published their book on the
“Nazi Census” in the light of these questions and employed the Nazi State as a
deterrent and explicit statement to protest against the German census planned
for 1983 (Aly and Roth 2004). The 1980s were a time in which it became obvious
that more and more areas of life are organized by data and also the private
sphere is increasingly permeated by data. In the German discourse, the fear of
the “gläserner Mensch” – a man made of glass, transparent and open for in-
spection of all the secretive bits and details of their personal lives – was a wide-
spread catchword. From the perspective of historical surveillance studies, Sven
Reichhardt (2016) shows how data-based infrastructures, practices and techni-
ques of surveillance, and self-surveillance as essential processes were embed-
ded ever deeper into everyday life, privacy and societies. The fear regarding
surveillance through data transparency also echoed in pop culture. The 1981
song “Computerwelt” by pioneering German band Kraftwerk is but one example
of the fear of misuse of computer data and digital surveillance by German and
international institutions: “Interpol und Deutsche Bank / FBI und Scotland Yard /
Flensburg und das BKA / Haben unsere Daten da” (“Interpol and Deutschr Bank,
FBI and Scotland Yard, Flensburg (location of the Federal Motor Transport Author-
ity) and BKA (Federal Criminal Police), they all have our data”). The critical reac-
tions to datafication processes reflect a quantitative and qualitative shift and
increase in keeping with the prevalence and relevance of data for social processes.
In the second half of the twentieth century, data has become “a fundamen-
tal organizational principle of modern societies” (Bächle 2016, 157, translation
by the authors). According to Nassehi (2019), in the course of the computeriza-
tion and digitization of society, data has finally established itself as a functional
logic of modern societies. Through these processes of social transformation,
data become both a trade secret as well as the leading currency and the raw
material of modern societies. In this sense, data for societies has an enormous
potential to generate social order, which, according to Nassehi, primarily lies in
their inexhaustible “recombination possibilities”: “The simplicity of the data is
the key to its effectiveness” (Nassehi 2019, 145). In digital societies, data in-
creasingly accumulates in abundance and everywhere.
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Whereas in the previous historical examples data were seen as a means of
recording social relations and experiences, in this current period data itself
moves to the center of interest. In this process, the relationship between the re-
corded data and social life is partially inverted and data changes from being an
ex-post codification of, resource for, and the result of economic operations and
legislative measures. We have shown that throughout history, social and eco-
nomic relationships as well as observable patterns of human behavior were
made into data, e.g., translated into contracts or codified into laws; addition-
ally, with social science data gathering there was an interest to be defined and
then investigated, data was accumulated to serve a particular goal or to provide
insights to specific areas. With the rise of digital platforms and big data, human
behavior itself, particularly the use of and interaction with digital devices, gen-
erates data. The prospect of datafication in the digital era hence was widened to
capture all aspects of life from digital traces and to later find patterns in these
enormous volumes of data, which can be used for various interests.
Over time, the concept of datafication has since become more widespread
and is used in a variety of fields and (sub)disciplines, also beyond online plat-
forms and the traces left behind by navigating through or with digital devices.
The “quantification of the social” renewed historical promises of providing ac-
cess to a “rationalized world of data” (Mau 2019, 36), which allows for anticipat-
ing and controlling human behavior as well as for minimizing risks while doing
so. While the character of datafied societies is sometimes rather seen in a wide-
spread “data voluntarism” (Mau 2019) of people, which is cleverly driven by
promises of social participation as well as a “cult of numbers that masquerades
as rationalization” (Mau 2019), datafication does not only affect those who pro-
vide data voluntarily. Instead, big data can also create new and reinforce old
divides regarding access to data, interpretation of data, representation in data,
and the ethics of data and their processes of capturing (boyd and Crawford
2012). Datafication, in addition to its use as a notion describing a phenomenon
and process of social transformation, is hence also increasingly used to name
critical research perspectives, discussing potential biases, omissions, or dis-
criminations caused by big data or its analytical application (Leurs and Shepherd
2017; Milan and Treré 2020; Dencik and Kaun 2020). Interestingly, historical refer-
ences and interpretative schemes prominently feature in such discussions. Em-
ploying perspectives from (post-)colonial studies, datafication is seen to create
new centers of power and exploited or dependent peripheries, oftentimes
mirroring colonial dependencies from the past (Thatcher, O’Sullivan, and
Mahmoudi 2016). While colonialism might seem like a thing of the past, as
Couldry and Mejias (2019) write, the historic appropriation of land, bodies,
and natural resources is mirrored today in this new era of pervasive datafication.
150 Erik Koenen, Christian Schwarzenegger and Juraj Kittler
This is just another way of looking at how research into datafication today can
learn from historicizing the concept and idea.
Conclusion
Institutions, practices, and processes of datafication, according to the guiding
thesis of this chapter, did not simply surface out of nowhere nor come upon us
in the wake of digitalization, but have a long prehistory with diverse historical
roots. The ambitions and initiatives for understanding the world through data
can be traced through time as a persistent and ongoing historical enterprise. A
look at earlier epochs can help us to compare and put in perspective processes
of datafication today with the data practices of other historical contexts. Histori-
cizing data(fication) does not focus on what is distinct about datafication in the
digital age but examines data(fication) with regard to its interrelations with
changing social conditions and evolving media environments. Dirk Baecker (2013,
164, 184), hence, proposes seeing “society or culture as metadata,” which is char-
acterized by and has enabled “historically varying” processes of datafication. It
can then be observed how societies were repeatedly challenged by new forms and
quantities of data records in the face of media (r)evolutions (Burke 2000, 2012).
Changing media environments affected the generation, storage, and exchange of
data. Beer (2016, 1) thus proposes investigating and contextualizing processes of
datafication in “historical, political and sociological terms.”
The first traces of data-processing instruments and techniques can already
be discovered from ancient to early modern times. The main driving forces be-
hind the development of symbolic forms of data gathering and recordkeeping
were the necessity of the earliest complex social formations to keep records of
their legislative measures and taxes. Apart from that, Nassehi (2019) has pointed
out in his studies of the “patterns” of modern societies how closely the nine-
teenth century as an age of analog data-driven discovery of society by the state,
statistics and sociology is linked to the current digital data-driven permeation of
our present. Gradually, over the course of the twentieth century, more and more
fields of society changed their working basis to data. As a result, data have be-
come a kind of “key currency” not only to quantify but also as a possibility to
code and recode almost all facets of the social (Mau 2019). This can already be
observed in around 1900 in discourses and ideas of social planning and social
engineering to optimize social life and societies and experienced its darkest ex-
cesses in the use of data for the race-hygienic extermination policy of the Nazi
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regime. Today, data permeates and influences our lives as a matter of course, but
as a historical topic, datafication has yet to greatly resonate.
Following a perspective on the social history of data and datafication in the
longue durée, we illustrate that the production, collection, and processing of
data not only predate digitalization but also, in the immediate decades before
the digital revolution, produced exclusive infrastructures, knowledge orders,
and practices. Historicizing the concept of data(fication) provides an analytical
matrix for identifying persistent questions and changing answers through the
ages. In order to capture historically long-term processes of datafication, this
research framework can be further systematized by asking not only for the social
contexts but also for the respective ideas, discourses, infrastructures, media, prac-
tices, and techniques around data in a particular epoch. Using these lenses, we
can trace and discuss the shifts and persistence of data collection institutions
(e.g., state or private), the governance of access (e.g., open or restricted) and the
processing of data, the means and the ends of data collection, and the discursive
transparency about (and potential resistance against) socially collected and rele-
vant data and what happens with it.
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Fake News
Tracing the Genesis of a New Term and Old Practices
Abstract: Fake news has recently emerged as a buzzword in media and political
discourses. Many incidences ranging from ethnic violence, inter-racial and reli-
gious conflicts to mass riots have been blamed on the spread of fake news. This
chapter provides a clear historicization of the phenomenon of fake news, from
its early days as far back as can be documented up to present day. Here we ad-
vance the argument that fake news is not a new phenomenon, but a part of
human lives since societies were formed and information was shared. We further
argue that the technological changes of the past century and recent decades,
along with the expansion of communication spaces, have simply accelerated
the speed at which fake news can be shared, as well as increased the spaces
and platforms in which fake news may be found and spread.
Keywords: disinformation, history, fake news, strategic communications,
propaganda
While it is clear that fake news has existed since humans began communicating
and sharing information, fake news as a term is not the most useful when it
comes to the myriad categories of false information as there are marked differ-
ences between types of inaccurate or misleading stories. For the purposes of
this chapter, we can differentiate between disinformation (lies, hoaxes, stories,
and images deliberately created and disseminated to influence or cause harm)
and misinformation (mistakes, accidental sharing of false or misleading infor-
mation, not intended to cause harm). The two should be understood as part of
the “fake news ecosystem” and the “information disorder” currently afflicting
the world. In this chapter, we treat them as such. The origins of each term stem
from a particular place in history. Disinformation is commonly associated with
the Russian term “dezinformaciya” and was defined in 1952 as “dissemination
of false reports intended to mislead public opinion” (Taylor 2016). These, often
government-sponsored, campaigns differ from propaganda (originally a posi-
tive term for the work of foreign Catholic missions to propagate the faith, taking
the newer, more pejorative, definition connotations after World War I) (Diggs-
Brown 2012, 48). Propaganda, as referred to in this chapter, denotes the system-
atic propagation of information or ideas by an interested party, specifically, in a
tendentious way, in order to encourage or instill a certain attitude or response
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(OED 1989). There is a thin line separating propaganda and disinformation.
This is because propaganda utilizes disinformation and vice versa. The thin dif-
ference, however, is that propaganda is information that advances only one
side of an argument, while disinformation may advance both or all sides of an
argument with a view to cause rifts in society and exploit them further for dis-
traction or political gain.
This chapter is organized as follows: the first section provides a genesis of
fake news by tracing its growth from 44 BCE, in the ancient Egyptian and Roman
societies. This section outlines fake news up to the invention of the Guttenberg
press, citing major incidences recorded as manifestations of fake news in historical
texts. The second section, Fake News in the Modern Age, discusses the growth of
fake news in the modern era, from the 1800s up to the end of World War II. The
third section, Fake News in the New Information Age, explores disinformation in
the new information age, from 1945 to 1995, while the final section, Fake News in
the Digital Media Age, explores developments from 1995 to the present day.
1 The Genesis of Fake News (44 BCE–1799 CE)
To clearly trace the evolution of this information space prior to the digital age,
we divide this section into two categories: pre-printing press and post-printing
press.
The intent and action of creating and distributing false information has been
in existence even during the pre-printing era (Uberti 2016; Burkhardt 2017). Ex-
amples of fake news have been well-documented and are littered throughout his-
tory (Parkinson 2016). Some researchers (Soll 2016) argue that fake news has
been around for a very long time and, consequently, has left a lot more destruc-
tion behind than any kind of news that can be imagined.
In the pre-printing era, fake news spread through rumors and false stories.
In most instances, fake news stories served a political purpose – for political
“character assassination.” A famous instance of the use of fake news for politi-
cal purpose involves Procopius of Caesara, the principal historian of the Byzan-
tium Kingdom (Burkhardt 2017). He released a treatise called Secret History that
discredited the emperor and his wife with wild and unverifiable claims (Bur-
khardt 2017), in a bid to curry the favor of the new, incoming emperor. During
the Second Triumvirate in Rome (43 BC), fake news fueled internal jealousies
and hatred amongst the three architects of the Triumvirate – Octavian, Antony,
and Lepidus (Wright 1937). It was no secret that the three were naturally ambi-
tious men (Weigel 1992) but the spread of fake news – untrue stories, unfounded
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tales of plots and counter-plots – destabilized the Triumvirate (Weigel 1992). Such
bizarre stories also circulated during Emperor Ramesses II’s campaigns in Egypt
(1303 BCE) against the Nubians, Syrians, and Libyans as he consolidated his
power, strengthened Egypt and fended off external threats (James 2000). One
such piece of damaging news was that the Emperor’s army had been defeated
in battle by Sherden sea pirates (James 2000). The fake news story nearly
caused mass panic and alarm in the Kingdom. Thus, for more than 2000 years,
fake news has been part of humanity’s news narratives, with almost the same in-
tentions as today’s Internet era – to inflame passions, raise alarm and cause (usu-
ally political and religious) prejudice. And, in most of these instances, fake news
embodied the same sensationalist and extremist content.
This trend gathered momentum with the invention of the Gutenberg printing
press in 1450. Printing allowed for fake news to become part of the emerging
press outlets and could be distributed faster to a larger audience (Soll 2016). The
advent of the printing press led to the mass production of pamphlets, books, and
treatises that could circulate widely (Vicario et al. 2016). Yet, despite the develop-
ment of mass printing, and mass circulation of reading material, the development
of a code of journalistic ethics, such as truth-telling, did not arise simultaneously:
an ethical code that would go in some way to hold journalists to professionalism,
and, thus, help reduce fake news from the mainstream. There was also a plethora
of news sources in the centuries up to the Enlightenment, around 1700, which
were valued as official and unquestioned (Holan 2016). These included religious
authorities, accounts, official publications, eyewitness accounts by sailors and
merchants – all with a claim to authenticity. These sources, because of their “sa-
cred predisposition,” could easily become sources of fake news. As a result, fake
news emerged from such “valorized” news sources and circulated easily. When
spread by the so-called trusted sources, fake news could lead to deaths and the
displacement of communities. For instance, on Easter Sunday in 1475, in Italy, a
two-and-a-half-year-old boy called Simonino disappeared (Soll 2016). The Catho-
lic preacher of the city spread fake news blaming the Jewish community for ab-
ducting the boy, beheading him and drinking his blood for ritual sacrifices (Soll
2016). The result was the public lynching and beheading of many Jewish people
in the town. Others were displaced as the fake news spread (Soll 2016). Christian-
Jewish hostilities that have culminated in violent anti-Semitism can equally be
traced to the propagation of fake news (Myles and Crossley 2012; Kaplan 1985).
The cultivated fake narrative that Jewish people drink children’s blood as ritual
sacrifice can be traced back to this period (Kaplan 1985).
Such fake narratives about other ethnic groups have proved to endure over
time, and they have provided fodder with which other ethnic groups have later
been treated. For instance, Goebbels’ anti-Semitic propaganda of the twentieth
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century, which led to the Holocaust, thrived on such ancient and false myths
about the Jewish people (Ivanova 2019). Between 1500 and 1600, as printing
expanded and became commercial and dominant, fake news emerged as in-
strumental to boosting circulation figures (Standage 2017). News books or pam-
phlets ran fake stories of weird sightings. For instance, in 1654, a Catalonian
news book reported the discovery of a monster with goat’s legs, a human
body, seven arms, and seven heads (Standage 2017). In 1611, an English pam-
phlet reported a Dutch woman had lived for 14 years without eating or drinking
(Standag 2017). These are classic instances when fake news was intentionally ma-
nipulated as a commercial strategy. The invention of the printing press in the
mid-1400s, like the invention of the Internet, increased the speed at which fake
news could spread.
The coming of the Enlightenment, from the seventeenth to nineteenth cen-
turies, was characterized by widespread philosophical and intellectual ideas,
the growth of the (printed) mass media as we know it, and more fake news.
These two centuries witnessed the overt practice of fake news production in
mainstream media publications. This may be attributed to the intense commer-
cialization of the media, which roughly began in these two centuries, or at least
gained impetus. Like today, newspapers then began to source funding from ad-
vertisers. This exerted pressure on editors to pursue readers at all costs in order
to attract advertisers (Mott 1942). Secondly, the period between 1700 and 1900
was characterized by political revolutions in many parts of the world, for exam-
ple, the American and the French revolutions. Moments of political upheavals
like these produce anxieties and are fertile ground for fake news (Joubert 2020).
Through frequent publication of fake news surrounding “outrageous” French de-
mands for a loan before negotiations, the press attempted, through fake news, to
stir public opinion towards war.
From 1700 onwards, fake news evolved further, becoming a costly phenome-
non associated with enormous loss of life. For instance, in 1761, a fake news story
circulated in the city of Toulouse about Antoine Calas, who was alleged to have
been murdered by his father, Jean Calas (Holan 2016). The fake news gained offi-
cial recognition and the father was convicted, publicly tried and hanged. Concur-
rently, in the U.S., racial tensions became grounds for the propagation of fake
news (Knopf 2017). The Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 sparked the production of an
entire genre of fake news (Soll 2016). Fake news pamphlets spread stories that
the earthquake was divine retribution against sinners, and that survivors owed
their lives to the divine apparition of the Virgin Mary (Soll 2016). Across the At-
lantic, in the U.S., African-American relations of the eighteenth century proved to
be a “cottage industry” of fake news. For example, fake news swirled around
imaginary and strange crimes committed by slaves around the U.S., including
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bestiality, cannibalism, and other weird and unverified accounts (Pettey 2003;
Turner 1993). The French revolution, which dominated the eighteenth century,
became notorious for its production of fake news (Burkhardt 2017). For example,
fake reports of counter-revolutionary forces from Belgium mobilized at the behest
of the beleaguered queen (Darnton 2017). These fake news stories about Marie
Antoinette contributed to her harsh treatment by revolutionaries and subsequent
demise on the guillotine (Pettey 2003; Turner 1993). In past centuries, before the
digital era, it was not easy to verify if news was true or fake. This gave false news
stories the same credibility and legitimacy as true stories, since fact checking, or
debunking, was much more difficult in a time of information scarcity. The in-
creasing veneration of the principles of truthfulness, objectivity and integrity
began to inhibit the spread of fake news, especially in the 1900s. The absence of
such standards was in itself a contributing factor to fake news. There were no
professional norms which could be used as a measure of deviation or standard
reporting. Newspapers evolved to be more professional (Raymond 2013), but the
seeds of fake news had already been sown and were growing.
2 Fake News in the Modern Age (1800–1945)
2.1 The Spanish-American War and the Birth of Yellow
Journalism
The early-1800s saw a turning point for news media and journalism in the
United States with the advent of what became known as “yellow journalism.”
In this era (Emery 1972), societies were subjected to a steady diet of fake news.
As Burkhardt (2017) notes, it was competition to break the news first and attract
more readers and advertisers that led to fake news in this period. In 1835, the
editor of The New York Sun ran a series of articles about astonishing sights wit-
nessed by the British astronomer, John Herschel, from his observatory in Cape
Town, South Africa (Standage 2017). The paper’s editor, Richard Adam Loche,
ran stories of observed great man bats that collected fruit and held animated con-
versations on the moon, along with blue-skinned goat-like creatures (Standage
2017). A total of six articles of these sensational observations became known as
the Great Moon Hoax. The stories were initially believed, and despite the false
nature of these articles, the paper’s daily circulation shot up from 8,000 copies to
19,000 copies, ushering in the era of yellow journalism (Standage 2017). The
newspaper never issued a retraction (O’Brien 1918).
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The years of 1860–1920 ushered in the age of mass-circulated newspapers
in the United States (Lutes 2011). The American Civil War (1861–65) saw the cre-
ation of large-scale war reporters and the use of the telegraph in wartime for
faster transmission of information (Andrews 1964). After Joseph Pulitzer bought
the New York World in 1883, and William Randolph Hearst acquired the New York
Journal in 1895, they found themselves competing for increased readership, rely-
ing on tactics of sensationalism and scandal. In a battle to increase the circula-
tion of their respective newspapers, Hearst and Pulitzer engaged in fierce
competition, which historians refer to as the first press-driven war (Lutes
2011, 97–101). The Spanish-American War gained the support of the American
people, who had previously opposed intervention in Cuba, largely through
sensationalist and fabricated stories in the newspapers of Hearst and Pulit-
zer. These stories weaved invented tales of oppressed Cubans, persecution
by the Spanish, and in great need of American military intervention. Ameri-
can sympathies grew as the papers published, though support for a war was
not explicit (Cinquemani 2014). In 1898, the sinking of the USS Maine in the
port of Havana, Cuba, killed hundreds of those aboard. Both papers were
quick to blame the Spanish without any basis, with headlines reading “The
Spirit of War Pervades the Breasts of All Americans” and “Maine was Blown
up by a Mine or Torpedo”, and urged the government to respond (Swift 1899). This
reporting spurned Americans into action, including Theodore Roosevelt, who
assembled a cavalry regiment, soon dubbed the Rough Riders by the press
(Musicant 1998).
2.2 The Boer Wars
Preceding the Second Boer War (1899–1902), Britain’s Forster Education Act of
1870 increased literacy rates and, as a result, the readership of newspapers rose
and new papers were founded, including the Daily Mail and Daily Express. As a
result, information consumption during the Boer War was vast compared to any
wars of the past and the Daily Mail reached over a million people daily (Thomp-
son 2000). Throughout the war, the Boers were presented as backward, savage,
and primitive, compared to the more advanced British. Though there were more
newspapers at the time than ever before in British history, nearly all were in
favor of the war (Morgan 2002, 1–16). The war was also the first in which pho-
tography was able to be featured so prominently, initiating the era of photojour-
nalism, as well as photo manipulation and use for disinformation (Morgan 2002,
1–16). Reporting focused not on the deaths of Boer children and their mothers in
British concentration camps, but on the mothers being ignorant about nutrition
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and their children’s health (Krebs 2004). A photo taken of an emaciated seven-
year-old girl, Lizzie van Zyl, an inmate of a camp in Bloemfontein, was released
in 1902 by The Times. This photo was used as a way to persuade the British public
that Boer mothers were mistreating and neglecting their children as a further
method of dehumanizing the enemy, which served to garner support for the war
(Godby 2013, 171–183).
2.3 World War I (1914–1918)
The first of the World Wars brought about the foremost use of widespread mass
media and government-backed and propagated fake news (Keil 2017). While
today most news outlets claim a degree of freedom and objectivity, in 1914, they
expressed political leanings more openly (Paddock 2004). A lack of first-hand
information from the front lines due to a banning of journalists by many coun-
tries also contributed to incomplete or inaccurate information (Beurier 2014).
Prior to the American entry into World War I, stories of the atrocities ap-
peared in magazines and newspapers (Kingsbury 2010, 66–68). When the Lusi-
tania sank in 1915, a new wave of propaganda and disinformation arose. Of the
most circulated fake news stories was one of a mutilated Belgian baby, purpose-
fully harmed by German soldiers. This story was unique as it became transoce-
anic, spreading across America as well as France, appearing in Le Rive Rouge
with photos allegedly depicting Germans eating the hands of the baby. Despite
the implausibility of the survival of these handless babies and children, many
claimed to have seen them first-hand (Graves 2007). Other stories included a
nurse mutilated by German soldiers, crucified Canadian soldiers, as well as
some of the first instances of doctored photographs (Ponsonby 1929). In the last
months of 1914, the attention of citizens was turned towards Russia, with the
idea that their soldiers passed through Great Britain on their way to the Western
Front. Despite being false, this rumor spread around the country with myriad re-
ports of citizens spotting Russian soldiers (Ponsonby 1929). These reports were
published by The Daily News, The Daily Mail and others.
Concurrently, the British forces made calculated efforts to gain support and
persuade China to take part in the war (Ponsonby 1929). As a strategy to vilify
their German enemy, British propagandists developed atrocity propaganda and
concocted the story of the German corpse factory, detailing how Germany was
using the corpses of their soldiers as sources for fat during the British naval
blockade (Knightley 2000). Though rumors had circulated since 1915, the story
first appeared in the English-language press in China, North China Daily News,
in early 1917. Several months later, the story appeared in articles in Britain’s
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Daily Mail and The Times. The effect was achieved and, in August 1917, China
entered the war. In 1925, it was admitted by parliamentarian John Charteris and
Secretary of State Sir Austen Chamberlain that the story was fabricated (Nean-
der and Marlin 2010). Atrocity propaganda was used by all sides of the war,
with stories of soldiers further mutilating women and babies spreading widely
across Europe and the U.S. (Lawson 2020).
French newspapers during the time of the war tended to suppress news of
enemy advancement and inevitable defeat and were some of the most censored
press in Europe (Beurier 2014). In a time when the civilian population was hungry
for information from the front, the first months of the war provided very little offi-
cial information as journalists were barred from reaching the front. Newspapers
invented letters and rumors to provide text for articles and to contribute to mo-
rale. News of how close the front was were also skewed in the press. Until Au-
gust 1914, through news reports, the public had believed that the French troops
were winning in Belgium and Alsace, when, in reality, the front ran from the
Somme to the Vosges rivers, much closer than reported. News stories around the
1914 Battle of Marne exemplified this strategy, with papers stating that Germans
were using shells made of cardboard, or that they had lost five million troops
(Demm 2017). On the German side, though the army had to enact a quick retreat,
leaving behind 50,000 prisoners, the German press proclaimed the capture of pris-
oners and French canons. Much of the false information disseminated in France at
the time came more from a lack of authentic reporting and access as opposed to
an orchestrated disinformation campaign. Interestingly, most of the exaggerated
or invented accounts faded away as news from the front and first-hand military
reports and photographs started to be supplied in 1915 (Beurier 2014).
The situation in Russia was somewhat different at the time, primarily due
to the 40% literacy rate and low circulation of newspapers, as well as a lack of
an overall cohesive and patriotic society. However, the will to fight against a
common threat was apparent, and the public needed very little motivation to
back the war effort. Despite the lack of a coordinating propaganda body, like
Great Britain’s, Russia spread disinformation through its 4th Department of the
Quartermaster-General of the General Staff along with the press bureau of the
Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with the aim of providing
propaganda materials to newspapers (Medyakov 2014). The primary narrative
was that the enemy was violating laws of war, along with the “otherization” of
the Germans and their influence in Russian culture. The Russian press em-
ployed narratives of German orientalism, portraying their barbaric tendencies,
and, in effect, positioning Russia as a champion of “the West” while Germany
represented the East. Russian newspapers printed stories of the rapes and beat-
ings of Russian tourists in Germany, and the city of Kalisz became a propaganda
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example of German atrocities, which led to the anger of the Poles as a conse-
quence (Medyakov 2014).
One piece of false information, deemed misinformation, that travelled around
the globe on November 7, 1918, was that of the armistice. This news, greeted by
celebrations and cheers from Canada to Argentina and beyond, however, was not
true. The news was spread in large part due to the United Press Agency president,
Roy Howard, himself in France, who received a cable that stated Germany had
signed the armistice agreement, fighting had ceased and the German-occupied
town of Sedan had been taken by the U.S. military (Smith 2017). The message was
transmitted to the British and the U.S. without passing French censors because
they had left the building to celebrate. The message was received by Reuters who
then circulated it among British papers, only to send a follow-on message 20 mi-
nutes later to correct the story, but the news had already spread (Beard 2016,
73–77). Work across the U.S. and Great Britain ceased, shops closed and workers
abandoned their offices (Beard 2016, 73–77). The reputation of Reuters suffered
greatly as a result and the Associated Press called for the court-martialing of Roy
Howard, and for the United Press Agency to fund the clean-up of New York City
following the celebrations of November 7. Ultimately, no real repercussions were
conferred (Smith 2017).
3 World War II (1939–1945)
World War I served to lay the groundwork for disinformation in World War II
and Germany did not forget Britain’s disinformation campaigns. The stories in
the foreign press about Nazi atrocities were easily decried by the Nazis, citing
the corpse factory hoax of the previous war, by then known to Germans as dis-
information (Neander and Marlin 2010).
Technology saw further developments in the interwar period, with radio re-
porting becoming more popular and relied upon for information. The outbreak
of World War II is simply traceable to a single, well-crafted disinformation item.
Faced with citizen fatigue from losses in World War I, motivation to enter an-
other war was not forthcoming (Luckert 2019). In this section, we will outline
examples from Germany, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States.
In August 1939, following months of reporting ethnic violence against Ger-
mans in Poland, a new plan was sought to bring about a reason to invade Po-
land. Orchestrated by Hitler, a radio station in German territory at Gleiwitz was
raided by SS operatives in Polish uniforms. Incendiary words were broadcast in
Polish, and several concentration camp inmates and prisoners were killed and
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left as proof of the violent raid (de Zayas 1992, 383–399). After U.S. correspondents
were called the next day to view the damage, this false flag operation was re-
ported widely in the United States and Great Britain. Germany invaded Poland
that same day. While the intent behind the German initiation of the event and
subsequent reporting was clear, those reporting the news in the West could be
seen as disseminators of misinformation, without the explicit intent to mislead
the public (Godson and Wirtz 2008). Fake reports abounded during this time, in-
cluding information that German soldiers were receiving syphilis-tainted blood
from captured Polish and Russian soldiers (Shaer 2017).
The strongest disinformation was certainly directed at those of Jewish decent,
heavily vilified and demonized so as to provide a basis for atrocities to be will-
ingly committed against them. The Wehrmachtbericht, a daily radio broadcast
from the High Command of the Wehrmacht, was one of the primary sources for
disinformation at the time, including portraying Operation Barbarossa in 1941 as
a success against the Soviets, as opposed to the reality (Stahel 2009). The radio
channel broadcast news about President Roosevelt being Jewish, Jewish crimes
and false German victories (Murawksi 1962). All newspapers and information
were controlled by the state, with the most widely disseminated newspapers,
such as the Völkischer Beobachter (People’s Observer), spreading stories of near-
constant Nazi success in the war, plans to attack the United States for countering
anti-Semitic policies and widely blaming most negative events on the Jewish
people.
Much of German news revolved around the protection of Europe from the
enslavement of Communism, and less so around pure German protection (Rho-
des 1983).
No stranger to orchestrated propaganda campaigns at this point, Soviet dis-
information during the period of World War II included stories of German killers,
cannibals, widely circulated in the newspaper Pravda amidst general stories of
fascist Germans. The overall Soviet disinformation machine would develop more
after the war as the Cold War took hold. The primary narratives of the time were
that Germany wished to exterminate the people of the USSR, atrocities committed
by the Germans, the strength of the Soviet army and emphasizing the use of Ger-
man allies for the most dangerous missions (Overy 2004).
The Ministry of Information of World War I in Great Britain was revived dur-
ing World War II, making use of not only newspapers, but the now-popular cin-
ema, as well as radio. One notable instance was that of the 1939 sinking of the
SS Athenia, in which Americans, Canadians, and British were killed on the
first day of the war. It was exploited as a way to invoke the same terror of U-
boats from World War I. However, the Germans continued to deny involvement
in the incident until the 1946 Nuremburg Trials, largely based on the fear that
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the United States would be persuaded to join the war should this attribution be
made. The Ministry also disseminated information that the Katyn Massacre in
Poland in 1940 was staged by the Nazis, information that was believed by the
British public until well after the end of the war (Roberts 2012). Meanwhile, Ger-
many used the massacre as a way to exaggerate Soviet crimes and further vilify
their enemy.
The U.S. entrance into World War II was largely a result of the daring Japa-
nese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. But the very entrance of the
United States into World War II may have also been based on a large piece of
fake information in 1941 – that President Roosevelt was in possession of a secret
Nazi map, outlining a reorganization of South and Central America, and the
idea that Germany had their sights set on dominating the United States. Years
later, it was discovered that the map itself may have been made by the British.
Whether or not the president knew this is unclear (Blanding 2019).
Much of the disinformation and false stories circulating in the United States
during this time involved a significant racial undertone, specifically anti-Japanese.
The hysteria in newspapers of the time included fake stories of the mistreatment of
prisoners, bayonetting Hawaiian babies, along with spreading the narrative
that Germany had encouraged Japan to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Dower
1987, 43–44). Meanwhile, both Germany and Japan were disseminating leaf-
lets dropped on U.S. troops that black men were violating white women while
white men were at war, which went as far as a Japanese short-wave radio station
broadcasting news of lynchings and discrimination against African-Americans in
the United States, often voiced by African-American prisoners of war. These nu-
ances of pitting one nation’s race against the minority and vice versa were also
seen later in Cold War disinformation (Brcak and Pavia 1994, 671–684).
4 Fake News in the New Information Age
(1945–1995)
The end of World War II did not mean that massive information campaigns ceased.
During the ensuing Cold War (1947–1991), disinformation laundered by the Soviet
government through the news outlets of other states resulted in some of the great-
est hoaxes and disinformation campaigns that the public still remembers today.
By using a blend of covert and overt methods, the Soviet government attempted to
influence events and behaviors abroad, including government action. Strategies
also involved discrediting and weakening governmental opponents, creating forg-
eries, as well as the purposeful dissemination of false information to be spread by
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Soviet-friendly media (Cull et al. 2017). The most notable case was Operation Infek-
tion, the story that the U.S. invented AIDS. By using a number of proxies and So-
viet-friendly news outlets, it began in the Patriot newspaper in 1983 and spread
outwardly across the world. This widespread campaign is illustrative of the Soviet
Active Measures pattern of dissemination. A piece of information or story was
given to an outside source, not known to be Soviet-affiliated, where the news
would break. The story would then be picked up by Soviet news, citing the interna-
tional investigative sources in a process of circular reporting or false confirmation
to show legitimacy (U.S. State Dept. 1987). The impact through time has remained
strong, with a 2005 RAND study revealing that 50% of Americans believed that
AIDS was man-made and 25% that it was made in a government laboratory (Bog-
hardt 2009).
To counter this threat, the United Kingdom created the Information Research
Department, a covert research facility to respond to Soviet Active Measures, pri-
marily active in the 1950s–1960s. The department created their own forgeries to
be disseminated covertly, to include press releases and fake copies of The Times
of North Korea depicting communist propaganda (Thomson 2010). The majority
of the stories were circulated to maintain a constantly negative view of life in the
Soviet Bloc. The department supplied materials to the BBC World Service, funded
Reuters and assisted greatly in bringing down the Indonesian Communist Party
through radio and newspapers to emphasize and exaggerate news of murdered
Indonesian generals and their families (Thomson 2010). The department was also
later involved in false information surrounding the “Troubles” in Northern Ire-
land. Media outlets such as News of the World featured invented tales of Soviet
involvement in shipping rocket-launchers to Ireland and sightings of Soviet tank-
ers off the coast of Ireland, as well as disseminated other fake news stories about
the Irish Republican Army.
Following World War II, South African media took after the British model,
with relative freedom and independent expression (Kolbe 2005). However, follow-
ing the 1948 rise to power of the Nationalists, the press was significantly restricted
and gave rise to considerable disinformation. Within the apartheid government,
the Stratcom Department was created to spread messages and create campaigns to
discredit their opposition (Knight 2020). A former employee of the department,
Paul Erasmus, stated that the primary role was to “disseminate negative propa-
ganda or disinformation against its enemies or perceived enemies” (Knight 2020).
These Stratcom agents placed letters to media outlets on their doorsteps at night;
the next morning, these pieces would become headline local news. Internationally,
Stratcom, via Erasmus under a pseudonym, even published a smear-campaign
piece in the U.S. magazine Vanity Fair about Winnie Mandela. This campaign to
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discredit Mandela was entitled Operation Romulus (South African Press Associa-
tion 1997).
In the 1970s and 1980s, during apartheid in South Africa, the controlling
regime had to rely on fake news in order to “take the offensive against those in
opposition” (Nixon 2016, 71). The regime launched an operation codenamed
“Acoda” – or “Operation Heartbreak” to try and influence political opinion in
the U.S. and Europe. This operation involved the spread of fake news and pro-
paganda on a massive scale to try and influence international public opinion
(Nixon 2016). It is instructive to note that De Clerk, the last apartheid president,
dismantled the propaganda apparatuses that had sustained the regime for about
50 years (Nixon 2016). Much of the propaganda was based on fake news stories of
political reforms and black African terrorism which made it difficult for inclusion
and reconciliation. The South African “Afrikaner media” (Kolbe 2005) ruthlessly
spread fake news in order to delegitimize the anti-apartheid struggle. One conse-
quence of this fake news strategy by the Afrikaner press was that it successfully
split the anti-apartheid forces in the country (Kolbe 2005).
5 Fake News in the Digital Media Age
(1995–Present)
In the digital media age, fake news has become an even greater concern, largely
due to the ability of technology to facilitate the spread of information much
more quickly than before. This is especially apparent during momentous events
like war and elections (Kurtzleben 2018). Fake news and strategic disinforma-
tion during elections, wars, and other conflicts such as terrorist attacks, can be
seen in different formats. These range from the proliferation of emotionally
charged online fake stories, false vitriol aimed at certain groups, unverifiable
sensationalist stories and outright lies about a political party or candidate (Can-
tarella, Fraccaroli, and Volpe 2019). Hartmann (2017) notes that, during elec-
tions, bots on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have been
responsible for the spread of fake news. Fake accounts on these platforms have
also been responsible for “ideologically extreme, hyper-partisan or conspirato-
rial” stories about election candidates (Hartmann 2017). Facebook, for example,
had to suspend about 30,000 accounts that propagated fake news during the
French elections in 2016 (Hartmann 2017).
The account of fake news during the 2016 elections in the U.S. is by now a
very familiar story (Kurtzleben 2018; Gunther, Beck, and Nisbet 2018). The Hi-
lary Clinton-Donald Trump campaign generated a lot of fake news that is now
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well-documented in the academic literature (Kurtzleben 2018; Gunther, Beck,
and Nisbet 2018 and many others). In fact, both sides of the U.S. political divide
were victims of fake news both domestically and as part of orchestrated disin-
formation campaigns, now attributed to the Russian Internet Research Agency.
There was, for instance, a fake news story that Trump had a secret server that
allowed him to communicate privately with Russian banks. The fake story went
viral on online news spaces in the US. Pizzagate was also a notorious story al-
leging Hilary Clinton was involved in a child slavery ring operating out of a
pizza restaurant in Washington D.C. This led to an armed man going to the res-
taurant to free the (non-existing) children. After the election and subsequent in-
vestigations the narratives spread, creating bigger rifts between political parties,
widening racial divides and sowing general discord in the United States. Many of
the accounts spreading disinformation in 2016 are still active today.
In the global south, particularly in Africa, Mumbere (2019) notes that elec-
tions on this continent “have a fake news problem.” The concern with fake
news in Africa has grown with each passing election. In 2018, in southern Africa,
for example, Zimbabwean elections were riddled with fake news (Mumbere 2019).
There was a fake news story explaining that the leading opposition candidate, Nel-
son Chamisa, had pulled out of the election (Associated Foreign Press 2018). In
Malawi, Kondowe (2019) notes that WhatsApp had been the biggest propagator of
fake news in the country’s 2018 elections. Kondowe notes that one of the most no-
torious fake news stories of the Malawian election was that popular Nigerian
prophet, TB Joshua, had prophesied that the opposition candidate, Saulos Chi-
lima of the United Transformation Movement, would win the election. In a conti-
nent where prophets are revered, this fake news story, according to Mumbere
(2019), had the potential to change voter opinions or cause election violence in
fragile political environments. TB Joshua had to issue a statement denying the
prophecy and dissociating himself from the elections.
In war and terrorist conflicts, fake news has become a preferred weapon
(Husseini 2018). One characteristic of fake news during wars has been the circu-
lation of often old and unrelated images to either “confirm” the savagery of ei-
ther the conflict or one side in the conflict. This has been prominent in war
contexts such as the Syrian War (Husseini 2018). In Syria, Husseini (2018) notes
that the conflict has become a fertile breeding ground for bizarre fake news sto-
ries including unverifiable tales of cannibalism, dramatic rescue stories, unveri-
fied stories of extreme torture and many more. This has also been the case of
the Boko Haram conflict in Northern Nigeria (Associated Press 2019). This has
given rise to wild stories of Boko Haram insurgents drinking the blood of their
victims with such stories pushing the ethno-religious conflict (Associated Press
2019).
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In the digital age, there are four general characteristics that have generally
defined the character of fake news (Kurtzleben 2018). First, fake news is rampant
during momentous events like wars and elections. Second, it is spread by fake
social media account profiles, bots and propagandists (Gunther, Beck, and Nisbet
2018). Third, fake news stories play into peoples’ already existing biases and be-
liefs. Last, fake news goes viral quickly, which makes the argument that fake
news is a platform problem valid. The consumption of news on social media plat-
forms has facilitated the speedy increase in the quantities of fake news being con-
sumed. New developments in technology, from deep fake videos, bots increasing
the spread of information to record levels, as well as an increase in artificial intel-
ligence and machine learning to create and distribute news, are potential current
and future trends. However, as with any new technology, the advance is often
faster than the ability to counter it.
Conclusion
The importance of historicizing and exploring this concept through the lens of
extended history is to provide researchers, citizens, teachers, politicians and in-
deed anyone who comes into contact with information with the knowledge that
the answers to today’s current disinformation phenomenon may lie in learning
from the past. The increased attention to the field of disinformation and fake
news, while beneficial to build societal awareness of the issue, can also be
problematic. It has been shown throughout this chapter that the generation of
fake news can be politically or financially motivated, or sometimes the motiva-
tion is a combination of both. However, to dismiss all fake news as a scheme by
media outlets to attract readership through salacious and misleading content
disregards the very real and often malicious intent behind spreading fake news,
disinformation, and other items that fall under the umbrella of the ecosystem of
fake news – namely, information warfare or information operations. In these in-
stances, as noted above in the cases of Soviet Active Measures or activities con-
ducted by the Internet Research Agency, information is weaponized to create
mass confusion, sow discord and generally pollute the information environ-
ment, and less so for monetary gain.
The common thread of all forms of disinformation in the past is their tar-
get – the human mind. By critically examining these tactics and the spreading
of disinformation, along with societal effects, we become more aware of when
similar tactics are deployed. By enhancing critical thinking skills, media literacy
and general historical awareness, it is much easier to discern between real and
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fake news (Jones-Jang and Mortenson 2019, 1–18). Fact-checking organizations,
non-governmental organizations that work with the public to build awareness,
along with governmental efforts to be more transparent and build public trust
are all efforts currently deployed to help stop the consumption and spread of
fake information.
Standardization of terms to replace these “floating signifiers” (Farkas and
Schou 2018, 298–314), which tend to be vague and empty of meaning, yet used
ubiquitously, would also further debates and research in the field. The term
“fake news,” while a very straightforward phrase, does little to break down the
categories, motivations and significance of items of false information, nor does
it help stop their spread. The term is frequently co-opted by anti-democratic voi-
ces to encourage censorship, which is also greatly problematic. The Ethical
Journalism Network, The European Parliament (Bayer 2019) and others have
put forward clarifications to standardize the discussion between academics or
member states. However, there is no concrete terminology reference. In fact,
counterproductively, new terms are often introduced (Vilmer et al. 2018) with-
out attempts to further refine or clarify already existing terms. This is especially
problematic in academia when myriad terms are used in journal publications to
essentially refer to the same topic even though, due to differing terms, they are
often not read or referenced in conjunction.
As we look towards the future, both from a technical and societal view-
point, there is no indication that the creation, spread, and consumption of dis-
information, malinformation, or misinformation will cease. In order to create
resilient societies, states must increase trust in public institutions, work to-
gether with social media and news platforms to ensure transparency and qual-
ity reporting without infringing on freedoms of expression as well as bolstering
the awareness of society to provide a foundation for quality news consumption.
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Echo Chambers
A Further Dystopia of Media Generated Fragmentation
Abstract: With his reflections on echo chambers, American legal scholar Cass
R. Sunstein provided one of the most prominent buzzwords for pessimistic views
on online communication. Although it refers to the latest changes of the media
environment, the idea of echo chambers replicates past worries regarding frag-
mentation of public discourse. Statements about internet users and their selective
exposure form the cornerstone of the echo chambers argumentation. Against this
background, the chapter analyzes the concept of echo chambers in a historical
perspective on media use. It provides a history of ideas and discourses on
audiences as well as a social history of media use and its relations to the pub-
lic sphere. Research shows that the concept of echo chambers and earlier de-
pictions of fragmentation are based on rather simplistic assumptions regarding
media use.
Keywords: public sphere, media use, fragmentation, polarization, history of
ideas, social history
Digital media “have generated another wave of great expectations and concerns
about the place of the media in a public sphere” (Butsch 2011, 162). Cyber-optimists
have, sometimes in revolutionary rhetoric, emphasized “the democracy-enhancing
potential of the online public sphere” (Trenz 2016, 10). While until around 2010 such
great expectations prevailed, since then critical voices have become louder. The
“cyber-pessimists” have worried about the “fate of the public” (Splichal 2012). One
of their concerns has been that “a further fragmentation of user communities [. . .]
might promote monologues in segregated blogospheres but no dialogue in an inte-
grated public sphere” (Trenz 2016, 10). The concern of emerging echo chambers as
fragmented communication spaces reinforcing views among certain groups has
been heavily influenced by Cass Sunstein. His book Republic.com and its two suc-
cessors have become one of (Sunstein 2001; 2007; 2017) if not the most visible
contribution to this pessimistic view (Gripsrud et al. 2010, xv; McLeod and Lee
2012, 203).
Despite the drastically changed media environment, a lot of the echo cham-
bers concern echoed past worries. Like earlier authors, Sunstein and the ensu-
ing empirical research identified the fragmentation of audiences and media
users’ behavior to be the cause for the dissociation of the public sphere. Unlike
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earlier authors, Sunstein excluded the other main cause for this danger, the mo-
nopolization of media companies and communicators (Averbeck 2000; Gripsrud
et al. 2010, xxii–xxiii). The US-American scholar explicitly focused on the “con-
sumers of information,” not on the side of “producers” such as large internet
companies (Sunstein 2001, 17). Like earlier authors being concerned with the
relation of people to the public sphere, he had to draw on a concept of media
audiences (Butsch 2000, 2). Statements about internet users and their selec-
tive exposure form the cornerstone of the echo chambers argumentation.
Therefore, we approach our historical investigation into echo chambers from
the perspective of media users in their relation to the public sphere. We do
so in a twofold way: firstly, as a history of ideas and discourses about audi-
ences (Butsch 2000; Mihelj 2015) and secondly as a social history of audien-
ces (Eichner et al. 2020).
Section 1 sets the assumptions of Sunstein’s book in the “continual flow of
worries about social disorders arising from audiences” (Butsch 2000, 2). Sec-
tion 2 raises several questions in this regard. Which similarities and differences
exist between Sunstein’s echo chambers as well as his user construction and
earlier problem definitions of political audiences’ relations to mass media and
the public sphere? Which causes were identified? This section will show that
Sunstein’s contribution echoed past discourses regarding
– media determinism and overarching interest in media effects (on the indi-
vidual and on society),
– a psychological perspective on media users (and not a sociological one),
– a normative, dichotomous description of media users (“citizens” versus “con-
sumers”) (Butsch 2000, 1–19).
Section 3 searches for the history of some of the phenomena which Sunstein
subsumed under “echo chambers.” It focuses on Germany in the late nineteenth
century and early twentieth century. What is known about media usage in com-
munication spaces focused on politics back then? Which relation did exist be-
tween a politicized press and societal polarization and fragmentation?
1 Echo Chambers: User-related Assumptions
The legal scholar Cass Sunstein identified problems in US-American democracy
due to “individual choices.” They are enabled by the “rise of endless communi-
cation options” (Sunstein 2007, xii) and personalization and cause a “large set
of social difficulties” (Sunstein 2001, 5, 14–15). By means of the metaphor echo
chambers he described his observation that people “sort themselves into
178 Maria Löblich and Niklas Venema
enclaves” in the internet, “in which their own views and commitments are con-
stantly reaffirmed” (Sunstein 2007, xii).1 They would either choose offers that fit
their views or completely filter out political news in favor of entertainment. Cap-
tured in their echo chamber, people would not hear any alternative opinions
and issues. Echo chambers – basically, the loss of a common public sphere2 –
threatened deliberative democracy. Fragmentation on the micro-level implied
“serious dangers” for the macro-level (Sunstein 2001, 16): polarization (“which
can breed extremism and even hatred and violence”) (Sunstein 2007, 44), “hate
groups” (Sunstein 2007, 57–60) and “cyber-cascades” (“social cascades,” “in
which information, whether true or false, spreads like wildfire”) (Sunstein 2001,
14). With the rise of social media, he reinforced his gloomy diagnosis of the
“power of echo chambers” (Sunstein 2017, 17). The 2017 version introduced a
whole new chapter on “terrorism.com” and gave “polarization” and “cyber-
cascades”more space than before. Sunstein called his work a “dark book” (Sun-
stein 2017, 263).
His view of internet usage and users is quite simplistic. Sunstein’s restricted
online usage to filtering. His argumentation is (implicitly) based on the theory
of selective exposure. There is a belief in technology effects:3 the “most striking
power provided by emerging technologies” was “the growing power of consum-
ers to filter what they see [emphasis in original]” (Sunstein 2001, 8). The as-
sumption here is basically that people take technology the way it is given to
them without considering social adoption, everyday life, motives, and needs
apart from affirmative filtering. Neither personal conversation which exposes
people with alternative views nor media repertoires (the idea that people use
various media types to get information) were considered.4
Individuals were ascribed to make “choices” according to “preferences”
(Sunstein 2001, 17). The main influences on preferences are the “number of op-
tions”, the “market” and “one’s own past choices”. Sunstein (2017, 166) also
mentioned “social influences.” However, this term refers to peer groups only.
Sunstein used examples from group behavior to show how groups may foster
self-isolation, polarization, and hate. He also referred to behavioral science to
1 Republic.com 2.0 introduced the term echo chambers, whereas in the first edition words
such as “enclaves” and “self-insulated groups” appeared (Sunstein 2001, 75).
2 Sunstein did not use this concept in 2001. In Republic.com 2.0 he then discussed Yochai Ben-
kler’s concept of the “networked public sphere” (Sunstein 2007, 114–17).
3 For this criticism see also Bruns 2019.
4 In the 2017 version of the book (p. 114), Sunstein asked “What do we actually know about
the use of the Internet?” He answers without discussing corresponding studies: “Not nearly
enough. But a picture is emerging.”
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explain his observation that internet users “voluntarily choose alternatives that
sharply limit their own horizons” (Sunstein 2017, 17, 166). First, people tried to min-
imize efforts “to attend to topics and concerns” others than their own, and second,
attention allocation was a habitual process, without much thinking. Users’ behav-
ior according to Sunstein is guided by cognitive biases, conflicts of interests and
occasional lack of willpower (Farber 2001, 280). These dispositions were “built into
our species” (Sunstein 2017, 18) and serve Sunstein as basis for the plea for “con-
tinuing education for adults” and regulation (Sunstein 2017, 167, 176).
In Sunstein’s idealistic view, in the past, the mass media had educated indi-
viduals and turned them into “citizens” by providing them with a spectrum of
issues and opinions, with “unplanned encounters,” “irritations” and common
experiences. The “consumer” (internet usage according to one’s preferences,
market driven) opposes the “citizen,” the term for the desired user. The term
user is not applied.
There are few historical hints here and there included to strengthen the
overall argumentation, mostly without references to literature. There are “some
historical notes” on the technical sides of the internet (Sunstein 2007, 157–160),
as well as some reflections on past media regulatory attempts. However, mass
media history and public sphere history are widely neglected. Mass media’s per-
formance is (consciously) idealized as non-ideological universe. Communica-
tion studies do not play a significant role. Critics have argued that empirical
findings on newspaper and television exposure would trouble the “over-generalized
conceptualization of internet use” in his work (Hardy, Jamieson, and Winneg 2010,
135). According to other voices, Sunstein provided “a good deal of theoretical specu-
lation” on echo chambers (Brundidge and Rice 2010, 145).5 Overall, the theory of se-
lective exposure has received “only mixed support” (Brundidge and Rice 2010, 151).
Used as a metaphor without much reflection or criticism,6 the term echo cham-
bers has anchored in communication studies. It has been stimulating empirical re-
search on selective exposure online and ideological segregation for several years.
Both theoretical work and empirical evidence have remained weak. Usually, the
theory of selective exposure is simply mapped onto the internet.7 Echo chambers
and related buzzwords such as Eli Pariser’s filter bubbles (Pariser 2011) are only
5 Sunstein for instance speculated that mass media could generate effects such as polarization
and fragmentation, however, “when they are working well [. . .] polarization is far less likely
to occur” (Sunstein, 2007, 71–72).
6 See for instance the reviews by Calvert (2003), Webster (2008), Zhou (2017).
7 Jamieson and Cappella (2008) are an exception. They transferred the metaphor to traditional
mass media in the US and reflected on how changes of media structure promoted echo cham-
bers. They also discussed linkages to media effects theory.
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poorly defined. Basically, while echo chambers are described as communication
spaces connecting like-minded people and allowing them to reinforce their views,
filter bubbles are said to isolate such groups from contrary perspectives. Apart
from single platform studies, these interwoven theoretical speculations lack empir-
ical support (Dubois and Blank 2018; Jungherr, Rivero, and Gayo-Avello 2020). His-
torically, the long tradition of research on selective exposure to mass media is
probably also due to article lengths, rather mentioned than discussed. The same
applies to the large number of variables moderating the role of dissonance and
consonance (Donsbach 2009, 141; Jungherr, Rivero, and Gayo-Avello 2020). Scarce
references to past media environments date back to cable TV, roughly two decades
in the past.
2 Historical Discourses on Audiences
and their Relation to Public Sphere
We contextualize Sunstein’s echo chambers ideas in three historical lines of
thought. The first one is democracy and public sphere theory. The second one is
the broader historical discourse on audiences and the third one is mass commu-
nication research.
Sunstein referred to British and US-American political philosophy to sub-
stantiate his ideas on freedom, deliberative democracy and the idea to meet
people dissimilar to oneself. John Stuart Mill and John Dewey stand out among
the authors he cites (Sunstein 2001, 15, 217; 2007, 212; 2017, x–xi, 252–253). With
these sources he cannot be considered a public sphere theorist in a narrower
sense. Habermas’ The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, being one
of the most influential works in this field, also in the US, does not play a role.8
Consequently, the term public sphere does not appear in his book. Instead, Sun-
stein used the word public. With past thinkers of democracy such as Mill he
shares the idea that a public9 is essential “since without common attention,
common issues and some kind of synthesizing of dispersed opinions there can
be no well-functioning public rule” (Gripsrud et al. 2010, xv). By referring to
Dewey, Sunstein was able to emphasize the public, the collective of citizens
8 He critically discussed Habermas’ speech ideals in Between Facts and Norms regarding the
“blogosphere” (Sunstein 2007, 144–145). The legal scholar, moreover, was (like John Rawls
and unlike Habermas) convinced that the supreme court of a democracy incarnates the “public
reason” (Gripsrud et al. 2010, xix).
9 For a definition of this concept see Gripsrud et al., xiv.
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who are responsible for public debate. Moreover, with Dewey’s thoughts he could
base his (voluntary, self-)regulatory proposals in order to avoid echo chambers on
the idea that democracy needs “the improvement of the methods and condition of
debate” (Gripsrud et al. 2010, xviii).
From the rise of the commercial press in the nineteenth century throughout
the twentieth century, causing first vast mediatisation effects, pessimists of public
sphere have regarded newly emerging, privately owned media “as platforms for
populist deviations from Reason,” as channels for propaganda or “filled with trivia
and sensations that deflect attention away from pressing political issues” (Gripsrud
et al. 2010, xvi). Sunstein shared these negative descriptions of (private) interests
steering public communication. New (social) media are potential tools for manipu-
lation and persuasion.10 Regarding causal attribution, his analysis differed from
earlier pessimist thinkers. Commercialization has been seen to be a central cause
for fragmentation and dissociation of public sphere. German social theorists for in-
stance identified the monopolization of press business as a main reason for the dis-
aggregation of public sphere (Averbeck 2000, 97). Sunstein was far away from
analyzing the capitalist organization of media (Sunstein 2001, 17; 2017, 28), pursu-
ing a quite technical understanding of media (“communications system,” “new
technologies”). He was skeptical of “consumer sovereignty” (Sunstein 2007, 38).
People are not treated as “citizens,” instead “we act as if the purpose of a system
of communications is to ensure that people can see exactly what they ‘want’”
(Sunstein 2007, 40).
The next step shows how Sunstein’s gloomy thinking about democracy and
internet users can be contextualized in the broader historical discourse about
audiences. These discourses were largely led by elites (Bourdon 2015, 15).11 Audi-
ences have been worrisome for elites probably since there were media or public
forums, in which opinions other than the ones controlled by power holders could
be articulated. Research indicates that worries have increased since relatively au-
tonomous, diversified mass media started spreading into everyday life from the
end of the nineteenth century on and throughout the twentieth century in the US
10 “Polarization entrepreneurs,” “hashtag entrepreneurs,” “hate groups” and “extremist
groups” would try to employ these tools creating “cyber-cascades” (Sunstein 2001, 14; 2007,
74; 2017, 79).
11 Reviewers of Sunstein’s books have explained his view also by his social position. The Har-
vard professor has “as elite an education as the US can offer” (Webster 2008, 95). His idealistic
view on traditional media reflected the interests of the “dominant members of society” whose
interests, unlike those of minority groups, were covered by mass media. The positive communi-
cation potentials of the internet for the underrepresented were excluded due to these interests
(Chander 2002, 1484).
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and Europe. Although the media environment changed, as well as political, social,
and economic circumstances, the underlying issues of these debates have always
been power and social order (Butsch 2000, 2). In Sunstein’s case it was power and
social order in US democracy. The historical discourses – led by different institutions
such as science, law, policy, economy, pop culture – have usually focused “on the
nature of the medium and the psychology of audience members” (Butsch 2011, 164).
Audiences have been described by means of dichotomies (for instance activ-
ity/passivity, citizens/consumers, rational/irrational), varying in the assessment to
be good or bad (Bourdon 2015, 8). These dichotomies can be found in Sunstein’s
book, too. In the nineteenth century, “activity” of an individual regarding political
participation tended to be evaluated as bad, later on in the twentieth century as
positive. “The masses” or “the crowds” in the nineteenth century were feared to
violently rise against the order. Would the new industrial and urban workers fulfil
their role in a “public” (engaged in reasoned, public discussion on issues of the
state)? While crowd psychology regarded the “crowd” to be irrational, easy to be
manipulated and impulsive, “publics” represented the positive counterpart. Crowd
was replaced with negative media audience terms such as consumer, a term pushed
forward by episodes of media commercialization. But “each new term continued to
emphasize the emotionality and suggestibility of the audience” (Butsch 2011, 154).
Sunstein has conserved elements of this conception as we will describe below. More-
over, the negativity of his users’ conception is visible in 1) the exclusion of the citizen
empowering sides of the internet as a pool of diverse information and opinion and a
tool for civil society’s mobilization and protests, and in 2) highlighting internet activi-
ties of “hate groups”, “extremists” and “terrorists” (Sunstein 2017, 9, 70, 236). In con-
trast, the media users with an ideal behavior in public sphere were called citizens in
the twentieth century: “educated, informed, cultivated and civic-minded [. . .] capable
and committed to their duty as citizens.” Their negative counterpart, consumers,
“sought entertainment and self-indulgence, acted on emotion and impulse” (Butsch
2011, 153–154). Societal, political, and media changes have revived concerns about
media audiences and their relation to the public sphere. Whereas the rise of fascism
in Europe and the spread of broadcasting generated worries about the manipulation
of people between the 1930s until the 1950s, since the 1980s in Western parts of the
world, a media expansion and differentiation, the end of Cold War, globalization and
digitalization (just to name some major trends) revived concerns about audience
fragmentation and disaggregation of the public sphere (Butsch 2011, 149).
Sunstein shared with earlier thinkers a skepticism regarding (political) niches
being not under control of established institutions and regarding communication
spaces where information and opinions can be searched and exchanged uncontained
by traditional mass media. Similar to elitist conceptions of democracy theory, there
is a paternalistic undertone to Sunstein’s user assessment (Sunstein 2001, 67). And
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finally, the idea of echo chambers can be seen as part of discourses that are limited
and selective in their understanding of the social context and sustenance of publics
in a mediated world (Butsch 2011, 164). This aspect directs us to the selective expo-
sure research, which will be the third historical track to contextualize Sunstein.
Sunstein’s postulate – that citizens “avoid engaging with opinions that contradict
their own’s” – has been debated by mass communication scholars in the US and Eu-
rope for decades (Hayat and Samuel-Azran 2017, 294). The effects of radio, television,
newspapers, and the internet as well as the effects of mixedmedia environments have
beenmeasured again and again. Leon Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory, includ-
ing the assumption of selective exposure to information (Festinger 1957), is one of the
classical studies in this field, although Festinger’s book originally did not deal with
mass media. Twomain strands of behavioristic research traditions onmedia selection,
dissonance, and information reception since the 1970s can be distinguished. On the
one hand, there was an approach that tended towards the paradigm of “passive” re-
cipients, assuming irrational behavior in line with dissonance theory (Donsbach 2009,
144). On the other hand, a behavioristic approach followed the idea of an “active” au-
dience. Both research traditions are – to different degrees – “media deterministic,” ul-
timately sharing an understanding of selection as reaction to media messages (Schenk
2009, 652–657).12 The issue of how “narrowed domains of political discourse” emerge
due to media selection has become a central field of political communication studies
(Brundidge and Rice 2010, 150).
Sunstein’s work shares several characteristics with behavioristic information ex-
posure research, without, however, quoting much of it (Sunstein 2017, 280–281). First,
he drew on media determinism and the belief in media and communication technol-
ogy effects. Even if intervening variables and a range of factors have been considered,
the basic assumption is maintained: effects on attitudes and behavior are ultimately
explained by features of present or new media and information technologies. In Sun-
stein’s case, echo chambers are attributed to the explosion of communication op-
tions and their algorithmic personalization. He differentiates his argument but
nevertheless dramatizes present technology.13 Second, Sunstein shared modern
behaviorism which takes into account that individuals are embedded in some
12 German communication scholar Michael Schenk has written that although certain frame-
works of selective exposure and information reception consistency attributed “activity” to the
audience, “activity” was not introduced as an independent variable but as a mediating “distur-
bance variable” in the effects process (Schenk 2009, 651).
13 Whereas Sunstein (2017, 66) admitted that newspapers and magazines also “often cater to
people with definite interests in certain points of view,” he relativized this “balkanization” by
emphasizing the “dramatic increase in options” due to the internet and “a greater power to
customize.”
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kind of social relations and that they are capable of rational choice but often de-
cide either irrationally, not “reasonably”, or following dispositions. This kind of
behavior is seen to potentially produce negative consequences for society. The
psychological approach excludes information selection as interpretive social ac-
tion embedded in a subject’s everyday life. Societal explanations for narrowed
domains of political discourse (e.g., media monopolies, political discourse, media
discourse) are mostly disregarded. These exclusions, finally, can be seen to be
functional for the ultimate interest: how can people’s opinions and behavior be
influenced. Mass communication studies for a long time have called this interest
mass persuasion. Being a leading Harvard scholar and earlier Administrator of the
White House in the Obama administration, Cass Sunstein’s interest was how
human behavior can be effectively shaped by law (Farber 2001).
3 Social History of Political Media Usage
The final section explains that the first episode of mediatisation, the spread of mass
press in society, had already expanded the choice of information. Information usage
in politically focused communication spaces was not only driven by affirmation of
one’s world view but by a spectrum of motives. This finding produces awareness of
the fact that the spectrum of motives of media exposure is broader than the echo
chamber thesis assumes. Communication history also helps to discuss Cass Sun-
stein’s assumption regarding the effects of media and communication technology
on the political system via political information behavior. Historical research sug-
gests that polarization and fragmentation were not simply triggered by an increase
of choice due to new communication technologies or types of media. Social, cul-
tural, economic, and political cleavages are important to understand why social
groups confirmed, reproduced and fought for their political opinion. These clea-
vages are also important to understand, why they dissociated themselves from
other groups by means of media and which role media usage played.
We choose a limited focus for the purpose of this section. We focus on the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century in Germany.14 There are several
14 Research about this time period has widely reflected on the problem of sources in the time before
surveys of media users came up. Rudolf Stöber (1998) and Frank Bösch (2004) for instance have used
police and authorities’material, Erik Koenen (2012) an early empirical study in social sciences, Kutsch
and Wagner (2014) housekeeping bills. For the spectrum of sources that can be used for audience his-
tory research in general, see Jérôme Bourdon (2015) who is also one author of this book (see his chap-
ter on telepresence).
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reasons for this decision with respect to geography and time. Unlike the press
market in the United Kingdom or France for instance, the German one was
highly fragmented around 1900 due to its federalism and decentral Empire structure
(Hung et al. 2020, 119). There was a higher number of (local) newspaper titles in the
German Empire than in Great Britain (with much lower circulation numbers on aver-
age). Moreover, unlike the street sale model in the UK, in Germany subscription
dominated, tying readers more strongly to their newspaper (Geppert 2007, 45–46).
Choice for readers and close ties to (partisan) newspapers make Germany a good
example to discuss assumptions related to echo chambers. The time frame chosen is
useful because, at the end of the nineteenth century, a high-choice media environ-
ment developed, at first in urban centers. There was a strong quantitative expansion
and differentiation of the newspaper and magazine market, as well as of the book
and pamphlet market. The amount of news items grew and the number of resorts,
articles and topics within one newspaper increased. Readers now could select what
to read within a newspaper (Stöber 1998, 269). Other new media such as film and
photography started to attract broad audiences. Public libraries offered affordable or
free access to all. Mass media became highly significant in everyday life, with differ-
ences between the classes. The working class could not yet undertake the expendi-
tures that the middle class regularly made for media offers nor had the workers its
temporal means (Kutsch and Wagner 2014). Despite these limitations, reading the
newspapers was an important element of workers’ habitual leisure activity.
It is well known that, throughout the nineteenth century and far into the
twentieth century, societal groups formed by religious, cultural, and political
orientation created their own communication spaces and media. Historical re-
search, however, suggests that members of such groups probably did not sim-
ply filter news according to their particular world view. This applies at least to
the German urban working class around 1900, which we take as an example. A
study about the role of the press in everyday bar conversations found a spec-
trum of motives of newspaper usage during scandals and an exposure to other
than reaffirming social democratic papers.15 Newspaper content was important
for bar conversations. It was read for entertainment, emotions, playful use of
politics or provided the chance to get social attention. It applies until today’s
high-choice media environment that journalistic content provides the reader
with commonly known issues that more easily than private topics fill conversa-
tions in public spaces. While the social democratic press received particular at-
tention, and its arguments were mostly adopted, the (male) pub goer also took
note of other partisan newspapers, including mass press (Requate 2006, 128).
15 In the following we refer to Bösch 2004.
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Workers knew about debates in Parliament with adversarial speakers. Speeches
by (mostly famous) politicians with different political stances were picked up
by them. Being widely informed promised attention and reputation in the bar,
which was a space of particular political orientation. From time to time, conver-
sations brought up the issue of trust in newspapers. This issue required the ca-
pability to distance from the “filter” chosen. The newspapers themselves nourished
the skepticism by dealing at length with other papers. Here is a parallel to social
media in which references to media reality constructions frequently occur (Swart,
Peter, and Broersma 2018). Overall, this study suggests that workers searched for in-
formation not only to affirm their social democratic stance, but to get a range of so-
cial, emotional and cognitive gratifications. Another study about reading needs of
workers in the early twentieth century confirms the broad spectrum of motives in
media usage.16 Moreover, to speak of an echo chamber would be undifferentiated
also in another regard (Sunstein 2017, 166). Obviously, the well-known social confor-
mity of the workers’ milieu did not prevent critical comment on social democratic
opinions and newspaper (Bösch 2004). Altogether, this knowledge casts doubt on
the wide-reaching conclusions regarding echo chambers.
The division of German society and its media system along class and belief
remained characteristically after the foundation of the Weimar Republic and
has been identified as a reason for its fate in 1933. Therefore, Weimar provides a
suitable example to study a further assumption of the echo chambers thesis:
whether fragmentation and polarization of public discourse emerge above all
due to narrowed news offers and narrowed (“personalized”) news media usage.
The outstanding circumstances of Weimar Republic as a particular communica-
tion era allow the shedding of light on the issue of political consequences of
media usage. The Weimar Republic was shaped by the aftermaths of the First
World War, by economic crises as well as the new democratic system and led
finally, yet not inevitably, to the fascism of Nazi-Germany. Against this back-
ground, research has come to various results regarding the role of the press and
press usage for fragmentation and polarization. Generally, communication his-
torians consider the fragmentation of Weimar society to be manifested in a
politically fragmented press that again reinforced radicalization (Wilke 2008,
355). The media system was not only characterized by a great extent of political
parallelism between parties and the press but also by the influence of big indus-
try’s capital interests. National conservative industrialists such as Alfred Hugen-
berg gained control over various newspapers and contributed to an antidemocratic
public opinion and a radicalization of the bourgeois right-wing towards Nazism
16 Koenen (2012, 45–49) also emphasized bars as communicative spaces of workers.
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(Stöber 1998, 332–333; Wilke 2008, 350). Nevertheless, the conclusion that a politi-
cally fragmented press supply led to a fragmented public discourse in terms of par-
tisan echo chambers has to assume very strong media effects and deny intervening
factors of media use. Especially the discrepancy between election results of politi-
cal parties and circulations of their respective newspapers contradicts the assump-
tion of such strong and immediate effects of media use (Meyen 2008; Stöber 1998,
293–295). Against this background, German historian Bernhard Fulda argues that
with a sensationalist but still highly politicized style, journalism indeed had an im-
pact on political culture. Press campaigns, scandalization, and a personalized cov-
erage with a focus on single politicians led to a polarization, brutalization, and
rejection of parliamentarism in general. However, the immediate effects on readers
were limited and depended rather on their general beliefs and milieus than on the
newspapers’ affiliation to particular parties. This might explain, for instance, why
bourgeois right-wing newspapers were able to reinforce anti-communist fears, but
their readers voted for Hitler and not for the national-conservative parties the jour-
nalists promoted (Fulda 2009).
Conclusion
From the perspective of a history of ideas and discourse, Cass Sunstein’s meta-
phor of echo chambers perpetuates the long tradition of dystopic views and fears
of fragmentation. These views and fears can be found in past public sphere the-
ory, broader historical discourses and mass communication research. Media re-
lated dystopias of fragmentation have been underpinned by assumptions about
media users and their relations to the public sphere and polity. Media users were
described by means of simplistic dichotomies such as active/passive and citi-
zens/consumers and usually ended up by negative assessments of media audien-
ces. Like earlier contributions, Republic.com and its successor versions adapted
the fragmentation narrative to the changing media environment. Sunstein shared
with earlier contributions the distrust in communication spaces that emerge due
to new media and are uncontained by established institutions.
Findings from social historical research on media audiences make awareness
of social contexts of media usage neglected by the echo chambers’ argumenta-
tion. Both the case of media use among the lower class in the late German Empire
and the fragmentation of the public discourse in the Weimar Republic challenge
simplistic assumptions of echo chambers and stress the importance of social
structures. On the one hand, users did not just filter news that fit their beliefs. On
the other hand, these world views tended to moderate media effects.
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Emiliano Treré and Anne Kaun
Digital Media Activism
A Situated, Historical, and Ecological Approach Beyond
the Technological Sublime
Abstract: This chapter engages with the notion of digital media activism. The start-
ing point is that current studies often fall short in situating digital media activism
within a longer historical trajectory and in the context of a complex media ecology,
comprising both old and new media interactions. As a result, they frequently as-
sume activism has been (and is) predominantly “digital”. Countering this as-
sumption, this chapter argues for the importance of establishing both a historical
perspective and a contextualized ecological lens of this concept, allowing for a
nuanced analysis of activist media practices beyond the technological sublime.
In the first part, the chapter situates the notion of digital media activism within
broader research on media activism and then disentangles its constitutive elements,
i.e. “digital,” “media,” and “activism.” In the second part, the chapter brings to-
gether attempts to historicize and contextualize digital media activism. It shows
that a historical perspective is able to capture the continuities and evolution
in relation to a long history of technologically mediated activism. Then, it il-
lustrates how media ecology perspectives can contextualise digital activism
by (a) identifying the coexistence of multiple media practices and artefacts;
(b) elucidating motivations and obstacles in the adoption and rejection of digital
tools; (c) shedding light on how citizens purposely disconnect from media tech-
nologies as a form of resistance.
Keywords: activism, media activism, mediated activism, social movements, media
ecologies
As with other contributions to this edited volume, our chapter engages with a
concept that has gained traction in the past two decades with intense debates
and periods characterized by less emphasis on digital activism. In parallel with
protest waves such as the current Black Lives Matter mobilisations, discussions
of media practices also came and went, and digital media activism has emerged
as yet another hot topic for academic research. As we already displayed in 2019
(Kaun and Uldam 2018), conferences, special issues and workshops are increas-
ingly dedicated to digital media activism and, according to Google’s ngram graph,
references to digital activism have steadily increased since the mid-1990s. In con-
nection with the growing interest in digital activism, different conclusions have
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been drawn in terms of its impact and consequences. For instance, Michael Hardt
(2017) has linked the emergence of digital media activism to the speeding-up of the
protest cycles more generally as a consequence of the focus on communication
practices of social movement organisations and individual activists. The much-
cited work by Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg (2013) foregrounds the or-
ganisational shifts in social movements that emerge with digital networked media,
namely a shift from collective to connective action. More recently (digital) media
activism has been approached from the perspective of social imaginaries (Barassi
2015; Ferrari 2019; Treré 2019) and frames (Sádaba Rodríguez 2019) that modulate
and modify activism across digital technologies and political contexts. Here, the
question of how activists relate to and make sense of digital technologies as part of
the political repertoire is foregrounded. Others suggest to refrain from using the
notion of digital media activism completely as it imposes an unnecessary
and unfruitful overemphasis on technology (Kavada 2020).
In this chapter, we aim to historicise the notion of digital activism and
make conceptual connections to other, earlier forms of media activism. In our
contribution, we argue for the importance of establishing both a historical and
contextualized ecological perspective on digital media activism that allows for
a nuanced analysis of activist media practices beyond the technological sub-
lime. We first provide a brief definition of digital activism and review earlier at-
tempts at historicizing the concept and forms of digital activism. Further, we
situate digital activism in the context of media activism. We conclude by pro-
posing media ecology approaches to both historicise and culturally contextual-
ize digital activism.
1 Digital Media Activism – A Definition
The notion of digital media activism itself is broad and ambiguous. Joyce (2010)
defines digital media activism as a form of political engagement that addresses
both fixed and mobile devices with access to the Internet, including practices
such as hacktivism, denial of service attacks, hashtag activism and open-source
advocacy. Other definitions are even broader. For example, Gerbaudo (2012) ar-
gues that any use of digital media for political purposes should be considered
as digital media activism. Differences in defining digital media activism partly
relate to the truly interdisciplinary character of studying digital media activ-
ism. Disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, political science, media and
communication studies as well as design studies are currently contributing to
this growing field that is increasingly rich and disparate. While some studies
194 Emiliano Treré and Anne Kaun
foreground forms of mobilisation, questions of opportunity structures as well as
framing and information diffusion (Bennett and Segerberg 2013; Garrett 2006;
González-Bailón et al. 2011), other more cultural-studies oriented research ex-
pands on the broader context of digital media activism including the social,
historical, political, and the broader media ecology that envelop digital media
activism (Yang 2009).
Besides digital media activism, a broad spectrum of other terms have been
used to represent either the same or overlapping concepts including: cyberacti-
vism (e.g. Carty and Onyett 2006), net activism (e.g. Meikle 2010), Internet activ-
ism (e.g. Earl et al. 2010; Tatarchevskiy 2011), online activism (e.g. Uldam 2013),
web activism (e.g. Dartnell 2011), networked activism (e.g. Beutz Land 2009; Tu-
fekci 2013), e-activism (e.g. Carty 2010), mobile activism (e.g. Cullum 2010), social
media activism (e.g. Miller 2015), hashtag activism (e.g. Yang 2016b), digital activ-
ism (e.g. Hands 2011) and frontstage/backstage activism (Treré 2020). Several
scholars have also adopted some of those concepts interchangeably (e.g., Kahn
and Kellner 2004; Meikle 2010). Other related combinations include the descrip-
tion of protests and mobilizations as Internet, web-based or digitally enabled,
and the prefix “net”, for example “netroots organisations” for organizations
that surged online (Carty 2010, 155) or “netizens” for (active) online citizens
(e.g., Mason 2013).
The assortment of terminology in the field stresses the meteoric development
and diffusion of the phenomenon and the changing landscape of meanings and
significations attached to it. Often, scholars are quick to embrace new terms with
scarce attention to conceptual nuances. Further, this changing terminology is
clearly linked to technological developments. While “web” and “cyber” reflect
early forms of online media, the terms “social media activism” and “hashtag activ-
ism” highlight instead subsequent developments following the emergence and
spread of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Additionally, the choice of terminology
is often related to a particular era in which a given term dominated the language
discourse (Wolfson 2014), such as the term “cyber” in connection to activism
which evokes “futuristic, science-fiction dimensions” (Lupton 2015, 13). Simi-
larly, digital activism’s positioning in a complex and interdisciplinary field
has affected its conceptualization. It has been explored in communications,
politics, public relations, marketing, and in the third sector. The contested
and problematic character of this term relates to the nature of digital scholar-
ship itself which, as Lupton (2015) has remarked, is necessarily interdisciplinary
and incorporates works in the areas of computer sciences, digital anthropology,
media studies, cultural geography, sociology, political science, anthropology,
and mass communications as well as media, design and data studies.
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Expressions such as online activism, cyber-activism, Internet activism and so-
cial media activism are not interchangeable. Joyce (2010) has pointed out that
some of these terms are not exhaustive, because they only refer to Internet en-
abled technologies (e.g., online activism and cyber-activism). Other notions, she
explains, focus instead exclusively on specific digital platforms (e.g., social media),
and thus are not able to account for other digitally enabled forms of activism. This
issue has been referred to by Treré (2012, 2019) as the “one-medium bias” in digital
activism studies. Terms like “mediated activism” (Waisbord 2018), “information ac-
tivism” (Stein, Notley, and Davis 2012), “ICT activism” (Hintz 2012) and “hybrid
media activism” (Treré 2019) are deliberately broader, aiming to include many vari-
eties of technologically mediated activism beyond the realm of the digital. Another
term that has gained traction lately is the notion of “data activism” (Milan 2017;
Lehtiniemi and Haapoja 2020), which refers to activism that addresses in particular
the role of data in both political engagement and everyday life. Milan (2017) argues
that data activism represents the new frontier of media activism and defines data
activism as involving both practices that use big data for political purposes –
which she calls pro-active data activism – and practices that are taking a critical
position towards the collection of large amounts of data on citizens – which she
names re-active data activism. While the connections and overlaps between digital
activism and data activism are multiple (Beraldo and Milan 2019), most studies
tend to separate the two, contributing to further exacerbating the terminological
and conceptual confusion around the term.
2 Media Activism: Situating Digital Media
Activism
In order to historicise digital media activism, we need to situate this concept in
the broader context of media activism or mediated activism. This is of particular
importance in the current moment as it allows us to reconsider emerging media
practices and political activism in terms of changes and continuities (Waisbord
2018).
More generally we can divide media activism into activism that
a) has media as an object to be revolutionized or reformed, for example the
media reform movement (Pickard 2015), and Hacktivism (Coleman 2014).
This is what we call media-centric media activism.
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b) strategically employs media to put forward their political causes, for exam-
ple Occupy, Movement of the squares, anti-austerity movements. This is
what we call non-media centric media activism.
One could question if this distinction makes sense and if the boundaries are not
increasingly blurred with (digital) media being so fundamentally engrained in
all aspects of our lives. Regardless of the usage of the notion media activism –
an increasingly popular concept as well (there are a number of research platforms
like MARC1 and a new interest group was founded in 2017 within the Interna-
tional Communication Association dedicated to Media Activism) – the interrela-
tionship between social movements and the media has a long history including
now classical studies such as Todd Gitlin’s (2003) “The Whole World Is Watching.”
Besides the specific focus or centrality of media in the study of media activ-
ism, we can, on a very basic level, divide between the study of social movements
representation in the mainstream media on the one hand and activists’ media
practices on the other; but even this distinction might increasingly be blurred
with boundaries between production and consumption of media content being
diminished by social media. As we have argued earlier (Kaun and Treré 2018),
typologies are always problematic while reducing complexity. However, these
distinctions allow us to situate both media as well as digital media activism.
2.1 Defining Activism in Media Activism
Yang (2016a) argues that activism itself is an ambiguous term that has slowly
replaced the usage of other, more radical terms for political action such as revo-
lution both in academia and more generally. Activism, he argues, is now used
for both radical, revolutionary action and non-revolutionary, community action.
Hence, it potentially encompasses action both in the service of the nation-state
and in opposition to it. Yang traces the etymological roots of the term activism
from “advocacy of a policy of supporting Germany in the war; pro-German feeling
or activity” to in the 1920s the more general meaning of “the policy of active par-
ticipation or engagement in a particular sphere of activity; the use of vigorous
campaigning to bring about political or social change” (Yang 2016a, 2). In that
sense, activism has several different meanings; a philosophical orientation to life
1 https://www.asc.upenn.edu/research/working-groups/media-activism-research-collective,
accessed on May 12, 2020.
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and an economic strategy to mobilize citizens for national industrialisation and
pro-German activities during World War I as well as vigorous political activity.
Today, activism includes all kinds of citizens’ political activities ranging
from high-cost, high-risk protests and revolutionary movements to everyday
practices aimed at protecting the environment against corporatized NGO activ-
ism. In contrast, the usage of revolution declined steadily after the 1970s, in
parallel with the rise of activism, NGO and civil society activism that tend to be
moderate, institutionalized and corporatized. After the 1990s, activism has mel-
lowed to indicate moderate rather than radical forms of action.
Yang argues that the current ambiguity of the term activism reflects the poli-
tics and purposes in the current age of ambiguity. In late-modern social movement
societies, protest becomes increasingly institutionalized and bureaucratized, and
civic rather than disruptive. The switch in language from revolution to activism
marks – according to Yang – a de-radicalisation of civic action towards corporati-
sation and moderate NGO activism. Yang then continues to discuss online activism
as an example for changes in the notion of activism and its ambivalence shifting
between the politicisation of everyday practices to the corporatisation of political
practices: the push and pull between politicisation and depoliticization.
2.2 Defining Media in Media Activism
If with Yang’s elaboration we have addressed the activism in media activism,
Raymond Williams (1980/2005) offers us a way to address the question of media
in media activism. He suggests that we should analyze media along three types
of transformation that appear in the context of mediation:
– Amplification that refers to everything from the megaphone to the more ad-
vanced technologies of directly transmitted radio;
– Duration (storing) that relates to direct physical resources to store media
content such as sound recording;
– Alternative symbolic production that extends the conventional use or trans-
formation of physical objects as signs, development of writing, of graphics
and of the means of their reproduction.
We argue that these three transformations that appear in the context of media-
tion are also helpful to make sense of media activism and its role for social
movements. Media amplify the political messages of social movement activists
in many ways. Particularly social media with a broad spread have been her-
alded for their abilities to amplify political messages for mobilisation. At the
same time, media technologies are crucial for preserving the histories of social
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movements for internal identification, but also external memory practices. Fur-
ther, media practices allow for completely new ways of (self-) expression, which
can be captured by William’s notion of alternative. They provide alternative ways
of meaning making and signification. Furthermore, Williams concludes his text
by alluding to the political importance of considering media not only as means of
communication but means of production which are part of a broader struggle for
social change. He argues that
we shall have entered a new social world when we have brought the means and systems
of the most direct communication under our own direct and general control. We shall
have transformed them from their normal contemporary functions as commodities or as
elements of a power structure. We shall have recovered these central elements of our so-
cial production from the many kinds of expropriator. (Williams 1980/2005, 62)
His point is that we, as political communities, should strive for “new means of pro-
duction for more advanced and complex realization of the decisive productive rela-
tionships between communication and community.” Digital media have been the
latest of such means of production of relationships within communities through
communication. That, however, does not necessitate the exclusiveness of digital
media fulfilling this function. Rather, as we argue, the whole media ecology – a
complex system of different means of production for communication – should be
considered.
3 Historicizing Digital Media Activism
While the hype around digital activism is arguably a recent phenomenon, there
is an overemphasis on newness in many studies of digital activism across differ-
ent disciplines and contexts. This despite the fact that the so-called “digital rev-
olution” started much earlier than the rise of social media in the 2010s. Before
social media platforms, mobile phones, video handheld cameras and personal
computers changed the way social movements self-organized and documented
their activities (Askanius 2012). However, one can find only rare attempts to his-
toricise the role of digital media for political activism. In an attempt to histori-
cise digital activism, Trebor Scholz (2010) links political practices to the history of
the Internet, going back to the 1970s. His focus remains, however, on technologi-
cal development rather than activism. In contrast, Todd Wolfson (2014) traces the
origins of the cyber left in the US back to the Zapatista movement in Mexico in
the 1990s as one of the first movements to explicitly include “a network of com-
munication among all our struggles” which in turn inspired activists in the US.
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While Wolfson is an excellent example of historicizing digital activism, his focus
remains on the US. Thus, there is a major research gap on histories of digital ac-
tivism beyond this single dominant technological and cultural context.
Even though a more thoroughly written history of digital activism seems still
to be missing, there are a few attempts at a periodisation of digital activism. Defin-
ing digital activism as political participation and protest organized in digital net-
works, Athina Karatzogianni (2015) explores four waves of digital activism. She
identifies the first wave as starting in 1994 with the Zapatista and antiglobalization
movements, including alternative media such as Indymedia. The second wave of
digital activism stretches from 2001 until 2007 and is mainly constituted by the rise
of digital activism linked to anti-Iraq war mobilisations. During the third wave
after 2007, digital activism spread to the BRICS and other countries beyond the
global north. The fourth wave, taking place roughly between 2010 to 2013, marks
the mainstreaming of digital activism that is sparked and dominated by discus-
sions of large-scale digital state surveillance unveiled by Wikileaks and Snowden
(Karatzogianni 2015). In contrast, Paolo Gerbaudo (2017) distinguishes only two pe-
riods of digital activism. He identifies a first wave of digital activism in the mid-
1990s characterized by cyber-autonomism within the anti-globalisation movement
that was characterized by attempts to build independent digital platforms and in-
frastructures such as the Indymedia project. The second wave starts – ac-
cording to Gerbaudo – in the 2010s and alludes to cyber-populism as constituted
within the mass mobilizations of Occupy, the movements of the squares and the
anti-austerity movements. In Gerbaudo’s periodisation, cyber-autonomism that is
oriented towards autonomous communication is contrasted with cyber-populism
with a techno-political orientation that is instituted by a web of commercial Inter-
net platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google and is mainly geared towards
mass outreach.
While both these periodizations are insightful, they somehow struggle to
balance a focus on the evolving media technologies on the one side with ideo-
logical changes and the socio-political context within which digital activism
evolves on the other. Gerbaudo is critical of technological determinism and
foregrounds an ideological analysis of digital activism practices and this surely
contributes to a much-needed political and contextualized understanding of
digital activism. However, many theorisations tend to lose sight of the character
of activism that is specific to different digital media and formats, thus lacking
media-specificity in its historical analysis (Kaun and Uldam 2018).
Recently, Bart Cammaerts has provided a historical overview of the ways in
which activists and protest movements have both appropriated and shaped media
and communication technologies “to fit a set of self-mediation practices in support
of their broader movement goals” (2019, 98). Cammaerts carefully balances both
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material affordances and the social shaping of technology on the one side, and
regulation and the interplay between the state and activists on the other. His over-
view is able to foreground the continuous dialectic between structure and agency
which we believe is essential to understand digital activism. To both further his-
toricise and radically contextualise digital media activism, we suggest employing
media ecological perspectives.
4 Contextualizing Digital Media Activism: Media
Ecology Perspectives
Media ecology perspectives have recently been adopted to explore digital activism
and the media practices of contemporary social movements (Barassi; Mattoni 2017;
Treré 2011, 2012, 2019). Inspired by the media ecology tradition that conceives
media as complex environments, the key strength of this approach lies in its holis-
tic gaze. This gaze does not privilege any specific media technology, but instead
investigates how activists, through their communicative practices, make sense of,
navigate, and merge newer and older media formats, physical and digital spaces,
internal and external forms of communication, as well as alternative and corporate
social media platforms (Treré 2019). This conceptual lens is able to foreground the
coexistence of multiple media practices and technologies within contemporary
movements and activist collectives, casting light on how they often rely on both
digital and analogue technologies and artefacts. Hence, media ecology perspec-
tives allow the researcher to better appraise the effective participatory potential of
each technology within a full spectrum of activist practices (Foust and Hoyt 2018;
Mercea, Iannelli, and Loader 2016).
This perspective has often been combined with a media practice approach
(for an extensive review, see Stephansen and Treré 2019) to shed light on the
complex, hybrid and multi-faceted nature of the media systems within which ac-
tivists operate. These two conceptual lenses, as Treré (2019, 205) illustrates, impli-
cate – and reinforce – each other: on the one hand, an analytical approach
anchored in practice theory puts us in a position to ask holistic questions regard-
ing a whole array of media used by activists; on the other, a media ecology per-
spective illuminates the complex interrelations among multiple types of media
(old and new, corporate and alternative, online and offline, etc.).
Research based on media ecology perspectives has greatly complicated
claims regarding the alleged digital exclusiveness of contemporary activism. It
has unveiled how old technologies still play a fundamental role in contemporary
activism and counteracted the uncritical celebration of the benefits of the latest
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technological platforms to appear on the scene. Treré (2011, 2012, 2018, 2019) has
extensively theorized and relied on a media ecology approach to overcome the
communicative reductionism that defines most of the literature on social move-
ment and communication. His nuanced ecological explorations of different social
movements and activist collectives in Italy, Spain, and Mexico have revealed how
the complexity of activists’ practices critically unfold over a multiplicity of online
and offline spaces, spanning unexpected constellations of old and new communi-
cation technologies. Scholars like Bonini (2017) have reached similar conclusions,
demonstrating the significance of radios in the protests that took place in Turkey
in 2013. The Italian scholar studied the role played by Açık Radyo – the only inde-
pendent and listener-supported radio station based in Istanbul – in the Gezi Park
protests, concluding that radio has not lost its value as citizen media, but has only
repositioned itself within the changing media ecology, blending itself with social
media in order to continue amplifying radical political discourses and enabling ac-
tivists to network. Similarly, in her comparative study of the media ecologies of
various political organisations in Spain and the UK, Barassi (2013) emphasized the
enduring political relevance of print magazines. Even in the digital era, these tradi-
tional forms of activism continue to operate and are continuously redefining their
role in order to compete within a crowded media ecology where social and mobile
media are given more prominence in relation to the spread of political messages.
As these examples illustrate, by embedding digital activism within a history
of never ending adaptations, displacements, and abandonments, a media ecology
approach allows us to appreciate not only how different technologies co-exist but
also how, why, and under what circumstances they co-evolve and subsequently
how their role changes.
A media ecology approach is thus complementary with historical analyzes
(see the previous section) that examine how the role of particular activist tech-
nologies has developed within specific social, cultural, economic and political
contexts (Rinke and Roder 2011). For instance, in her study of the media of anti-
capitalist food activism in the UK, Giraud (2018) demonstrated how Indymedia,
one of the most emblematic online alternative media during the first half of the
2000s, has changed significantly due to shifts in activist media practices and in
the broader media ecology. Giraud illustrates that in the context of food activ-
ism in the UK, Indymedia has not vanished but continues instead to fulfil an
archival function, alongside other newer media that are used for coordinating
more pressing political actions. Likewise, in her ethnographic case study of the
Salvadoran group Activista and the launch of its “Todos Somos Agua” cam-
paign, Harlow (2016) demonstrated that online social media like Facebook were
reconfigured as a form of activist citizen media in El Salvador. The activists in-
terviewed by Harlow pointed out that they believed Facebook offered a space
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that allowed people with non-mainstream views to voice an opinion, making it
possible for them to share news about mining, water contamination, and other
social issues that the public would otherwise never learn about. Moreover, they
saw Facebook as a reclaimed media territory for the youth, who are normally
excluded by mainstream media. Harlow’s study complicates linear and uncriti-
cal conceptions of digital activism by showing how social media can be appro-
priated in non-hegemonic and alternative ways.
Further, media ecology perspectives can also elucidate why some activist
groups still prefer or are simply not able to use digital tools in their activist prac-
tices for a variety of different reasons, difficulties, and obstacles (Arcila, Barran-
quero, and González Tanco 2018). While the dominant narrative of many digital
activism accounts is that activists around the world have massively adopted
digital tools, indigenous communities, and community radio activists still grap-
ple with several forms of digital divide and inequality that prevent them from
fully exploiting the possibilities of digital activism. But more crucially, it should
not be assumed that digital technologies are inherently better in serving the
needs of some communities and activist groups (Sartoretto 2016). As years of
research on community radio and alternative media demonstrate, many com-
munities are often better served by local radio and television stations (Rodrí-
guez 2001). However, one should also resist the temptation to conclude that
connectivity levels can unequivocally determine the intensity and spread of dig-
ital activism. As the manifold experiences in Latin America (Pertierra and Sala-
zar 2019), Africa (Mutsvairo 2016) and Asia (Postill 2014) clearly demonstrate,
vibrant digital cultures and activist practices have flourished despite several in-
frastructural, political and economic obstacles.
Finally, a media ecology perspective has also sparked reflections about the
interplay between connective and disconnective practices within digital activ-
ism (Kaun and Treré 2018). Emerging accounts of digital activism practices are
increasingly taking into consideration (Lim 2020; Natale and Treré 2020; Syvert-
sen 2020) how citizens purposely disconnect from digital technologies as a form
of resistance, further complicating the concepts of digital media activism and
connectivity. Disconnection is here not understood in straightforward terms.
Rather it is ambiguous in itself; never stable and always shifting in its expres-
sion. The argument to consider disconnection in the context of digital media
questions their centrality for political activism. Instead, we situate digital media
both in a complex web of other media (the media ecological perspective) as well
as media practices including non-use and disconnection. Hence, adopting dis-
connection as an entry point for understanding activists’ (dis)engagements with
media technologies unsettles traditional assumptions about the reliance on and
the taken-for-grantedness of digital infrastructures and tools.
Digital Media Activism 203
Conclusion
Digital activism has been one of the rising stars in the conceptual sky of media
and communication studies. As often the case, rising stars may fall. In this
chapter, we have critically engaged with the concept of digital activism to firstly
situate the term and idea of digital activism historically. We provide both short
definitions and histories of the digital and activism to carve out the crucial con-
tributions that the notion of digital activism can still make to the field at the
intersection of social movement and media studies.
Secondly, we argue that only with a historically and culturally contextualized
approach towards digital activism can we fruitfully explore contemporary expres-
sions of political activism that employs a plethora of media in endless variations,
constellations, and combinations (Constanza-Chock 2014; Sartoretto 2016). While
the empirical expressions of digital media activism change in relation to techno-
logical developments, at the same time, activism always also shapes and recon-
figures the forms and possibilities of media itself.
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Or, We Have Always Been Ghosts, from Cicero to Computers
Abstract: From the mid-1970s, new terms (social presence, telepresence, medi-
ated presence) have been coined to refer to synchronous communications at a
distance, through telecommunications or computers, with specific affordances:
feeling present in a remote space, interacting with faraway humans or ma-
chines; a tradition of empirical and theoretical research was soon born. Using
telepresence to refer to all those phenomena, this chapter also enlarges the mean-
ing of the term to include previous historical forms of presence at a distance, re-
sorting to “poor” technologies (classic broadcasting, the telegraph, newspapers,
correspondence, certain forms of painting) and allowing connection with a vari-
ety of creatures, both humans and non-humans, but always, in some ways, hu-
manized. It shows that the experience of human agents was not less rich and
complex with “poor” past technologies than with contemporary “rich” ones. It
emphasizes the ambivalence of the experience: telepresence has always been cel-
ebrated as bridging gaps and criticized for failing to do so, and this basic ambiva-
lence endures across technologies and times. Finally, this chapter suggests a
historical research program into various forms of presence, a general anthropo-
logical enterprise beyond our obsession with contemporary technologies.
Keywords: liveness, synchronicity, social presence, virtual reality, computer-
mediated communication
Since the 1980s, the notion of tele-presence has been conceptualized in various
fields, mainly through two technologies, which do not necessarily go together: vir-
tual reality and computer mediated communication. In the mid-1970s, telecommuni-
cations researchers had proposed a similar notion, social presence. With or without
making a comparison with the digital world and connecting the past and present,
some media and art historians also used expressions such as “presence at a dis-
tance,” “social presence,” “electronic presence” or simply “presence,” to discuss the
power of technologies to “transport” people to different spaces and to faraway peo-
ple or creatures, not necessarily including interaction. They went back to the nine-
teenth century (the telegraph) but also to the long tradition of 360 degrees painting,
starting out in Antiquity. Others discussed, more generally, the power of images, es-
pecially religious images. Finally, the power of letters to provide a sense of presence
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is sometimes considered in the history of the epistolary, very early on by past corre-
spondents themselves and more recently by researchers.
In this chapter, I will define, organize, and try to enrich the criteria used
by these varied researchers to consider these specific affordances of technology
of “disembedding” people from their immediate surrounding and transporting
them to faraway places and in the company of faraway people, real or imaginary.
For each criterion, I start out with the contemporary debate, and show how it can
be historicized. In conclusion, I will refute any teleological attempt to write his-
tory as a process of movement from “less” to “more,” from low-tech to high-tech:
the sense of telepresence (the intensity of the experience) is unseparatedly social
and technological and no simple technological yardstick can be used to measure
it, as we shall see throughout our lexical-historical promenade.
1 Defining Telepresence
In digital scholarship, numerous reviews of the notion of telepresence have been
proposed (Biocca, Harms, and Burgoon 2003; Lee 2004; Lombard and Ditton 1997;
Mantovani and Riva 1999; Mantovani and Riva 2001). Such reviews only occasion-
ally wink at the pre-digital world. All quote Minsky’s (1980) article as a turning
point, that led to the use of “presence” as an abbreviation of “telepresence.”Minsky
defined “presence” as the possibility of feeling present in a distant environment
and, even better, of being able to operate in such an environment. This was an ideal
to be reached as much as an existing technological capability. “Can telepresence be
a substitute for the real thing?” asked Minsky (1980, 46). Since then, much research
has been conducted with a practical orientation in mind, addressing issues such as
eliminating transportation, danger at work or facilitating e-learning.1
I will not abbreviate “telepresence.” I will distinguish between presence per se,
or physical presence (actually being in an existing space, with or without other peo-
ple), and telepresence. This may sound trivial. It is not. Abbreviating “telepresence”
is confusing, and this confusion is an ideological matter. The use of the abbreviation
“presence” for telepresence reveals the aim of Minsky, no less a prophet of technol-
ogy than a theorist: making telepresence “as good as” presence.2
1 See the collection of the journal Presence. Teleoperators and Virtual Environment, 1992–present.
2 Such axiological naming is not new in the history of technology: in broadcasting (starting
from radio), “live” broadcasting is about feeling the live presence of something which is not
actually there, not “life” itself but a representation, again, “as good as” the real thing.
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1.1 Social Versus Spatial Telepresence
I also define telepresence more broadly than Minsky, who focuses on the sense
of “being there,” whether one is “with” other humans or not, and who primes
the possibility of operating in the distant environment (for example, performing
surgery). Regardless of nuances in the lexicon used, I follow Heeter (1992) and
Biocca, Harms, and Burgoon (2003) in distinguishing two forms of telepresence:
social telepresence (being together with another, whether one feels transported
into another space of not), and spatial telepresence (being there in another
space, whether one feels the presence of others or not). Social (tele) presence
was first defined in a pioneering book about telecommunications, addressing
the telephone but mainly the then new and exciting videoconference: Williams
and Christie (1976, 65) defined social presence as “the degree of salience of the
other person in the interaction and the consequent salience of the interpersonal
relationships.”
1.2 Physical Presence (Copresence) Versus Telepresence
Such definitions help charter the field but should only be considered as ideal-
types. There are many grey zones and much overlapping. First, physical pres-
ence and telepresence are not always clearly contrasted, and this is crucial for
the historian. There are transitional moments, where one moves from one to the
next, especially when leaving or meeting someone. Goffman (1959) who had no
direct interest in telecommunications called physical presence with other per-
sons “copresence”. He uses the phrase being “within range” to characterize the
situation of “being with someone” (not through technology). He noted that it
depended on many physical factors: the sensory medium involved (viewing,
hearing, etc.), the presence of obstructions, even the temperature of the air. But
being “within range” is not easy to define precisely.
If you “dismember” the “range” according to the various sensory canals
and involve the combination of technological mediation and direct sensory con-
tact, the notion of range can be stretched endlessly. Consider a banal contempo-
rary situation. You take a loved one to the airport. You can no longer hug, but
still see and hear each other (although social conventions may prevent you
from screaming “goodbye”). You can no longer talk but only see each other. As
other people obstruct your visual path, you see each other less and less. Then
the person passes a door. (S)he is gone! You send your first text message, you
get an answer, now you have moved to a different location, let’s say above the
duty-free shops where your friend told you (s)he would stop and you receive a
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text: “U can c me, look at the entrance of the toy shop”. You keep on sending
texts and wave to each other. The friend writes, ok, I am checking in, “goodbye
for good.” Yet you remain in the airport until the plane has taken off, you go to
the rooftop, see the plane taking off, you are tempted to wave and feel silly (this
sense of silliness also belongs to history, as we will see). You leave the airport
for good. Then you look at the photo of your loved one (maybe on your smart-
phone screen) and kiss the smartphone (not the loved one, although you may
want to delude yourself for a while). This story shows how the move from ab-
sence to presence is gradual, a mixture of various sensory accesses, belief about
the chance of access, a combination of sensory access (touch, voice, view) and
technological mediation (texting, looking at pictures – or reading texts – in
order to perpetuate a sense of presence). This chapter was written before the
coronavirus pandemics but we assume readers will immediately relate this dis-
cussion to their own experiences of having to resort to the full gamut of applica-
tions and machines, to feel as dense a sense of telepresence as possible despite
the various frustrations and delays, not to mention the brutal borders of the ex-
perience (discussed below), as opposed to the gradual phasing out we just de-
scribed in our imaginary experience at the airport.
The border between physical presence and telepresence is complicated even
in situations of, purportedly, simple physical copresence (in Goffman’s sense of
“being with someone”). Consider the peculiar distance created by the theatrical
arrangement: the play, the stage, the lighting, the dresses of the actors. You are
in the same space, you hear them. But reporting on the event, nobody would say
(s)he was “with the actors,” except if (s)he paid a visit backstage, after the show.
This has been much discussed by theorists of performance (e.g., Dixon 2007).
The performer is out of reach, to a large extent out of range, because of an arrange-
ment that also includes social conventions (except in already trivialized avant-
garde plays, performers and spectators do not cross the border between the stage
and the audience space). The set, the voice, and the attire create an artificial pres-
ence, which we know to be different from a regular encounter with the “same” per-
son (that is, the actor behind the character) in a known, common space. This
should matter to communication scholars obsessed with supposedly new technolo-
gies: the old apparatus of the theater involves numerous old technologies, for ex-
ample acoustics, lighting, the building itself and the very old tradition of the mask.
Redefining technology in a broad way will be crucial to our historical enterprise.
I now move to the specific criteria which can be used to refine and compare
categories of telepresence. I start, and deal more at length, with social telepre-
sence. I first discuss the nature of the entity “at the other end of the line”: hu-
mans, but also other creatures, including the dead. I then consider directionality
(is the experience interactive or not), (a)synchronicity, and the quantitative aspect
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of social presence (one to one, one to many). I move back to spatial telepresence,
discussing the contrast between the simple illusion of being in another space,
and more full-fledged immersion. The notion of immersion will lead me to dis-
cuss the limits of the experience of telepresence: even idealistic prophets such as
Minsky had to accept that the experience is limited, both in space and time, and
is never quite “the real thing.” Whether this is, by necessity, a defect, I consider
in the conclusion.
2 Social Telepresence
2.1 Humans, but also Gods and Bots
Discussing our binary definition, I start with a crucial point for historians. So far, I
have taken for granted the sense of “being with” (someone) as opposed to being
alone. This “someone,” obviously, is assumed to be another human being, known
or not known before the experience of telepresence. In the digital context, this bor-
der has been discussed only regarding bots. For example, Lee (2004, 32) defines
presence online as “a psychological state in which the virtuality of experience is
unnoticed.” He then redefines social presence as “a psychological state in which
virtual social actors (para-authentic or artificial) are experienced as actual social
actors in either sensory or non-sensory ways” (Lee 2004, 45). By para-authentic, he
means actual, alive persons. Artificial characters are mainly bots (although he in-
cludes fictional characters, let us say in movies, a point which I will not incorpo-
rate as it poses problems that I have no space to consider here).
The human collective has many more complex borders with purportedly
alive, but non-human creatures. Remaining in the contemporary media age, re-
searchers have shown how media users personalize their technologies, and ex-
perience complex senses of presence while they know they are only interacting
with a technological arrangement. In a classic book, Reeves and Nass (1996)
demonstrate, on the basis of numerous experiments, that in given circumstan-
ces, people treat media, broadly speaking, like “real persons”: media may refer
to a cable channel (who can be nice or whimsical), a machine (a computer), or,
more vividly, a mediated representation of a pseudo-person. People humanize
all those entities, get irritated at them or are grateful to them. Especially for on-
line representations they can interact with, they react to gender, to supposed
personality traits, they can feel flattered or cheated by a “virtual agent.” Pub-
lished 30 years ago, their book has lost nothing of its relevance.
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Moving backwards, to the first development of electric (the telegraph) and
electronic media, Sconce (2000) retraces the history of the numerous ghosts which
have haunted our media. He comments on the rich lexicon used across the years,
much before computer-mediated communication: “Variously described as ‘pres-
ence,’ ‘simultaneity,’ ‘instantaneity,’ ‘immediacy,’ ‘now-ness,’ ‘intimacy,’ ‘present-
ness,’ the ‘time of now,’ this [. . .] at times occult sense of ‘liveness’ is clearly an
important component in understanding electronic media’s technological, textual,
and critical histories” (Sconce 2000, 6). This is a different kind of presence than
the one conceptualized by Reeves and Naas, a belief in the existence of paranormal
communication, communication with the dead or connection with parallel worlds,
which, as Sconce shows, can teach us much about our present fantasies regarding
“cyberspace.” In addition, Natale (2016) has shown how the rise of this specific
form of telepresence was linked to the new entertainment industry: a remarkable
example of the rise of telepresence as a new market.
Although Sconce seems to suggest that electronic technologies of communi-
cation offered a remarkable chance to connect new technologies with changing
beliefs in the afterlife, the whole history of images is replete with beliefs in the
presence of distant, paranormal, or religious creatures, residing “in the image.”
Belting (1994) has retraced this history from Antiquity to the Renaissance. He has
shown how holy images of sacred creatures were endowed with specific forms of
presence, often against the advice of theologians who had a hard time disciplining
such images: images could provide success, comfort, protect against various ail-
ments. Sometimes, they could bleed or cry. In short, the question of “who is pres-
ent” in telepresence has been a complex issue for a long time and not only in past
media and communication ecologies. In addition, all the above is discussed within
the modern Westernized world, while other ontologies (animism, totemism) can
provide an even richer spectrum of a sense of presence at a distance (Descola 2013).
Less known is the power of another medium with a very long history, the letter,
to provide various forms of telepresence, and not only with other humans. The his-
tory of correspondence, starting as early as the Antiquity, has immediately included
legends and stories about letters allowing communication with the dead or with the
gods. Indeed, in the Middle Ages, some people claimed to have received letters from
the Virgin Mary or, more threateningly, from the devil himself (Boureau 1991).
Internet research has only recently started exploring the beliefs in the con-
tact with non-human or dead people in the digital world (Natale and Pasulka
2019). As noted ten years ago, folklorists have neglected cyberspace. Yet, for ex-
ample, Elizabeth Tucker (2009) offers a fascinating example of websites devoted
to missing women, which mix information and legends about their ghosts, or
reports about sightings. The study of Facebook pages (Brubaker, Hayes, and
Dourish 2013; Georges 2014) devoted to grieving has recently grown, and, then
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again, websites where images and information accumulate also express, among
some participants, the hope for and belief in a form of electronic survival.
2.2 Unilateral or Bidirectional?
Contemporary telepresence (starting from telecommunications) is supposed to
be interactive. In media history, the term “interactivity” came to the fore in the
first age of cable television in the 1970s: interactivity was supposed to be a rem-
edy to a basic “defect” of television which is mono-directional (see Benjamin
Thierry’s chapter in this book). It started modestly, with the idea of a “return
path” to give feedback to the transmitting channel, which could be used for dif-
ferent services. More ambitiously, interactivity included the full-fledged “visio-
phone,” which was experimented, and later studied as a classic case of technological
failure (Lipartito 2003; Ortoleva 1998).
As so often, thinking of a medium in isolation is misleading. Interactivity
was celebrated as the remedy for a fault of a previous medium: television. But,
without the name, interactive media already had a remarkably long history. The
telegraph and the telephone were interactive, although the utopian discourse
around these media insisted more on the instantaneity (see below) of communi-
cation, by contrast, probably, with a very old interactive (but not instantaneous)
medium: correspondence.
For our purpose, it would be worth incorporating correspondence into media
history. In the last thirty years, a considerable body of historical work on the epis-
tolary has been accumulated, and not only in the West.3 The first letters (not on
paper, but on numerous other media, including clay, bronze, parchment) were
exchanged soon after the invention of writing. Correspondence offered the possi-
bility of exchanging messages in a bi-directional way. For our purpose, we will
insist on the fact that time and, again, users of correspondence marvel at its
power to make the absent (especially the dear absent) present. In Greek antiquity,
the term parusia (Greek for presence) was used about correspondence (Ceccarelli
2013). Across history, correspondents used often similar strategies to underline
this power, fetishizing the letter, carrying it with them, kissing it, putting into the
envelope (when there was one) a lock of hair, a picture, a dried flower, later a
photograph (Bourdon 2020).
3 One fascinating example of the thick bibliography on correspondence history, which shows
us that its powers at “presencing” the absent were reflected upon beyond the West, is by
Richter 2013.
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Interactivity was key here: the letter was based on an exchange. Although
this is hidden by the fact that literary correspondence, especially, has been read
as the work of a single author, as the letters of the less valued correspondent
(almost always a female one) have been lost, we should think of letters as going
in pairs, or in series. An isolated letter never tells the full story of epistolary “tel-
ecopresence” as a mutual, reciprocated action.
When the other correspondent disappeared, or stopped writing (“ghosting,”
in contemporary parlance), emotions ran strong (Farman 2018, for a transcul-
tural and historical perspective): moving from worry (is (s)he sick, or worse?) to
anger (why did (s)he stop writing?). Remarkably, this anger could be directed at
the correspondent, but also at the technological system (the post office) afford-
ing presence. Again, this phenomenon of displaced anger can be found across
history. When a conversation runs amok on Skype, users can feel an ambivalent
anger, at the person who stopped talking, or is doing something else, until a
further exchange establishes that the supposedly reliable technology is, yet
again, not working. In an earlier age, we blamed the post office for losing our
letter (but worried this could be used as an excuse by lazy correspondents).
2.3 Synchronous or A-synchronous: The Relativity of Speed
Much research in computer mediated-communication has compared synchro-
nous or a-synchronous devices, with a practical-empirical focus about the ad-
vantages and drawbacks of each, for example in teaching, or in professional
exchanges (Watts 2016). Is it better to wait, to have time to elaborate a response
(and lose the spontaneity, and the to-and-fro of immediate exchange)? Would
not it be better to answer immediately (but maybe too quickly, exposing feel-
ings one wanted to control, or rushing to the wrong answer)? Unsurprisingly,
there has been a tendency to conclude that, especially in teaching, a combina-
tion of synchronicity and a-synchronicity is desirable.
In such discussions, a-synchronicity always refers to very short delays, counted
in hours or days, rarely more. Such short delays, in the pre-telegraph era, would have
been considered not as delays, but as fast communication, as quasi synchronicity.
This brings us back to correspondence. Ancient correspondents (examples can be
found from the Antiquity onwards) mostly lamented the slow pace of correspondence,
expressed their impatience at delays and used various carriers (before and during the
time of official postal systems) to get their letter to travel faster. More rarely, however,
they could appreciate the slow rhythms of their exchanges, which gave time to elabo-
rate long, precise answers, and, exactly as in a-synchronous CMC, to control compli-
cated feelings. “A letter doesn’t blush” wrote Cicero while, famously, Madame de
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Sévigné (seventeenth century) extolled the pleasure of writing to her absent daugh-
ter, confronting a paradox I will return to: “I love writing to you, my dear daughter.
This means I love your absence. My God, how dreadful!”
In the history of correspondence, the rise of postal systems in the fifteenth
and sixteenth century was felt as a major improvement. Berhinger (2006) has
reminded us that the theme of speed became central to the discourse of moder-
nity well before the mechanical engines of the nineteenth century, but with a
“low-tech” system, based on the division of labor and the careful calculation of
time: the modern postal system. The increase in the rhythm of the circulation of
messages was perceived as a major change linked to the new technology, to
such an extent that it left specific phrases in major European languages: “post-
haste” (found in Shakespeare) “en poste” (meaning, in French, very fast, found
in Montaigne), “a la celerita de la estefa” (Italian), were used for centuries.
The nineteenth century and early twentieth century saw the rise of technol-
ogies of instantaneity, with the telegraph, the telephone, and broadcasting.
Broadcasting, however, proposed a complicated form of instantaneity. While
transmission itself was instantaneous, some messages were soon recorded and
not broadcast at the time they were performed in front of the microphones and
the cameras. In the 1930s, this type of transmission received a specific moniker
derived from the idea of life, in some languages (“live” in English, “vivo” in
Spanish), or from “direct” in others (“direct in French, diretta” in Italian). This
brings us to the crucial possibility of cheating about “live presence”, which
touches debates about presence far beyond broadcasting (Bourdon 2020). Mes-
sages could feel “live” while they had been recorded, especially if programs
were recorded in continuity with production (“recorded live,” or “direct dif-
féré”, in French). These debates did not move “wholesale” to contemporary, In-
ternet-connected television, but they are still relevant, especially when programs
combine live and recorded (edited) sequences: a program can be felt as live (as if
live) even when it is recorded. This is crucial, for example, for some sequences of
reality television, another genre whose authenticity is viewed with suspicion (and
liveness remains a crucial resource for providing a sense of authenticity through
presence). More broadly, there has been a stream of rich theoretical debates about
“the meaning of live” and liveness in contemporary life (e.g., Scannell 2014).
Let us move back in time. The sense of speed, and even the apparently
clear-cut notion of synchronicity, depends very much on the context. The first
medium which triggered a sense of remarkably speedy communication was the
postal systems, starting from the “royal” post services of ancient empires, the
Akkadian or the Persian cases, for example (Bryce 2003). From a phenomeno-
logical point of view, we have numerous examples, across the ages, of corre-
spondents celebrating the sense of being “as if” with the persons, knowing that
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the letter had arrived, or would arrive, within what was, for them, a remarkably
short time-span. In short, the sense of liveliness, or liveness, is not a mathemat-
ical datum, but a human relation. And, as Farman notes about the rise of written
messaging, including through smartphones, “though the mythologies of the digital
age continue to argue that we are eliminating waiting from daily life, we are actu-
ally putting it right at the center of how we connect with one another” (Farman
2018, 23).
2.4 One-to-one, One-to-many: Between Telepresence
and Togetherness
We are now moving to a complex form of telepresence, although the lexicon is
deceptively simple. For much of the twentieth century, the opposition between
one-to-one communication on the one hand, and one-to-many on the other, has
been central to communication studies, with broadcasting taking center stage
as the powerful, new form of communication allowing one to address many in a
synchronous manner. However, the opposition is more complex, and, then again,
grey areas abound between the two extreme, pure models, which make it difficult
to organize them, for example, into a long-term historical narrative (Balbi and Kit-
tler 2016).
First, both models have long been combined. The letter may be considered
as the “pure form” of one-to-one communication, but this idea of an ideal, pri-
vate dialogue is a recent, romantic one. Numerous letters (from public figures,
especially religious ones) were meant to be addressed to many, as in the Chris-
tian tradition of the epistle (Bourdon 2019), while the sense of secrecy has been
established only recently (by law, only in the nineteenth century in the West).
Letters (including official, highly protected ones) have long been threatened by
breach of privacy in many ways (Bryce 2003). Email users who believed they
were writing only to one person, and discovered that, among other possibilities,
they have inadvertently pressed “reply to all,” or that their email has been for-
warded (intentionally or not) by their correspondent, or that a hacker has read
it, have numerous historical companions for such unpleasant experiences.
Furthermore, with all due respect to broadcasting, one-to-many has never
been as pure as we think, and has always cohabited with one-to-one. The hy-
postasis of broadcasting as mass communication bypasses the persistence and
also the birth of parallel one-to-one forms of communication. Most simply, the
telephone has been relatively ignored by media/communication researchers.
The idea of broadcasting as mass-communication emerged only slowly from the
use of radio as one-to-one “wireless telegraphy.” Any sense of mass togetherness,
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through broadcasting or the reading of papers (as famously analyzed by Ander-
son for the national community), is often linked to other forms of presence: audi-
ences may read in small groups (with someone reading aloud before the era of
general literacy), or view/listen to a broadcast program together. They use the
material received alone to connect through conversation, anticipate such acts of
sharing while viewing or reading. And digital technologies have allowed even
more intricate situations of “multicommunicating”: tweeting or texting while watch-
ing a program, for example.
3 Spatial Presence: From Illusion to Immersion?
From the start of this chapter, I have focused mainly on social telepresence. The
notion of spatial presence deserves specific treatment but has drawn less atten-
tion per se: imaginary transportation to another space has been treated, in gen-
eral, as less important than social presence, especially in spaces where there are
no humans or living creatures. In science fiction, such transportation to empty
worlds brings about fear, more than marveling. See for example the H.G. Wells
(1895) story The Time Machine in which, at some point, the hero reaches a future
without any human presence. Spatial telepresence, so to speak, tends to be treated
as the background or the environment of “more valuable” social presence. An ex-
ception, of course, is the practical interest in teleoperation (Minsky 1980) in a
different space, for example, in abyssal depths. But this wholly practical focus,
brought about by new technological affordance, is recent in the long history of
telepresence.
However, spatial telepresence is the only aspect of presence which has been
the object of a full-fledged attempt at historicization. For example, Grau (2003)
starts from the idea that painting has long been used in order to provide spatial
telepresence. He discusses at length the first preserved attempt, the room with its
four painted walls in the Villa Dei Mister, in Pompei, and the different visual de-
vices used to provide what he calls an “illusion” of transportation into a different
space, peopled by humans, gods and mythological creatures. One could say that
the aim was practical as well: the illusory space is surmised to have allowed the
performance of rituals. Like Belting, Grau is sensitive to the role of religious im-
ages but, unlike him, he connects the remote past to the contemporary use of tel-
epresence, especially by artists, at the end of a rich historical voyage through the
trompe-l’oeil, the fully painted walls and ceilings of baroque villas and palazzi,
and the detailed consideration of a forgotten medium: the panorama.
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The panorama’s history lasted a century, starting from its invention (and
earlier patenting) by Scottish artist Robert Barker in 1792, in a cultural context
where the interest in large landscape painting, and the use of a bird’s eye view,
was growing. A panorama was a 360 degrees huge painting which people viewed
from the center of a dedicated building (a rotunda), where the landscape “envel-
oped” them. Such panoramas (unlike the religious frescoes of the past) made
claims at being fully realistic representations of existing landscapes and events.
Together with the growth of tourism, the panorama was said to be able to replace
travel, and also give access to current affairs (the major battles of the time were
proposed). The metaphor of “travelling” was widely used to refer to the experi-
ence. Variations were proposed: the moving panorama (the paintings circulated
and the viewer could remain static) and the diorama (where landscapes changed
through the elaborate use of lighting). A whole industry, much commented on in
the press, developed. As for other media, utopian and counter-utopian positions
existed, the first extolling the wonder of this new form of presence at a distance,
the other deriding the cheap illusion it produced, which could, by no means, re-
place the “real thing.” Interestingly, the word “panorama”, which we now mostly
use for “real” panoramas (but note the option of “panoramic” photographing on
your smart phone) was invented for this specific device.
This form of past spatial presence has been easily forgotten, probably be-
cause compared to the power of cinema, 3D images and, finally, virtual reality,
it feels “weak.” Yet, a reconstruction of its history linking it to current forms of
telepresence can teach us much about the aspirations of modern societies to
create strong illusory spaces. The “realistic” focus of the panorama, for exam-
ple, as opposed to the religious one of the Villa Dei Misteri, or the massively
fictive character of cinema production, tells us much about the desire to see a
newly conceptualized, secular “real world”. There was a growing market for
this, through all forms of nineteenth century communications, including, of
course, transportation technologies. In addition, the panorama had a remark-
able feature, which made it, if you want, “better” than VR: people did not have
to wear an accessory, a prothesis, in order to experience presence. Of course,
such accessories may become lighter and easier to manipulate, yet the very act
of putting them on and off clearly delineates a border between the “real life” of
continuous presence of our surroundings and the pseudo-life of tele-presence. I
now turn to this question.
222 Jérôme Bourdon
4 “Being There” but Never Completely:
the Persistent Borders of the Telepresence
Experience
I now turn to an issue which is not explicit in most past or present discussions
of telepresence, or only as an obstacle to be overcome: the borders of the expe-
rience. Telepresence is a specific experience which removes people from the
here and now of their immediate spatial and social surroundings. Being ab-
sorbed in reading or writing a letter in 500, immersed in a panorama in 1800,
under a VR headset in 2010, praying in front of a holy icon in 1300, playing for
hours on Second Life in 2000, the human subject feels (s)he is “not there”. How-
ever, this “not being there” has a beginning and an end and can only be partial.
Even during the experience, simple reminders can destroy the illusion: in all
the examples given, think of someone tapping gently on the shoulder saying:
it’s lunchtime (which may also trigger the feeling of hunger which had been for-
gotten, “dissolved” into the experience of telepresence).
Frame has been discussed recently as regards virtual reality. Pleading for the
power of VR to be used as an “empathy machine”, through a strong experience
of social telepresence, Milk (2015) expresses his desire to break the screen which
has so far been a condition of the access to “other realities” (unknowingly echo-
ing the words of Robert Barker, the inventor of the panorama): “I mean, all the
media that we watch – television, cinema – they’re these windows into these
other worlds. And I thought, well, great. I got you in a frame. But I don’t want
you in the frame, I don’t want you in the window, I want you through the win-
dow, I want you on the other side, in the world, inhabiting the world”.
The word immersion suggests this: breaking the frame/screen, going through
the (looking?) glass: another technological dream whose long roots into myths and
literature would be worth a detailed exploration. Assuming VR can successfully
“break the frame” of space, there is another frame, that of time. One has to enter
the telepresence experience and leave it, “get back” to the real world. Science fic-
tion writers have early imagined experiences of living in a wholly virtual world and
no longer being able to distinguish the real places and creatures from the fake or
virtual ones, and there is a whole cinematic tradition about this. Importantly, this
is mostly treated as a danger, as a pathology (the same was written about the nine-
teenth century panorama). Being just as good as the real thing may not be a real
aspiration. One may need and want limits to the telepresence experience.
One development of telepresence is the possibility of keeping in touch, at a
distance, for long periods of time. Madianou (2016) has proposed the term “am-
bient copresence” for the experience of migrants who live far away from their
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family. For example, a mother leaves Skype open on her computer, can hear and
occasionally see her faraway children. Interestingly, this expansion of the time
frame goes together with a “backgrounding” of the experience, which is, by defi-
nition, not very intense. “Ambient presence,” even if it is not activated, may re-
main the horizon of our possible interaction with faraway loved ones, a dream of
telepresence without borders in time.
The whole question of intensity, viewed in a historical perspective, is much
more complicated than any simple “quantitative” comparison. The whole dis-
course of telepresence, once it latches onto the modern discourse of technologi-
cal progress (a tradition which authors like Minsky or Milk continue, precisely
at the time they think they are celebrating a revolutionary development) is
about the capacity of technologies to offer “more,” more full-fledged presence,
getting closer and closer to “the real thing.” Researchers of contemporary tele-
presence all mention the increased intensity of the experience, contrasting the
“strong” present with the “weak” past, e.g. in the following: “The emphasis on
interactive behavior is a more recent component of social presence theories.
Most social presence research until the mid-1990s dealt primarily with low-
bandwidth media, textual media, or teleconferencing systems [. . .]. Therefore,
behavioral variation was limited and rarely extended beyond text-based verbal
behavior and a narrow range of nonverbal communication behaviors” (Biocca,
Harms, and Burgoon 2003, 465).
Yet, art, cultural, epistolary, and media history reveal that old forms of telepre-
sence were no less intense for their users. The analysis of the use of technologies
matters here more than the dry comparison between “bandwidths”. Belting (1994)
and Grau (2003) are especially relevant regarding visual art and representations. But
the written word has its own potential for disembedding its users. Reading past let-
ters of “heavy” correspondents, such as Madame de Sévigné or Diderot, show how
they were absorbed, for hours, into their letters. Human beings early developed “sec-
ond lives” not only through digital media but also through any communication tech-
nology. The intensity of the experience lies in the body of the user, and should not
be judged anachronically, from the perspective of promoters of “better”, more recent
technologies.
The appreciation of intensity is also a matter of the specific historical techno-
social configuration. Coming back to our different parameters of presence: when
interactivity was lacking, the arrival of interactivity is perceived as key to inten-
sity. When immediacy came (the telegraph), the whole debate switched to imme-
diacy, even for a technology, the telegraph, which performs poorly regarding
representation, and offers simply long and short dots to decipher, which one
could produce only by going to a dedicated place with the help of an operator. Yet,
this “revolution” of instantaneity was a considerable shock for contemporaries.
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It triggered mostly a positive utopia: it is hard to find much worry or skepticism
about the telegraph. Thoreau is the most famous sceptic, and Walden is ritually
quoted by historians of the telegraph: “We are in great haste to construct a mag-
netic telegraph from Maine to Texas; but Maine and Texas, it may be, have noth-
ing important to communicate . . . ” A few other intellectuals or writers express
reservations: Aby Warburg stressed the “awareness heightening power of distance,
as a condition for intellectual productivity and called it the ‘original act of human
civilization’” (Grau 2003, 286); he worried that the sudden proximity made possible
by the telegraph would threaten this. This latches onto contemporary critiques of
the power of always available, instant communications (Rosa 2015).
Conclusion
Exposing the long roots of the recent debates of computer mediated communi-
cation and virtual reality, I have proposed a few analytical concepts for telling
the long history of telepresence. Full-wall frescoes (or even 360 degrees paint-
ing), the theatre, or the modest letter have long given their spectators and users
a sense of being transported from their here and now to see far-away, imaginary
places and people, and even to communicate with them. Telepresence has al-
ways been supported by physical presence, and reciprocally, as they are today,
although the experience of “pure” telepresence is of course much more frequent
than in the distant past.
People have long thought they could make the dead, gods or supernatural
creatures present through various magic devices, but also through letters, and
this was combined early with electronic presence. This dream of communica-
tion with the afterlife continued with television, and today with the Internet.
Intensity is not related to the measurable power of technologies but to the
emotional experience. Similarly, the sense of instantaneity is relative: the cele-
bration of instantaneous telepresence, starting with the telegraph, hides from
our contemporary eyes the sense of speedy communication with distant persons
through the letter, a modest and powerful medium. Finally, the sense of being
together with a vast audience has never been the privilege of broadcasting:
newspapers, religious epistles, but also, most simply, public speech in vast as-
semblies and churches, have remarkable histories.
And maybe most importantly, technologies of presence have always been
ambivalent for their users. While, starting with the telegraph, the contemporary
age has tended to celebrate the power of technologies to make up for absence
and distance, the experience of technologies has been replete with experiences
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of frustration, delays (Farman 2018), “buffering”, “ghosting” and their ancient
accoutrements. It is befitting here to come back to Warburg. In his comments
on the merits of distance, what he suggests is that more can actually be less,
that being “as good as the real thing” also means being a poorer, one-dimensional
access to presence at a distance, unable to go through all the facets of experience
and to exploit the human capacity for “scaling” crucial experience in different
ways and reflecting upon them. We need presence and distance, the voice and si-
lence, the body and the ghost, together. The whole spectrum of partial presences
has long contributed to make us fully human and will continue to do so.
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Asking Too Simple a Question about a Complex Problem
Abstract: This chapter attempts to historicize “digital loneliness.” To do so, it
considers two ways to historically contextualize media and loneliness. The first
considers today’s discussions of “digital loneliness” as the latest manifestation of
the type of polarized “hopes and fears” discourse that cyclically greets new com-
munications tools. The second approach places technology in the background
and foregrounds loneliness as a cultural phenomenon that is shaped by long-
term historical processes. This, arguably, points towards more fruitful ways of
thinking about loneliness as a complex problem.
Keywords: loneliness, technology, modernization, privatization, other-directed-
ness, romance
Loneliness has found its way into media discussion and governmental policy
agendas. We live amidst an “epidemic of loneliness” (Killeen 1998). Previously
associated with the elderly, loneliness is now prevalent among the young (Pitt-
man and Reich 2016, 155). Over a fifth of American adults and almost a quarter
of those in Britain always or often feel lonely, lacking in companionship or oth-
erwise left out or isolated (Economist and Kaiser Family Foundation Survey,
The Economist September 1, 2018). Social isolation has increased. Nearly half of
all Britons aged over 65 rely on television or a pet as their main source of com-
pany (Davidson and Rossall 2015, 2). Between 2010 and 2019, the number of Eu-
ropean households consisting of a single adult without children increased by
almost a fifth (18.7 per cent) (Eurostat 2020).
Loneliness has potential impacts on personal well-being, public health, and
political stability. Long-term loneliness can destroy health, increasing the risk of
coronary disease and damaging immunity (The Economist, April 16, 2020). It is
associated with mental health problems including anxiety, depression, and sub-
stance abuse (Cacioppo and Patrick 2008). The European Commission’s Joint Re-
search Centre (JRC) observed that “loneliness and social isolation correlate with
feelings of vulnerability, threat and anxiety levels.” Hence, loneliness is, poten-
tially, “associated with political and social values” (Joint Research Centre 2018).
Noreena Hertz, following Hannah Arendt, argues that isolated, lonely people may
find purpose and self-respect through a surrender to totalitarian ideologies. For
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Hertz, the twenty-first century rise of right-wing populism can only be understood
in the context of an ever lonelier world (The Financial Times, September 24, 2020).
The diagnosis of this epidemic has broadly coincided with the arrival of
smartphones and social media. And these new media technologies are often
blamed for an increase in loneliness. For many journalists and commentators,
we are in the grip of digital loneliness. Conversely, there are researchers and
civil society groups who advocate the use of digital technologies as tools to fos-
ter social connections and improve well-being. Digital technologies are typically
cast as either a cause or a cure for loneliness. They are neither.
This chapter attempts to historicize “digital loneliness.” To do so, it consid-
ers two ways to historically contextualize media and loneliness. The first con-
siders today’s discussions of “digital loneliness” as the latest manifestation of
the type of polarized “hopes and fears” discourse that cyclically greets new
communications tools. The second approach places technology in the back-
ground and foregrounds loneliness as a cultural phenomenon that is shaped by
long-term historical processes. Arguably, this offers more fruitful ways of think-
ing about today’s problems. Before proceeding, however, we need to take a mo-
ment to ask what loneliness is.
1 What is Loneliness?
Loneliness is complex. For a start, we can divide it into two fundamentally differ-
ent phenomena. In the short term, loneliness can be positive. Hunger prompts us
to eat, and loneliness can prompt us to seek company. Transient loneliness may
prompt us to use social media to provide for our psychological needs, to reconnect
with friends, to organize meet ups and so on. Like hunger, a brief experience of
loneliness bears no resemblance to suffering it in the long term. Chronic loneliness
is individually and socially destructive. It can prompt us to ignore our psychologi-
cal needs. We may become “hyper-vigilant,” viewing the world as a competitive,
untrustworthy and threatening place. When chronically lonely we are more likely
to avoid company and to experience the social interactions we do have with nega-
tivity and suspicion. Those who are chronically lonely are more likely to be victims
of cyberbullying, as well as more likely to engage in aggressive online behavior
(Nowland, Necka, and Cacioppo 2018, 79). Chronic loneliness is, ironically, a self-
reinforcing barrier to social interaction (Nowland, Neck, and Cacioppo 2018, 76).
Social isolation is on the rise, but isolation is not the same as, and does not
necessarily lead to, loneliness. A person might live alone without suffering for
it. Somebody else could live surrounded by family, friends, and acquaintances
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and still feel painfully left out. Isolation is not loneliness but it does make it more
likely. For John Cacioppo and William Patrick, the experience of loneliness is
shaped by our “mental representations and expectation of, as well as reasoning
about, others” (2008, 14). The painful experience of social isolation is to some
extent determined by individual perceptions. The level of social connection that
satisfies our needs is peculiar to each of us and is moulded by individual psycho-
logical and genetic traits (Cacioppo and Patrick 2008, 4). Of course, loneliness is
about society as much as it is about individual experience. As such, it is also a
cultural phenomenon.
We can experience loneliness when there is a discrepancy between the rela-
tionships that we have and those that we imagine to constitute a normal level
of connection. It may lie in the perception, not that we are isolated, but that we
are isolated relative to our peers. Loneliness among young people, in America,
Britain, and Japan, for example, was seen to arise more frequently from a “gap
in expectations between relationships they have and those they want” (The
Economist, September 1, 2018). Experiences of loneliness are shaped by how we
perceive ourselves and others. Those perceptions, in turn, are products of the
cultures that we inhabit. Loneliness is, in part, cultural and, as such, it can be
better understood through historical exploration.
2 A Spiral of Hopes and Fears
In 1904, an American telephone salesman wrote that the “telephone takes from
the farmer’s family its sense of loneliness and isolation” Largely through its in-
fluence the “pathos and the tragedy” of farm women’s lives would disappear
(Fischer 1994, 99). Popular magazines emphasized the same theme, with one
arguing in 1907 that, between isolated farm houses, “a sense of community life
is impossible without this ready means of communication.” Again, the “loneli-
ness and insecurity” felt by farmers’ wives would disappear replaced by a sense
of solidarity similar to that of a small country town (Fischer 1994, 99). Claude
Fischer’s work reveals a view, common at the time, that the telephone had trans-
formed the social and psychological lives of rural Americans at the turn of the
century. Equally there were popular and academic accounts of the telephone that
deplored the amount of time that people, and particularly women, would waste
on “gossip, chitchat, and chatter” (Rakow 1992, 2; Tufekci 2014, 16).
The arrival of radio in the 1920s was accompanied by predictions that it
would foster peace and a new internationalism. Christopher Morash cites, for ex-
ample, the Irish Radio Journal, which in 1925 opined that broadcasts in Esperanto
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would bring the world “a step nearer that state of existence that people have
been seeking since the confusion of tongues” (2010, 186). Reverend Canon Theo-
dore O. Wedel, College of Preachers, Washington, wrote in 1957 that the “techno-
logical triumphs of the twentieth century” had appeared to move people “out of
prisons of isolation into intimate contact with one another”. Travel and mass
media, like radio, had banished any need to fear solitude. Yet, beneath this he
discerned a paradox. Mass communication was not communication between peo-
ple at all. It was a “tyranny of monologue” that only the lonely and the isolated
were likely to need. He concluded that the monologue of the radio may be an an-
odyne for loneliness but it was “not a cure” (Wedel 1957, 71–72).
In 1961, G.L. Hindson, a British medical general practitioner exploring the
relationship between television and health, reported that many people who in-
stalled a television in their homes did so because it would help them to relax
and avoid boredom. Single people and the elderly thought that they would be
better able to “tolerate loneliness, misfortune, or isolation if they had a televi-
sion set to comfort them” (Hindson 1961, 554). Among its many perceived bene-
fits, the television seemed to be another technology that could ease the torment
of loneliness. American advertisements for television would commonly feature
a “family circle” with parents and children sitting around the screen. The televi-
sion was portrayed as the heart of a stable and sheltering home (Spigel 1992,
40). Optimism was not confined to advertisers. Echoing hopes for the new me-
dium, in 1950, Irish journalist John Pudney wrote:
Month by month there are more and more people joining the television audience of Brit-
ain. In time, this great service, which, as far as I can see, has no destructive potential
about it may extend over Europe. It will do but good in fact if the whole world is linked
together not only by sound but by sight. In these days, information and truth is the most
valuable currency in the world; and the one currency which all men of goodwill must
share. (John Pudney in The Irish Independent, April 25, 1950)
And, at the same time, television was being derided as a technology that would
tear families apart and encourage social isolation. Paternal authority would be
undermined by the domestic screen. Men would be emasculated as they became
couch-bound (Spigel 1992, 63). Housewives would be distracted from their work.
Children would be diverted from their lessons and dulled by the medium’s pas-
sivity (Spigel 1992, 50–51).
In 2014, Zeynep Tufekci lamented that the “lonely world of cyberspace”
had become the latest example of the “vast gap that every so often opens be-
tween an idea’s popularity among pundits,” which was considerable, and “its
basis in empirical research,” which was scant. The New York Times, she re-
counted, had run op-eds that social media or our phones could be eroding
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human connections. The Atlantic had run a cover story asking if Facebook was
making us lonely? MIT psychologist Sherry Turkle had published her 2011 book
Alone Together, arguing that new media undermined personal relationships.
Pope Benedict cautioned young people not to “replace their real friends with
virtual ones.” But, in the meantime, Tufekci countered, a “growing pile of em-
pirical research” showed that “if anything, the relationship runs the other way
– Internet users are more social and less isolated” (Tufekci 2014, 13). Of course,
as is often the way in studies of media effects, we can locate a competing pile of
research to show that internet users are less social and more isolated (Nowland,
Necka, and Cacioppo 2018, 70–71). This pattern, present in academia, is repeated
among journalists and social commentators. The internet is either a hotline to
friendship or a siren song that seduces and isolates. It is rarely contemplated that
it might be both at once. As we can see, this polarized reception for a new com-
munication tool is not new. It is cyclical.
For Nancy Baym, the complaint that new communications technologies have
corrupted the youth and furthered the undoing of society are a perennial social
fixture since antiquity (2010, 25–26). “There is a strong tendency” she wrote, “es-
pecially when technologies are new, to view them as causal agents, entering soci-
eties as active forces of change that humans have little power to resist” (Baym
2010, 24). Here “predictable negative stories are met with predictable positive al-
ternatives in a familiar contradictory binary” (2010, 27). As Klaus Schoenbach has
suggested, what the hopes and fears dichotomy reveals to us are two underlying
myths in modern cultures: a pessimistic belief in the fecklessness of media users,
and an optimistic faith in the emancipatory power of technology (2001, 365).
These cycles may reveal more to us about elements of our culture than they do
about the effects of communications technologies.
To argue that polarized discourses may be recurring symptoms of underly-
ing mythologies is not to dismiss concerns about how mediated communication
may be connected to loneliness. Cycles of hopes and fears surround a core of
long-term social transformations that are, arguably, more helpful in an attempt
to understand how media are related to twenty-first century loneliness. There is
a different history of media and loneliness to be told. We need to explore how
media have developed in tandem with society serving structural and psycholog-
ical needs. To better understand “digital loneliness” it is useful to consider how
loneliness, social isolation and media have been interwoven since the eigh-
teenth century.
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3 The Novel Psychology of Domestic Privatization
Computer technologies allow us to experience simulations of reality. For Turkle,
there is a risk attached to our ability to spend part of our lives engaged with
virtual worlds. Slow real world people and relationships may not be able to
compete with the pace of the virtual where something new is ready at the first
hint of boredom (Turkle 2011, 287–288). From gaming to music to social media,
change is constant. Newness is a habit. Turkle worried that people might expect
a similar level of drama from their real world relationships. When real lives
failed to yield comparable excitement people were even more likely to retreat
into life lived through a screen. Simulation could be addictive. However, Turkle
clarifies that “if there is an addiction here, it is not to a technology. It is to the
habits of mind that technology allows us to practice” (Turkle 2011, 288). And
these “habits of mind” long pre-date digital media.
European modernization saw the disappearance of “knowable communi-
ties.” John Durham Peters recounts that “Novels, newspapers, encyclopedias
and social statistics all make their decisive first appearance in the eighteenth
century. All attempt to describe a social world in which first-hand acquaintance
alone is no longer sufficient.” These new forms of representation offered “pan-
oramic surveys of the social horizon in varying ways.” They mediated society
for us and as such modern media became “means of imagining community”
(Peters 1993, 565–566). Amid the disruption of modernization, new media forms
also became means of imagining ourselves.
In the late 1700s, the homes of merchants and business owners became the
epicenter of a profound cultural and emotional revolution. The privatization of
the middle-class home was pivotal in European modernization. The bourgeois
home, unlike its aristocratic predecessor, was not designed to be a venue for
meetings or celebrations that served an economic or political role. It was, un-
precedentedly, private. Bourgeois family life was experienced as something sep-
arate from, and independent of, both society and economy.
In reality, the experience of family in familial, rather than economic or polit-
ical, terms depended upon a patriarchal capitalist society (Habermas 1989, 55).
For Raymond Williams, the dependence of the private home on the structures
and resources of the outside world, “created both the need [for] and the form of
a new kind of ‘communication’”: news from “outside,” from otherwise inacces-
sible sources.
Already in the drama of the 1880s and 1890s (Ibsen, Chekhov) this structure had appeared:
the center of dramatic interest was now for the first time the family home, but men and
women stared from its windows, or waited anxiously for messages, to learn about forces,
“out there”, which would determine the conditions of their lives. (Williams 2003, 21)
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The privatization of domestic space brought with it a new psychological and emo-
tional experience. Privatized individuals had a new need for psychological vali-
dation through vicarious living and reflection (see Habermas 1989, 43). There
was a newfound curiosity about psychology. Thinking about oneself became of
way of relating to others, and vice versa. The new mindset was audience-ori-
ented. Letters and diaries became “experiments with the subjectivity discovered
in the close relationships of the conjugal family.” The diary for example became
a “letter addressed to the sender, and the first person narrative became a conver-
sation with one’s self addressed to another person.” As Jurgen Habermas wrote,
the new subjectivity, as the “innermost core of the private” was “always already
oriented to an audience” (1989, 49). People made sense of themselves in dia-
logue, spoken or written, with others.
Initially, the personal letter provided the media substrate for this priva-
tized, purely human subjectivity (Habermas 1989, 48). This was an age of senti-
mentality and letters were “containers for the ‘outpourings of the heart”’. They
could not simply report events, the letter was an “imprint of the soul” or a “visit
of the soul.” They were to be “written in the heart’s blood, they practically were
to be wept” (Habermas 1989, 49). Quickly transcending the personal, letters
were written for wider audiences. They were borrowed and copied. Private, sen-
timental letters and diaries turned into fiction.
Thus, the directly or indirectly audience-oriented subjectivity of the letter exchange or diary
explained the origin of the typical genre and authentic literary achievement of that century,
the domestic novel, the psychological description in autobiographical form. Its early and
for a long time most influential example, Pamela (1740), arose directly from Richardson’s
intention to produce one of the popular collections of model letters. (Habermas 1989, 49)
Shortly after the publication of Pamela, public libraries appeared. Book clubs,
subscription libraries, and reading circles became popular (Habermas 1989,
51). Following Pamela, and fictional works from Rousseau and Goethe, the
“rest of the century reveled and felt at ease in a terrain of subjectivity barely
known at its beginning” (Habermas 1989, 50). The novel became part of mid-
dle-class life.
The relationship between authors, works and readers became “intimate mu-
tual relationships between privatized individuals who were psychologically inter-
ested in what was ‘human,’ in self-knowledge, and in empathy.” As David
Riesman observed, “to be alone with a book is to be alone in a new way.”
Reading provided an escape from society and offered a new space for reflection
(Riesman, Glazer, and Denney 2001, 96). There was an intimate conversation
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between authors, readers and fictitious characters. Habermas singles out the work
of Jonathan Sterne (Tristram Shandy, 1759) which directly addresses the reader
within the narrative as placing “a final veil over the difference between reality and
illusion” (Habermas 1989, 50). Literature became a backstage that allowed priva-
tized individuals to rehearse for reality.
The reality as illusion that the new genre created received its proper name in English, “fic-
tion”, to shed the character of the merely fictitious. The psychological novel fashioned for
the first time the kind of realism that allowed anyone to enter into the literary action as a
substitute for his own, to use the relationship between the figures, between the author,
the characters and the reader as substitute relationships for reality. (Habermas 1989, 50)
As people wrote to others, and read of other private lives, fiction became part of
personal reality. For themselves and others, they became characters to be un-
derstood and projected through media.
As we have seen, loneliness can occupy the gap between the relationships
that we have and those that we feel that we ought to have. Media may promote
such loneliness. Melodramatic and psychological novels served as a salve for the
newfound domestic privacy of the eighteenth century. The novel offered vivid,
emotionally-heightened insights into other lives. Romantic love was installed as
a literary obsession. It became a central life goal, particularly for women, to find
their “soul mate” rather than to marry for position or out of convenience. The
idea of love changed from companionship to something individualized and ideal-
ized. Indeed, a quest for deep, human connection was an intrinsic part of Roman-
tic ideology (Bound Alberti 2019, 68–69). Novels created psychologically realistic
visions of jeopardy and passion that could make real life look flat by comparison.
The “habits of mind” that concerned Turkle, where reality is not enough, thrive
through digital media but they originated in the privatization of domestic life and
the psychological and emotional needs that it created.
4 Lonely, but Never Alone
The privatization of the family home created a need to turn to media for valida-
tion and social comparison. Ironically, however, part of the problem with twenty
first century loneliness lies in our inability to be alone. For Turkle, people find it
difficult to, and indeed are reluctant to, experience solitude, which can refresh
and restore. Devices offer constant connection and endless distraction. To experi-
ence solitude, “you must be able to summon yourself by yourself; otherwise, you
will only know how to be lonely” (Turkle 2011, 288). Loneliness then could be
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described as failed solitude, where we are unable to achieve some degree of con-
tentment in, and by, ourselves.
Explaining failed solitude, Turkle referred to Riesman’s work in The Lonely
Crowd (published 1950). The book’s central concept is other-directedness, a type
of social character predominant among professional middle classes in mid-twen-
tieth century America. This mode of social conformity originated in mid-century
transformations in work and consumption, which had become less concerned
with physical material and more concerned with the management and manip-
ulation of people. The essence of other-directedness is the need to constantly
read, and adapt to, one’s peers. Neil McLaughlin has emphasized the renewed
salience of Riesman’s analysis in an age of folksy politicians, confessional re-
ality television and social media as an endless scramble for attention and pop-
ularity (2001, 15–16).
The other-directed society values popularity but constantly threatens ostra-
cism. People must compete while fitting in. Polite wars of “antagonistic coopera-
tion” are waged in the workplace and in spheres of taste and style (see Riesman,
Glazer, and Denney 2001, 81). The peer-group is the constant, ever-changing
moral authority that imposes conformity amid the impression of personal auton-
omy (Riesman, Glazer and Denney 2001, 82). Peers, however, did not need to be
real to enforce conformity.
In mass media, Riesman, saw the rise of synthetic company. Mass-mediated
and often entirely fictional peers became examples of what was normal. They
became visions of how to be. From childhood, media would “picture the world”
and “give both form and limits to . . . memory and imagination” (Riesman,
Glazer, and Denney 2001, 84–85). Media represented social groups through ster-
eotypes. Whether these representations were met with acceptance or rejection
did not matter. They engendered conformity because people acted in relation to
them (Riesman, Glazer and Denney 2001, 97).
Mass media are central to Riesman’s vision of the other-directed society.
They replaced traditional teachers and storytellers as agents of socialization
(2001, 97). Importantly, new twentieth century media forms were instrumental-
ized. They were funded by, and designed around, the sale of advertising and
the promotion of consumerism. New forms of storytelling on radio, in comics
and later on in television were central aspects of the training of children as ap-
prentice consumers (Riesman, Glazer and Denney 2001, 96–97). Media became
part of how people understood the world and their place in it. They told people
how they compared, how they fitted in, what was currently socially desirable
and so on. Celebrities through their fame, popularity and success became exem-
plars in the other-directed society. Instrumentalized, mediated personalities of-
fered models of how to be. They were, in effect, peers.
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For Riesman, media shaped standards of personal performances in the same
way that they standardized taste and acts of consumption. Mediated peers, for
example, could undermine personal investment in pursuits and hobbies. They
forced an inevitable comparison with the best of the best in fields like music,
sport, and so on. This process would become internalized to the extent that a
child could feel themselves in competition with the stars, even if no one else
were about (Riesman, Glazer, and Denney 2001, 76). Thus, for Riesman, it was
“difficult for an other-directed child to cultivate a highly personal gift.” There
was too “little private time to let it mature and the standards, imposed by peers
immediate and mediated” were too high (Riesman, Glazer, and Denney 2001, 76).
In the mid-twentieth century, people were relating to, and fitting in with, instru-
mentalized, mediated peers that banished effective solitude.
There is, perhaps, no better example of other-directed conformity than in the
relationship between television and suburbia. The American suburbs of the 1950s
were an amalgam of reality and media representation, of everyday culture and
consumer capitalism. Television advertised social aspiration as much as it did con-
sumer products. It also, in its ubiquitous representations of the suburban nuclear
family, tutored audiences in what was possible, normal and desirable. Commercial
representation and reality merged. As the line between “domestic economy and
the commercial culture” became increasingly unclear, “Americans and their fami-
lies were treated to entertainment designed to sell not only a product, but a way of
life.” Moreover, echoing more longstanding processes of domestic privatization,
this was “a way of life that was reinforced by the design of the very houses in
which they lived” (Kelly 1993, 36)
The suburban dream excluded black people, lesbian, and gay people, the
elderly, the homeless, the childless and the unmarried. These people did not
exist in mid-century television representations of the suburban good life, which
was white, middle class, and centered around the nuclear family. Spigel, how-
ever, treats the category of “white middle class” itself as a media construction
rather than as a real reflection of how people of different faiths and ethnicities
experienced their “fractured and complex” identities. Nonetheless, the category
is significant because “ . . . it was the particular aim of the mass media – espe-
cially television – to level class and ethnic differences in order to produce a ho-
mogenous public for national advertisers” (Spigel 1992, 6). Media marketers
hoped that people would fit in with peers that were imagined for them.
Social media can be taken as an arch example of other-directedness in ac-
tion. They facilitate peer surveillance. They can collapse together spaces that
were previously separate, opening some of our behaviors to unwanted audien-
ces (Tufekci 2014, 17). As Joshua Meyrowitz has demonstrated, this can compro-
mise our ability to inhabit and perform the various social roles and identities
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that make up life in a modern society (1986). Social media are often, in effect,
mandatory. Tufekci remarked that for many, and particularly younger people,
they are only formally optional. To abandon social media would be to “isolate
oneself outside of vital spaces for contemporary social life” (Tufekci 2014, 17).
We may be condemned to fit in with our mediated peers. And still, none of this
is anything new. It is the continuation of a well-established trajectory.
5 Friends, Time, and Money
In Alone Together, Turkle offered emotive descriptions of people who had to resort
to, or even preferred the simulated company of robots and other machines to that
of human beings. In overstretched care homes, for example, nurses and physicians
saw seal-like companion robots to be better that the fleeting attention of staff, or
no company at all (Turkle 2011, 109). Elderly residents related to robots as though
the machines could feel and understand. Students admitted to Turkle that they
would accept the company of a machine rather than a romantic partner if the ma-
chine could offer a sense of company and a “no-risk relationship” (2011, 8).
The idea that we are ready to accept the synthetic as if it were human is at
the heart of what Turkle calls the “robotic moment.” This describes a state of
emotional and philosophical readiness where people are “willing to seriously
consider robots not only as pets but as potential friends, confidants, and even
romantic partners”. It seems not to matter that a machine might not “know” or
“understand” anything of the moments we share with them. Socially and indi-
vidually, we are increasingly ready to bond with, and confide in, inanimate ob-
jects. In the “robotic moment, the performance of connection seems connection
enough” (Turkle 2011, 8–9).
The robotic moment emerges, in part, from a desire for control. Smartphones
and social media make staying in touch easier but they also allow us to manage
our relationships. We can engage with friends and acquaintances on our own
terms. We can turn to our devices to fend off loneliness and we can use them as a
throttle for engagement and commitment (Turkle 2011, 13). New technologies can
offer the benefits of communication without the inconveniences and obligations of
the real world. Turkle explored the robotic moment in terms of “human vulnerabil-
ities” and largely through a psychoanalytic exploration of childhood socialization
(2011, 26). She revealed that, for many, machines, predictable and controllable,
could feel safer than people. Once again, however, we can look to history to see
that tendencies to mediate human relations through technology are longstanding
and may be rooted in economics as much as in psychology.
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For Adrian Franklin, loneliness is a “dominant emotional feature” of market-
led societies (2012, 16). Values of freedom and choice supplant those attached to
collective belonging. In his examination of loneliness in Australia, Franklin argued
that the logics of the market and consumerism replace the bonds of family, com-
munity, and work (Franklin 2012). With an economic imperative for flexibility, peo-
ple may wish to avoid bonds that create limits, obligations and duties. We may
prefer bonds that last “until further notice” (Franklin 2012, 15–16). The choice-
based logic of consumerism may apply to relationships as much as shopping.
Consumerism now organizes our individual stance to things in general; everything, includ-
ing relationships, is aestheticized and evaluated in terms of their capability to offer beauty,
desire and pleasure. Everything and consequently everybody becomes disposable (or ex-
changeable), and the experience of being disposed of (or exchanged), the ever-present fear
of immanent disposal (or replacement) and the background steady state of disposability all
serve to undermine, erode and ultimately destroy human bonds. (Franklin 2012, 16)
Loneliness might then be driven, not by technology, but by the commercial col-
onization of everyday life.
Alison Hearn identified self-promotional behavior and self-branding as a cen-
tral characteristic of the neoliberal age. Hearn attributes this to the dominance of
precarious employment and flexible recruitment practices (2008). Such behavior
can be found online and in real life, among friends and family as much as in at-
tempts to find work or drum up business. The self is reduced to a “set of purely
instrumental behaviors” that are circumscribed by market discourse. The pre-
dominance of such behavior promotes Machiavellian cynicism but discourages
connection and trust (Hearn 2008, 206). The “branded self” is not only instru-
mental and performative, it is also mediated. Hearn argues that the self-promo-
tion that we witness on social media, and the anxiety that can accompany it,
have their roots in economic transformation. The 1970s, with the rise of neoliberal
governance, are commonly seen as a moment when a sea change occurred in
economy, work and culture (Harvey; Sennett 2006). The idea of seeing oneself as
a product to be promoted is, however, older than this.
In the 1947 book, Man for Himself, German psychoanalyst and critical theo-
rist, Erich Fromm, noted the emergence of a “marketing orientation” in twenti-
eth century American society. He saw that “the package, the label, the brand
name” had “become important, in people as well as in commodities” (1947, 59).
Making a livelihood depended on being accepted by others. Capabilities were
necessary but not sufficient for success. Being in demand required a personal-
ity. As people became concerned with being “saleable,” a “personality market”
emerged. Self-esteem became a product of market value. Determined by fashion
and other vicissitudes of the market, it lies beyond our control. Identity and
240 Edward Brennan
self-esteem are provisional. We are left to find our worth in the opinions of others.
Acclaim, status, and success can, temporarily, shore up fragile identities. Fromm
acknowledged that “man naturally wants to be accepted by his fellows.” How-
ever, “modern man wants to be accepted by everybody and therefore is afraid to
deviate, in thinking, feeling, and acting, from the cultural pattern” (1947, 123).
Fromm’s analysis suggests that a culture valorizing a life lived in pursuit of “likes”
was entrenched decades before the internet, let alone Facebook, and existed in its
most rudimentary form.
At the core of the marketing orientation there is, necessarily, an emptiness.
There is the absence of any kind of personal quality that cannot be changed in
response to the market. Persistent character traits are likely, one day, to clash
with market demand. Personal qualities, principles and peculiarities must be
rooted out. Above all, Fromm wrote, “the marketing personality must be free,”
free that is “of all individuality” (1947, 56–7). The personality market demands
that people appear authentic, while abandoning any fixed sense of self. In
mid-twentieth century America, Fromm’s work provides a trace of a society
that demanded performance, and insisted on nothing more. It anticipates a
key ingredient of Turkle’s “robotic moment.” Turkle announced the twenty-
first century concern that people may turn to machines for the performance of
a relationship. This moment, however, has been a long time in the making.
McLaughlin argues that The Lonely Crowd “cannot be understood apart from
the dialogue between Riesman and Erich Fromm” (2001, 8). Fromm was Ries-
man’s therapist and, later, friend. The concept of the other-directed character
was, according to Riesman, ‘“stimulated by, and developed from, Erich Fromm’s
discussion of the “marketing orientation” inMan for Himself”’ (McLaughlin 2001,
10). David Riesman was a university mentor to Turkle (Turkle 2015, 8). And, Tur-
kle herself described The Lonely Crowd as the book that had most influenced her
own work (The Boston Globe, December 19, 2015). The psychological vulnerabil-
ities discussed by Turkle have a clear intellectual lineage in the work of Riesman
and Fromm. They also have clear roots in historic, structural transformations be-
yond individual “human vulnerabilities.”
Conclusion
Loneliness is shaped by cultural and normative expectations. Our success in
coping with the pain of loneliness is influenced by how we see other people,
how we think about them and what we expect from them. Over centuries of
modernization, chains of economic dependence have become global, while
Digital Loneliness 241
social relations have often contracted into the domestic sphere. Our social and
economic dependencies have become detached from the places that we live.
The disappearance of “knowable” communities has contributed to social isola-
tion. As the centrifugal forces of modernization have spun families and commu-
nities apart, media have acted as connective tissue. They have become central
means of connecting to, and knowing, the social world. Thus, they profoundly
shape how we perceive others and what we expect from them.
Pamela, as the first sentimental novel, has been identified as the earliest
origin of the television soap opera (Cantor and Pingree 1983, 20). Like so many
media forms, the soap opera provides a resource that allows people to under-
stand and contextualize their personal experiences. It is a mediated compensa-
tion for the privacy of modern domestic life. From the novel, to soap opera, to
Reality TV, to Instagram, media offer opportunities for vicarious living, social
comparison and personal reflection. Media can compensate for the costs of so-
cial fragmentation and help create a richer society and inner life.
Media can also create false impressions of what constitutes a “normal”
level of connection. Mediated peers can influence whether we experience our
real world relationships as being adequate. Brian Primack and colleagues, for
example, observed that rather than offer accurate representations of reality “so-
cial media feeds are in fact highly curated by their owners.” Regularly viewing
“such highly idealized representations of peers’ lives may elicit feelings of envy
and the distorted belief that others lead happier and more successful lives”
This, in turn, is likely to increase perceived social isolation (2017, 6–7). Media
allow us to look into the lives of others. They also, necessarily, amplify the
drama and emotion of other lives. They show us the world but they must work
to maintain our interest. Richardson’s Pamela, after all, marked the birth of a
fictional form that emerged from embellished accounts of daily life.
As Nowland and colleagues have argued, the question of how the internet
is used is a far more pertinent question than whether it in itself constitutes a
cause of, or a cure for, loneliness. The same media that facilitate social outings
for some can be a means of separation for others (see Nowland, Necka, and Ca-
cioppo 2018, 79). How we use the internet is, obviously, connected to who we
are and where we are located in an overall culture. Our culture can form a
taken-for-granted background but it also carries the historical momentum of
long-term movement towards privatization, commercialization and rationaliza-
tion. Finally, we need to recall the difference between transient and chronic
loneliness. There is a tipping point for many of us where tools for connection
can become a means of anaesthetizing and perpetuating isolation.
Questions about media and loneliness are questions about a total way of
life. Baym observed that “when we communicate about digital media, we are
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communicating about ourselves, as individuals, groups and societies” (2010,
23). The same is true of questions about the problem of loneliness. These are
questions about economics, architecture and values as much as they are queries
about media. The internet can offer neither a scapegoat nor a quick fix here. If
we are to successfully address complex problems like loneliness we can no lon-
ger approach them through simple questions.
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Amateurism
Exploring its Multiple Meanings in the Age of Film, Video,
and Digital Media
Abstract: In the current digital age, media amateurs seem to have taken over a
large part of cultural production and revised traditional hierarchies between pro-
fessionals and amateurs. This development has been characterized as a form of
“mass amateurisation,” or even “mass cultural production.” This present state of
affairs is deeply embedded in an ongoing discourse on the value of being an ama-
teur. Both in public discourse and in scholarly debates, amateurism has been
conceptually categorized as either a self-assigned role or as a label that is con-
ferred by others. To explore the multiple meanings of amateurism, this chapter
demonstrates how a media historical approach helps to better understand the
full complexity of the concept. In addition, we propose that future research can
benefit from the development of clear analytical approaches to identify various
amateur modes of practice, while also acknowledging the ongoing hybridity of
the media amateur.
Keywords: amateurism, amateur media practices, hybridity, modes of practice
Amidst the explosion of social media platforms in the first decade of the 2000s,
when consumers transformed into producers and distributors of expressive cul-
tural content, Ralph Rugoff (2008, 9), a curator of contemporary art, observed
how “amateurs have returned with a vengeance.” He noticed how cultural pro-
duction saw a strong resistance in the arts against “hyper-professionalization,”
which resulted in nothing less than a “cultural revolution” (Rugoff 2008, 9).
This resistance to the cultural industry and artworld was an ongoing concern
for many artists in the twentieth century. One such artist was Andy Warhol,
who explicitly praised the amateur in his book The Philosophy of Andy Warhol:
“Every professional performer [. . .] always does the same thing at exactly the
same moment in every show they do. What I like are things that are different
every time. That’s why I like amateurs . . . You can never tell what they’ll do
next” (Warhol 1977, 83).
The appreciation that speaks from the quote underlines an interesting mo-
ment in both art and media history. Warhol’s observations should be under-
stood within the context of the 1960s and 1970s when a quest for alternatives to
the mainstream, a plea for better access to the means of cultural production
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and a desire for authenticity and real-life experiences were taken up by many
media makers and artists. In the current digital age, however, amateurs seem to
have taken over a large part of cultural production and revised traditional hierar-
chies between professionals and amateurs. This development has been character-
ized as a form of “mass amateurization” (Shirky 2008), “mass cultural production”
(Manovich 2009) and an “amateurized media universe” (Zimmermann 2013). One
could even argue that amateur media production moved from being marginal to a
mainstream pursuit, thereby reconfiguring the media landscape (Motrescu-Mayes
and Aasman 2019).
This present mode of amateurism is embedded in an ongoing discourse on
the value of being an amateur. One that is furthermore embedded in a history of
everyday media use, with material, economic, aesthetic, cultural, and social di-
mensions. However, the question remains whether the ideals Warhol and others
adhered to have come to fruition in the digital age, or do they represent a myth-
ical conception of what the amateur and amateurism mean? Should we value
amateurism as something that is closely related to ideals of democratisation,
valuing a specific aesthetic and a desire for personal and intimate representa-
tions of everyday life? In order to deconstruct and better understand the current
debates and discourses surrounding the notion of amateurism, we think it is
crucial to historicise these notions of the amateur. By exploring the historical
dynamics of the media amateur, we will be able to understand the multidimen-
sional complexities of what it means or meant to be (called) an amateur.
In the first part of this chapter, we will discuss various scholarly debates
around the amateur and trace the main themes and perspectives, in particular
those related to amateur media. As we will show, the complexity of the debates
around the amateur are connected to the idea of how amateurism has been con-
ceptually categorized as either a self-assigned role or as a label that is conferred by
others. The latter distinction will be conceptualized in terms of “emic” and “etic”
approaches to amateurism. In the second part, based on empirical research, we
historicise the notion of amateurism by focusing on film, video, and digital media
as amateur media technologies and their appropriation by users within three his-
torical periods of time. For each media technology and time period, we discuss
the ways in which “the amateur” has been defined and how conceptualisations
of amateurism have developed over time.1 In the conclusion, we propose two
1 This chapter is based on the results of the NWO-funded research project “Changing Plat-
forms of Ritualized Memory Practices: The Cultural Dynamics of Home Movies” (2012–2016), in
which the authors traced the history of amateur media from a long-term historical perspective.
More information about this research project can be found on the project’s weblog: https://
homemoviesproject.wordpress.com/.
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complementary conceptual lenses – amateur modes of practice and hybridity –
for analysing the notion of amateurism in its historical complexity.
1 Getting a Grip on the Amateur
Over the years, the meaning of amateurism has been subject to change. Today,
the term amateurism often refers to informal, self-taught, hobbyist or do-it-
yourself practices, all of which tend to evoke mostly pejorative connotations,
such as being unqualified, or non-professional. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, however, identifying oneself as an amateur was often a mat-
ter of pride and honour: being an amateur meant that someone devoted a con-
siderable amount of time, energy, and commitment to practicing a particular
hobby for the purpose of sheer enjoyment. Etymologically speaking, the word
amateur is derived from the Latin word amare, meaning “to love.” This etymol-
ogy thus clearly connotes a favourable, even idealist meaning of amateurism.
The amateur practitioner loves the hobbyist pursuit in and of itself, without any
financial motives, as opposed to the professional practitioner.
In her 1965 essay “Amateur versus Professional,” the American avant-
garde filmmaker Maya Deren argued that amateur filmmakers should take in-
spiration from this original meaning of amateurism and “make use of the one
great advantage which all professionals envy him, namely, freedom – both ar-
tistic and physical.” At the same time, she underscored how “[t]he very classifi-
cation ‘amateur’ has an apologetic ring” (Deren 1965, 45). Four decades later,
media scholar Broderick Fox argued that in the digital age “the ringing has only
intensified, negative connotations of the term moving up to first definition status
in the dictionary of popular consciousness” (Fox 2004, 5). Clearly, current
connotations and understandings diverge from the original idealist meaning
of amateurism which, as film historian Ryan Shand argues, is “so out of step
with contemporary ideologies that it requires a historical explanation to be
properly grasped” (Shand 2007, 7).
A number of historians, sociologists, and scholars from the field of cultural
studies have tried to grasp amateurism, both as a historical and a sociocultural
phenomenon. The American historian Steven Gelber, for instance, understood
amateurism as part of the broader rise of hobbyism, a phenomenon that came
to prominence with changing notions regarding the relationship between work
and private life during the processes of professionalisation, industrialisation
and modernisation in the nineteenth century. Amateurism, then, according to
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Gelber, was understood in relation to meaningful “leisure”, which served as a
bridge between working life and the home (Gelber 1999, 2–3). Moreover, leisure
and amateurism were often strictly gendered categories. Whereas public leisure
was often seen as male oriented, women’s leisure was considered strictly pri-
vate, belonging to the domestic sphere. As a result, a “distinctly female culture”
developed with characteristic home-oriented activities (Gelber 1999, 157). It is
important to note that this led to new cultural hierarchies and values related to
male hobbies, such as photography or home movie making, as opposed to typi-
cal women’s “crafts” like embroidery or sewing. This gendered division of activ-
ities remained dominant throughout the twentieth century. For instance, in the
early 1960s, a manual for amateur filmmaking encouraged husbands to buy a
film camera while their wives were presumed to acquire a sewing machine (Aas-
man 2004). Of course, there were also forms of “leakage” (Gelber 1999, 157), be-
cause these categories were and are much more complex, and do not endlessly
reproduce the “ideology of ‘separate spheres’” (Jordan 2000).
The sociologist Robert Stebbins, in his writings on “serious leisure,” further-
more distinguished between amateurs, hobbyists and volunteers. Unlike Gelber,
Stebbins did not define amateurism as a form of hobbyism. A hobbyist, he ar-
gued, does not have a professional counterpart: “hobbyists are often enamoured
of pursuits bearing little or no resemblance to ordinary work roles” (Stebbins
1992, 11). Amateurs, on the other hand, always have a professional counterpart.
Therefore, according to Stebbins’ typology, “the term ‘amateur’ should be used
only with those activities that constitute [. . .] a professional work role. That is,
there must be a professional counterpart to the status of amateur” (Stebbins 1992,
41–42; original emphasis).
However, this division between the amateur and the professional (or ex-
pert) is not always straightforward. As Kristen Haring shows in her study on the
technical culture of ham radio: “Despite hams’ proud insistence at times on
their status as ‘amateur’ radio operators, there was a significant overlap be-
tween the groups that worked with electronics during the day for wages and in
the evening for pleasure” (Haring 2007; cf. Douglas 1986). The same applies to
the group of home computer amateurs from the 1960s and 1970s, who were like-
wise positioned “between work and play” (Gotkin 2014; cf. Kerssens 2016). The
blurring of boundaries between amateurs and professionals seems to intensify in
the digital age, as indicated by the rise of such new terminology as “pro-ams,”
“prosumer” and “produsers” (Leadbeater and Miller 2004; Bruns 2006; van Dijck
2009). These new terms are not neutral, however. Andrew Keen, for example, un-
derscored the more negative connotations of amateurism in the digital age by
stating that “On today’s Internet [. . .] amateurism, rather than expertise, is
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celebrated, even revered” (Keen 2007, 37). Others point at more positive mean-
ings of the term that, according to Nick Prior, relate in particular to a renewed
valorisation of the amateur: “In the last two decades or so, the status and position
of the amateur have been redeemed and a new, less aristocratic, breed of amateur
has emerged” (Prior 2010, 401).
In tandem with these broader discussions on amateurism, various conceptu-
alisations of media amateurism have also been discussed in scholarship on the
topic over the years. Defining amateurism clearly, with analytical precision, has
proven to be more challenging than might be expected for such a seemingly quo-
tidian phenomenon in media culture. A recurring trend in the scholarly pursuit
of a clear definition, or conceptual framework, is the pervasive impulse to under-
stand it in terms of what it is not. Broderick Fox, for example, remarked that
when we ask “for a concrete definition,” we rarely “respond with an answer of
what amateurism is, constructing a meaning, [but] instead, in terms of what it is
not – not sophisticated, not technically adept, not pretty or polished, not of popu-
lar interest, or perhaps, most frequently and opaquely, ‘not professional’” (Fox
2004, 5). This stance furthermore seems to align with the manner in which the
amateur is defined in everyday discourse. The Cambridge Dictionary Online, for
example, defines an amateur as “a person who takes part in an activity for plea-
sure, not as a job,” and as “someone who does not have much skill in what they
do” (Cambridge English Dictionary 2020; emphasis added). Moreover, in addition
to the efforts to define the amateur in terms of what it is not, as media scholar
Kevin Gotkin (2014, 5) observed, amateurs seem to “emerge in the cracks between
extant categories, and even the label ‘amateur’ has a historically mutable charac-
ter.” He furthermore reminds us that every intellectual effort to grasp the ama-
teur, whether from a synchronic or diachronic perspective, must acknowledge
that the amateur is essentially “a moving target” (Gotkin 2014, 6).
1.1 Fixing the Target
In order to make some headway in “fixing” the target, we hence propose to
cluster the definitional strategies derived from the historical sources and litera-
ture on the topic according to four types of amateurs. This typology of ama-
teurs, we should emphasise, is by no means exhaustive or exclusive but rather
serves as a pragmatic categorisation of the amateurism debate, in which each
amateur type places a different heuristic or analytical emphasis.
The first type is the amateur as non-professional user. This amateur type,
for instance, is discussed by sociologist Robert Stebbins (1992) and media theo-
rist Patricia Zimmermann (1995; 2008), who respectively defined, analyzed, and
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criticized the amateur in relation to their professional counterpart. Furthermore,
the amateur as non-professional user is prevalent in marketing discourses that
regularly differentiate between “amateur” and “professional” types of technolo-
gies and their (configured) usages, e.g. the domestic consumption of technologies
(cf. Silverstone and Hirsch 1992). In the current context, where amateurs are tak-
ing to commercial social media platforms like YouTube, the classification of the
amateur as non-professional has been challenged further. Media scholars such as
Jean Burgess (2013), for instance, observed amateurs crossing the line from tradi-
tional, domestic to more public, market-oriented modes of participation. This
then started a large-scale process of professionalisation and formalisation of am-
ateur media production.
The second type is the amateur as tinkerer. Unlike the first amateur type, this
one does not merely regard amateurs as (passive) consumers but rather considers
they play an active part in the innovation and development processes of media
technologies. Through tinkering, that is the technical playing with technologies
and their (creative) appropriation, amateurs can function as active agents in the
co-shaping, or “co-construction,” of a technology and its usages (Oudshoorn and
Pinch 2003). The amateur as tinkerer and innovator foregrounds a technical and
political understanding of amateurism in the debate (cf. Haring 2007; Gotkin 2014;
Bruyninckx 2018). In the words of media theorist Sean Cubitt (1999), this type of
amateur “is ready [. . .] to transform every material, to show respect through ma-
nipulating and changing what comes to hand, seizing a technology, a technique, a
shape or melody or image and making it anew”. Moreover, the idea of “crafts-
manship” is equally important, which implies that the development of skills and
making an effort are part and parcel of the amateur practice (cf. Sennett 2009;
Roepke 2013). Thus, the amateur as tinkerer type strongly foregrounds a particular
do-it-yourself mentality.
The amateur as tinkerer is closely related to the third type: the amateur as
avant-gardist. The discourses surrounding, or representing, this type of amateur
are less technically oriented but rather underscore the amateur’s wish to experi-
ment with new technologies and explore new topics or alternative aesthetics.
This type also spurs a more political connotation that refers to the potential of
amateurism in processes of cultural participation, democratisation, and valor-
isation (Prior 2010). This is done, for instance, by emphasizing the amateur’s
sense of freedom (Deren 1965) and do-it-yourself ethos. Therefore, this category
received various different labels over the years, such as counter practitioner,
grassroots artist, media activist, or independent media maker. According to Mi-
chael Z. Newman (2008, n.p.): “The notion that do–it–yourself amateurism can
stand on equal ground with media industry professionalism signals a demo-
cratic challenge to hierarchies of aesthetic value. And at the same time that
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amateur media are gaining ground, so is the communitarian alternative to tradi-
tional, top–down mass media distinctions between production and reception.”
The multiple, often contrasting discourses surrounding the fourth type, the
amateur as naive practitioner, demonstrate the complexity of this category. Within
the debate, this type of amateur is often conceptualized as someone who lacks cer-
tain expertise or particular skills, which resembles the popular, dictionary under-
standing of the amateur pointed out earlier. In the influential book The Cult of the
Amateur, Andrew Keen (2007) used this negative definition to typify the amateur
as a non-expert. However, the amateur as a naive practitioner is not only limited to
negative discourses and contemporary definitions. It can also reflect positive con-
notations, in which the naive is valued as “authentic” and can therefore be re-
garded as an asset. Here, the amateur is someone who, unlike professionals and
serious hobbyists, is not hindered by any aesthetic conventions or pre-defined so-
cial structures as an operational framework. The amateur as naive practitioner, in
this sense, reminds of the distinction between “naive artists” and “integrated ar-
tists” made by art sociologist Howard S. Becker. Naive artists lack institutional
training and work independently from any artistic points of reference, whereas in-
tegrated artists do operate, often collectively, in such art worlds (Becker 2008; cf.
Flichy 2018). It is exactly this (ideal of) amateur naïveté that was pursued and cher-
ished in the avant-garde filmmaking practices of members of the New York under-
ground, such as Jonas Mekas, Stan Brakhage, and Ken Jacobs. The notion of the
naive practitioner is furthermore prominent in the work of the visual anthropolo-
gist Richard Chalfen. He connects “cinéma naïveté” with home movie making as a
specific form of visual communication, in which the main goal is to make “use of
filmmaking technology to symbolically record, document and reproduce a reality”
(Chalfen 1975, 93; cf. Odin 1995). In the amateur handbooks, magazines, and in-
struction guidelines, the naive practitioner is often contrasted to the more ambi-
tious or “aspirational” practitioner (Buse 2018).
1.2 Emic versus Etic Approaches
Following these four types of amateurs within the debate, we can detect a clear
pattern that shows either a form of self-assignment or labelling of the term ama-
teur as a particular value, either positive or negative, or appropriating it as an
identity. To better understand this dynamic, we can learn from the field of an-
thropology, where the division between “emic” and “etic” is used to distinguish
between the perspectives of the observer, or outsider, and participant, or in-
sider, of a social group (Goodenough 1970; Harris 1976; Headland, Pike, and
Harris 1990). An emic approach includes the ways in which the participants of a
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social group perceive themselves, their behaviour and beliefs from an insider
and cultural-specific or “native” perspective. An etic approach, on the other
hand, includes the ways in which a (scientific) observer analyzes the behaviour
and beliefs of the participants of the social group from an outsider and cross-
cultural perspective.2
When looking at the four types of amateurs described above, we can see
how the distinction between emic and etic approaches to amateurism can be
helpful for better understanding the historical dynamics of the appropriation
and labelling of the term “amateur.” The amateur as tinkerer, for instance, can
be found in emic approaches to amateurism. As became apparent in discussions
on radio and computer amateurism, this is how amateurs saw themselves espe-
cially in the early twentieth century. The amateur as naive practitioner, on the
other hand, is more dominant as an etic approach in the amateurism debate.
This perspective comes to the fore most prominently in the work of Andrew
Keen (2007). For the amateur as avant-gardist, the emic approach is more domi-
nant again, as Jonas Mekas and other filmmakers from the New York underground
exemplify. The amateur as non-professional is more neutral and can therefore be
found in both emic and etic approaches. Emic approaches include those amateurs
who did not pursue professional standards, while etic approaches include the
perspective of the industry when striving for a standardization and domestication
of non-professional technologies. Nevertheless, emic and etic approaches can be
found in all four amateur types. Instead of deploying the emic-etic framework in
an oppositional or mutually exclusive manner, we would rather regard it as a
complementary concept in the historical analysis of the dynamic between appro-
priation and labelling in amateur discourses.3 In other words, both the etic and
the emic should be taken into consideration when historicizing amateurism. We
will show the benefits of such an endeavour in the next part, where we focus on
amateur film, video, and digital media in three different historical time periods.
2 For a history and development of the emic-etic concept, and its different conceptualizations
within the field of anthropology, see Headland, Pike and Harris (1990).
3 In the field of anthropology, the complementarity of the emic-etic approaches is likewise em-
braced. As Jingfeng Xia argues: “Although emics and etics are sometimes regarded as inher-
ently in conflict and one can be preferred to the exclusion of the other [. . .], the
complementarity of emic and etic approaches to anthropological research has been widely rec-
ognized, especially in the areas of interest concerning the characteristics of human nature as
well as the form and function of human social systems” (2011, 78).
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2 Historicizing Amateurism: Film, Video, Digital
The history of amateur media in particular can help us to understand the con-
stantly evolving discourses on amateurism. Several important observations point
at the relevance of a historical approach to the topic: the ongoing stream of
emerging and disappearing media technologies; a longstanding tradition of vocal
practitioners embracing various ideological positions; a strong rise in the eco-
nomic interests of the media industry; and last but not least, the increasing cul-
tural and social investments of millions of practitioners, or media users, make
this a fascinating but complex and contested field of historical research. As Patri-
cia Zimmermann (1997, 74) observed: “any study of amateur film throws us into a
mapping of submerged historical discourses on technology, aesthetics, politics
and social relations.” Indeed, we should acknowledge how histories of amateur
media can reconstruct socially and culturally specific experiences of meaning
that do justice to media as “unique and complicated historical subjects” (Gitel-
man 2006, 7). Therefore, in this part, we will historicise the notion of amateurism
by discussing the ways in which the amateur has been defined and conceptual-
ized in the age of film, video, and the digital (cf. Aasman, Fickers, and Wachelder
2018). Media historians are often confronted with a sheer diversity of direct and
indirect sources that can provide various possible answers (Motrescu-Mayes and
Aasman 2019). The sources available to reconstruct the historical media amateur
allow for the analysis of complex dynamics between discursive labelling, self-
assignment, and perhaps also the “othering” of the amateur (Buckingham, Pini
and Willett 2007, 191).
2.1 Film Amateurism
Who or what is the film amateur? While the first users of the film camera can be
called amateurs, there was arguably no strict distinction between amateur and
professional filmmakers between the late nineteenth century and the early 1920s.
Rather, as Zimmermann (1995, 9) argues, “professionalism and amateurism com-
plemented each other” in this early historical period.4 This changed in the years
1922–1923, when the French Pathé Frères Company and the American Eastman
Kodak Company respectively introduced their 9.5mm and 16mm “small-gauge”
film technologies for the amateur user. While several attempts had been made by
4 For a discussion on the definition of amateur film in relation to its professional counterpart,
see among others: Hogenkamp and Lauwers (1997); Hielscher (2007); Czach (2014).
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the industry before to release a substandard film format for amateur and domestic
usage specifically, such attempts failed to produce a truly cheaper, safer, and eas-
ier to use alternative to the standard 35mm film technologies that were used by
professionals (Kattelle 2000). With the releases of the Pathé’s 9.5mm and Kodak’s
16mm (and later 8mm) safety film formats and accompanying film equipment, am-
ateur filmmaking developed into a practice of its own right as it became accessible
to a larger group of middle-class families and amateur hobbyists who had grown
curious about the possibilities of recording and screening moving images.
Among such users were many amateur photographers. In the amateur pho-
tography magazines, they could read about the latest developments of the prac-
tice of filmmaking – then called “kinematography”. Two ideals of amateurism
are particularly dominant in these discourses. The first is the nineteenth-century
ideal of the amateur as someone who could elevate the profession to a higher ar-
tistic level. This ideal type reflects the amateur as avant-gardist: someone who,
unlike their professional counterpart, is not bound by the conventions and limita-
tions of the medium as set by their profession, but rather can explore new aes-
thetic avenues or directions to the medium in its development. In 1928, the Dutch
amateur photography magazine Lux-De Camera projected this ideal type of ama-
teurism onto the emerging practice of kinematography as follows: “Amateurism
stimulated a better and artistic form of photography, and this will happen with re-
spect to kinematography as well” (N.N. 1928, 222; translated from Dutch). This
ideal type of amateurism was particularly prominent within the avant-garde
movements of the late 1920s and 1930s (Horak 1998; Zimmermann 1995; Lins-
sen, Schoots, and Gunning 1999). In several countries, cine-clubs became the
sites where amateurs and the avant-garde would meet, exchange ideas, and
cross-over practices occurred (Hagener 2007; Shand 2007; Craven 2009; Nich-
olson 2012; de Cuir Jr 2014; Tepperman 2015; Slootweg 2018b). The second
ideal of amateurism is the amateur as tinkerer who, similar to the amateur
photographer, maintained a certain do-it-yourself mentality. This ideal type of
amateurism can be found in normative discourses emphasizing the impor-
tance of film amateurs to develop their films themselves instead of outsourc-
ing the development process to a manufacturer, so as to maintain as much
technical and aesthetic control over the creative process as possible.
It should be mentioned that these two ideal types of amateurism originating
from the domain of photography are not applicable to all amateur filmmakers;
neither for this specific time period nor in later times. Rather, they particularly
apply to the category of serious hobbyists and leisure practitioners who were
interested in filmmaking as a hobby and form of expression. This in contrast to
the large group of users who did not carefully plan, shoot, and edit their films
but were primarily interested in the function of the amateur film camera to
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record and preserve family memories (Hogenkamp and Lauwers 1997). This
last group of users corresponds to the type of amateur as naive practitioner,
who similar to the snapshot photographer practiced their hobby as a private
or “home mode” form of communication (Chalfen 1987). Within this home or
family mode, the French film theorist Roger Odin (1995) argued, the social
function of (recording and watching) family films is more important than their
aesthetic quality. Although for many users the making of family films was in-
deed the main reason to buy a film camera in the first place, the more ambi-
tious or aspirational amateurs often regarded this only as a first step towards
becoming a “real” amateur (van der Heijden and Aasman 2014).
This tension between amateur filmmaking as a hobby and memory practice
is a recurring theme in the history of amateur filmmaking (Aasman 2004, 254).
With the emergence of amateur ciné-clubs in the late 1920s and 1930s, the dif-
ferentiation between user groups would only solidify (van der Heijden 2018b).
The amateur in the film era, in other words, is neither synonymous nor comple-
mentary to the non-professional user. What makes or defines the amateur is
rather the outcome of a complex negotiation process between labelling (etic)
and appropriation (emic), in which various ideas, norms, values and motiva-
tions play a role.
2.2 Video Amateurism
Who or what is the video amateur? Can we even speak of the video amateur?
These questions arise when engaging with the historical traces left behind by the
video cultures of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Media scholars David Buckingham,
Maria Pini, and Rebekah Willett attempted to create some clarity when they ana-
lyzed not only the discursive construction of the historical film amateur but also
of the video amateur. They concluded that the latter in particular shows an ever
“increasing diversity of amateur video production [that] is making life more diffi-
cult for those who would seek to discipline and regulate it” (Buckingham, Pini,
and Willett 2007, 199). Scrutinising the numerous amateur video productions
made in the past will indeed reveal a staggering amount of diversity: home vid-
eos, activist and community videos, video diaries, spoof videos, bootlegs, ama-
teur porn, skate videos, and the list goes on (cf. Hilderbrand 2009). Having a look
at the content of these videotapes is nevertheless only one path to take in order
to trace the video amateur. We can locate them as well in amateur magazines,
manuals, in oral histories (memories), and other material sources.
The historical context in which the dynamic of the emergence of the video
amateur comes to the fore is different from that of the film amateur. Media
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scholar James M. Moran (2002), for instance, pointed at the various sociocul-
tural and aesthetic ramifications of video technologies for amateur practices.
Moreover, as an electronic medium, video was intimately related to television,
the dominant mass medium of the latter half of the twentieth century. As Mi-
chael Z. Newman reminds us, this intimacy dates back to the 1950s and early
1960s when “video was another word for television” (Newman 2014, 2). More-
over, the various consumer video formats and cameras at the disposal of the
amateur from the late 1970s onwards afforded many new possibilities to the am-
ateur as non-professional user. Two of the most prominent new features were
the automatic recording of synchronous sound and image and the significantly
extended amount of recording time, sometimes up to several hours, compared
to the precious minutes available on small-gauge film formats (Moran 2002; van
der Heijden 2018b; Slootweg 2018b). Interestingly, video’s proximity to televi-
sion and its new technological features were approached differently by various
types of video amateurs, representing various versions of labelling and self-
assignment.
The first example comes from the work of Jan A. Kleyn (1927–1998), a cine-
club member since the late 1950s and a prominent figure in the Dutch world of
amateur film and photography. In 1990, he published a book on video after years
of writing on various, more advanced topics, such as the creative use of editing,
sound, and cinematography in amateur filmmaking. Embracing a do-it-yourself
mentality, he represents the amateur as tinkerer. For Kleyn, video aroused con-
siderable suspicion among serious film amateurs and he highlighted that “good”
video amateurism was a highly controversial notion (Kleyn 1990, 8; translated
from Dutch). Video was based on different technological principles than film and
belonged to the often-maligned electronic world of television. According to these
amateurs, video encouraged sloppiness and furthermore lacked the “aura” of an-
alogue film (Slootweg 2018b).
These concerns were not shared by every new user, especially those who were
part of socially progressive video collectives from the 1970s and 1980s. An example
might be the members of the Dutch video collective Meatball who recounted what
attracted them to video: they explained how video’s intimate relationship with
television was not seen as problematic but rather as an opportunity for media dem-
ocratisation and participation (Slootweg 2016; Slootweg and Aasman 2015). They
were certainly not the only ones who labelled themselves activists or experiment-
ers seeking to challenge mainstream television broadcasting by exploring the so-
cial use of video. With various experiments of community and local television, the
video collective aimed to give a “voice” to those people who in their view were
absent in media discourses at the time (Slootweg 2016, 144). As such, these video
amateurs represent the amateur as avant-gardist type, highlighting the amateur’s
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potential as a counter practitioner in processes of cultural participation and media
democratisation.
The third example underscores the importance the “voice” video can liter-
ally give to its user thanks to the new technical affordance of synchronous
sound. For the father of an expat family in the 1980s, the camcorder allowed for
the recording of his “autobiographical voice” when capturing and narrating on
noteworthy events of his family’s everyday life abroad (Slootweg 2018b, 214).
The home video of his family furthermore showcases many choices that would
be considered as “bad” video amateurism in the first example, such as unsteady
handheld long takes, poor synchronous sound recording and unsophisticated
in-camera editing. At the same time, the condescending tone of “bad,” as a
label for a particular form of amateurism that is represented by the type of ama-
teur as naive practitioner, reminds us of Roger Odin’s analysis that there is no
such thing as a “bad” home movie or video, because it should be understood in
the context of the “space of communication” of family and friends (Odin 2014,
15). In other words, according to Odin, “mistakes” only add to the social func-
tion of this practice. The new features of video furthermore allowed for a far
more layered, narrative mediated memory artefact of the family, certainly when
compared to home movies (van Dijck 2007). For now, however, the cases dis-
cussed above indicate that it is perhaps more accurate to speak of video ama-
teurs, in the plural, with a wide variety of practices, intentions, beliefs, worries,
hopes, and expectations.
2.3 Digital Amateurism
Who or what is the digital amateur? In the twenty-first century, the amateur has
become an even more complex category. Consumer media technologies diversi-
fied, adding to ongoing processes of multi-mediatisation, miniaturisation and
convergence, which further widened the affordances for everyday users to doc-
ument their life or create stories. Moreover, the ubiquity of digital video cam-
eras, as something that is potentially always with us and ready to be used, truly
transformed it into a vernacular technology, deeply embedded in our daily life
and our communication routines. This process was strengthened by the ability
to produce user-generated content as an integrated functionality of a wide vari-
ety of emerging (and sometimes quickly disappearing) apps and platforms like
Vine, Snapchat, WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, and Tik-
Tok. In the current digital era, media amateurism merged with social media.
People communicate more than ever via (moving) images, whether they pull
pranks on one another, make selfies, perform a beauty tutorial, record their day
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in a life while in self-quarantine or videos of themselves preparing evening
meals.
It is interesting to note that users perform these practices not only in private
but also in public spaces. The World Wide Web made possible the distribution
of their footage beyond the confines of the home, the club or other locally de-
fined spaces. This attraction of the Internet, as a participatory space where any-
one might share, exploded after 2005 when YouTube became almost overnight
the dominant platform for sharing videos online. The amateur has become a
highly visible category in contemporary media culture, which forces us to re-
think Roland Barthes’ description of the amateur as someone “who does not ex-
hibit, the one who does not make himself heard” (Barthes 1991, 230).
Scholars have observed how discourses on the amateur became central in
ideals about empowerment through a “participatory culture” (Jenkins 2006; cf. the
chapter on fandom by Benecchi and Wang, in this volume). Even before the emer-
gence of YouTube, the rise of a more empowered form of amateurism was ac-
knowledged, notions of the amateur as non-professional were redefined through
an increasingly hybrid terminology, such as “prosumer,” to denote how user
agency alternates between bipolar categories of producer versus consumer, and
professional versus consumer (Bruns 2006; cf. van Dijck 2009). This rethinking of
the amateur also becomes clear in the notion of “pro-am,” which redefines the
hierarchy of the professional as expert and a mark of high standard versus the
amateur as the non-professional: “Pro-Ams are knowledgeable, educated, com-
mitted and networked, by new technology” (Leadbeater and Miller 2004, 12). In-
stead of a hybridisation between the amateur and professional, Patrice Flichy
rather speaks about the amateur in the digital age as an “in-between” category:
“Amateurs find themselves halfway between non-professionals and professio-
nals, between the ignorant and the expert, and between ordinary citizens and ad-
ministrators and/or politicians” (Flichy 2018, 172).
In conclusion, the digital amateur as a non-professional practitioner has be-
come a contested label (etic), but also as a form of self-assignment (emic), in
which – as with the film and video amateur – again ideas, norms, values, and
motivations play a role. A good example of this would be the popular YouTuber
Casey Neistat, who publicly complained when YouTube in 2017 changed its rules
and demonetized certain vloggers (Motrescu-Mayes and Aasman 2019, 44–65).
This had a devastating effect on the income of many YouTubers who were now
unable to make a living. Many of Neistat’s followers applauded him for de-
fending the “small creators” or “small YouTubers,” as some of them described
themselves. The rhetoric used here has an interesting connotation, referring to
“small-gauge” filmmakers, a historical term indicating amateurs using a sub-
standard film format. However, not all commentators agreed with him as they
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fiercely rejected the emphasis on monetisation. Indeed, they considered the act
of monetising (and with it the idea of professionalisation) to go against the idea
of YouTube as a place for amateurs as independent, grassroots or non-professional
practitioners (Hunter et al. 2013).
Conclusion
Both parts of this contribution show that, as Andy Warhol claimed, with amateurs
“you can never know what they’ll do next,” or, as we would like to add, who they
are from a media historical perspective. Not only have many scholars explored a
variety of ways to get a grip on the amateur, also among the various historical
sources can we detect many points of departure to answer this seemingly straight-
forward question. In the first part, we concluded that much of the academic debate
on the amateur revolves around etic attributions, broadly grouped into four ama-
teur types. We furthermore proposed conceptualizing attempts at self-assignment
by historical amateur media practitioners as mostly being emic in nature. In addi-
tion, we would like to note here that the plethora of heterogeneous historical traces
available, to be found both inside and outside of institutional archives, might also
trigger what could be termed an etic impulse in the historian as an observer and
interrogator of the past. The inherent “messiness of history” (Darnton 1990) can
entice historians to “discipline” and “regulate” it for their own purposes, by using
carefully chosen analytical and heuristic lenses with an acceptable degree of
explanatory power or sometimes allowing for normative evaluations. The lack
of scholarship on women as amateur filmmakers, for instance, requires more
attention. Only recently have several initiatives in film and video archives dug
up historical traces of these neglected amateurs (cf. Hill and Johnston 2020;
Motrescu-Mayes and Nicholson 2018).
In this concluding reflection, we bring together three points, based on the
insights yielded in this contribution that merit further reflection. First, we
want to include some additional reflections on our specific usage of the con-
cepts of emic and etic. What is the heuristic value of such a distinction for un-
derstanding the debate on amateurism, and for analysing historical cases and
time periods? These concepts, we believe, will help to historicise the notion of
amateurism because it allows for distinguishing how amateurs – as actors
within a social group at a certain moment in time – have been appropriating
the term to describe their own ways of doing and thinking compared to how ex-
ternal observers have been using the term to analyze and label certain historical
actors and their activities as such. Making such a distinction is meaningful in
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relation to the four amateur types we have distinguished in this chapter. More-
over, as we have shown, to understand the amateur, one needs to be conscious
of the complexities in the explicit or implicit labelling and self-assignment to cer-
tain categories.
In addition, by exploring the film, video, and digital media amateurs in par-
ticular, we can work towards identifying continuities and discontinuities in the
practices of and discourses on the amateur, in particular by those practitioners
who, over different periods of time, were committed to using various media
technologies to capture moving images and later also sound. By doing so, it is
not our intention to make a determinist argument on the transformative impact
of certain media technologies on their users at a particular historical juncture.
What we rather propose is to make a rough distinction between eras where the
use of certain media technologies dominated amateur media practices and dis-
courses. Such a technology-oriented perspective hence allows for a more precise
analysis of the similarities and differences in amateur media practices between
various moments in time, including the current digital age. In relation to the film
amateur, for instance, we have shown how amateurism at the beginning of the
twentieth century still draws on the nineteenth-century idealist meaning of the am-
ateur originating from discourses on amateur photography. For the video amateur,
the meanings of amateurism had already become more complex due to the diversi-
fication in the use of amateur video technologies within a rapidly changing media
landscape. In the digital age, this complexity intensified, which has not only given
rise to new, hybrid terminologies, like the “pro-am,” “prosumer” and “produser,”
but also made the amateur more ubiquitous and visible within popular culture
and the public domain (Flichy 2018).
Finally, on the basis of the two previous reflections, we would like to empha-
sise the need for conceptual lenses that help to understand this increased com-
plexity in the amateur debate. From a media historical perspective, the proposed
typology of four amateur types, in combination with etic and emic approaches to
amateurism, can be productive as an analytical framework for analysing and
grasping the multiple and ever-changing meanings of amateurism. However, we
believe that media historians could benefit from additional or complementary
conceptual lenses that enable both diachronic and synchronic analyses of media
amateurism. This is particularly relevant when taking into consideration the vari-
ety of perspectives on media amateurs found among the sources and historical
actors discussed in the second part of the chapter. Elsewhere, for example, Sloot-
weg proposed the discerning between three, sometimes overlapping, modes of
practice and functioning: the community mode, counter mode, and home mode
(Slootweg 2018a). As Motrescu-Mayes and Aasman furthermore pointed out, “the
counter mode, represented by social and political activists who embraced video
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as an oppositional practice, the home mode, driven by a desire to use video as a
technology of memory, and the community mode, presented by self-proclaimed
serious organized film amateurs” (Motrescu-Mayes and Aasman 2019, 16–17).5
Distinguishing between these three modes of amateur practices can be helpful in
adding a “perspective on media amateurism that will provide the means to bring
more descriptive and analytical clarity to the different intentions among histori-
cal film and video amateurs” (Slootweg 2018a, 204–205).
In addition, the notion of hybridity is crucial to emphasise as a key term
for describing the blurring of boundaries in the digital age (Moran 2002, xiii).
Elsewhere, van der Heijden suggests applying the notion of hybridity not just
as a descriptive category but rather as an analytical lens for studying “the inter-
mingling and co-existence of old and new media technologies, user practices, and
discourses as evolving in an ongoing process” (van der Heijden 2018a, 36; 2018b).
Maintaining both a synchronic and diachronic approach to media historiography,
the notion of hybridity provides a potentially valuable heuristic and analytical lens
for studying media transitions in their historical complexity. Moreover, van der
Heijden argues, this can be helpful for highlighting “the actual complexity and
‘messiness’ of media history and historians’ preoccupation with constructing nar-
ratives of change and discontinuity, rather than highlighting also the things that
happen ‘in between’” (van der Heijden 2018a, 40).
In conclusion, we can therefore say that this chapter not only explored the
multiple meanings of amateurism from a media historical perspective but also
revealed how the notion of the amateur, which is so central to our contempo-
rary digital age, can also function as an analytical lens in and of itself – both
synchronically and diachronically, as historical actors within various modes of
practice, and as a hybrid construct.
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Understanding the Activity of Media Use in the Age of Digital
Reproduction
Abstract: User-generated content was launched in the early 1990s as a concept
for describing media content produced outside of professional media institu-
tions by everyday media users. It gained widespread popularity around 2005
and in the article it is argued that the rise of the concept coincides with the in-
teractive web and the ability for industrialized media and culture production to
take advantage of the productivity of ordinary users. The article discusses first
the frameworks of production of UGC, including the business models of the
platform economy into which this kind of content is drawn. Secondly it dis-
cusses the types of users who generate content, and thirdly it accounts for some
of the criticism the concept has met. The article ends with situating UGC in the
longer history of media production and suggests an explanation for why the
concept appeared at the time it did.
Keywords:media production, media users, media content, amateur production
User-Generated Content, or UGC as it is commonly abbreviated, is a concept
that gained popularity with the widespread use of personal computers and the
launch of user-friendly interfaces for search engines, video-sharing, and social
networking sites, etc., in the early 2000s, when media users suddenly became
equipped with advanced means of production. The concept was connected to
the rise of the Web 2.0 (O’Reilly 2007), that is, the interactive or participatory
web, and refers to the ability for everyday media consumers to suddenly turn
into producers through the uploading and distribution of self-produced media
content on blogs, wikis, social media platforms or other public online media.
UGC can be defined as (digital) “media content generated by people outside
of professional media institutions, often for no pay, which is made available to
the public” (Daubs 2019, 1825). The first mentions of the concept in academic
writing appeared in the early 1990s, perhaps inspired by the concept of “user-
generated data” that had already appeared in computer science in the 1970s.
The popularity of the concept within media and cultural studies is often attrib-
uted to writers such as Henry Jenkins (2006), who in his Convergence Culture
points to the activity of media users on digital social media platforms. A Google
Ngram analysis of the search term “user – generated content” reveals that its
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peak popularity was in 2005, the year before the publication of Jenkins’ book, and
although the UGC concept is listed in the index of Convergence Culture, Jenkins in
fact never mentions the term in the book but instead writes of “audience-
generated content” or “consumer-generated content.” Admittedly, Jenkins
had studied active audiences for more than a decade by then, and especially
various types of audience productivity, and he also soon followed up on the
success of Convergence Culture by co-authoring Spreadable Media, emphasiz-
ing the ease by which such content could be disseminated (Jenkins, Ford,
and Green 2013). With reference to Jenkins, UGC has often been held forth as
the possibility for media users to counter the one-way communication struc-
ture of the mass media, thereby introducing a more democratic tool for citi-
zens to make their voices heard, and to participate actively in the societal
communication structure.
In parallel to the work of Jenkins, UGC was also related with adjacent con-
cepts such as produsers – an amalgamation of the concept of producer and user
launched by German-Australian media researcher Axel Bruns (2006), who de-
veloped it influenced by Alvin Toffler’s (1971) concept “prosumer,” which Tof-
fler used to emphasize the productive side of consumption in the information
society. Alternative concepts were also launched for describing the same phe-
nomenon at the time, for example Pro-Ams – a combination of professionals and
amateurs (Leadbeater and Miller 2004; Anderson 2006), or peer production, as
discussed by Joshua Benkler in his influential book The Wealth of Networks,
where he positions this production in a new and decentralized “networked infor-
mation economy” that is replacing the previous stage of “industrial information
economy” with its more centralized production processes (Benkler 2006, 3). Fa-
mous examples of such peer-production are Wikipedia, founded in 2001, but also
video-and music-sharing sites such as YouTube and Soundcloud. It was also ap-
plied to phenomena such as “crowd-sourcing” (Brabham 2008), a web-based
business model based on online, distributed problem-solving, and production
which is less about the content itself but rather the ways in which media indus-
tries can benefit from small contributions from a lot of people.
The rise of concepts for business models in relation to USG is significant,
and as I will show in the following, the concept of USG was born in relation to
the technological affordances and commercial potential of digital media even if
the productive activity of everyday media users itself has a very long history.
Against this short background, I will in the following discuss the longer history,
or perhaps pre-history, of the phenomenon itself. The concept itself focuses on
users and content, but I will start by describing the prerequisites to this specific
kind of content generation by users as it is my point that it is within the techno-
logical and commercial frameworks of production that the concept itself becomes
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intelligible. I will then discuss the users that generate content, and how their con-
tent production has been seen as non-profit motivated, non-professional or ama-
teur textual production. Third, I will account for some of the criticism that the
uses of the concept of user-generated content have generated. Lastly, I will bring
this discussion together to make some conclusive reflections on the rise and pop-
ularity of the concept.
1 Prerequisites for UGC
Although the concept of UGC is relatively new, dating back to the early years of
the twenty-first century and the rise of the interactive web, the phenomenon
that it refers to has a very long history. It might therefore be instructive to ac-
count for some of the analogue predecessors to digital UGC, in order to under-
stand its specificity and in which ways it differs from historical communication
forms. Portions of the content in the press and on the broadcasting media can,
for example, be considered as early such forms of UGC. One can, for example,
think of letters to the editor, where readers can voice their opinion in textual
form, or phone-in programs on the radio, where ordinary listeners can make
themselves heard. Obituaries are another example that is common in the print
media. As has been discussed by Lobato, Thomas and Hunter (2011), such forms
point to the tensions between formal and informal media production in which
UGC is often produced by non-professionals but distributed within industrial-
ized frameworks which are formally regulated through state policy, taxation,
and regulation, especially UGC distributed via the mass media press, radio, and
television. This places the producer in relative control of the construction of the
text but not over its distribution since there is no guarantee that letters submit-
ted to the editor get published. And even if they do get published, the newspa-
per editors can, and often do, edit the letters or obituaries. The content also
needs to follow editorial principles in terms of length and tone of language. The
same goes for debate articles which, to the contrary of letters to the editor or
obituaries, are often written by people in their capacity as experts, such as re-
searchers, politicians or corporate executives. All these types of content are pro-
duced outside of the distributing organization but are subsumed by its editorial
processes of selection, policy, and quality assessment.
However, it could be argued that what we today consider to be UGC pre-
cedes the mass media, and that it is one of the central features of traditional
communications systems such as the postal system, or the telephone system. Just
like the postal and telephone system, social media platforms such as Facebook,
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Twitter, and Instagram, and sharing platforms such as YouTube, Flickr, and
Soundcloud are not content producers themselves, but are offering a service
where users can communicate with distant others. They are infrastructures for
communication, offering a service to the user, and their business models are
founded on that type of functionality.
The earliest known postal systems were established in ancient Egypt and
China ca. 2.000–1.000 BC. The Roman empire developed the most advanced
postal system of the time – the cursus publicus – composed of stations equipped
with fast-running horses distributed with regular intervals along the main roads
of the empire (Siegert 1993/1999, 6–7; cf. Balbi and Kittler 2016, 1976). This com-
munication system was, however, mainly used by the emperor and his provin-
cial governors for messages between the different parts of the Roman empire. In
this exclusive function, it was largely similar to the telegraph in the early 1800s
(Carey 1983). Like the cursus publicus, the telegraph was for the most part not a
medium that was operated by private citizens. Electronic communication net-
works for the general public came first with the telephone, patented by Alexan-
der Graham Bell in the 1870s, and spread among the general populations first
in the US but also in many other industrialized countries in Europe and else-
where. And even if this medium initially had its experiments with mass distri-
bution, its dominant use was for interpersonal communication at a distance
(Marvin 1988, 223–228).
Both the postal and the telephone systems, when introduced to a general pub-
lic of users, provided them with a service to take advantage of for a fee. The busi-
ness model was then based on selling access to the service to customers wishing
to communicate across distance. When sending mail, you needed a stamp, and
when making a phone call you paid a subscription rate in combination with a fee
per call made, and per minute used. Long-distance and especially international
calls were more expensive, just as sending letters with express delivery was more
expensive. Prices were thus set according to the service level delivered to the
customer.
This is, however, how the postal and telephone systems also differ from the
platform companies of today, since most of them – Facebook, Twitter, Insta-
gram, or search companies such as Google, Yahoo, etc. – do not provide the ser-
vice for a fee but for access to the data that the users provide them with when
they act in the digital space, and sometimes also for the content they produce.
This is because in this business model it is not the user of the service that is the
customer. Those who use the service in order to communicate with friends and
relatives only contribute to the revenues for the platform companies indirectly
as their data are not directly sold to advertisers. The customer is instead those
advertising companies, or their representatives, who wish to reach the attention
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of users in order to promote their products or are in other ways seeking to gain
the attention of the service users. In that sense, platform companies are more
similar to traditional commercial broadcasters who get their revenues from the
sales of advertising. Platform companies are thus merging two business models:
that of the traditional commercial mass media that build on the selling of texts
to users (the text-based business model), or on delivering users’ attention to ad-
vertisers (the audience-based business model) and that of the telecommunica-
tions business (the service model). The latter is necessary because it is the
telecommunications sector that controls the flows of digits through their fiber
optic cables and Wi-Fi networks, and thus controls access to the IP numbers of
digital devices, which is needed in order to produce the digital consumer based
on his or her movement in digital space. It is the combination of these business
models that makes contemporary platform companies unique. Content, in this
case, is both the actual texts produced by media users but also the data pro-
duced as a result of the users’ activities.
What distinguishes contemporary platform companies from the service pro-
viders in the pre-digital era is that the telephone companies never sold the content
provided by the partakers in telephone conversations, and the post companies did
not provide third parties with the content of letters. This is, however, exactly what
is the basis for the platform companies’ business models. Of course, there are an-
ecdotes of wire-tapping by telephone operators in the early days of manual switch-
boards, and in some totalitarian states this has also been part of systematic state
surveillance strategies (e.g. Weiner and Rahi-Tamm 2012). However, these are ex-
amples of state surveillance for political purposes, for crime prevention, or simply
snooping behavior by private individuals. Commercial companies have not had
any incentives to open mails or wire-tap customers. Arguably, this is also one of
the reasons the concept of UGC is seldom used in relation to all service providers
but reserved for production that in the end produces economic value. We shall re-
turn to this point and what it means for the rise of the concept of UGC but, before
that, we need to say something about those who are generating the user-generated
content, that is, the media users.
2 UGC and Amateur Media Production
Within media audience studies, a recurring discussion has approached the de-
grees to which audiences are active or passive recipients of media messages. The
history of media audiences research is often described in terms of a pendulum
that swings between the views on the audience as either passive or active. The
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media were initially seen as powerful agents that injected their messages into the
audiences who received the messages in a uniform manner. When research had a
hard time establishing these uniform influences, the question “what do the media
do to people” was reversed and uses and gratifications research regarded media
users as active subjects who sought to satisfy individual “needs.” Both the theories
of uniform influences and the uses and gratifications theories focused on the ef-
fects or the needs of the individual as a psychological subject. With theories on
cultural imperialism and cultivation theory, the relationship between the media
and their audiences was again reconsidered, and it was no longer individual texts
or individual users who were under focus but the power of the cultural environ-
ment in its entirety that influenced users as social subjects on a societal level. With
the rise of Cultural Studies as a research field, the active audience was again re-
evaluated, and with the ambivalences and resistance potentials to dominant mes-
sages emphasized as well as the empowering potentials of popular culture. This is
also where audience activity got thematized in terms of productivity: the concept
of audience was largely abandoned to the benefit of the more active noun “users”
and these became theorized in terms of their “identity work” (Ziehe 1982/1986), or
“symbolic work” (Willis 1990), or in terms of their engagement in social or textual
productivity (Fiske 1992).
Parts of the productivity resulting in UGC stems from amateur production, for
example the writing of diaries, poetry for the desktop drawer, or amateur photog-
raphy and film-making. The English word amateur is borrowed from French, and
has its root in the Latin word amator, i.e. one who loves or is fond of something,
but has become understood as one “who cultivates anything as a pastime, as dis-
tinguished from one who prosecutes it professionally” (Oxford English Dictionary;
see also the chapter on amateurism in this book). To be an amateur producer usu-
ally also means that the activity is less formally organized than commercial media
production or other types of professional media production, such as production
within public service broadcasting. Amateur production is, in fact, a broad cate-
gory that includes everything from individual scribblings of poetry or diary writing
to quite complex online broadcasts of amateur music festivals or theatre plays.
The concept of amateur as opposed to professional media producer of course
only makes sense in a capitalist economy where production and consumption of
cultural objects and texts is separated. The first such market was the market for
books, following the possibilities of mass production of the written word since
the mid-fifteenth century. This market was, however, quite restricted until the
rapid modernization of European infrastructure in the nineteenth century, in-
cluding new means of transport such as railroads. This expansion of the market
can also be related to further developments in print technology, where setting
machines and rotary presses made it possible to drastically increase print runs of
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books and newspapers (Williams 1958/1963, 290). With the subsequent introduc-
tion of continuously new media technologies, the market for cultural products ex-
panded to include photography, film, radio, television and so on. Some of these
technologies, such as photography, have always also been areas where the lines
between professional and amateur might not be too sharp. Other media forms
that are reliant on large investments and complex production apparatuses, such
as filmmaking, have had stricter lines between them, where separate technical
formats have been reserved for professional filmmaking (35 and 70 mm film) and
amateur formats (8 mm, with 16 mm as a middle format between these) (Zimmer-
mann 1995). Beyond the technological formats, professional film and television
production also requires a distribution network that goes far beyond what ama-
teurs have access to.
A specific form of amateur production is the productions made by fans (see
also the chapter on fandom in this book), that is, highly engaged followers of a
specific media content or a specific star or artist. Many studies of UGC have in
fact taken fans and their textual production as their point of departure and, un-
surprisingly, this is also the point of departure for the above-mentioned Henry
Jenkins, whose first book was a study of fans of the television series Star Trek
(Jenkins 1992). These fans were highly active and productive, and arranged con-
ventions, produced artworks, wrote stories, made fanzines, etc., all of which cir-
culated within the “participatory culture” of Star Trek followers. Jenkins’ Star
Trek study was published in 1992, and the research that led up to it therefore
preceded the interactive web. He was not the first to do research of fans, not
even on Star Trek, but his ideas sparked off an avalanche of studies on partici-
patory culture over the next decades (Hills 2002).
Amateur media production naturally needs to be related to professional
production within the technological framework of digital telecommunications
systems. Elsewhere, I have suggested that this can be theorized as two separate
fields of cultural production: one that is commercially driven within the frame-
work of a market economy, and one which is non-market driven within a social
and cultural economy, and where the non-profit motivated production of every-
day media users in this field of “prosumption” gets appropriated and taken ad-
vantage of by the industrialized field of media production where it is converted
to economic profit (Bolin 2012).
What distinguishes amateur production from its professional counterpart is
not quality in itself, but the motivations and the frameworks. Professional media
production is goal-oriented, organized and remunerated. Amateur media produc-
tion is based on a “labor of love,” and admittedly also professional producers can
love what they do for a living but their labor is only compensated for economically
if it meets the objectives of others. An amateur musician is not necessarily less
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skilled or talented as a professional musician but is mainly motivated by
other values such as aesthetic or social values. Many professional journalists
are less eloquent than amateur writers, but they are conducting their writing
within a framework of formal employment, union membership, etc. that gives
them access to accredited places at certain events and places (cf. Lobato, Thomas
and Hunter 2011).
3 Critical Perspectives on UGC
The concept has also met with a fair deal of criticism. One such criticism con-
cerns the idea that the boundary between media production and consumption
had disappeared with the new interactive technologies. This idea has been criti-
cized on the grounds that, first, there are clear differences between the produc-
tion conducted by large-scale media corporations, such as the big television
networks, the film and publishing industry, the music industry, etc., and the
more limited and less profit-driven production by everyday media users. There
are also empirical studies which have analyzed the extent to which media users
contribute with content in the commentary fields of newspapers and concluded
that it is not much, and that users are fairly restricted in what type of content
they can contribute with (Örnebring 2008). Typically, UGC is produced by a
small but very active minority of media users (Balbi and Magaudda 2018: 100f).
The language of “activity” and “passivity” is also reflected in how everyday
media users talk about their own online behavior, where it is common to refer
to one’s own behavior in passive terms (Bolin and Velkova 2020).
A related reflection on the concept is that it overstates the activity and produc-
tivity of users. Most of what is published and disseminated on social media and
sharing platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc., is actually produced
by the traditional cultural industries – the film industry, the television industry,
and the press. The activity of users is mostly in the form of distributing video clips
and text snippets, and very little of what is circulating is actually produced by ev-
eryday media users. Lothar Mikos has thus suggested that it would be more accu-
rate to talk about “user-distributed content,” since 83 per cent of the most popular
content on YouTube was actually produced by professional content-producers in
the media industries, and only 17 per cent produced by everyday media users.
Fans, he argues, have become part of the marketing and promotion activities of
large-scale professional productions, for example, various talent shows such as
X-Factor and fiction franchises such as Lost (Mikos 2010).
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Another type of criticism focusses on the fact that UGC contributes to the
exploitation of “free labor” (Terranova 2000). This criticism is directed to the
fact that those who produce data through their activities on social networking
media and upload and distribute content provide the basis for the profit of the
platform companies in the digital economy, and that their “labor” is not remu-
nerated. The argument is that the activity of users is what generate the revenues
for the platform companies. This labor is “free,” both in the sense that it is free
to exploit by the platforms but also freely given by the laborers. This criticism is
highly influenced by the Italian autonomist Marxist paradigm, with authors
such as Michael Hardt and Maurizio Lazzarato theorizing this type of activity as
“immaterial labour” (Lazzarato 1996). This is the kind of labor “that produces
an immaterial product, such as ideas, images, forms of communication, affects,
or social relationships” (Hardt 2005).
Now, it can be argued that it is not really the labor itself that is immaterial, but
the result of labor – even signifying how practices that are at the bottom of the
production of sign commodities are material. Furthermore, those who actually
conduct work in producing the digital media user commodity are not the ones
who generate data but the ones who process these data and package them into the
audience commodity that is then offered to advertisers and others who wish to
buy this kind of intangible commodity. Thus, it is not the audiences who work
but rather the statisticians at the analytics and marketing departments of the
platform companies (Bolin 2009). José van Dijck also problematizes the activity
on the grounds that the relations between media use and industry is much more
complex than both the affirmative “produsage” paradigm or the free labor para-
digm accounts for (van Dijck 2009), whereas Søren Mørk Petersen has argued
that UGC would be better labelled “loser-generated content” because the fruits of
the labor are robbed from the media users (Petersen 2008). David Hesmondhalgh
(2010) has also thoroughly criticized both the affirmative stance of the “produser”
debate and the free labor discourse and argues that the analogy with work is mis-
leading. His main argument is that the idea of media use as work does not fit into
the Marxist theory of exploitation because of the lack of force and forced relations
between capital and labor. Hesmondhalgh refers to a distinction made by Mark
Andrejevic between “user-generated content” and “user-generated data”, where
it is mainly the latter that is the basis for profit in the media industries (Andre-
jevic 2009).
The question, however, is why do people contribute with their data, and
sometimes with their content, if they know that the data collected is intrusive,
and that the platform companies are making money on their actions in the digi-
tal space? Elsewhere, I have suggested that one might think of the mechanisms
behind the activities as two separate but related fields of action (Bolin 2012). In
User-Generated Content (UGC) 275
the field of “presumption”, as we might call it for want of a better term, social
subjects produce posts on social media, communicate in chat rooms, share pic-
tures on sharing sites, all for the benefit of social and cultural value. This field
is based on a social and cultural economy, not profit-driven, and producing so-
cial and cultural value for the involved subjects. These activities, both the user-
generated data produced and the UGC, get drawn into the field of professional
media and cultural production into a field that is indeed profit-driven within
the framework of a commercial economy, where the main value is economic. If
seen from this perspective, it is hard to talk about the subjects generating data
as doing labor or being exploited. Their activities do admittedly result in data,
which is then appropriated by the commercial media and culture industries and
enters into the commercial economy. But the motivations for user production
are rewards in value forms other than the economic.
4 The Long History of Everyday Media Production
and the Short History of UGC
Before media texts became commodities in the wake of print technology, media
production and consumption were less separated. It is only with print capital-
ism, and the fixation of the text or the cultural object to a tangible carrier, and
hence a controllable commodity that a market for texts appear. British-Danish
literary scholar and Shakespeare expert Tom Pettitt (2007) launched the con-
cept of “The Gutenberg Parenthesis” to argue that print technology introduced
the prerequisites for the media market and the separation of textual producers
from consumers (in addition to several other consequences of the printed text,
discussed by historians such as Elizabeth Eisenstein 1979 and Walter Ong 1982).
With the introduction of the printing press, the word became affixed, whereas it
in earlier times had been a floating object that could change, for example in the
performance of a song or a theatre play, or when hand-copied scripts became
altered in the copying process in chirographic culture. The object form thus
paved the way for the commodity form. Pettitt argues that we are now at the
end of this parenthesis, and that texts are again becoming freed from their affix-
ation to a specific carrier.
In a historical perspective, a concept such as user-generated content thus
only makes sense after this market has separated production and consumption
from each other, and hence also separated those who produce texts from those
who consume them. Before this separation, the concept does not make sense.
Furthermore, it continued to be largely unintelligible as long as this separation
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was upheld, and early media studies rather talked of audiences, recipients, lis-
teners, viewers or readers of media content. With the re-evaluation of audience
activity in the 1980s and 1990s, the “user” was born, and “user-generated con-
tent” appeared for the first time. But it is not until the culture and media indus-
tries develop business models for capitalizing on this content production that
the concept takes off in popularity. With the interactive web it became, for the
first time in history, possible for the media and culture industries to capitalize
upon the activity of media users, to integrate their productivity into the industrial-
ized and profit-driven production circuit. Indicative of this was the rise of the con-
cept of user-generated content, which was introduced in the early 1990s, but took
off rapidly with the launch of the interactive possibilities of digital and online plat-
forms in around 2005. As Walter Benjamin (1936/1977) observed, something hap-
pened with cultural objects in the age of mechanical reproduction; we could say
that we have now witnessed another transformation of cultural objects in the age
of digital reproduction and the re-integration of production and consumption.
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Fandom
Historicized Fandom and the Conversation between East
and West Perspectives
Abstract: Digital fandom is traditionally connected to the concept of “participa-
tory culture” (Jenkins 1992) and framed as a novelty developed thanks to the so-
called “Internet turn”. We cannot deny the fact that fandom has changed with
digitalization, but the focus on “digital fandoms” has often led to an overesti-
mation of the novelty of modern fan communities. In this chapter, we study fan-
dom using a historical and comparative approach demonstrating that, if we
historicize fandom, we can easily see how digital fan practices can often be
dated back to a pre-digital era. We will try to understand why scholarship has
been focusing on the “Internet turn,” neglecting other shifts, by looking at the
key issue of fan productivity as one of the most popularized traits of digital fan-
dom. By inserting fandom in a broader transnational context and analyzing dif-
ferent case studies, from the East and West, we will also show that different
kinds of fandom definitions and fan traits might become visible if we focus on
nonwhite fans’ historical participation.
Keywords: digital Fandom, fan productivity, participatory culture, media fan-
dom, transnational fandom
In this chapter, we interrogate the concept of fandom in a historical dimension.
This dimension is often neglected in fan scholarship or reduced to a single his-
torical change: the advent of the Internet. Instead, fandom must be historicized
since digital fan practices can often be dated back to a pre-digital era. We will
try to understand why fan scholarship has been focusing on the “Internet turn,”
neglecting other shifts. In order to do that we look at the key issue of fan produc-
tivity as one of the most popularized fan traits. As we think about the concept of
fandom and the productive interaction of fans with the media before and after
the digital age, we need to take into account different sources and perspectives.
One of the problems with fandom histories is that they tend to be whitewashed
histories of fandoms (Pande 2018) as the discipline has been dominated by white
scholars (De Kosnik and Carrington 2019).
Therefore, we will try to re-historicise the widely accepted definition of fan-
dom so as to both “name” its western origin, in other words its whiteness, and
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to register the presence of different concurring definitions. In a second step, we
will show how the traditional concept of fandom changes if observed by a non-
white, in our case Asian, perspective. In the third paragraph, we point to the
complexity of the material contributions of fans to fandom spaces, when ob-
served in a historical way, and we take into account both a Western and an
Eastern perspective in response to the push to decolonise fan studies in the dig-
ital age in terms of bibliographies and frameworks (Wanzo 2015). The analysis
of different case studies, from the East and West, will detail how specific fan
definitions and practices were used before the digital age while showing that
different kinds of fan traits might become visible if we look at nonwhite fans’
historical participation. Additionally, as already demonstrated (Morimoto 2019), ex-
ploring transcultural/transnational fandoms where the source text is non-Western
and in languages other than English can help destabilise the anglophone focus of
our field.
1 Defining Fandom
The definition of “fandom” has been historically disputed among Western re-
searchers who approached the field with competing agendas. Especially in the
context of the first studies focusing on cinema, music, comics and TV, fandom
is alternatively described based on the intensity of the relationship it has with
its cult object (Jensen 1992; Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998; Le Guern 2002),
as an interpretative and sometimes productive community (Bacon-Smith 1992;
Jenkins 1992; Baym 2000; Hills 2002; Booth 2010) and as a cultural identity
built through a specific type of attachment to a media text (Tulloch and Jenkins
1995; Askwith 2007). Fandom as a concept is also related to the meanings that
in different times and contexts have been attributed to the word “fan”. Accord-
ing to the first wave of fan scholars, the term “fan” is short for “fanatic,” from
the Modern Latin “fanaticus” and originally referred to religious membership
“of or belonging to the temple, a temple servant, a devotee” (Jenkins 1992, 40).
As noted by Le Guern (2002) the interpretation of the word “fan” as short for
“fanatic” led to a connection between fandom and religion, as the usage of “fa-
natic” generally referred to an unwavering, uncritical belief in (usually religious)
dogmas. In turn, the negative connotation of “fanatism” reflected negatively back
on the people labelled with the term “fan” (Fiske 1992). If we look at the represen-
tation of fans in the media, the recurring image is that of irrational, unsocial, ob-
sessive and in some cases even dangerous individuals (Bennet and Booth 2016).
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But, if we look at the realm of sports fandom, we find a concurring defini-
tion since the word “fan” is traced back to the nineteenth-century writings of
Pierce Egan (1823) who used the term “fancy” to refer to the fans of a specific
hobby or sport, especially of boxing. This sports connection is also credited by
William Hazlitt who wrote in the New Monthly Magazine of February 1822 of a
man “whose costume bespoke him one of the fancy, and who had risen from a
three months’ sickbed” to go to see a prize fight (Dickinson 1989). According to
William Henry Nugent (1929), baseball borrowed the term “fancy” and short-
ened it to “fans” and “fan” to refer to enthusiastic followers of this sport and it
was later popularized in US baseball circles in the 1880s.
In any case, there is such detailed documentation of negative characteriza-
tions of fans in popular culture that early Western fan studies set out to debunk
many of the negative stereotypes that had been associated with fan activities
(Gray, Sandvoss, and Harrington 2007).
One of the first scholars to challenge the common presentation of fans as
solitary and obsessive individuals or part of a massified culture was the sociolo-
gist Joli Jensen (1992), whose work acknowledged fandom as a respectable and
traceable social phenomenon occurring in all those situations in which some-
one shows a deep interest in something. But it is by focusing on the more crea-
tive and productive sides of fandom that early fan scholars such as Fiske (1992)
and Bacon-Smith (1992) challenge the negative connotation of fandom while
also connecting fan practices with the concept of “participatory culture” intro-
duced by Henry Jenkins (1992) to explain the culture and logic of fan communi-
ties. During the first wave of fan studies, fandom was also connected to the
concept of resistant consumption (De Certeau 1984) to indicate how fans would
usually appropriate the media text through a series of tactics openly in contrast
with the intentions of the original authors and that fan spaces were inherently
subversive, considering that fans work “against the grain” of hegemonic popu-
lar cultural texts (Coppa 2008). Therefore, the concept of fan productivity be-
came one of the distinguishing traits of fan practices.
This association was reinforced by the transition of fan communities online
(Benecchi 2018) and with studies focusing on digital fandom (Askwith 2007;
Caldwell 2008) that attribute a central role to fans within the contemporary
media universe, highlighting how some sectors of the cultural industry have de-
veloped production policies explicitly aimed at incorporating and taming the
most typical fan practices. In the digital era, the productions of fan communi-
ties are reframed as resources for the mainstream media and culture, both from
a creative and a commercial point of view (Jenkins, Ford, and Green 2013; Ben-
ecchi 2018). The Internet is seen as the leading factor of this reframing and is
connected to an overarching “sense of community” and “positive participatory
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practices” that many fan scholars still find attractive. This attraction could be
one of the reasons the “Internet turn” is widely used by recent fan scholarship.
2 Fandom from a Chinese Perspective: From Fans
to Fensi and Beyond
If we look at the definition and history of fandom from a non-Western/non-white
perspective, in an attempt to decolonize the history of fandom, we open up differ-
ent perspectives both on the origins and the evolution of the phenomenon.
Descriptions of the development of fandom in China take a very different
route from those in the West, starting from the word used to describe fans and
fan communities. The western word “fan”, in its “fanatics” acceptation, can be
directly translated in Chinese as mi “迷”. But, in contrast to the western history
of fandom, this literary translation is never utilized, as it is, to label a person as
a fan intended as someone who is an enthusiast or a devotee or even a fanatic
of something. When it comes to the Chinese language, the word mi “迷” cannot
stand by itself. We need to specify the object of fandom for the word to make
sense: therefore, we cannot use mi “迷” to describe a person, but we can talk
about “dianying mi 电影迷” to describe fans of films (Zheng 2016). It is only re-
cently, and in connection to the migration of fandom online, that a new word
emerged and became more common: “fensi (粉丝)”, a phonetical translation of
the word “fans”. Interestingly enough, Chinese fans seem nowadays unwilling
to be labelled as “fensi” a word that in time “turned from a neuter into a deroga-
tory noun linked to specific acts, such as quarrels, irrational insults toward
others, or forcing other fensi to choose a camp” (Yin and Xie 2018). Another
problematic aspect of this word in connection to Chinese fandoms is that its en-
dogenous origin appears to be a reflection of the foreign sources influencing
the new generation of Chinese fans. Indeed, if we look at the origins of modern
Chinese fan culture, we can see that it developed as a cultural re-appropriation
of foreign media products and within the context of transnational fluxes ob-
served in the realm of popular music (Zhang and Negus 2020), but also in
anime (Mōri 2011), manga and TV dramas (Fung 2009; Chen 2018). It must be
noted although this foreign, and especially Japanese, heritage is often neglected
by Chinese fans, especially when retracing the origins of Chinese fandom: in
their reconstructions and oral histories, Chinese fans build a lineage that con-
nects Chinese fandoms and canonical high art literature (Zheng 2013).
While we have precise dates and origin stories, even if contrasting versions,
when it comes to the Western and Anglophone history of fandom, if we look at
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the history of China, it is difficult to get an accurate answer about the origins of
fandom. We might get a glimpse of early fan culture from the legendary stories
dating back to the Western Jin Dynasty (AC 265–316) more than 1700 years
ago – with stories similar to the fanatical behaviour of fans depicted in some
historical books of that period (Li 2017, 36). In contemporary China, as a prod-
uct of the development of modern industry and market economy, popular cul-
ture is essentially a civic culture (Zou 1998, 55–60). Therefore, after the reform
and opening up (since 1979), the era of mass culture in Chinese society was
gradually established (Hu 2020, 112). At the same time, the rapid development
of the electronic media, represented by television and radio, has not only laid
the technical foundation for the mass production and widespread dissemina-
tion of cultural products; but also the characteristics of the electronic media,
with visual images as the main symbols of communication, have lowered the
threshold of cultural reception so that the content of their dissemination can
reach a wider range of people (ibid.). The development of fans in China in the
modern sense could be said to have witnessed the migration and integration of
East Asian popular culture. Chinese scholars (e.g., Yang 2009; Xu 2012; Hu
2020) have roughly divided the development of fan culture into three stages.
The first stage was in the 1980–90s, when the films, TV dramas and pop music
of Hong Kong and Taiwan, which had developed and emerged in mainland
China, were imported in large numbers. Singers and actors from Hong Kong,
represented by the “Four Kings” (Andy Lau, Jacky Cheung, Leon Lai, Aaron
Kwok), became very popular in mainland China, and their fandom first began
to emerge at that time. Since then, “star-chasers” (追星族), before “fans”, were
widely recognized and became known to the public (Hu 2020, 113).
The second phase began with the TV show Super Girl in 2005. The 2005 sea-
son of the televised singing contest Super Girl (超级女声), organized by Hunan
Satellite TV, swept the whole nation with amazing popularity and success. Fans
from all walks of life and age groups not only provided enthusiastic support to
their favourite contestants but also formed their own unique fan cultures. The
Super Girl television show in 2005 inadvertently created a new profit model for
the mainland pop music industry: the idol economy, which applies the rituals
of valorisation, including fan magazines, awards ceremonies, television or radio
programs about idols’ personalities, to achieve the profitability of record compa-
nies (Guilbault 2002, 192). Focusing on the Super Girl champion Li Yuchun in
2005, for example, Ling Yang (2009) argues that the rise of Super Girl fans repre-
sents a more active, autonomous and participatory cultural consumption model
in China. This model of cultural consumption, with pleasurable identification and
fantasy at its core, is based on Internet fan communities and characterized by the
use of new media and fan production, while breaking the traditional production/
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consumption dichotomy and changing the power relationship between producers
and consumers in the media-entertainment industry (Yang 2009, 104–112). As a
phonetic translation of “fans,” “fensi” not only began to become known to the pub-
lic, gradually turning “star-chasers” into a historical word, but also with fans grad-
ually becoming a group that could not be ignored.
During the third stage, starting from 2014, a large number of Chinese K-Pop
stars, typically represented by Luhan, Lay Zhang, and Kris Wu, who returned to
China to develop their careers (Jin 2018, 66), started to emerge and the Internet-
based fan communities began to form. The fan economy has become an impor-
tant part of the mass culture industry. With the rise of Internet entertainment
shows, many idol shows were born, which attracted large numbers of fans and
created huge economic revenues. Fans are active in almost all areas of the crea-
tive industries as an emerging community but we can see how cinema, TV and
music media texts are dominant in the histories of fandom both in the western
and eastern contexts, even though we will show how fan practices are also his-
torically connected to non-media texts.
Particularly through the lenses of history and ethnography, Chinese fan
cultures are revealed to be very different from their Western counterparts. Re-
cent studies (Yin and Fung 2017; Zhang 2016; Zheng 2016) have shown a pivotal
difference between Western fandoms, conceptualized as groups of fans with
similar interests, consumption or production practices around the same fan ob-
jects and Chinese fandoms where the individual (in some cases even elitist) and
affective experience is the most important aspect, especially if we look at pre-
Internet fandoms. In the past, Chinese fans divided themselves by “pits,” or fan
objects: to enter a pit meant building an affective bond with a fan object (Yin
and Xie 2018). As argued by Zheng (2016), even when we move from traditional
to online fan cultures, the intimate relationship between the fan object and the
fan remains a defining trait of fan cultures in China, also influencing the collec-
tive aspects of the fan community. This is not to say that fan communities are
not relevant or that fandom is only an individual phenomenon in China but the
way we look at the existing fan communities, mostly developing after the migra-
tion of fandoms within the online space, must be adapted to the local context.
Recently, a new expression – “fan circles” – entered the realm of fandom in
China and is now used by fans instead of the Western label “fandom.” “Fan cir-
cle” implies the fact that a fan is connecting not only with an object but also
with other fans. More importantly, Chinese fans in such fan circles have formed
subcommunities with hierarchical power structures. Even though popularized
in the digital age, the Chinese concept of “fan pits” and “fan circle” is not a dig-
ital invention: fans have always been organized in circles, as in communities,
both in the East and the West. But, in contrast to the typically imagined active
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fan we can retrace within classical Western fandom literature, Chinese fan circles
are not “a subversive community in the periphery that simply rebels against the
centre but are a constantly negotiating subculture that adopts various evaluation
system and hierarchies from the mainstream culture and the educational institu-
tion” (Zheng 2016, 3). As Yang and Xu (2016) have suggested, under the censorship
regime in mainland China, fans have mostly taken up what James Scott (1985, 241)
has called “the weapons of the weak,” that is, “cautious resistance and calculated
conformity.” Other studies underline that Chinese fans are extremely conscious of
how their online activities are monitored and tracked to produce metrics within the
context of the music industry (Negus 2019; Prey 2016). These “tech-savvy” fans
auto-labelled themselves as data fans (shù jù fěn, 数据粉), meaning that they “rec-
ognize their importance as data and use this to benefit the musicians or idols they
are following, and to enhance their sense of achievement and agency” (Zhang and
Negus 2020, 3).
This is further proof that fandom, whether in a pre-Internet or digital con-
text, cannot be easily generalized and quantified: fan cultures are deeply rooted
in their social and cultural environment, and must therefore be observed as si-
multaneously decentred but interconnected, globalized but localized, mainstream
but subculture.
3 Debunking the Novelty of Digital Fan
Productivity West to East
Fandom is not a modern or Internet-based phenomenon. Early fan practices, at
least the ones that we can document, are not even connected to twentieth-century
media. One of the oldest and best documented Western fandoms is that composed
by railway enthusiasts (Gray 1986). Many different labels, from “railfan” and “rail-
way enthusiast,” to “trainspotter” or “anorak,” were used to describe people who
were fans of rail transport. We have also seen that in Asia, accounts of “fanatical
behaviour” can be seen in some historical books even dating back to the Western
Jin Dynasty, AC 265–316 – legend has it that Pan An (潘安), the most famous beau-
tiful man of the time, was warmly greeted every time he went out by his fanatical
female followers, who expressed their love by throwing fruit into Pan An’s carriage,
so much fruit that it spilt out of the car (Li 2017, 36). Literature was a native realm
for early fan practices in the West as well. Courtney A. Bates (2011) recently studied
a corpus of fan letters addressed to Willa Cather (1873–1947), which are now held
by the University of Nebraska–Lincoln’s Special Collections. During the First World
War, there were even those who advised soldiers to read Jane Austen’s books and
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share stories and interpretations of the characters. This specific fan practice was
documented by the writer Rudyard Kipling in his The Janeites, which tells of the
bonds created between Jane Austin fans with very different roles and uses at the
front (Kipling 1926). In 1901, it was under the pressure from the fans of the detec-
tive Sherlock Holmes that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle resumed the adventures of
Sherlock Holmes with The Hound of Baskerville, after “killing” his most famous
character in the literary adventure The Final Problem in 1893. In correspondence
to Holmes “resurrection,” fans organized well-documented tribute campaigns to
greet the return of their favorite detective and explicitly pointed out that Sherlock
Holmes “is alive and well” as a 1901 sticker distribution and posted campaign
shouts (Benecchi 2018).
The pre-Internet or even pre-electronic media origin of many fan practices is
also demonstrated by insider histories of particular fandoms (Moskowitz 1974; Lel-
lenberg 1990; Heinemann 2000) and some historical accounts of early fan practices
retraced by fandom studies scholars (Nieminski and Lellenberg 1989; Hayward
1997). “Fan productivity” is an example of how, when talking about fandom’s dis-
tinctive traits, we must adopt a perspective that both historicizes and decolonizes
the concept. The case of Boys’ Love (referred to as BL) fandom in Taiwan shows
how fan productivity can activate transcultural fandoms and be connected both to
digital and pre-digital contexts. Fan productivity connected to BL manga in fact
shows the persistence of fan practices connected both to the physical sphere and
to analogue spaces even in a digital era.
BL originated in the 1970s as a genre of Japanese manga which featured
“love, sex and romance between boys and young men,” and later transformed
into different forms of cultural texts (Martin 2012, 365). As the popularity of the
BL genre increased, a fujoshi (rotten girls) community arose along with it: young
and heterosexual women who proactively consume, circulate, reproduce and as-
sociate with the BL culture as can be seen in a wide range of cultural products,
including manga, animation, video games, light novels, and cosplay (Galbraith
2011). Since the 1980s, along with the popularity of Japanese manga and anime,
Japanese BL culture has become popular among young people in East Asia, in-
cluding Taiwan. Similar to the ways that BL culture developed in Japan, in Taiwan,
BL female readers discussed and shared their reading experiences and comments
with friends or in online forums, blogs, comic markets, and tea parties that they
planned themselves. Therefore, in recent years, a funü community (its counterpart
in Japan is fujoshi) has also emerged in Taiwan.
In 1949, martial law was declared in Taiwan to suppress political dissidence
(Huang 2005, 2). The people’s freedom of speech and publication were strictly
limited by the government to the significant detriment of comic publishing.
This censorship lasted for a long time, and consequently, the quality of domestic
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comics decreased, and the number of local cartoonists shrank (Chou 2007,
79). Albeit being illegal, publishers smuggling comics from Japan was fre-
quent. 1976 marks the beginning of the “piracy period” (Su 2010, 104) in Tai-
wan, thereafter, publishers pirated Japanese manga by photocopying them to
enter the comic market in Taiwan to fill the gaps (Li 2002, 192; Ye 2010, 7).
Many major Taiwanese manga publishers were founded during the piracy pe-
riod by selling cheaply copied Japanese works. It was during this “piracy pe-
riod” (1976 to early 1990s) that Japanese BL culture was brought into the country,
as were a huge number of Japanese dōjinshi.
BL dōjinshi (fan-made magazines in Japan) refers to parodic and amateur
works by fans of BL that serve to reproduce the original BL artefacts (Galbraith
2011, 212). At that time, the Japanese manga Saint Seiya was the most popular
among manga readers. Because Saint Seiya was still serialized in Japan, it took
the Japanese publishers three to four months to publish one paperback. Each
new paperback was published almost immediately in a pirated edition in Tai-
wan. However, Taiwanese publishers wanted to publish Saint Seiya more fre-
quently to meet the needs of the market so they divided the original paperback
into thinner ones. Then, publishers added to each of the paperbacks about 50
pages of additional content, which mostly originated from fans’ dōjinshi. More
and more Japanese dōjinshi of Saint Seiya were circulated among students in
Taiwanese high schools, and the vast majority of these were of the BL theme
(Miyako 2016, 80). Responding to the popularity of BL dōjinshi, the comic pub-
lishers pushed a lot of BL dōjinshi into the market and after 1988, BL manga and
novels became very popular among young Taiwanese girls who created BL ton-
grenzhi (Chinese translation of dōjinshi) by themselves and set up BL focused
activities.
The importation of BL into Taiwan not only stimulated the creativity of
Taiwanese authors but also inspired many BL fans to reproduce the Japanese
BL culture in Taiwan by organizing BL activities, such as tongrenzhi markets.
Together, the imported Japanese BL dōjinshi and the amateur Taiwanese BL
tongrenzhi constituted the main products of Taiwanese BL tongrenzhi markets
(Zhang 2013, 100). At the same time, many semi-underground publishers also
started to publish Japanese BL dōjinshi. Taiwanese funü, inspired by Japanese
dōjinshi, were discovering a new way to express their passion for a certain work.
A tongrenzhi always contains a snippet of the original work, usually a few pages,
and uses the same story background and characters as the source material so
readers would easily accept and share them. As printing costs gradually dropped
in the 1980s, it became even more convenient for Taiwanese funü to create their
Tongren works (ibid.).
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The early Taiwanese tongren groups were formed in much the same way as
their Japanese counterparts, thus mostly in schools. In the 1990s, many tongren
communities, which created and circulated BL products, were still set up in
high schools and universities (Miyako 2016, 86), while online tongren communi-
ties and BBS were still in their infancy. However, fan desires to communicate
with other funü inspired them to seek creative solutions. By 1992, the Taiwanese
funü community had developed a special “message book” system (Miyako 2016,
84), which helped members make friends and share their experiences. These
message books were placed where funü gathered, such as comic bookstores and
the print shops – wherever female high school students gathered to exchange
their tongren works (Su 2010, 113).
By the mid-1990s, as the BBS Forums became widely known, Taiwanese
Tongrenzhi creators began to make extensive use of forums to discuss BL topics,
post BL novels and pictures, or advertise BL tongrenzhi. The Internet was help-
ful for Taiwanese funü to establish a platform for real-time communication and
circulation, which in turn has promoted the popularity of Taiwanese BL culture.
The practice of funü in Taiwan indicates a cultural link between BL culture and
LGBT support, which becomes an important characteristic of Taiwan’s BL cul-
ture: in the 1990s, Taiwanese culture changed drastically when martial law and
state control of mass media were abolished. As Miyako (2016) mentioned, the
student movement had a strong influence since it awoke an awareness of de-
mocracy and freedom. Inspired by this, Taiwanese students began to fight for
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights. Overall, from an Asian
perspective, the attitudes of BL fans towards masculinity and homosexuality
can be seen as a subculture that provides a space of resistance and advocacy in
opposition to the mainstream culture, independently of whether or not the space
is digital.
Despite all that, much scholarship has neglected the historical dimension
of fandom or has emphasized the importance of a single historical change: the
advent of the Internet. Certainly, we cannot deny the fact that fandom has
changed with digitalisation so much so that fan culture has emerged from an
underground and community-based activity to become a vibrant social platform
operating on the Internet (Yin and Xie 2018). This is particularly true and well
documented when we look at fandom in countries such as China, where the ac-
celeration of the process of globalisation and the emergence of the Internet has
led to a transformation of fan cultures (Iwabuchi 2010; Ito, Okabe and Tsuji
2012; Fung 2013). In this new context, “patterns shifted from individual fan
practices in relatively private lives to the collective fan practices across the so-
cial life of fans” (Yin and Xie 2018, 3326). Nevertheless, the focus on “digital
fandoms” has often led to an overestimation of the novelty of modern fan
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communities as demonstrated in the very first published collection of historical
studies of fan communities and activities (Reagin and Rubenstein 2011). Accord-
ing to recent historical studies, compared to the pre-Internet age, the reading
and (re)writing practices of online fan communities, especially, do not present
a significant break in taste, content or form.
Consequently, without denying the transformation of fandom in specific social
contexts over time, we must be careful not to flatten the history of fan cultures as
the sole by-product of changes in media technologies. Fan culture is never an inde-
pendent entity but is deeply rooted in the contemporary social and cultural envi-
ronment, responding to social issues and cultural debates (Chin and Morimoto
2013; Benecchi 2015; Pande 2018).
As fandom migrated online at the turn of the 2000s, new forms of expression
appeared, with fans simultaneously collaborating with new platforms, such as
social networking sites (Hills 2013; Yin and Xie 2018). Nevertheless, even digitized
forms of fan productions can be traced back to pre-Internet examples of the same
fan practice: an example of this is that of vidding, a grassroots form of audiovi-
sual production, which combines clips from a TV series or movie with the music
of various genres (Coppa 2008). When YouTube was founded in 2005, fans cele-
brated the thirtieth anniversary of this practice in a dedicated convention called
Vividcon, demonstrating that vidding is a form of amateur audiovisual produc-
tion that precedes the digital age with the first fan video of this genre dating back
to 1975, when the web and social media platforms did not yet exist, made by
Kandy Fong, one of the founders of the United Federation of Phoenix, the lon-
gest-running Star Trek fan club: it is a slideshow of restored images presented
with background music at a fan convention but still represents a first model of
amateur audiovisual appropriation and production (Fong 2014).
As demonstrated by the case of BL fandom, we may also find a similar phe-
nomenon in East Asia, where fan productivity has existed among Asian fans
long before the Internet was born. One of the informants (Miyako 2016), inter-
viewed during four months of fieldwork in Taiwan in 2016, recounted how, as a
comic fan in Taiwan, she was able to conduct the cultural production of fans in
the 1980s. Miyako was born in 1974 and grew up in Taipei. During her child-
hood, pirated Japanese comics were very popular among Taiwanese teenagers. In
the meantime, the first generation of local cartoonists like You Sulan (游素兰)
were also receiving more and more attention. When Miyako was in middle
school, she was a fan of You Sulan and learned to paint in You’s manga style. At
that time, manga magazines were popular in Taiwan and manga fans had oppor-
tunities to publish short manga or post their illustrations. Special columns were
even provided by the magazines for manga fans to post a brief self-introduction
and mailing address, in the hope of finding pen pals. In this way, Miyako made
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friends with other manga fangirls. At first, they wrote letters to each other to
share their opinions about certain manga but this discussion sparked their strong
desire to write new stories based on the original manga. Therefore, they began to
draw their own manga inspired by the original material and to send them to
other fans. These manga were the origin of tongrenzhi in Taiwan, which means
fan-made magazines.
Conclusion
This chapter observed fandom as a sociohistorical practice, highlighting the longi-
tudinal transformations of fan practices from a pre-digital to a digital environment,
and also taking into account different cultural and social contexts in order to decol-
onize fandom history. We showed how fandom has evolved and shifted in specific
contexts but also how much modern fan practices resemble traditional ones. This
certainly does not deny the fact that fandom has changed with digitalization so
much so that fan culture has emerged from an underground and community-based
activity to become a vibrant social platform operating on the Internet. This is par-
ticularly true and well documented when we look at fandom in Asia, as we demon-
strated through our analysis. Nevertheless, this focus on “digital fandoms” has
often led to an overestimation of the novelty of modern fan communities. Through
the analysis of case studies from the East and the West, we argued that in the evo-
lution of fandom the significance of digital media has not resided in forming new
fan practices. Rather, digital media have played a role in changing the forms and
scope of some traditional fan practices, making them more visible, and sometimes
more acceptable, to a larger audience. In doing so, digital media also stretched
some of the limits of fandom and made visible some of its hidden and often dis-
carded tensions. In the case of Asian fandom, the deep affective relationship be-
tween fan and fan object has been built relatively consistently, while the means,
but not the practices, of fan participation have been changed by digitization. Asian
fans showed the same transformative productivity before and after the digital age,
as is clearly demonstrated by the case of the dōjinshi/tongrenzhi markets in
Taiwan.
By focusing on the traditional concept of fan productivity, we also demon-
strated that while fandom has become more visible, this does not mean that
fandom has become more productive in the digital age. Indeed, when studying
concrete cases, one immediately realizes that only a small part of fandom is pro-
ductive, as already demonstrated by the study of online communities by Ben
McConnell and Jackie Huba (2006) and the study of social media communities
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by Paul Schneider (2011), both based on producing a Nielsen pyramid (1997), in
turn addressing the issue of active participation by drawing on the Pareto law.
Recent studies of fan communities have also confirmed the issue of applying
the idea of active participation in connection to digital fan communities and the
so-called Internet turn (Benecchi 2018). And yet the aspect of “productivity,”
which in early fan studies was just one of the traits defining fans and not a discrim-
inating feature, has been reinforced and put forward as the main characteristic of
fandom in the digital age. The term “fandom” has itself been mainstreamed, thus
becoming a powerful metaphor for the over present and often overvalued “online
participatory culture.” This inevitably led to a misunderstanding of the compli-
cated cultural and social contexts the word “fandom” connects to and the granu-
larity of fan communities that are constantly shifting not only in accordance with
changes in the media but also due to cultural and social changes.
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Historical Data Integrity and the Layered Materiality
of Digital Objects
Abstract: This chapter investigates how digitality has affected the idea, concept,
and meaning of authenticity of historical sources. A key question in media history
is that of the historical authenticity of mediated representation of the past. Digiti-
zation affects the indexical relationship between past realities and their digital
“appresentation” and therefore asks for a critical understanding of how digital
infrastructures, tools, and technologies affect historical methodology and claims
for a new multi-modal literacy.
Keywords: authenticity, data integrity, source criticism, indexicality, aura
Throughout twentieth-century cultural history, the idea of authenticity emerged when
revolutions in media technology challenged prior modes of perception. The speed of com-
munication (i.e., telephone), the precise mimesis of the world (i.e., photography), the
nearby audibility of distant sounds (i.e., radio), and the dreamlike movement of pictures
(i.e., film) changed reality along with the perspectives implemented by those “new”media.
(Zeller 2012, 75)
This quote resumes a theoretical and intellectual discussion, which material
traces in forms of books and papers easily fill a library. The question of the so-
called indexical relationship between reality and its mediated representations
has been foundational for media theoretical reflections in the twentieth century
(Cowie 2011). The complex relation between a “sign” and “the signified,” be-
tween an iconic or symbolic representation and its meaning in a given semiotic
system and historical context, has produced a highly specialized scholarship in
such different disciplines as philosophy of language, semiotics, film and media
studies, art history, and literary sciences.
The notion of authenticity, originally referring to the Greek semantics of
αὐθέντης (authéntēs) meaning “to author / lead / rule,” has been at the heart
of philological and historical thinking when discussing questions of reliabil-
ity, originality, and credibility of historical sources. But, as Achim Saupe has
shown, next to this “object-related authenticity,” the semantics of the term
also refer to a subjective dimension. The development of the modern concept of
authenticity has been closely linked to the history of the modern subject – stay-
ing true to oneself has turned into a key idea of modern subjectivity (Saupe 2016).
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While the link between “saying” and “being” and the idea of an “authentic self”
has long been the credo of moral conceptions of identity, post-modern theories
have deconstructed the idea of single authorship, and constructivist approaches
in philosophy and sociology of knowledge have questioned the idea of objectivity
and truth and dismantled the “biographical illusion” of the fragmented self.
The aim of this contribution is not to deal with the many philosophical, se-
mantic or even aesthetic reflections on authenticity as a key topos of modernity
(Saupe 2017), neither to offer a historiographical discussion of the changing
meanings and interpretations of the concept over time. Instead, this chapter
aims at taking a slightly different approach to most of the other chapters of the
book by transferring the concept of authenticity to the phenomenon of digital-
ity. More specifically, I want to discuss the impact of digitality on the idea and
practice of historical source or data criticism and to what extent the specific me-
diality of digital representations and their staging of the past influence our his-
torical imagination and/or experience of history. Digitality characterizes itself
through the duality of digital materiality and the digital as symbolic form, and
both dimensions have to be historicized in their own right. In the area of the sym-
bolic, the question of the authenticity of the digital must be located in the tradi-
tion of heuristic and epistemological debates on truth, credibility, and originality
of historical sources or testimonies. On the other hand, questions of material au-
thenticity of digital media, i.e., of their integrity, exactness or permanence, must
be discussed in the context of technical authentication processes and institu-
tional authentication discourses. Both dimensions will be briefly sketched out in
the following in order to then address questions of the significance of the digital
for the historical imagination and experience and the question of “aura” in digital
representations of the past.
If the “aura of the authentic” can be qualified as the “myth of modernity”
(Sabrow 2016, 30), the aura of the virtual could be qualified as the myth of the
digital age. The mass digitalization of historical testimonies and their online
availability on the Internet has brought about a new turn in the longing for
the authentic, the original or the genuine. Even though the term “digitality”
explicitly refers to the intertwining and networking of analogue and digital
technologies and life worlds (Stalder 2016), the equation of the digital with
the “non-material,” the “virtual” and thus “non-real” dominates in general
usage. The omnipresence of the digital – both material (for example in the
form of smartphones or tablets) and symbolic (i.e., as the socially dominant
socio-technical imagination) – reinforces the longing for the supposedly au-
thentic, whether in the field of culture, technology or historical experience.
The transition from the “age of scarcity” to the “age of abundance” (Rosen-
zweig 2003) has led to a renaissance of the analogue, even on a popular cultural
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level – “retromania” and “technostalgia” have become catchwords of this move-
ment (Boym 2002; Reynolds 2011; Sax 2016).
1 Traces without Traceability: The Historian’s
Belief in “Sources”
The longing for an “authentic historical experience” is by no means a contem-
porary phenomenon of our digital and virtual age. As Frank Ankersmit has
shown, this “desire” of being as close to the past as possible has emerged as an
intellectual ambition during Romanticism and ever since inspired philosophical
reasoning about history as an intellectual and scholarly endeavor (Ankersmit
2005). This desire for an authentic historical experience obviously cannot be re-
alized – history as historical writing can only take place in the present – which
only increases the yearning for a transcendental experience. It was only to-
wards the end of the nineteenth century that the university-based “science-
history” gradually came into its own. It rests essentially on three pillars: firstly,
on the ideal of objectivity; secondly, on the authenticity of “documentary sour-
ces”; thirdly, on the professional behavior of academically trained historians
(Barrelmeyer 1997). Even today, these three elements still form the basis of the
epistemological identity of historical scientific research – the highly problem-
atic metaphor of the “source” has lost nothing of the pathos, which has reso-
nated since the time of European humanism with the call of the motto “ad
fontes.”
Indeed, in the words of Achim Landwehr, it is a question here of a true “faith
in sources” (“Quellenglauben” in German): the historical source has been treated
as a relic, which derives its truth from the singularity of the testimony it gives
about a past event (Landwehr 2016). This function as guarantor of the truth and
reality of the “source” remains largely intact, despite the fact that a “source” is
never connected to a causal relationship, but always to a correlation between the
image, the representation and the historical reality. The art of source criticism
lies precisely in the ability to reveal the complex relationship between the past
and its medial representation, i.e. to discover the different levels of the indexical
relationship between past reality and its written, pictorial or sonic documenta-
tion. The historian’s sources – generally subdivided into different genres – are
thus already based on narrative conventions, which are primarily due to the ma-
teriality of the representations (Droysen 1974).
This is due, firstly, to the material (e.g., hieroglyphics carved in stone), se-
condly, to the technical properties of the documentary media (e.g., the wax plate
Authenticity 301
of Edison’s phonograph for early sound recordings, or the influence of collodion
mixture for coating glass plates in early photography) and, thirdly, to the narra-
tive means of expression of various media (the length of a telegram sent in the
Morse code or an epitaph differs markedly from that of a newspaper article or a
television or radio program). The “decoding” of the external (material) and inter-
nal (content and formal) qualities of these “traces” of the past and their interpre-
tation as a representation of a past reality are the tools of any qualified (media)
historian (Ginzburg 2001). To understand and interpret the intrinsic relationship
between the “truth of the art” (the artistic and literary quality of a historical
source) and the “truth of the fact” (the historical evidence) is the very funda-
ment of the hermeneutic tradition of humanities in general and of the method
of historical source criticism in specific (Palmer 1969; Michel 2019).
2 Reality Effects and the Narrative Conventions
of Factual Storytelling in History
The claim to truth in historical narrative is therefore based on strategies of objec-
tification and verisimilitude, which aim to make the narrator as invisible as possi-
ble. Among the most important stylistic elements of this strategy are the footnote
and the proscription of the “I” and the use of a narrative meta-perspective, which
gives the historian the role of a universal and, above all, uninvolved observer.
This narrative “habitus of objectivity” creates what Roland Barthes has called the
“effect of reality” (Barthes 1968). This effect of reality as a result of narrative con-
ventions and a repertoire of scientific styles is, as it were, the literary expression
of methodical objectivism and thus contributes to the linguistic confirmation of
the scientific requirement of the work of historical reconstruction. Even if there
are still some historians today who cling to the positivist ideal of objectivity, a
large part of today’s historical community agrees that it cannot be a question of
seeking historical truth in historical science: “To do social science is not therefore
to find the truth”, as Ivan Jablonka put it, “but to construct reasoning, administer
proof, and formulate statements with a minimum of solidity and explanatory rel-
evance” (Jablonka 2014, 183). “Dire du vrai” – and not “dire la vérité” – history is
about the production of evidence-based arguments, not about telling the truth.
What about the “authenticity” of such historical narratives then? In the pro-
duction of a historical narrative, which Siegfried Kracauer once compared to the
technique of film editing, narrative techniques such as fading, changing of lenses,
rewinding or fast-forwarding allow for a change of perspective and rhythm, and
can help to create “thick descriptions” (or close-ups) or to produce a distanced
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bird’s-eye perspective suitable for macrohistorical reflections (Kracauer 2014). The
technique of “zooming in” on a character, or a particular historical actor, allows
for the individualization, psychologization, and emotionalization of history with a
capital H, and masters virtually all popular and historical television formats and
film productions as a stylistic means. The transmission of history in popular forms
and formats is largely based on the dramatization and emotionalization of the nar-
rative and the sacral revaluation of the period witness as the guarantor of historical
authenticity. Event television of history has emancipated itself in docudramas,
docufictions, and reconstructions of the “veto power of sources” (Jordan 2010)
and plays effectively with the combination of fictional and factual narrative mod-
els. The indexical quality of the moving image, combined with original sounds,
background noises, and the authoritative voice of a narrator, produce a “reality
effect,” whose suggestive power is greater than that of written descriptions (De-
lage 2006). As the British film specialist Elizabeth Cowie convincingly demon-
strated in her book on the documentary film “Recording Reality, Desiring the
Real,” photographic or film recordings paradoxically give rise to two different
and apparently contradictory needs (Cowie 2011). On the one hand, our fascina-
tion with revisiting original recordings can be seen as part of our scientific appro-
priation of the world – the sense of sight being considered since antiquity as the
most objective sense, by the distance it puts, yet providing sensory access to our
immediate environment. On the other hand, there is also a profound joy in look-
ing that is part of our modern visual habits, a fascination with spectacle inherent
in photography and cinema.
Documentary film and photography must therefore be considered as narra-
tive formats, based on specific narrative conventions. Like textual representa-
tions, it is the narrative conventions that justify the right to “non-fictional truth”
(Tagg 1993; Ellis 2011). These conventions influence our perception so strongly
that we have great difficulty in detecting “false” or “fake” audio-visual record-
ings – even if they clearly represent nonsense. Many films or television programs
are the skillful result of a staging that plays with the apparent visual evidence of
audio-visual recordings: the “authentic style” of a live television program is sys-
tematically combined with the narrative conventions of documentary film. Both
play with the viewer and his or her desire for reality. As I want to argue in the
next paragraph, it is the intrinsic paradox of the mediality of all history – the fact
that mediation enables immediacy – that continues to trigger the utopian think-
ing about “mediated immediacy” in the digital realm in very much the same way
it did with any analogue media.
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3 The Layered Materiality of Digital Objects
In fact, what happens when changing the physical nature of a source, e.g.,
when retrodigitising a family photo album with Polaroid pictures of the 1970s,
turning a VHS tape into an mp4 file, translating a Schellack record into a com-
pressed audio file, or scanning a book or handwritten letter and treating it with
an optical character recognition software for making them searchable? In the
field of historical studies, the question of the authenticity of digital sources – be it
retro-digitized archival holdings, 3-D reconstructions of museum objects, spatio-
temporal simulations of complex historical processes based on relational data-
bases or large amounts of digitally born formats such as tweets or e-mails – is
part of the hermeneutic tradition of modern source criticism (Föhr 2019). Even if
clarifying the integrity of a digital source requires new technical skills and meth-
ods, classical questions of source criticism – such as the provenance or the credi-
bility of a source – remain of central importance in the digital age. However, the
enrichment of the historian’s toolbox with digital aids, infrastructures, and tech-
niques requires an “update” of classical source criticism to a digital form of data
criticism that does justice to the dual reference character of digital sources as rep-
resentations of historical events or processes and their mediality as fluid and un-
stable matter (Fickers 2020).
The first thing to abandon when thinking about digital representations as his-
torical sources is the misleading idea of qualifying digitality as freed frommaterial-
ity (Negroponte 1995). From an etymological perspective, the digital does not refer
to the electronic or computer-based processing of information, but to the numeri-
cal representation of information in a finite series of discrete elements – ones and
zeros. The measurement of the quantity of data in defined units – bytes and bits –
dates back to the 1960s, when the American Standard Code for Information Inter-
change (ASCII) became internationally accepted. Data as “objects” and historical
sources thus always have mass and momentum, i.e. their material properties deter-
mine both the costs and the physical possibilities of storage, retrieval and use
(Strasser and Edwards 2017, 331). In order to make the information encoded in the
bits and bytes readable and usable, transcription and migration, i.e. translation or
decoding by computer programs (software) and the transfer of the data to different
storage media (hardware), are required.
When we speak of digital sources or data, we are thus dealing with a “lay-
ered” or “distributed” materiality (Blanchette 2011), which is characterized by
the interweaving of hardware and software environments. Johanna Drucker de-
scribes the principle of “distributed materiality” as follows:
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Distributed materiality focuses on the complex of interdependencies on which any digital
artefact depends for its basic existence. In a distributed approach, any digital “entity” is
dependent on servers, networks, software, hosting environments and the relations among
them [. . .] the distributed concept requires attention to the many layers and relationships
of hardware, software, bandwidth, processing, storage, memory, and other factors. The
distributed approach registers a shift from materiality grounded in a single feature or fac-
tor to an approach based on multiple systems of interrelated activity.
(Drucker 2013, paragraph 21)
4 Is the Concept of the “Original” Obsolete?
The principle of the distributed materiality of digital data poses a fundamental
problem for historical source criticism, as it renders obsolete the idea of the “origi-
nal”, whose symbolic capital is so deeply inscribed in the self-understanding
of historical science (Landwehr 2016). If, in the course of retro-digitization
measures, digitized archival documents are turned into digital copies, an on-
tological transformation of the “source” takes place, transforming the ana-
logue object (e.g. a postcard) into a relational data conglomerate. As soon as
the source is scanned, technical settings (resolution, storage format) as well
as the metadata attached to the digitized material determine which software
can be used to read the data in the future, to what extent it can be retrieved
by search algorithms in OPACs, and how much storage and thus cost is re-
quired for long-term storage. Even during the production of digital sources –
be it retro-digitization or the creation of digital born data sets – multiple cod-
ing processes take place that remain largely invisible to the user. In addition,
the retrieval of digital data sets on the user’s own computer and the recontex-
tualization of digitized data in online environments lead to further manipula-
tion and overwriting of the original data.
According to Matthew Kirschenbaum, from a forensic perspective, every
storage process means digital manipulation:
One can, in a very literal sense, never access the 'same' electronic file twice, since each
and every access constitutes a distinct instance of the file that will be addressed and
stored in a unique location in computer memory. Access is thus duplication, duplication
is preservation, and preservation is creation – and recreation. That is the catechism of the
textual condition, condensed and consolidated in operational terms by the click of a
mouse button or the touch of a key. (Kirschenbaum 2013, paragraph 16)
The same is true for digital documents on the Net: the dynamic and relational
architecture of the WWW is responsible for the fact that when we retrieve ar-
chived Web pages, according to Niels Brügger, we are dealing with “digital
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rebirths” whose information-technological, content-related and representational
integrity is corrupted in multiple ways (Brügger 2018). What is depicted as a “dig-
ital source” on the computer screen or smartphone is thus always the result of a
digital recoding and recontextualization inscribed in the software and hardware
of the user technologies. “When working with digital objects it’s essential to re-
member that what they look like on the screen is a performance,” says Trevor
Owens (Owens 2020, 6), head of the “Digital Content Management” department
at the Library of Congress in Washington D.C.
In order to reconstruct the digital life cycle of a document made available
online, a new terminology and new instruments and skills of digital forensics
are required, which have so far hardly been included in the training of archiv-
ists or media historians (Rogers 2015). According to Matthew Kirschenbaum, the
determination of authenticity in the sense of technical authentication of digital
sources can only be achieved by checking the integrity and consistency of data.
Kirschenbaum differentiates here between “forensic materiality” and “formal
materiality” of digital objects. While “forensic materiality” refers to an official
certification of the “authenticity” of digital objects, as is customary for the long-
term storage of digital documents in state archives on the basis of the OAIS
standard, for example, the term “formal materiality” reflects the fact that file
formats pre-configure later possibilities of using the data (Kirschenbaum 2008,
132–156). If, in the context of “forensic materiality,” classical questions of source
criticism can thus be discussed in terms of authentication strategies, this will
hardly be feasible for the “normal historian” when confronted with the question
of analyzing the “formal materiality” of digital objects (Ries 2019).
This shift in knowledge and competence from the critical historical method to
computer and information science procedures provokes a break in the “control
zones” of archival or historical science institutions and disciplines (Lagoze 2014).
Just as the emergence of historical hermeneutics can be read as a mirror of the sci-
entification of the discipline of history in the nineteenth century, the current de-
bate on authentic storage, reproduction, and use of digital information must be
interpreted as a discourse of professionalization in which archives and historical
research re-explore and renegotiate fundamental criteria and concepts of scholarly
practice. The authenticating authority of archival institutions is just as much a
matter of debate as the critical competence of historians in dealing with digitized
material (Hirtle 2000).
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5 The Aura of the Digital and the Meaning
of History
While the aspect of “object authenticity” in the context of digital source criti-
cism, i.e. the technically induced change in authentication strategies, has been
dealt with so far, I will now turn to the question of to what extent the specific
mediality of digital representations and their staging of the past influence our
historical imagination and/or experience of history. Do digital representations
and narratives of history change our perception and interpretation of the past?
According to Simon Reynolds, we have already
become victims of our ever-increasing capacity to store, organise, instantly access, and
share vast amounts of cultural data [. . .]. Not only has there never before been a society
so obsessed with the cultural artefacts of its immediate past, but there has never before
been a society that is able to access the immediate past so easily and so copiously.
(Reynolds 2011, 21)
But does the digital abundancy and online availability mean that our historical
experiences change? As Wulf Kantsteiner (2018) and Todd Presner (2016) have
shown using the example of Holocaust remembrance, digital media such as
Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram or the virtual staging of contemporary witnesses
in the “Visual History Archive” of the Shoah Foundation can have a direct impact
on the perception and experience of authentic testimonies or places – for example
during a visit to the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp. The “selfie debate”
of 2014 exemplifies the complex overlap between institutionalized commemorative
culture and digital media practices: authentic on-site experience and synchronous
sharing of one’s own “dark tourism” experiences in social media effectively merge
into a new historical experience of digital memory culture. According to Kansteiner
(2018, 119), the successful staging of “the authentic experience” in the digital age
even requires the use of digital media.
If one accepts the sociological observation made by Hartmut Rosa (2005)
that our present is characterized by increased rhythm and a higher speed of
co-construction of our mediated reality, it seems but logical that our experi-
ence and imagination of the past – which is essentially mediated by the
media – are also affected by this development. While the historical culture of
the nineteenth century was characterized by the “sensual appeal” (Sabrow
and Saupe 2016, 14) of historical novels or national museums, that of the
twentieth century by the auratic effect of sound and image recordings, that
of the twenty first century are shaped by historical network visualizations,
“deep mapping” technologies and multi-linear timelines in virtual exhibi-
tions or web-documentaries (Fickers 2017). Interactive interfaces and relational
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databases, filled with thousands or millions of historical data of different genres,
create a new historical sense that, according to Alan Liu, refuses the ideology of
linearity in historical thinking.
We might say that the essential hermeneutic – or what we might today call algorithm – of
Historismus was to interpret all the spatial (and political) barriers that impeded full-on
human sociality as temporal delay. Civilization was the delayed action of sociality unfold-
ing in historical time. [. . .] The temporality of shared culture is thus no longer experi-
enced as unfolding narration but instead as 'real time' media. (Liu 2018, 29–30)
Dynamic visualizations of the complex relationship of historical processes and events
generate a new historical knowledge, which Liu calls “hypergraphical knowledge”: “The
digital age promotes hypergraphical models of knowledge that conform to a world view in
which knowledge is conceived by default to be multiperspectival and multiscalar, distrib-
uted in its foci and relations, and (connecting all the disparate nodes and levels) ulti-
mately networked”. (Liu 2018, 73)
When we as (media) historians approach such digital visualizations, i.e., the
computer-based interpretations of the past, we perform a hermeneutic move-
ment that has always been at the origin of a problem-based approach in history:
we perform the diagnostic paradigm of searching for traces and simultaneously
generate historical meaning by assembling them into a narrative – but now in
the digital space of “retrospective divination” (Ginzburg 2011; Boucheron 2016).
The fact that the “back end” of such performances of digital historiography
often remain hidden or black-boxed is probably what constitutes their contem-
porary aura. As Walter Benjamin stated in his famous article on “The Work of
Art in the Age of Its Technical Reproducibility”: “The trace is the appearance of
a proximity, however distant that which it left behind. The aura is the appear-
ance of a distance, however close that which it evokes may be. In the trace we
get hold of the thing; in the aura it takes possession of us” (Benjamin 1982,
560). The invisibility or concealment of database structures, digital infrastruc-
tures, and software when interacting with computer screens and the interface
of our smartphone therefore ask for a new form of critical reading of digital rep-
resentations of the past. To deal with such “appresentations” (Knorr-Cetina and
Brügger 2002) of knowledge and to be able to deconstruct the apparent “lure of
objectivity” (Rieder and Röhle 2012) or “look of certainty” (Drucker 2013) of fancy
word clouds, network visualizations, analytics dashboards, and heat maps. “If
displays of data are to be truthful and revealing, then the design logic of the dis-
play must reflect the intellectual logic of the analysis [. . .]. Clear and precise see-
ing becomes as one with clear and precise thinking” (Tufte 2001, 53).
The mediation from world to data, data to visualization, and visualization to
the eyes and minds of the “reader” ask for a new literacy of data infrastructures
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and interface criticism that embodies new ways of seeing, knowing, and under-
standing (Gray, Gorlitz, and Bounder 2018). For media historians of the digital
age, new skills – which are part of the broader framework of digital hermeneu-
tics – are key when trying to understand the “codes” and “conventions” of digital
representations of the past and to grasp the complex meanings of “authenticity”
as a key concept of digital media studies and history. Such skills are not only
quintessential for a critical deconstruction of digitally mediated representations
of the past, but equally important for the reconstruction and recontextualization
of the past by means of digital storytelling. A digital literacy which encompasses
a critical understanding of both the “encoding,” “decoding,” and “recoding” of
historical data seems to become ever more important in the age of “fake news”
where the “semiotics of authenticity” are to be studied on the level of tweets
(Shane 2018), comics journalism (Weber and Rall 2017), photoshopped images
(Keller 2010), and audio-visual narratives online (Lees 2016).
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